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Abstract
This thesis investigates the impact of the International Safety Management (ISM) Code on 
the management of occupational health and safety in the global maritime industry. The 
Code -  which introduced regulated self-regulation to the industry in 1998 -  is seen as a 
major instrument to safeguard seafarers from workplace hazards and a mechanism to 
counter the consequence of economic globalisation on the regulation in the maritime 
industry. However, its effectiveness has been widely debated.
A case study approach is used in this study to examine the operation of the Code in two 
shipping organisations involving ethnographic fieldwork onboard ships and at company 
offices using semi-structured interview, observation and documentary analysis as the 
research techniques. The study specifically looked into the factors that influenced the 
perceptions of the managers and seafarers on the operation of three central elements of the 
ISM Code: risk assessment, incident reporting and audit and review.
My findings showed significant differences in the experiences of operation of the Code of 
the managers and seafarers in the organisations studied and revealed that although the two 
organisations implemented the ISM Code in theory there was a considerable gap between 
its purpose and what it achieved in practice. Significantly it indicated that seafarers’ fear of 
job security, low-trust work environment and lack of organisational support were some of 
the main impeding factors for seafarers’ participation in the management of occupational 
health and safety.
Further analysis revealed that the organisational context and the employment relations 
affecting seafarers, as well as their social relations onboard ships and between the 
managers and seafarers in the companies studied were not conducive to a participatory 
style of management of occupational health and safety. The thesis argues that to be 
effective self-regulation of occupational health and safety management -  such as envisaged 
by the ISM Code -  requires a participatory approach. However, the thesis demonstrates that 
the preconditions that have been shown to be necessary to achieve this in land-based 
workplaces are much reduced or absent from the maritime situation which undermines the 
potential for the effective operation of the ISM Code.
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Introduction
The aim of this study is to investigate the practice of the management of occupational 
health and safety (OHS) in the maritime industry. The maritime industry fulfils a critical 
role in the world economy as the primary carrier of international trade and driver of global 
supply chains. It transports over 90% of the world trade in volume and generates 
significant revenue for States. Moreover it employs over 1.2 million seafarers globally and 
contributes significantly to the development of subsidiary businesses and employment 
(IMO, 2008).
The significance of this study derives from a number of research findings suggesting that 
seafaring is ranked among the most hazardous occupations (see for example Roberts and 
Marlow, 2005). Although ships are widely acknowledged as inherently difficult and 
dangerous workplaces, studies, such as by DeSombre (2006), argue that a significant 
proportion of the work related injuries and ill health on ships are due to lack of regulatory 
control and to ineffective management of OHS in the maritime industry.
Regulating the maritime industry is a challenging task. Due to the nature of the business, 
ships very often do not remain embedded in one State and spend most of the time at sea or 
in far-away ports, remote from their managers and regulatory authorities. Conducting day- 
to-day managerial tasks or regulatory surveillance thus poses major challenges as does the 
implementation of uniform regulatory standards across this global industry.
In addition, a large body of academic literature (such as Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000; 
Quinlan and Mayhew, 2000; Johnstone et al., 2005) argues that the difficulty of regulating 
industries in general and of managing OHS in particular is further exacerbated by the 
damaging impacts of economic globalisation. Research specific to the maritime industry 
similarly indicates the adverse effects of globalisation on OHS in the industry. It points to 
the maritime industry as an extreme example of free-market capitalism in which capital and 
labour cross national boundaries with very little restrictions -  which indicates that the 
management of OHS in the maritime industry under these conditions faces major additional 
impediments (Alderton and Winchester, 2002; Lillie, 2006).
1
In the regulatory context, every ship is considered an extension of the territory of the State 
in which it is registered.1 By incorporating a ship into its register the Flag State assumes 
authority to exercise jurisdiction over the ship and also undertakes responsibility for the 
implementation of relevant legislation. In addition it exercises control in administrative, 
technical and social matters on board each ship entered in its register.
Until around the late 1960s, a significant majority of the ship-owners registered their ships 
in their home countries against a fee. The registry of ships was thus largely determined by 
the nationality of the ship-owners. The tradition was also to employ local seafarers, such 
that the ship-owner, his or her ship and the seafarers sailing on it all had the same national 
identity. As much of the maritime business was operated and owned by ship-owners from 
the advanced economies, such as the UK, Japan and Norway, such tradition was embedded 
in these countries. These States, thus, are widely known as the Traditional Maritime 
Nations (TMN) (Alderton and Winchester, 2002).
TMN generally imposed high standards for admitting ships in their registries and 
maintained stringent regulatory practices. However, from the mid 1960s, as a consequence 
of deregulation and increased free-market capitalism, more and more ship-owners chose to 
register their ships in countries that offered lucrative registration fees, minimal conditions 
for admission and comparatively relaxed regulatory standards. These new maritime 
nations, commonly known as the Flags of Convenience (FOC), had little or no genuine link 
with the ship-owners (Ozcayir, 2001). The major FOC comprised of Liberia, Panama, 
Bahamas, Cyprus, Malta, and more recently included nations such as Solomon Island, 
Jamaica, Barbados, and Belize (Lloyds List, 2005a).
The impetus to register ships under FOC was also located in ship-owners’ interest in 
reducing the operational costs of ships. One particular area where ship-owners cut cost was 
by hiring cheaper labour. As the FOC did not impose any restriction on the nationality of 
seafarers, the ship-owners increasingly began to employ low-wage seafarers from new 
labour-supply nations, such as from the East European, East and South East Asian 
countries. This way they consolidated their economic advantage by engaging in increased 
cross-border activity and exploitation of various resources. As a consequence of flagging
1 In the shipping industry it is common to refer the State in which a ship is registered as the Flag State, which 
emanates from the fact that each ship is required to fly the maritime flag o f  that State.
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out and employing labour from different parts of the world, the influence of local trade 
unions was eroded. Their scope of engaging in collective bargaining and representing 
seafarers on labour condition issues was significantly reduced. The declining influence of 
States and trade union organisations thus posed a new threat to what was already a 
challenging task to regulate the OHS in the maritime industry (Selkou and Roe, 2004; 
Lillie, 2004; Alderton and Winchester, 2002).
It is against this background that the ‘International Safety Management (ISM) Code’ was 
introduced into the maritime industry as a regulatory requirement. This piece of globally 
applicable legislation was specifically designed to promote a form of regulated self- 
regulation in the maritime industry worldwide. It made ship managers assume the 
responsibility for ensuring that OHS in their individual organisations was effectively 
managed. The ISM Code provided a broad framework of general provisions on the basis of 
which ship-owners were required to establish written policies and procedures and 
documented safety management systems for implementation in their organisations.
It has been over a decade since the ISM Code was implemented. During this period, 
however, the Code has been the subject of considerable debate. The maritime press and 
practitioners in the industry have regularly exposed significant weaknesses of the Code. 
They have argued that the Code, which was implemented with the intention to find a 
solution to the worsening state of OHS in the maritime industry, has largely been 
ineffective (see for example Lloyds List, 2008a). A major concern has been that many ISM 
Code certified ships continue to operate perilously due to poor management of onboard 
OHS. They have highlighted ineffective implementation of the Code and called into 
question its underlying assumption that self-regulation is an appropriate and effective way 
of managing OHS in the maritime industry.
Although the effectiveness of the ISM Code has been the centre of much discussion in the 
maritime community, there have been very few academic studies conducted in this field. 
One such study (Anderson, 2002) used a questionnaire-based survey technique to solicit 
views, comments and opinions from seafarers and other key industry officials about how 
they perceived the usefulness of the ISM Code and its implementation. The study was 
widely welcomed by the maritime community as a major attempt to throw light on the 
practical aspects of implementation and on compliance issues. However, broadly due to its
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methodological limitations the study failed to expose the underlying concerns affecting the 
implementation of the Code in the maritime industry.
Three years later the apex body of the industry, the International Maritime Organisation 
(IMO), decided to pursue another study to assess the effectiveness of the Code’s 
implementation. For this purpose it formed an independent group of experts from key 
stakeholders in the industry which used a similar questionnaire-based survey technique on 
a global scale. It too failed, however, to reach any firm conclusion with regard to the 
effectiveness of the ISM Code in enhancing safety in the maritime industry or reveal the 
issues that influence the implementation of the Code. Significantly, the group’s report 
suggested, as a major recommendation, that there was a need for in-depth, qualitative 
research into the ISM-related performance of ships and company offices (IMO, 2006).
Against this background, this study seeks to answer the following research question: What 
is the impact o f  the ISM Code on the management o f OHS in the maritime industry? In 
answering the question it focuses on the effectiveness of the implementation of the Code as 
operationalised in practice. My principal aim is to deepen understandings of the nature of 
the management of OHS in the maritime industry and fill in the void of lack of academic 
study conducted in this field. The study primarily seeks to locate the underlying social 
relationships and socioeconomic concerns that influence the implementation of the Code in 
practice. In order to answer the research question effectively, the thesis delves into relevant 
literature, follows a qualitative methodology and presents and discusses extensive findings 
from empirical research before drawing conclusions and making recommendations. The 
layout of the thesis is described in detail below.
The thesis is organised into eight main chapters. Chapters 1 and 2 present the review of the 
literature. Chapter 1 considers the appropriate literature providing an overview of the 
various types of OHS problem encountered by seafarers. Highlighting how seafaring is a 
significantly vulnerable profession, it goes on to discuss how globalisation further 
exacerbates the challenges concerning the management of OHS especially as it 
significantly weakens the regulatory regimes pertaining to the maritime industry. The final 
section of the chapter presents the measures taken by the industry in response to 
globalisation with particular reference to the development and introduction of the ISM 
Code.
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Chapter 2 continues the discussion on self-regulation, making extensive reference to the 
wider literature, which is largely based on studies of shore-based industries. In order to 
highlight the range of issues affecting self-regulation, it critically assesses the roles of the 
three key players in self regulation: employers, employees and regulators. Drawing on 
some key studies, it discusses the main socio-economic factors that play major roles in the 
implementation of self-regulation. The chapter then looks into the more practical elements 
of the implementation of self-regulation, drawing on the literature that identifies and 
discusses the main elements of commonly used safety management systems. Last, it 
presents an overview of the abovementioned studies of Anderson (2002) and IMO (2006) 
on the implementation of the ISM Code.
Chapter 3 explains and justifies the methodology of the study including the selection of the 
two case studies. It presents an outline of the different methods used in the fieldwork -  in 
shore-based ship management units and on board ships (oil tankers). The chapter provides 
a reflexive account of the fieldwork experience and highlights the ethical elements of the 
research.
Chapter 4 introduces the readers to the two case studies. First it provides an overview of 
the tanker sector of the maritime industry. It then discusses the relevant features of the case 
studies including their businesses, company operating procedures, ship managers’ and 
seafarers’ responsibilities, and standards of OHS.
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 present an analysis of the empirical data collected during the fieldwork, 
which used interviewing, documentary analysis and observation techniques. By analysing 
the data, the three chapters identify several factors affecting the practices of the 
implementation of the ISM Code in the two case studies. While Chapter 5 presents the 
practice of risk assessment, Chapter 6 discusses the practice of incident and near-miss 
reporting and Chapter 7 highlights the practices of audit and review of the safety 
management systems in the two case studies. The arguments on all three chapters draw on 
written data on the companies’ policies, procedures and practices of the implementation of 
the ISM Code, and practices on the implementation of the Code from the perspectives of 
both -  the shore-based managers and seafarers.
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Chapter 8 synthesises the main findings that emerged from the three preceding chapters. It 
engages in a discussion that identifies the main sociological underpinnings and brings out 
the underlying socioeconomic factors that influence the implementation of the ISM Code in 
the two case studies. It also examines how some of the specific features of the maritime 
industry further influence the implementation of the Code.
Last, the concluding chapter highlights the main findings of the study before elaborating on 
how certain external factors, such as the roles of the management systems and of 
regulators, also influence practices with regard to the development and implementation of 
the ISM Code. It then presents a set of recommendations to consider and makes suggestion 
for further research.
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Chapter-1: Occupational Health and Safety in the 
Maritime Industry
Introduction
This chapter explores international research findings on seafarers’ Occupational Health and 
Safety (OHS). Among other academic work, it draws on Bloor et al.'s (2000) discussion 
which reviews the extant literature on a wide range of issues affecting the global maritime 
labour. The current knowledge base on seafarers’ occupational health and safety is 
fragmented and fails to portray the global picture of OHS in the maritime industry; 
nonetheless, the available studies categorically reveal high rates of occupational fatalities, 
injuries and ill health in the maritime industry and point to the urgent need for further 
investigation in this area.
The first part of the chapter draws on a body of literature on maritime health and safety 
issues that comes largely from studies conducted in the North West European and 
Scandinavian countries. The second part of this chapter explores how economic 
globalisation posed further challenges in safeguarding OHS of seafarers. It discusses how 
increased mobility of capital and labour across national boundaries and an overall 
deregulation brought in deterioration in seafarers’ working conditions and potentially 
weakened effective management of OHS. In the final section of this chapter I discuss the 
different measures taken by the maritime industry in response to the damaging impact of 
economic globalisation, and illustrate how the maritime industry adopted regulated self- 
regulation for improving the standards of OHS in the industry.
1.1 An overview of seafarers' OHS: skewed focus on maritime 
casualty
In this discussion there is a distinction made between two fundamentally different causes 
for seafarers’ fatalities. One is maritime casualty and the other is occupational fatality. 
Maritime casualty is identified as a major disaster affecting an entire ship. As a 
consequence in most cases, several seafarers -  often most of them onboard the ship -  lose 
their lives. Common causes of such disasters are fire, or collision and foundering owing to 
poor weather or rough seas. Occupational fatality, on the other hand, corresponds closely 
with what is commonly identified in the land-based industries. In this case, an individual
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seafarer or a group of seafarers involved in specific tasks lose their lives as a consequence 
of work-related mishaps, which typically include slips, trips and falls.
International data on OHS of seafarers is consistently and historically grim. A report from 
1873 based on statistical report, for instance, showed that approximately 17 out of 1000 
seafarers employed on British ships lost their lives either due to maritime casualties or 
occupational fatalities. The mortality rate in the maritime industry at that time was over 
five times higher than what was recorded in the British Railways (Scrutton, 1886).
Similarly, data from after the turn of the century (between 1908-09 and 1912-13) showed 
that while British coal-mining and railways accounted for 1.56 and 0.59 fatalities 
respectively for every 1000 persons employed in those industries, the corresponding 
fatality ratio for seafarers on the UK registered ships stood out at 4.05 (Verdier, 1922).
Research carried out at different times in the 20th century continued to point out that in 
comparison to shore-based professions, seafaring remained a high-risk occupation. Data 
from a study undertaken on Swedish seafarers in the period between 1945 and 1954, for 
instance, showed that the fatality rate on board merchant ships was seven times higher than 
that of the general workforce in land-based industries (Otterland, 1960).
More recent studies show a continuation of the same trend. Hansen (1996), for example, 
reported a similarly depressing picture. The author found that the rate of fatalities including 
drowning suffered by Danish seafarers was 11.5 times more than fatalities suffered by the 
male workers in the shore-based industries of the country.
While most of the studies on OHS in the maritime industry are from Britain and Nordic 
countries, there is some evidence that conditions in other parts of the world are even worse. 
Nielsen (1999), for example, demonstrated that between 1986 and 1995 the mortality rate 
for seafarers working on ships registered in Hong Kong was one of the highest in the 
world. Comparing this data with those from other maritime nations, the author showed that 
the mortality rate for seafarers on Hong Kong registered ships was around 2.39 per 1000 
seafarers, which was seven times higher than the corresponding British figure.
8
Finally, a more recent large scale study conducted by Roberts and Marlow (2005) on 
traumatic work-related mortalities in the UK maritime industry once again revealed that 
despite the improvements in ship building technology, and the use of sophisticated 
equipment enhancing safety on board ships, seafaring, compared to a number of other 
professions, continues to remain the most dangerous. This retrospective study, conducted 
on 835 work-related fatalities between 1976 and 2002, showed that the rate of fatalities for 
seafarers was considerably higher than those for the general UK workforce. Between 1976 
and 2002 (see table below) seafarers employed on board British registered ships 
experienced 13 to 28 times more work-related fatalities than the general British workforce.
Year
Seafaring 
population at 
risk
Seafarers’ death 
from accidents at 
work
Rate o f  
death per 
1000 
seafarers
Comparative fatality rate at 
work: British seafarer 
against general British 
workforce
1976-1980 441200 289 0.66 25.5
1981-1985 288000 124 0.43 20.1
1986-1990 135500 75 0.55 28.9
1991-1995 118419 19 0.16 12.8
1996-2002 153308 23 0.15 16.0
1976-2002 1136427 530 0.47 27.8
Table 1: Work-related fatalities in British Merchant shipping, 1976-2002 and its comparison to the genera 
British workforce
Source: Roberts and Marlow (2005).
While limited data on seafarers’ occupational fatalities are still available, information on 
seafarers’ non-fatal occupational injuries, however, is harder to find. Besides the acute 
paucity of research, the data available from national sources in most cases lack 
accompanying information, such as causes of injury or circumstances leading to injury. 
Moreover, data collected from individual nations often follow different measurement 
standards which make research on seafarers’ non-fatal injury on an international scale 
challenging.
However, one recent cross-sectional survey conducted by Jensen, et al. (2004; 2005), 
indicates a high rate of non-fatal injuries in this global industry. From a large international 
study using a questionnaire survey of over 6000 seafarers, the authors estimated that 
between nine and 20% of seafarers sustained at least one non-fatal injury at work during
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their past employments. It showed that seafarers most commonly sustained injuries as a 
consequence of workplace slips, trips and falls.
Another study conducted on Danish registered ships pointed out that notwithstanding the 
rate of underreporting of non-fatal injuries, the number of reported cases of seafarers’ 
injuries at work was 1.7 times more than that for workers from shore-based industries. This 
study was based on scrutinising a total of 1993 occupational accident figures extracted 
from the Danish Maritime Authority and insurance data between 1993 and 1997. It also 
showed that seafarers were 1.5 times more likely to suffer accidents resulting in ‘5% or 
more physical disability’ than their shore-based counterparts (Hansen et al., 2002).
Although the available data is far from comprehensive, a careful look at the fatality
thstatistics points to a particular trend in the maritime industry. During the course of the 20 
century the proportion of seafarers’ fatalities resulting from maritime casualties decreased 
considerably, however on board work-related fatalities have continued to remain a major 
concern. The UK figures, for example, showed that at the dawn of the century, seafarers’ 
fatalities due to maritime causalities were roughly between 1.8 and 4.1 times more than 
their work-related fatalities. Whereas, studies from the latter part of the same century 
showed that the number of fatalities from maritime casualties and occupational accidents at 
the global level was roughly the same (see table below). In fact recent studies show that 
ships registered in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
nations, such as the UK, Germany, France, Norway, Denmark and Sweden experience 
more fatalities due to occupational accidents than through maritime casualties (Nielsen, 
1999; Nielsen and Roberts, 1999, and Roberts and Marlow, 2005).
By looking at the reversal of the trend it can be argued that while technological 
advancement in the maritime industry has improved seafarers’ safety over time in terms of 
reducing maritime casualties, work-related fatalities on board ships are still a major 
concern. This argument reinforces the purpose of this thesis which focuses on seafarers’ 
OHS concerns related to seafarers’ work and its management on board.
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Year Country Maritime Disaster 
(MD)
Occupational Fatality 
(OF)
Ratio o f MD 
and OF
1903-1904 UK 121 fatalities 69 fatalities 1.8
1906-1907 UK 233 fatalities 77 fatalities 3.0
1909-1910 UK 286 fatalities 70 fatalities 4.1
1976-2002 UK 176 fatalities 225 fatalities 0.8
1990-1994 World 3.60/10,000 seafarers 3.20/10,000 seafarers 1.1
1990-1994 Germany 0.22/10,000 seafarers 3.60/10,000 seafarers 0.1
1990-1994 France 0.33/10,000 seafarers 1.66/10,000 seafarers 0.2
1990-1994 Norway 4.51/10,000 seafarers 5.69/10,000 seafarers 0.8
1990-1994 Denmark 2.67/10,000 seafarers 4.67/10,000 seafarers 0.6
1990-1994 Sweden 0.00/10,000 seafarers 0.95/10,000 seafarers 0.0
Table 2: Ratio o f maritime disaster and occupational fatality on ships registered in selected countries. Data 
from early and latter part o f  20th century 
(Note: The figures do not include fatalities caused by illnesses)
Sources: Verdier (1922), Nielsen (1999), Nielsen and Roberts (1999) and Roberts and Marlow (2005).
In the maritime industry it is widely acknowledged that there is considerable attention paid 
towards maritime disasters, especially the high profile disasters involving large numbers of 
casualties or maritime oil pollution in coastal areas (see for example Cahill, 1990). As in 
the case with similar high-reliability industries public outcry and media attention have 
contributed to this skewed focus (Petts et al., 2000), leaving work related onboard incidents 
including fatalities, to appear comparatively insignificant. In the maritime industry in 
particular the trend of development of regulation clearly follows such practice. The 
introduction of SOLAS2 and MARPOL3, for example, evolved only in the wake of major 
maritime disasters. Work-related health and safety concerns however continue to fail to 
bring out similar fervour with the industry stakeholders and regulators.
The discussion so far has presented a picture of the poor state of OHS in the maritime 
industry and shown how the industry has largely ignored concerns with work-related 
occupational safety. It also has pointed out the way the literature has been biased towards 
seafarers’ sudden accidental death as very few studies have been conducted on other 
concerns with seafarers’ occupational safety, such as non-fatal injuries.
2 SOLAS: Safety o f  Life at Sea Convention specifies international minimum standards for the construction, 
equipment and operation o f  ships with particular reference to their safety. The first version was adopted in 
1914, in response to the Titanic disaster.
3 MARPOL: The International Convention for the Prevention o f Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) is the main 
international convention covering prevention o f pollution o f the marine environment by ships from 
operational or accidental causes. The origin o f this convention can be traced back to the pollution incident 
caused by the tanker Torrey Canyon which spilled 120,000 tons o f crude oil into the sea.
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Moving on, studies on seafarers’ occupational health offer data that is not only sparse but is 
also confined to very recent research originating almost entirely from the Nordic States. 
Unlike shore-based traditional industries where a significant proportion of the employees 
are employed on full time basis, the employment pattern in the maritime industry is 
distinctly different. The reason for this is twofold. Firstly, a sizeable section of employment 
in the maritime industry resembles precarious employment (see Couper et al., 1999), which 
according to Quinlan (1999) offers low certainty of future employability. Thus employment 
in the industry carries with it occupational health concerns associated with such form of 
employment (discussed in section 2.2.3).
Secondly, in this profession it is hard to distinguish the boundary between life at work and 
life outside work as seafarers live and work in the same environment (Sampson and 
Thomas, 2003a). As a result the literature review for this thesis on seafarers’ occupational 
health looks at both the traditional concerns of seafarers’ occupational exposure due to 
chemicals and noise as well as studies conducted on seafarers’ chronic diseases, such as 
hypertension, and on studies that investigate seafarers’ work-related stress and work-life 
balance.
1.1.1 Traditional occupational health concern
Recent studies have revealed the presence of high levels of carcinogens in seafarers’ 
workplaces. They show that seafarers, in comparison to the general population, have 
increased chances of suffering from high levels of exposure-related cancers. In one study 
Moen et al. (1995) revealed high concentrations of benzene in the working environment on 
board product tankers4. By monitoring air samples during cargo loading and unloading 
operations from the deck of eight tankers in Norwegian ports and analysing questionnaires 
returned by the seafarers exposed to such conditions, the authors found that the seafarers 
were exposed to high levels of carcinogens. They concluded that the seafarers were thus at 
an increased risk of getting various forms of cancers, such as cancers of the lung and 
urogenital.
In another study Brandt et al. (1994) used data of the economically active male Danish 
population for the period between 1970 and 1985 for analysing the mortality pattern in the
4 Product tankers: Oil tankers carrying refined petroleum products, such as Kerosene and Gasoline.
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seafaring professionals. It showed that as a consequence of working with chemicals 
seafarers were significantly more susceptible to cancer than the general workforce. The 
authors found that engine room officers were 1.9 times and engine room ratings5 were 2.5 
times more likely to get cancer of the respiratory system than the general working 
population of that country. The authors concluded that the occupational environment was 
one of the main contributing factors for the raised level of cancer in the profession.
In the same country Kaerlav et al. (2005) studied cancer morbidity among all Danish 
seafarers between 1986 and 1999. The study involved 33,340 men and 11,291 women and 
used standardised incident ratio of the national rate. It showed that male seafarers were 
1.26 times more at risk of getting exposure-related cancers than the national male 
population. While the corresponding figures for the female seafarers was 1.07 times.
In a large scale longitudinal study researchers working with data from over 40,000 Finnish 
seafarers also found that seafarers were at a high risk of suffering from occupational 
cancers (Pukkala and Saami, 1996; Saami et al., 2002). By examining data from a group of 
seafarers over a period of 20 years since their first employment, the researchers estimated 
that male seafarers were 1.8 times more likely to get skin-cancer and 2.9 times more likely 
to get mesothelioma6 than the general national male population. Furthermore, by following 
data over a 10-year period since a group of male seafarers were first employed as deck 
ratings, the researchers found that the particular group of male deck ratings was twice as 
likely to have cancer of the pancreas and 1.6 times more likely to have cancer of the 
prostrate than the overall Finnish male population. Besides these, the study also revealed 
that seafarers on tankers were at significantly high risk of suffering from renal cancer, 
leukaemia, and possibly lymphoma -  all of which were related to excessive exposure to 
chemicals. It also showed that seafarers working in the engine room were at a particularly 
high risk of suffering from mesothelioma due to their exposure to asbestos.
Arguably the most convincing evidence on the dismal state of seafarers’ occupational 
health comes from the research conducted by Andersen et al. (1999). The authors
5 Engine room officer and rating work with the ship’s machineries. They spend a significant amount o f their 
working time in the ship’s engine room, which is a large compartment where the majority o f  ships’ 
machineries are located.
6 Mesothelioma: It is a rare form o f cancer in which malignant (cancerous) cells are found in the 
mesothelium, a protective sac that covers most o f the body's internal organs. Most people who develop it 
have worked on jobs where they inhaled asbestos particles (Source: US National Institute o f Health).
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investigated 20 years’ of data from one million diagnosed cancer cases among the different 
occupational groups across the four Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway, and 
Sweden). The study using standardised incident ratios revealed that seafarers alongside 
workers producing beverages and tobacco were the most vulnerable to a range of cancers 
among all working groups.
1.1.2 Seafarers’ Occupational diseases
Research also indicates that work-related cancer is not the only concern with seafarers’ 
health. It shows that seafarers have high rates of a number of other chronic diseases such as 
ischemic heart disease, hepatitis and diabetes and suffer from high rates of infectious 
diseases such as malaria and HIV-related diseases. Moreover, studies have also indicated 
that seafarers are also susceptible to musculoskeletal problems due to their working 
conditions.
A recent study by Kaerlev et al (2007), for example, found out that on Danish ships acute 
and chronic ischemic heart disease rates increased among seafarers employed for longer 
periods compared to those employed for shorter periods. The authors concluded that 
working conditions aboard ships were a contributing factor for heart disease. They also 
pointed out that besides heart diseases male seafarers in comparison to the working 
population ashore also faced a number of other serious diseases, which mainly included 
diseases of the respiratory system, diabetes and obesity problems. The female seafarers also 
suffered from high occurrences of diseases of the circulatory system and diseases of the 
vein.
In another large scale study involving 7401 male and 926 female Danish seafarers, Hansen 
et al. (2005) compared the state of health of seafarers and the general working population 
by investigating data from hospitalisations. The authors found that the proportion of 
seafarers (both male and female) hospitalised was significantly higher than that of the 
general workforce. While seafarers’ occupational injury was the main cause, 
hospitalisations due to lifestyle-related diseases, such as endocrine and nutritional related 
diseases, including diabetes (278% of General Workforce (GWf)), diseases of the 
respiratory system (115% of GWf) and diseases of the digestive system (112% of GWf), 
were significantly pronounced. The authors also argued that the seafarers’ high
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hospitalisation rates were evident despite the healthy worker effect7 and also despite the 
possibility that a proportion of the seafarers studied may have been hospitalised in foreign 
countries and thus did not form part of the data set.
A number of studies also point to a high occurrence of serious infectious diseases among 
seafarers. Researchers have highlighted that a combination of factors such as the 
international nature of the profession, long periods away from family, along with the lack 
of appropriate medical guidance contribute to a high burden of infectious diseases such as 
Hepatitis (Wickramatillake, 1998; Hansen et al., 1996); malaria (Tomaszunas, 1998), and 
sexually transmitted diseases including HIV and AIDS (Vuksanovic and Low, 1991; ILO, 
2005).
A relatively small number of studies have also inquired into the impacts of the physical 
layout and the challenging working environment of ships on the musculoskeletal system of 
seafarers. Tomer et al. (1994), for example, carried out an experiment by simulating 
various kinds of motion that are generally experienced at sea. They calculated the impacts 
of the vertical and horizontal motions as well as moments at seven major joint systems of 
the human body. It showed that the motions of the ships produce significant stress on the 
lower back of the human body even when a person is merely standing erect. Moreover, the 
musculoskeletal stress gets further exacerbated when a person either holds or lifts a load 
under such moving work environment. The authors highlighted that lifting or carrying 
heavy workloads at sea thus poses significant risk to musculoskeletal system of seafarers.
In another study Pearce et al. (1996) also highlighted that seafarers suffer heavily from 
degenerative changes to the knees. The authors, drawing on a sample of 1250 patients who 
were referred to the Dreadnought Unit, St Thomas' Hospital in London during the period 
1989-1990, found that around 24% of the patients were either active or retired seafarers. 
Their main problems were joint line tenderness and ‘varus angulation’ (commonly known 
as bow-leg) at the knee joint. By drawing on various other studies (Kellgren and Lawrence, 
1952; Anderson, 1984; Partridge and Duthie, 1968) Pearce et al pointed out that such 
medical conditions were also suffered by physically demanding professionals such as coal 
miners and dock workers and argued that physical layout and working conditions of ships 
provided similarly hostile environment. They highlighted that the predominantly vertically
7 Healthy Worker Effect: Health checks conducted as part o f pre-employment requirement in which 
employers are required to demonstrate a minimum standard o f health.
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arranged work place on ships in which seafarers and especially the engineers are required 
to climb several hundred steps per day and are required regularly lift weights in confined 
spaces, which may involve kneeling or twisting in a crouched position were some of the 
main reasons why seafarers suffered heavily from knee related problems.
Similarly, another UK based study on seafarers’ OHS and socioeconomic conditions 
highlighted that a noticeable proportion of seafarers was compelled to take early retirement 
due to health conditions. The study showed that in 2005, for example, out of the 
approximately 29,050 UK registered seafarers below the age of sixty-two, 175 failed to 
pass the compulsory annual medical test conducted by Maritime Coastguard Agency 
approved doctors. While the main cause (24%) from all the cases in that particular year was 
due to ailments related to the cardio-vascular system, the second most prevalent cause was 
musculoskeletal disorders which prevented 23% of the seafarers to return to work.
1.1.3 Occupational diseases due to lifestyle and work-life balance
Finally, a group of recent studies point out how seafarers suffer from health-related
concerns as a consequence of their lifestyle and work-life balance. Researchers, such as 
Parker et al. (1997) and Thomas (2003) showed that long working hours, isolated and 
monotonous lifestyle on ships, and long-term separation from home and family are the 
greatest source of stress in the lives of seafarers.
Also, related to this topic, Hemmingsson et al. (1997) pointed out that the working 
conditions in the seafaring profession contribute to seafarers’ drinking habits and 
significantly increase their chances of psychiatric disorders. With regard to mental health 
problems, a number of researchers have also identified seafarers with a high rate of 
suicides.
Jaremin et al. (1996), for example, revealed that Polish seafarers were three times more 
likely to commit suicide than the shore-based working population in Poland and in general 
were more likely to suffer from mental and emotional disorders.
Also, Roberts and Marlow (2005) in their study of fatalities in British merchant ships 
argued that about half of the ‘open-verdicts’ on missing seafarers, i.e. unsolved cases, were 
likely to be cases of suicides, which, if true, amounted to 14% of all seafaring work-related
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fatalities. This, the authors highlighted, was much higher than various other working 
groups, such as the general US workforce where studies show (see Conroy, 1989) that only 
3% die from work-related suicides.
One of the large scale studies on occupational health of seafarers was conducted by Parker 
et al. (1997). The authors took part in a project named: FASTOH (fatigue stress and 
occupational health of seafarers), which was a large scale Australian study with responses 
from nearly 1800 seafarers sailing on Australian coasts. In this study the authors focussed 
on seafarers’ health and lifestyle concerns and their work-related stress factors. The study 
pointed out that seafarers experience a higher level of stress than normative groups on all 
measures of sources of work pressure. In particular, the researchers indicated that 
environmental hardship, such as heat, high humidity and noise levels played negative 
impacts on the seafarers’ health. Similarly, poor quality of sleep was identified as another 
major source of health concern, as, in the study, approximately half the seafarers reported 
sleeping for six hours or less a day. Long working hours and short duration of sleep which 
was further disturbed by noise and vibration from various engines and machinery as well as 
excessive rolling of the ship during bad weather were yet other major reasons for seafarers’ 
sleep deprivation. The researchers also identified that fast port turnaround of ships made 
the seafarers tasks even more demanding, leading to a condition of progressive chronic 
fatigue.
Pointing to the importance of medical facilities, authors, such as Scott et al. (1997), Hansen 
and Pedersen (2001) and Jaremin et al. (1996) have highlighted how the lack of medical 
attention at hand makes seafarers extremely vulnerable. These researchers point out how 
seafarers do not have easy access to qualified medical assistance or medical facilities to 
recover from injury or ill health at sea which becomes a particularly challenging problem 
when seafarers fall ill while remote from land. In such cases, the injured or the sick could 
receive diagnosis from qualified doctors using only long-distance radio-medical advice or 
rely exclusively on the limited medicine stock on board and the basic medical skills of their 
seafaring colleagues (Lateef and Anantharaman, 2002; and Rizzo et al., 1997).
While the review of the literature showed that the standards of shipboard occupational 
safety as well as health are both major concerns it is important to mention here that in the 
maritime industry issues related to occupational health are scarcely addressed. As pointed
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out in the discussion in section 1.1 the industry pays considerable attention to issues in 
connection with maritime disasters, such as ship collision and grounding, while giving 
relatively low importance to work-related incidents on ships. Furthermore the issues on 
seafarers’ work-related illnesses get even more cursory attention and are considered 
peripheral compared to issues affecting maritime safety. As a result the industry 
practitioners and key stakeholders pay a significant focus discussing and debating how to 
make ships safer while largely ignoring issues affecting seafarer’ work-rated illnesses 
(Lloyds List, 2003a). Thus there is a dearth of material on seafarers’ occupation health and 
as a consequence the focus of this empirical study as presented in the subsequent chapters 
is also skewed towards issues related to occupational safety, its regulation and 
management8.
1.2 Impact of economic globalisation on OHS in the maritime 
industry
Having identified a range of concerns with OHS of seafarers this section presents findings 
on how economic globalisation over the last 30 years further exacerbated the already 
precarious OHS conditions in the maritime profession. Authors, such as Lillie (2006) and 
DeSombers (2006) are among those who discussed how the influence of economic 
globalisation on OHS was particularly severe in the maritime industry. Due to the high 
mobility of the capital asset, i.e. the ships and the labour, ship-owners have managed to 
achieve significant benefits by relocating their assets to and sourcing labour from different 
parts of the world to attain economic advantage. These issues in terms of how they 
potentially affect seafarers’ OHS are discussed below.
1.2.1 Increase of FOC resulting in decreased OHS surveillance
As pointed out in the introduction, a large section of the ownership of the shipping capital
has mainly been from the OECD countries, such as the UK, Japan and Germany. As of the 
beginning of 2009, 64% (measured in terms of Dead Weight (DWT))9 of the global cargo 
carrying capacity was owned by ship-owners in the OECD nations (see diagram below).
8 For the purpose o f this study, however, the term occupational health and safety (OHS) is used in the rest of 
the thesis.
9 Dead Weight Tonnage: The measurement used for determining the cargo carrying capacity o f a ship.
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Figure 1: Global ship-ownership distribution of the maritime industry 
Source: ISL (2009).
However, the global ship-registration map paints a very different picture. It shows that a 
vast majority of these ships are registered in foreign countries, typically in FOC, such as 
Panama, Liberia, Marshal Islands and Bahamas. At the beginning of 2009, the percentage 
of ships registered under foreign flags stood at 71% measured in terms of DWT (see 
diagram below).
Global Ship Registry Distribution
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Nations
O thers
36%
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42%
Figure 2: Global distribution of the registry of ship in the maritime industry 
Source: ISL (2009).
The extent of the shift in the registry can also be seen in the table below. It shows the trend 
in the relationship between the country of domicile of the ship-owner and the extent of
O th e rs
29% ,
O p en
reg istry
n atio n s
1%
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foreign registration of the ships of some selected nations. Recent data (UNCTAD, 2006) 
indicates that in the case of ship-owners domiciled in Germany, for example, who own 
nearly 8% (which is a sizeable percentage) of world deadweight tonnage (DWT) over 80% 
of them chose to register their ships in foreign countries.
Country o f ship­
owner’s domicile
Percentage share o f total world ship tonnage 
(DWT)
Percentage o f ships 
under foreign Flag
Greece 18.02 70.95
Japan 14.52 91.07
Germany 7.89 81.66
USA 5.18 78.32
Norway 5.01 69.91
United Kingdom 2.35 57.92
Table 3: Registration under foreign flags by ship-owners from selected countries, 2006 
Source: UNCTAD (2006).
In the literature on maritime regulation and economics it is widely acknowledged that the 
transfer of assets to a FOC provides a twofold benefit for ship-owners. Firstly, it offers a 
competitive cost advantage (registration fees, tonnage tax10 etc) to register ships with these 
countries. Secondly, the regulatory framework of the FOC allows ship-owners to adhere to 
a set of relaxed regulatory requirements. Transferring of ships to FOC thus offers 
considerable cost saving (DeSombre, 2006).
The extent to which ship-owners have taken advantage of these benefits can be seen in the 
chart below. Ships registered in Panama, for example, have risen exponentially from 
approximately 58.3 million DWT (i.e. 9.1% of world tonnage share) in 1984 to 
approximately 270.9 million DWT (i.e. 23.5% of world tonnage share) in 2009. On the 
other hand, the ships registered in Japan, which is an example of TMN, shows a significant 
fall in the registered fleet. It dropped from 59.4 million DWT (i.e. 9.3% of world tonnage 
share) in 1984 -  which was nearly the same tonnage held by Panama at that time -  to 
approximately 14.5 million DWT (i.e. 1.3% of world tonnage share) in 2009 (ISL, 1985; 
1995; 2000; 2005a and 2009).
10 Registration Fees and Tonnage Tax are the main expenses for ship-owners towards registering their ships 
with any State which among other factors depend on the size o f the ship.
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Figure 3: Change in Ship Registry, examples of Japan and Panama, 1984-2009.
Source: ISL (1985; 1995; 2000; 2005a and 2009).
Although the ships under FOC continued to operate under the same set of international 
regulations, such as SOLAS, with this shift there were questions raised on their overall 
administrative competence and regulatory surveillance capacity. It was suggested that the 
well-developed and well-implemented regulatory practice of TMN was barely matched by 
the regulatory standards of FOC which had little or no experience in regulating shipboard 
OHS standards. The growth of FOC thus posed serious questions on the standard of 
implementation of OHS regulations in the maritime industry (Boisson, 1999).
Moreover with the increasing opportunity to register ships under a host of different States, 
ship-owners could choose the suitable register as part of their business strategy and also 
retain their right to hop from one register to another with considerable ease. States that 
showed keenness to acquire more ships from foreign owners often failed to look beyond 
immediate commercial gain from ship registration and tonnage fees. They generally stayed 
clear of imposing regulatory pressures on ship-owners because they were fearful of losing 
ships to other Flags. Due to such competitiveness, the FOC appeared to bring in the 
concept of providing a service of registration which greatly diminished the State’s original 
role of regulating OHS (Alderton et al., 2004: 53).
1.2.2 Changes to seafarers’ crewing structure and its effect on OHS
The other and equally pervasive change that took place in the maritime industry was the
shift in the employment pattern. Alderton and Winchester (2002), for example, pointed out
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how relaxed regulatory requirements of FOC facilitated a significant increase in the 
number of seafarers from new labour-supply nations. It had a significant implication on the 
standard of their training and consequently on the level of OHS in the industry. The 
number of seafarers employed from the TMN, such as UK, Germany, Denmark and France 
reduced considerably, while seafarers from new labour-supply nations, such as, 
Philippines, Indonesia, and India and East European countries increased. For example, in 
1992 the number of seafarers from the UK was barely a quarter of what it used to be in 
1968 despite an increase in the global maritime activities during the same period.
Labour Supply in Global Maritime 
Industry
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Figure 4: Global distribution of source of seafarers, 2005.
Source: BIMCO/ISF (2005).
The increase of Filipino seafarers in the European-owned fleet only completes the picture. 
In 1987 alone the employment of Filipino seafarers increased nearly six folds (Alderton et 
al., 2004). Taking advantage of the globalised environment, the ship-owners thus employed 
cheaper labour from developing countries (see global distribution of seafaring labour figure 
above). This argument is supported by the fact that in 1994, for instance, the wages of 
employing Japanese seafarers was five times more than that of Filipino seafarers, and 
similarly, the wages of employing British seafarers was six times more than that of their 
East European counterparts (Lloyds List, 1994a; 1994b).
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As a result of the influx of seafarers from the newer labour-supply nations the standard of 
OHS in the industry was threatened. It would be unfounded, however, to make a claim that 
seafarers from TMN in general are more professional to the ones from the new labour- 
supply nations until the intricacies attached to the profession are pointed out. Development 
of seafaring skills, often regarded as good seamanship, has been a painstaking task. It 
involves formal training through land-based vocational courses and examinations as well as 
developing skills through practical training. The seafarers were required to understudy their 
seniors while on board for several years. Based on such century old practice, the TMN 
developed a systematic maritime education and training mechanism. Whereas, the new 
labour-supply nations did not enjoy any such advantage and as a result the seafaring skills 
of these seafarers were met with scepticism. More importantly, as one of the main aspects 
of good seamanship is giving due regard to OHS, the standard of OHS on the ships in 
which seafarers were employed from the new labour-supply nations was deemed highly 
questionable (Couper et al., 1999; HMSO, 1994).
Secondly, the lack of regulatory requirements and implementation capacities of the FOC 
gave opportunity to less scrupulous ship-owners to further reduce their running costs by 
downsizing of the numbers of onboard seafarers. Reduction of the number of seafarers is 
not new. Roughly, between 1950 and 1970 the number was reduced by approximately 50% 
for a typical 12,000 DWT cargo ship. This trend continued and between 1970 and 2000 the 
number of seafarers on a similar type and size of ship dropped by approximately another 
60% (Couper et a l , 1999).
However, there was an important difference in the motives behind these two reductions. 
While the drop in number between 1950s and 1970s was largely associated with the 
technological innovation, such as automation and mechanisation of the engine room that 
replaced human workforce. The more recent reduction on the other hand is attributed to the 
ship-owners’ purposeful downsizing through multitasking the seafarers and increasing their 
working hours. This downsizing was primarily a cost-cutting drive (Alderton et al., 2004; 
Beth et al., 1984). It is most apparent in the reduction in numbers, and in many cases in the 
complete removal of trainees, cadets and junior staff who used to hold supporting positions 
and learn through practical exposures from their seniors. In fact during this period many of 
the catering and housekeeping staff, who were considered peripheral to the core seafarers, 
were altogether removed from employment (Bloor et al., 2000; HMSO, 1994).
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This downsizing had a potentially damaging effect on OHS of seafarers as it resulted in 
considerable work intensification. Government marine accident investigation bodies have 
consistently pointed to the dangers to OHS due to reduction of onboard manpower. These 
reports indicate that reduced manpower inevitably leads to longer working hours, 
particularly for watch-keepers, and when coupled with short turnaround of ships, it results 
in seafarers’ fatigue (MAIB, 2004, 2005; AMSA, 2007).
Studies on ‘fatigue’ in the maritime industry also indicate its close association with marine 
accidents and seafarers’ injuries. They show that fatigue not only leads to immediate 
unfavourable conditions, such as impaired performance, but also decreases seafarers’ 
wellbeing and increases their risk of mental health problems (Smith et al., 2006). 
Moreover, such downsizing has also shrunk the opportunity for social interaction on board, 
making seafarers comparatively more isolated from their fellow workers. Ironically, this 
downsizing took place at a time when ships in general got bigger, travelled faster between 
ports and experienced quicker turnaround times in ports -  all of which arguably made a 
considerable negative impact on seafarers’ OHS (Numast, 2006).
Finally, as seafarers from the TMN lost their employment, the practice of permanent 
employment of seafarers also decreased. Compared to the previous setup more and more 
seafarers were being employed from new labour-supply nations on short-term contractual 
employment. In this system seafarers were typically employed for a single tour of duty 
which lasted a maximum of a year. The employers thus had no obligation towards the 
seafarers’ future employability. From the seafarers’ perspective such short-term contractual 
employment potentially made them insecure about their next employment. Consequently 
the relationship between ship-owners and seafarers increasingly became ‘contractual’ 
negatively affecting the general labour conditions of seafarers (Alderton et al., 2004).
Concluding remarks
The above discussion identifies a series of developments in the maritime industry as a 
consequence of economic globalisation that potentially had negative influence on the OHS 
of seafarers. It was initiated primarily by the flagging out of ships from TMN to FOC. For 
the ship-owners, the incentives to register their ships under FOC were the relaxed 
regulatory requirements and an overall financial benefit package. With regard to the
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seafarers in particular, it promoted employment of labour from new labour supply nations 
and negatively affected the labour standards through practices such as downsizing. All 
these indicate that globalisation resulted in an environment that challenged the conditions 
considered important for safeguarding OHS in the maritime industry. For a wider 
appreciation of the problem the literature on State deregulation and reduced OHS 
surveillance will be revisited in the next chapter.
Also, the maritime industry particularly in the 1970s witnessed a major shift in its ship- 
owning and ship-managing structure. Partially as a consequence of deregulation and 
partially due to the changes in the supply and demand situation in the world shipping 
tonnage, there was an increase in new-entrant ship-owners such as financial institutions and 
banks. While traditional ship-owners, who were usually long-established ship-operators 
based in TMN usually operating their ships with their own ship-management team, the new 
type of ship-owners on the other hand did not have the much needed proficiency in ship 
management. It lacked technical and operational skills and also in the expertise in manning 
their ships with suitable seafarers. As a solution to this concern ‘third-party ship- 
management companies’, which are private companies taking on the responsibility of asset 
management and looking after the day-to-day operational needs of the ships, grew in 
popularity (Alderton et al., 2004; ILO, 2001a). However, there were critical views of their 
professional abilities. Though the literature also acknowledged that a section of the third- 
party ship managers were well reputed and highly skilled professionals, in general, they 
were grouped together with the activities of FOC, poorly managed ships and poor standards 
of OHS (Spruyt, 1994; Haralambides, 1998). This arrangement further distanced the 
association between the actual ship-owners and seafarers sailing on their ships.
The following simplified schematic diagram summarises the different adverse impacts of 
economic globalisation on the conditions necessary for effective management of OHS. It 
also points to the regulatory measures taken by the maritime industry in response -  which 
will be the theme discussed in the following section.
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Development o f  three regulations as measures against OHS concerns:
•  Port State Control (PSC) primarily for OHS inspection and control in foreign ports
•  Standard o f  Training & Certification (STCW) for standardising maritime training
•  International Safety Management (ISM) Code for management o f  OHS
Figure 5: Simplified schematic representation o f the effects o f globalisation in the maritime industry and the 
industry’s subsequent response
1.3 Measures taken by industry in response
While these developments were being seen as serious challenges to safeguarding OHS in 
the maritime industry a number of high profile maritime disasters with heavy losses of life 
and extensive environmental pollution also took place. Many of these (as shown in the 
table below) which occurred close to the shores of TMN mostly involving ships registered 
with FOC drew considerable attention from the industry regulators and the public alike.
Ship Name Registry Year Location
1. Foundering
Herald o f Free Enterprise UK 1987 English Channel
Scandinavian Star Bahamas 1990 Scandinavian waters
Estonia Cyprus 1994 Baltic Sea
2 6
2. Oil Pollution
Torrey Canyon Liberia 1967 UK
Amoco Cadiz Liberia 1978 France
Exxon Valdez USA 1989 Alaska
Braer Liberia 1993 UK
Sea Empress Liberia 1996 UK
Table 4: Detail o f selected ship-disasters since late 1960s 
Sources: ITOPF (2008) and IMO (2008).
Investigative reports of most of these maritime disasters indicated concerns similar to those 
discussed in the previous section. For example, in the case of the Herald o f Free 
Enterprise, poor support from shore management was identified as one of the prime causes 
(HMSO, 1987), while the analysis of the Exxon Valdez indicated crew fatigue (NTSB, 
1990) and in the case of the Braer, the report indicated a need for improvement in 
seafarers’ training standards (MAIB, 1993). All these high profile incidents acted as 
conclusive evidence of the consequences of the shift in the maritime industry and prompted 
regulators to expedite addressing the industry’s OHS and pollution concerns. In the 
following section the discussion looks into the ways the industry attempted to address it by 
bringing in a set of new regulations.
1.3.1 Industry’s response to the concerns with seafarers’ OHS
Regulations in the maritime industry are developed at the global level and involve
individual States and industry stakeholders together engaging in multilateral deliberations 
in a worldwide forum at the International Maritime Organisation (IMO). Its aim is to adopt 
internationally agreed regulations for subsequent implementation and enforcement under 
national legislation. The States and different stakeholders submit proposals for global 
regulation and then seek to reach consensus by debating these proposals among 
themselves, all the while aware of their respective, often differing, vested interests. Once a 
regulatory consensus is reached, the responsibility for implementing and enforcing the 
agreed global rules and standards is transferred to the individual States (Boisson, 1999; Li 
and Wonham, 2001).
One piece of regulation that the industry came up with as a measure to rescue the industry 
from failing OHS standards was the Port State Control (PSC) inspection and control 
mechanism. In 1982 it was introduced to the industry primarily to bring a solution to the 
limited surveillance capacities of the FOC. Through this regulation the PSC administrators
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of maritime nations, such as the United States Coast Guard in the USA, acquired the rights 
to inspect ships which were registered with other States when such ships visited their ports. 
For example, the national administration of State A was allowed to inspect ships registered 
with States B, C or D whenever they called its ports. Based on the result of the inspection, 
the PSC of State A also held the statutory right to detain ships (if need be) till their defects 
were rectified.
The PSC produces statistical data on operational deficiencies. Although the inspection does 
not specifically enumerate OHS checks, it carries out general inspection on operational and 
safety practices. The PSC inspections thus generate data showing the number of 
deficiencies and whether these are serious enough to warrant the ship’s detention on 
grounds that allowing the ship to sail would endanger safety and could result in an 
accident. The results of the inspection are made available on the public websites. The 
industry, for regulatory compliance as well as commercial purposes, considers PSC- 
generated data as a valuable indicator for measuring the OHS performance of individual 
ships as well as their owner and/or manager (Ozcayir, 2001).
The industry also responded to the ‘inconsistencies’ in the seafarers’ maritime education 
and training standards by introducing a convention named: the International Convention on 
Standards of Training, Certification and Watch-keeping for Seafarers (STCW). It set the 
minimum level of seafarers’ training standards irrespective of the country of origin of the 
seafarers or the location of the training establishment. The regulation specifically aimed at 
developing maritime training standards in the new labour-supply nations. It came into force 
in 1984 and was amended in 1997 which among other changes included the ‘rest period’ 
requirements for watch-keeping personnel as a measure against fatigue. It also authorised 
the PSC inspectors to check the compliance of STCW requirements of ships (IMO, 2008; 
USCG, 2007).
During the same time, based around the concept of ‘human factor’, the interest on ways to 
improve the effectiveness of ship management practice was also gaining strength. 
Increasingly, maritime accident investigation reports and discussions at the IMO began to 
debate on the quality of the management of ships as a measure to improve OHS in the 
industry. These discussions hinted at introducing a new international regulation standard 
for a shift towards more systematic OHS management. Such development was also in line
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with the land-based industries in the industrially developed nations where around the same 
time changes to land-based regulations were prompting a more process based approach to 
OHS management (Frick and Wren, 2000).
1.3.2 Development towards self-regulation
The debate on improving OHS management leading to self-regulating OHS in the maritime 
sector could be traced back to the early 1980s. In November 1981, the ICS11, OCIMF12 and
13INTERTANKO , all located in London, carried out investigations on a number of 
incidents on tankers involving fire and explosion and produced a report termed ‘Tanker 
Casualty Investigation’ (IMCO, 1982). The report pointed out that the incidents resulted 
due to lack of proficiency of the ship-managers who failed to advise the ships’ captain on 
the necessary safety precautions. The report further pointed out that although the 
appropriate regulations in the organisations were in place they were not being implemented 
properly. It recommended a move towards greater self-regulation as it urged ship managers 
to play a greater role in making their ships safer -  which was similar to what was 
mentioned in some parts of the UK Robens report published a decade earlier (HMSO, 
1972: 8-10).
In the following year, the ICS and ISF14 jointly produced a voluntary guideline: Code of 
Good Management Practice in Safe Ship Operation, to further promote the importance of 
management of OHS. This Code aimed at addressing good management practices on all
11 ICS (International Chamber o f  Shipping): ICS membership comprises national ship-owners' associations 
representing over half o f  the world's merchant fleet from different trades in the industry including ship­
owners and third party ship managers. It is heavily involved in areas such as technical, legal and operational 
matters affecting merchant ships and has consultative status with various intergovernmental bodies including 
the IMO.
12 OCIMF (Oil Company International Maritime Forum) was formed at a meeting in London on 8th April 
1970 and was initially the oil industry's response to increasing public awareness o f marine pollution 
particularly by oil, after the "Torrey Canyon" incident. Current membership o f OCIMF comprises o f 61 
companies worldwide.
13 INTERTANKO (International Association o f Independent Tanker Owners) has been the voice of the 
independent tanker owners since 1970. It provides a forum where the tanker industry meets, as well as being 
a valuable source o f information, opinions and guidance for its members and associate members. Presently, it 
has over 75% o f independent fleet over 10,000 DWT as its member.
14 ISF (International Shipping Federation) is an employers' organisation dedicated to maritime manpower 
issues, providing advice and guidance to members. It represents the employers' voice on industrial relations 
issues, proactively explaining and justifying employers' activities to the media in areas such as international 
wage rates, training developments or recruitment trends. ISF has consultative status with the ILO and the 
IMO.
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types of ships in the maritime industry and is arguably the first voluntary guideline on OHS 
management in the global maritime industry. It highlighted that as a result of decreasing 
OHS surveillance capacity of the States, especially FOC, the burden of safeguarding 
seafarers’ OHS was being passed on to the ship’s captain. The main objective of this Code 
was thus to point out that the ship’s captain was not capable of carrying out this 
responsibility unless they received active involvement of the managers. It pointed out that 
while a ship’s captain is clearly responsible for the direct operation of the ship, the overall 
responsibility (for OHS) should lie with the managers of the company (IMO, 1982).
The ICS/ISF Code undoubtedly bore similarities with the International Safety Management 
(ISM) Code, which became a mandatory piece of regulation in the industry nearly 16 years 
later. Similarities between the two Codes can be found in various places, such as in 
identifying a person at the shore-based management responsible for the safe operation and 
environmental protection15, in making procedures for emergency preparedness and 
conducting drills, and in the shore management identifying additional training needs for 
seafarers (IMO, 1982; 2002a).
The focus on OHS management was also initiated from some of the governmental 
agencies. In 1986, the UK Department of Transport, for instance, brought out a Merchant 
Shipping Guidance Notice M.1188 named: Good Ship Management, for ships under the 
UK registry. It pointed out that good management practice from both ship and shore side 
could improve OHS. It also advised the company managers to ensure that they maintained 
a close co-operation with their ships and have an effective ‘two-way’ communication 
(HMSO, 1987).
From the accounts of these developments it shows that the industry gradually moved to a 
process based and self-regulatory approach requiring the managements to play the leading 
role in managing OHS in their own organisations.
While these developments were taking place, in March 1987 a UK registered passenger 
ferry the Herald o f Free Enterprise capsized in the English Channel with the loss of 188 
lives. The UK investigation report located serious lapses on the part of the shore-based
15 The ISM Code identified the ‘responsible person’ as the Designated Person Ashore (DPA). He/she is 
regarded as the direct link between the ship and the highest level o f the company management. The 
responsibilities o f the DPA include monitoring the safety and pollution prevention aspects o f the operation of 
each ship and ensuring that adequate resources and shore based support are applied as required.
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managers of the organisation. It was a damning report which stated that the ‘Board of 
Directors did not appreciate their responsibility for the safe management of their ships’ and 
highlighted repeated failures on their part in providing adequate support to the captains for 
safe operation of the fleet. Besides technical advices, the report indicated a serious need for 
a committed approach from the management for safeguarding safety at sea. It is widely 
acknowledged in the industry that this incident influenced a move from voluntary 
compliance with OHS management standards of self-regulation to a mandatory form 
(HMSO, 1987: 14).
Following the loss of Herald o f Free Enterprise, the delegates at the IMO continued to 
debate till the final version of the ISM Code was reached. The delegates actively involved 
in the deliberation, however, came from a selected set of countries. Out of the 19 delegates, 
with the exception of Liberia, all came from the OECD group of countries. A great 
majority of them actually came from the North West Europe and Scandinavia alone. 
Besides, this group also included representatives from the ICS, ISF and INTERTANKO, 
all of whom were based in the UK (IMO, 1988g). Notably the countries which had large 
tonnage under their flags, such as Panama or Bahamas, or the major labour-supply nations, 
such as Philippines and nations from East Europe were not engaged in actively debating 
their perspectives in developing the ISM Code.
For between three to four years since the Herald o f Free Enterprise incident the 
chronology of intense debate at the IMO involved international lobbying and arguments 
and counter-arguments between and among these nations (IMO, 1987, 1988a-f, 1989a-b). 
In February 1988, to facilitate the debate, the IMO got the first draft version of the Code 
which was prepared by a private consultant company located in London (IMO, 1988b).
The first and subsequent draft versions not only included most of the elements from the 
voluntary guidelines prepared by ICS/ISF and the UK Merchant Shipping Guidance notes 
M.1188, but also certain elements which closely resembled features of Quality 
Management Systems. These incorporated features, such as, the need for companies to 
conduct safety audits and review the company’s operating procedures (IMO, 1988b; 
1988g). The archived reports at the IMO library did not document as to what influenced the 
private consultant company or the delegates to include the elements of quality management
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systems in the ISM Code, but increasing popularity of quality management systems in 
businesses in general may have been the reason for their inclusion (see section 2.3).
1.3.3 Introduction of the ISM Code
After years of debate at the IMO, the final version of the ISM Code was introduced in two 
phases between 1998 and 2002. It was applicable to all ship-owners operating all sizes of 
passenger ships and cargo ships of 500GRT and above. In its preamble the Code 
highlighted that the purpose behind its development was to make managers better respond 
to the need of those on board ships (IMO, 2002a: 5).
The Code by itself did not add any new technical or operational features but required the 
shipping companies in the maritime industry to abide by the existing rules and regulations 
as well as guidelines recommended by various industry stakeholders. It further pointed out 
that the three most important ‘objectives’ of the regulation are to:
1. Provide for safe practices in ship operation and a safe working environment;
2. Establish safeguards against all identified risks; and
3. Continuously improve the safety management skills of all employees.
Derived from the purpose and objectives, the ISM Code provided only a broad 
infrastructure of functional requirements in a 15-page booklet16. The individual ship­
owners were expected to develop their own policies and procedures based on the functional 
requirement to suit their operating style and trading pattern of the ships in their fleets. 
These organisation-specific policies and procedures were commonly known as Safety 
Management System or SMS (IMO, 2002a).
These ‘functional requirements’ of the ISM Code required the ship managers to include the 
following elements in their SMSs:
1. Safety and Environmental Policies;
2. Procedures to ensure safe operation of ships and protection of the environment;
3. Defined level of authority and lines of communication;
4. Procedures for reporting accidents and non-conformities;
5. Procedures to prepare for and respond to emergency situations; and
6. Procedures for internal audit and management reviews.
16 A copy o f the ISM Code is in Appendix-A.
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Besides the managers, the ISM Code also obliged the Flag States to play an important role 
in overseeing the implementation of regulated self-regulation. It required the States to 
inspect and certify each shore-based ship-management unit and each ship belonging to the 
unit before the two, as a team, could start trading. As per the regulation, the State was 
required to check whether:
• The company’s SMS conformed to the functional requirements, and
• The three main objectives of the ISM Code were being met.
The certificate issued to the shore-based management units was known as the Document o f 
Compliance while the certificate issued to each ship was known as the Safety Management 
Certificate. The States could issue them for a maximum of five years and were required to 
conduct intermediate inspections through what is widely known in the industry as external 
audits17 (IMO, 2002a).
Thus, the introduction of the ISM Code was a significant shift from the previous command 
and control model of regulatory approach which was followed in the maritime industry. 
Although the Flag States continued to remain legally responsible for OHS of seafarers on 
their ships, through the introduction of the Code it increased the focus on organisations to 
manage OHS (and prevent pollution from ships). The managers were now required to 
develop their own SMSs based on the requirements of the ISM Code and manage OHS in 
their own organisations.
Summary
This chapter provided an account of the OHS concerns of the global maritime industry. 
Although research in this sector is scanty, the description showed that OHS in the maritime 
industry is a matter of significant concern. The available literature consistently indicated 
that in comparison to shore-based industries, the OHS outcome in the maritime industry is 
considerably worse. The discussion also indicated that the proportion of maritime casualty 
figures (large scale maritime casualties often involving the whole ship) has improved over 
the last one hundred years while occupational fatalities at sea still remained a major 
concern. The review of the literature also portrayed a sombre picture of seafarers’
17 Internal Audit is a term used in the maritime industry as the audit conducted by organisations in their own 
companies, while external audit is regarded as the audit conducted by the Flag States.
33
occupational health. It showed that in comparison to land-based industries, seafarers were 
more vulnerable to suffer from ailment related to their occupations. Seafarers’ health not 
only suffered as a consequence of traditional work-related exposures, it was also prone to 
being affected by life threatening illnesses as well as stress related to their work.
The discussion also illustrated how globalisation weakened the industry’s regulatory 
environment. Since the 1970s an increasing number of ship-owners transferred the registry 
of their ships to FOC. It resulted in a noticeable vacuum in the implementation and 
surveillance of OHS standards in the maritime industry. Also, as a consequence of the lack 
of regulatory control in the industry, seafarers’ employment standards and their general 
labour conditions deteriorated -  which further contributed to the concerns on OHS in the 
industry. In the final section the discussion pointed out how the maritime industry brought 
in new regulations in response to the challenges thrown at it. In particular it discussed the 
development of the ISM Code.
For a better appreciation of what influences the implementation of the ISM Code in the 
maritime industry, the following chapter visits the wider literature drawn on studies 
conducted in the shore based industries.
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Chapter-2: Management of OHS in the maritime industry 
Introduction: Paradigm shift in safeguarding OHS
The discussion in Chapter-1 showed how the maritime industry gradually moved towards 
regulation of Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) management through the introduction 
of the ISM Code. This development in the maritime industry, however, was not an isolated 
occurrence. Since the 1970s industries in the economically advanced nations generally 
underwent a similar change in the approach to OHS regulation. From earlier ‘command- 
and-control’ method of regulation, the introduction of regulated self-regulation saw 
employers of individual organisations assume a greater burden of responsibility for 
managing OHS (Gunningham and Johnstone, 1999).
The implementation of regulated self-regulation has been critically evaluated in a number 
of studies which discuss how this shift introduced significant changes in the ways workers 
are safeguarded from hazards at workplaces. In the following sections the discussion draws 
on a large body of literature which identifies these changes and points out the main features 
of the development and operation of regulated self-regulation. The review of the literature 
is almost entirely based on studies conducted on shore-based industries because of the 
limited number of studies found in the maritime industry that meet academic rigour. 
Throughout the review, however, the discussion is located in the context of the 
implementation of the International Safety Management (ISM) Code. In order to appreciate 
the practice of the ISM Code, the discussion also draws on anecdotal evidence and 
commentaries from practitioners in the maritime industry and the maritime press.
The first section of this chapter reviews the literature from the perspective of the roles 
played by the three key players in regulated self-regulation. It draws on international 
evidence on how employers, employees and regulators play important roles for its effective 
implementation. In particular it discusses some of the critical literatures that investigate the 
strengths and weaknesses of the roles played by each of the three players.
The second section looks into the literature that brings out the underlying social factors 
affecting the management of OHS. It points out how risk is perceived differently by 
different groups of people and the importance of employees’ participation in risk 
assessment. It also discusses how social relationships, such as trust and communication
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between employers and workers are important elements for the effective management of 
OHS. The final subsection draws on the literature which points out how economic 
globalisation leads to workers’ job insecurity which, for instance, acts as a major hindrance 
to effective communication within an organisation.
The discussion then draws on the literature that shows how the implementation of regulated 
self-regulation introduced various forms of Safety Management Systems (SMSs). It 
discusses the development of SMSs and looks into how SMSs influence the management 
of OHS. Following that, it highlights three central elements of SMSs: risk assessment, 
incident reporting, audit and review and discusses the essential features of these elements 
and presents the available data on their practices in the maritime industry.
The fourth and final section of this chapter reviews two particular studies (Anderson, 
200218; IMO, 2006) which investigated the implementation of the ISM Code. The 
discussion highlights their main findings and critically analyses the methodologies 
followed in the two studies.
2.1 Key players: the employers, employees and regulators
Regulated self-regulation, in general, obliges employers to establish a systematic process to 
manage OHS in their workplaces and requires them to take necessary measures for 
protecting workers’ health and safety. They are in effect required to assume greater 
responsibility in managing workers’ OHS. Besides the role of the employers, it also places 
significant importance on employees’ participation in the management of OHS. Studies 
show effective participation of employees is critical to the effective implementation of self- 
regulatory management arrangements (see for example Dawson et al., 1988). Studies also 
point out that despite the move towards self-regulation within organisations the regulatory 
bodies play a vital role with regard to providing supporting infrastructures for their self­
regulation and also in monitoring its outcome -  which is why scholars have called this 
development ‘regulating self-regulation’ (see for example Rogowski and Wilthagen, 1984).
18 While Anderson (2002) conducted the study for his doctoral dissertation, his findings are reported in this 
thesis from another publication: Anderson et a l ,  2003.
2.1.1 The role of employers
A number of studies on the management of OHS identified that its effectiveness largely 
depended on the role played by the employers. Nytro et al. (1998), for example, studying 
Norwegian industries, revealed that commitment from organisations’ top management was 
the main prerequisite for the effectiveness of regulated self-regulation. The authors pointed 
out that success of self-regulatory approaches depended significantly on the involvement of 
the employers’ and resources made available by them for the purpose of safeguarding 
OHS.
Similarly, LaMontagne et a l (2004) in their study of 15 manufacturing sites in the United 
States looked into determining whether a management-focused intervention resulted in 
greater improvement in OHS programmes compared to minimal intervention controls. The 
authors found that the most significant underlying factor for effective implementation of 
SMSs was dependent on sustained management focused intervention.
Discussing the importance of employers’ commitment, Frick and Wren (2000) in the 
review of the literature on effective implementation of SMSs, pointed to the importance of 
systematically managing OHS. Central to the notion of systematically managing OHS is 
the requirement for employers to ensure that workplace hazards were being identified and 
risk was being effectively assessed. The authors argued that commitment from 
organisations’ senior managers thus holds the key to effective implementation of SMSs.
With regard to employers’ approaches to OHS management, Bohle and Quinlan (2000), for 
example, reviewing the literature on the management of OHS illustrated some of the 
common approaches. These included allocation of funds for effective implementation of 
SMSs, conducting risk assessment and operationalising workplace health and safety 
committee with the view that managers and workers discuss OHS concerns which 
contributes to the OHS decision-making (discussed in more detail later in this chapter). The 
authors also pointed out that rigorous feedback mechanisms on the operation of 
organisations’ SMSs, such as OHS surveys and audits, were also critical for the effective 
management of OHS. In the following subsections the discussion looks into some of the 
critical literatures that identify the main factors affecting employers’ commitment in the 
management of OHS.
37
Employers9 ability and willingness
One of the most widely used references in the debate on effective OHS management is the 
European Union Framework Directive19 (see for example Vogel, 1994; Walters and Jensen, 
2000). In wake of the shift to regulated self-regulation, the European Union Framework 
Directive introduced measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health of 
workers at work places across the European Economic Community (EEC). It provided a set 
of guidelines which were mostly addressed to the employers within the EEC nations to 
ensure effective safeguarding of workers’ OHS. The directive placed general obligation on 
employers to safeguard their employees by avoiding workplace risks or evaluating the risks 
which cannot be avoided and combating them at source (EEC, 1989).
Despite the widely acknowledged role of employers in safeguarding workers’ OHS, studies 
have pointed out that in practice much depends on individual employer’s ability and 
willingness to manage OHS in their organisations. An Australian study on small and 
medium enterprises (SME) conducted by Mayhew (1997), for instance, showed that the 
most consistent concern with the SME employers was their lack of knowledge and 
expertise in managing OHS. Walters’s (2001) work on SME in several European countries 
also reinforced these findings. In both works the authors found out that the poor standards 
of OHS in SME were largely due to the managers’ limited competency, their inexperience 
and lack of training, and not so much due to the consequence of the nature of hazards at 
work.
Gunningham’s (1998a) work on the importance of different regulatory approaches for 
different types of employers identified such groups of employers as ‘the incompetent’. The 
author pointed out that while a significant section of the incompetents were the employers 
of SME, they also operated larger organisations. Such employers in general possessed 
limited understanding of the legislations on OHS, failed to turn to proper OHS advice and 
were primarily focused on economic survival.
The study (Gunningham, 1998a) also identified that besides the lack of ability, a section of 
the employers also lacked ‘willingness’ to manage OHS in their organisations effectively. 
According to the author, these employers consider safeguarding OHS primarily as cost
19 The European Council Directive on self-regulation o f OHS is referred to as 89/391/EEC dated 12 June 
1989.
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factors and ignore the benefit of effective implementation of the management of OHS in 
their organisations. Their focus on short-term economic gain prevents them from 
identifying the connection between investing in safety and success of their businesses. 
Such employers, thus, for example, tend to invest no more than the minimum, provide no 
additional training to their workers and remain driven largely by regulator’s punitive 
measures.
The argument on cost benefit analysis of OHS investment has been highlighted by a 
number of authors. One popular slogan -  safety pays -  used by various entities including 
State agencies, such as Health and Safety Executive in the UK (HSE, 1997), urges 
employers to invest in safety for the purpose of promoting business productivity, profit and 
reputation. It argues that lack of workplace safety may lead to employees’ injury or cause 
damage to property. Such incidents not only reduce the potential for bringing in revenues 
but also increase the cost of running businesses due to for instance increased insurance 
premiums and delays in production.
While it appears as a rigorous justification to promote investment in safeguarding OHS, 
studies show that this argument is not convincing enough for a significant section of the 
employers. Authors such as Nichols and Armstrong (1973), Geis (1973) and Codrington 
and Henley (1981) and more recently Cutler and James (1996), Frick (1997) and Walters 
(2002) have pointed out that the benefits from investing in OHS do not transpire in a short 
period of time. Such investments are typically aimed at investing in the organisations’ 
infrastructure, bringing in resource-intensive technology or providing education and 
training to the workers. The benefits of all such investments therefore are generally reaped 
in the long-term. Thus employers who cannot see beyond short-term profit making find it 
hard to take this route. The authors pointed out that such an approach is also influenced by 
the employer’s reliance on investors and shareholders in the company to whom short-term 
profit-making through the company’s businesses remains one of their main objectives. It, 
as Gunningham (1999: 202, 210) identified as ‘employers’ bounded rationality’, restricts 
them to calculating a crude cost benefit analysis based on immediate outcome. In other 
words, it prevents the employers from appreciating the bigger picture. Authors such as 
Grayson and Goddard (1975) reinforced this argument. They pointed out that it becomes 
even harder to convince the unwilling employers to invest in OHS because while the 
employers themselves bear the cost of investing in safeguarding OHS, the loss, resulting
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from industrial injuries, are generally shared by a number of players, such as the insurance 
companies, the victim’s families and the State.
Commentators in the maritime press have also expressed similar concerns. They have 
indicated that despite the implementation of the ISM Code, one major concern in this 
global industry is the lack of employer’s commitment towards investing in safeguarding 
workers’ OHS. One article, for example, pointed out that besides the leading 20% of the 
ship-owners the remaining 80% largely regarded the ISM Code merely as a license to 
conduct their businesses. These employers failed to look beyond the short-term economic 
gains and thus did not see the purpose of investing in OHS any more than the absolute 
minimum (Lloyds List, 2003b).
Employers’ obligation to provide a safe working environment
A number of studies also critically assessed employers’ role by scrutinising the practice of
risk assessment. The regulations governing the management of OHS, such as, Norway’s 
Internal Control regulation and the European Economic Community Directive 89/391, 
categorically stress the importance of employers in safeguarding the working environment. 
Article-6 of the EU Directive, for example, requires employers to follow the general 
principle of prevention by avoiding risk, evaluating risk and combating risk at source 
before giving collective protective measures to workers and evaluating risk for the health 
and safety of workers (EEC, 1989). This approach to regulating self-regulation is widely 
known as the safe-place approach. Despite the explicit legal requirements of following a 
safe-place approach, studies show a wide variation in the ways employers implement it in 
practice (see for example Karageorgiou et a l ’s (2000) study in four EU States).
A large number of studies have also shown the benefits of following a safe-place approach. 
Gallagher’s (2000) empirical work on 20 Australian companies, for example, revealed that 
employers who focused on providing safe working environments showed better standards 
of OHS. It highlighted how the employers’ approach to risk assessment made a 
considerable difference in the outcome of OHS. Comparing her sample of 20 companies to 
the industry-wide audit outcome (SafeMAP20), the author found that employers who 
prioritised providing safe and healthy working environments experienced above average
20 SafeMAP: Safety Management Achievement Program is an audit tool for independently reviewing OHS in 
industries in Australia.
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OHS performance. In contrast, employers who largely followed a top-down style of 
management prioritising on fixing the employees’ behaviour, i.e. followed a safe-person 
approach, performed comparatively poorly.
The weaknesses of implementing requirements on health and safety management 
predominantly from the safe-person standpoint have been critically assessed by a number 
of authors. Bohle and Quinlan (2000: 506), for example, argued that in organisations in 
which employers remain preoccupied with modifying employees’ behaviour or controlling 
parameters related to the human qualities for improving workplace OHS meet with ‘a dead­
end alley’. They pointed out that in such circumstances the most common approach taken 
by employers is to train their employees, motivate them and generally take a narrow focus 
on improving employees’ rule-following behaviour, and cautioned that employers who 
subscribe to such systems find it difficult to raise their standards of OHS.
Several other studies have also reiterated these findings. They have revealed how 
employers taking this approach place significant emphasis on employees’ behaviour and 
attitude (Fahlbruch and Wilpert, 1999), take disproportionate interest in employees’ 
training and strict supervision (Wokutch and VanSandt, 2000), and focus heavily on 
employees’ medical screening (Bohle and Quinlan, 2000).
Such ‘fix-the-worker’ approach integrates well with the wider notion that highlights how 
the role of human element is an important building block in organisational operations. 
Many studies show that, although, there is a degree of validity on how human input plays a 
pivotal role in safeguarding workplaces, employers who are biased towards making it their 
major focus undermine the significance of regulated self-regulation. Authors, such as 
Denton (1982), Hofmann and Stertzer (1996), Dotson (1996), Krause (1997), Farrington- 
Darby et al (2005) argued that such an approach is considerably myopic as it generally 
overlooks the employers’ primary obligation to provide a safe working environment. 
Arguing more critically, authors, such as Hale and Hale (1970) and, more recently, Nichols 
(1997), pointed out that such an approach takes the attention away from the workplace 
hazards and places the emphasis on identifying the weaknesses in the individual workers. 
As a consequence, it individualises the workforce and simply reinforces the employers’ 
control over their workers.
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Studies have also shown that using a safe-person approach encourages employers to locate 
faults with the individual workers. It helps in benchmarking the ‘accident safe workers’ as 
the desired type. Research by authors, such as Culvenor (1996), pointed out that managers 
with such a frame of mind tend to focus on the last link in the causal chain of incidents -  
which, in most cases, are the workers on the production line or the operators of factory 
machineries. In cases of incident investigations, locating shortcomings of the individuals 
thus becomes the focal point undermining other underlying causes of incidents. Moreover, 
studies have also shown that as employers operate free of injuries and incidents for a great 
majority of the operating period, the employers tend to develop confidence in the success 
of their operating systems. Thus, when an accident does occur, the careless and the 
accident prone workers are generally identified as the cause (Kinnersley, 1973; Mathews, 
1986).
The one particular model that has arguably taken this idea to the extreme is the DuPont 
approach, which almost entirely focuses on employees taking on ‘good safety habits’ and 
believes that workers’ behaviour should be measured and transformed for improving OHS 
(DuPont, 2007). However, such model is widely criticised in a large body of academic 
literature which points to the weaknesses and myopic nature of this approach. Wokutch and 
VanSandt (2000), for example, highlighted how the DuPont approach merely provides the 
managers with additional managerial tools to target only what is visible on the surface -  
ignoring the importance of providing a safe workplace or paying no attention to the 
underlying social and economic factors such as employment practices, downsizing and 
production pressures that affect the day-to-day life of the workers.
In the maritime industry the role of the employers in safeguarding OHS requires a careful 
examination. The ISM Code, which regulates self-regulation in the industry, lays down a 
series of responsibilities for the employers, such as establishing company’s safety policy 
(ISM Code section: 2.1), ensuring that all employees are duly qualified (ISM Code section: 
6.2) and providing measures to deal with in emergency situations (ISM Code section 8.3). 
While the ISM Code identifies these operational responsibilities of the managers 
(employers), it does not mention the employers’ obligation towards conducting risk 
assessment nor does it mention how and who should conduct it. The Code only places the 
obligation on the managers to safeguard seafarers from hazards -  implying that they should 
safeguard seafarers from hazards that have already been identified. Equally the Code,
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especially in section 6, gives considerable attention to the abilities of seafarers to adhere to 
the companies’ procedure. Among other features, the Code mentions the need for seafarers’ 
training, motivation and medical fitness but makes no attempt to highlight how seafarers 
should participate in managing OHS in their workplaces. By studying the ISM Code in the 
light of the above discussion, it may be argued that the focus of the Code is considerably 
skewed towards the ‘safe-person approach’.
Articles from the maritime press also indicate that in practice too ship-managers largely do 
not concentrate on risk-based management and place considerable focus on rectifying 
seafarers’ behaviour. They highlight how ship-managers predominantly tend to victimise 
individual seafarers by blaming them for most mishaps that take place on ships. The ship- 
managers frequently point to seafarers’ negligence as the most common cause. By taking 
examples of the practice of incident reporting mechanism of the operation of SMSs, a 
number of press articles have shown that managers place a disproportionate level of focus 
on blaming individual seafarers which discourages them from reporting incidents to their 
managers (see for example, Lloyds List, 2004a, 2007a).
Employers’ commitment: the importance of audit
Moving on, the importance of the use of audit systems by employers to assess the 
effectiveness of health and safety management systems is also widely acknowledged in the 
literature. The International Labour Organisation (ILO) guidelines on occupational safety 
and health management (ILO, 2001b), for example, urge employers to make use of the 
audit system to assess the effectiveness of the company’s SMSs. It points out that by using 
the audit system effectively, employers should check for the adequacy of the management 
arrangements in relation to the risks encountered in their organisations.
A number of studies have also critically investigated the ways employers used audit 
mechanisms to assess the effectiveness of SMSs. Hopkins’ (2000) case study on the 
explosion at the Esso Oil plant at Longford in Australia -  where two workers lost their lives 
and many more were injured -  serves as an example. The author showed that even though 
the employer had a SMS in place and conducted audits at regular intervals, Esso failed to 
identify any weakness in the system. In fact, an audit conducted a few months prior to the 
accident could not detect the symptoms which subsequently contributed to the cause of the 
explosion. The author pointed out that the audit system used at the Esso plant failed to
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reveal the adequacy and the factors affecting the implementation of the organisation’s risk 
assessment procedures. It merely inquired the presence of organisation’s SMS and the 
functioning of management mechanisms. It conveyed only positive messages to the top 
management of the organisation and failed to communicate its actual effectiveness.
Power (1997) and Parker (2003) in their studies also provided similar arguments. Although 
their research were based on audits conducted by external entities (regulatory bodies or 
quality auditing organisations, such as the DNV21) they identified the limitations in the use 
of audit in OHS management generally. The well known critical work of Power (1997) 
brought to light the current societies’ disproportionate dependence on auditing. The author 
pointed out that the commonly used audit systems through their certification mechanism 
only measure employees’ adherence to SMSs. The author showed that auditors rarely look 
into the validity of the different elements of SMSs used in the organisations. Instead, they 
merely ensure that the existing SMSs are in place and workers are adhering to the details of 
the systems. Such mechanism, the authors cautioned, provided a legitimate tool for 
reinforcing managerial control over employees.
The views from the maritime industry provide a similar picture on the practice of audit. 
They cast doubt on the adequacy of the requirements laid out in the Code and also on 
whether the ship-managers fully realise the potential of the audit mechanism. They 
highlight, for example, how companies use audits solely as fault-finding exercise. One 
article (Lloyds List, 2003b), for example, pointed out that auditors use checklists 
mechanically as their audits reveal very little with regard to how well the SMS is actually 
implemented. The report argued that such auditing practice was crude as it merely satisfied 
the procedural formality of the audit and thus turned it into a symbolic exercise.
Frick et al. (2000) after reviewing the debate on the practice of OHS management 
developed three possible hypotheses with regard to the outcome of regulated self­
regulation: success hypothesis, paper-tiger hypothesis and sham hypothesis. The authors 
pointed out that the difference in the outcome depended primarily on the employers’ 
commitment to the implementation of systematic approaches to OHS management. They 
argued that in organisations where top managements are committed to safeguarding OHS 
by focusing on detecting, abating and preventing workplace hazards, and engage workers
21 DNV: Det Norske Veritas is a Norwegian based accreditation and certification body for various industrial 
sectors.
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in the decision making process in the management of OHS are likely to meet with the 
success hypothesis.
Whereas, in Frick et al.’s (2000) analysis, organisations where employers use such 
approaches as a bureaucratic mechanism for enforcing a top-down management achieve 
little in safeguarding workers’ OHS and meet with the ‘paper-tiger’ hypothesis. In such 
cases, employers pay considerable focus on producing convincing documentation to 
demonstrate that their organisations are complying with the requirements for OHS 
management but fail to implement the prerequisites for effective implementation. The 
authors pointed out that very often in such cases the focus gets skewed towards fixing the 
workers’ behaviour and making the individual workers more suitable for the purpose of the 
job.
Frick et al. (2000) also pointed to a third group of employers whose way of managing OHS 
transpired as a ‘sham’. The authors argued that such employers not only follow tokenistic 
paper compliance but do so merely to obtain license to operate and hide behind the facade 
of paperwork. These employers pay little attention to providing safe working environments 
and generally misuse the freedom of self-regulation for the purpose of enhancing their 
business objectives.
Thus, while there is a scarcity of academic research on the practice of operating OHS 
management systems in the maritime industry, evidence generally indicates weaknesses in 
commitment from employers. They suggest that employers do not prioritise providing safe 
and healthy working environments for the seafarers. Instead, they place considerable focus 
on managing seafarers’ behaviour and related attributes. However what emerged from the 
discussion in this section on studies based on shore-based industries clearly pointed out that 
commitment from employers was a prerequisite for the effective management of OHS. 
Therefore the employers’ role in the implementation of the ISM Code in the maritime 
industry appears as an area of concern. In the current study therefore it would be among the 
main objectives to ascertain the role played by the managers in the maritime industry in 
implementing the ISM Code and the factors that influence their approach and level of 
commitment.
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2.1.2 The role of employees
A wide body of literature points out that besides the role of the employers, employees’ 
participation is essential in the effective implementation of regulated self-regulation. 
Drawing on the Robens report that ushered in regulated self-regulation in the UK and 
influenced its development in several other nations, Dawson et al. (1988), for example, 
argued that the new model presupposes employees’ contribution in the decision making 
process on the management of OHS. Based on empirical work on four different 
industries, the authors argued that employees’ participation was the essential ‘corollary’ 
that supported the employers’ obligation to self-regulation.
The need for effective employee participation is also explicitly mentioned in several 
guidelines and statutes. The EU Framework Directive 89/391 (article: 11), for example, 
requires employers to consult with workers and/or their representatives on OHS matters.
It states that ‘employers shall consult with workers and/or their representatives and allow 
them to take part in discussions on all questions relating to safety and health at work’. It 
‘presupposes consultation of workers, the right of workers and/or their representatives to 
make proposals, and balanced participation in accordance with national laws and/or 
practices’ (EEC, 1989).
Research points to multiple benefits of employee participation in the implementation of 
systematic OHS management. Authors such as Walters and Frick (2000) have argued that 
employee participation can potentially contribute at two levels. Firstly, employees can play 
a major role in spotting hazards at workplaces and sharing their practical knowledge on 
ways to control them. Secondly, employees’ participation can generally promote the tenets 
of workplace democracy. It gives them the opportunity to contribute to the organisations’ 
decision-making process on OHS which also gives them an ownership of the decisions 
taken in managing it.
Several empirical studies reveal significant benefits of employee participation at these two 
levels. Shannon et a l (1996, 1997) and Shannon (1998), for example, in their research in 
Canadian workplaces demonstrated that employee participation in OHS decision making 
led to better standards of OHS. Their research pointed to the consistency between 
implementation of safety committee meetings, empowerment of the workforce and lower 
injury and claims rates. In the same way researchers analysing the British Workplace
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Industrial Relation Survey report of 1990 found that workplaces where managers 
safeguarded OHS without employee consultation had comparatively higher rates of injury 
(Reilly et al., 1995; Nichols et al., 1995). These studies were supported by a number of 
other authors (see for example Dedobbeleer et al., 1990; Tucker, 1992; Walters and 
Gourlay, 1990; Shaw and Turner, 2003) whose work also revealed that workers’ 
participation was a prerequisite for effective implementation of regulated self-regulation. 
Authors, such as Baugher (2003), who carried out research on 26 shop-floor workers at a 
car manufacturing plant in the USA, similarly found that the benefit of workers’ 
participation was realised when workers were involved in the organisations’ decision 
making process and not when they were simply indoctrinated in the competitive corporate 
aim.
Similarly, other scholars, such as Biggins et al. (1991) and Warren-Longford et al. (1993) 
have shown that a representative form of worker participation in Australian industries 
helped in the day-to-day safety matters on the shop floor. The trade unions supported by 
fulltime health and safety officers helped employees in discussing issues on OHS with the 
organisations’ managers. Also, Fuller and Suruda (2000) studying hydrogen sulphide 
fatalities in several workplaces in the USA found that between 1984 and 1994 around 83% 
of the fatalities took place in workplaces where worker participation was largely ineffective 
due to the lack of trade unions. More recently, Walters and Nichols (2007) drawing on ten 
case studies from the UK construction and chemical industries have demonstrated 
statistically significant improvement in injury rates was achieved with trade union 
involvement in workplace arrangements for consultation on OHS management.
Role of Trade Unions
The significance of trade unions in effective employee participation is widely 
acknowledged in the industrial relations literature. Bohle and Quinlan (2000), for example, 
reviewing a wide body of literature on the management of OHS pointed to the importance 
of a set of preconditions necessary to get workers to communicate and contribute in the 
management of OHS. Drawing on studies from different parts of the world, the authors 
identified that the bottom line for effective worker participation was an organised 
workforce who should be able to present their views to the managers in a representative 
manner. Such representative form of participation facilitates effective risk communication, 
dialogue between workers and managers, and resolves disagreement between them. The
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authors also showed that (2000: 438-442) historically trade unions played a crucial role in 
improving labour conditions. They identified seven main methods by which trade unions 
assisted employees in safeguarding OHS. These included bargaining with employers on 
providing a safer and healthier working environment, bringing in changes to the legislation 
on OHS, providing information and logistical assistance to workers on OHS and training 
and educating workers and especially for the worker-representatives for the issues affecting 
OHS.
Expanding on the wide scope of trade unions’ influence on the management of OHS, 
Walters (1996), in his study where he used several empirical examples from UK, argued 
that a strong presence of trade unions was a prerequisite in facilitating effective 
representative participation. It also showed that the employers need to facilitate the 
functioning of the workers’ representatives such that workers could make effective 
contribution in the management of OHS and communication of risk. The study showed that 
even with the presence of the unions in workers’ participation, employers’ commitment 
was essential because without such commitment workers’ participation was likely to 
remain a struggle and largely unrealised. Underlying all these, however, was the need for a 
strong legislative provision for promoting and ensuring the effectiveness of representative 
worker participation. The study pointed out that legislative steer sets out the specific 
requirements of recognising the roles of worker or union representation and provides the 
necessary monitoring provision for its effectiveness.
Discussing the benefits of trade unions, Walters (2006) pointed to the three different levels 
at which trade unions play a vital role in facilitating workers’ participation. In his study on 
worker representation in the UK industries, the author’s work drew on a large body of UK 
as well as international evidence (such as Bryce and Manga’s (1985) work in the Canadian 
industries). He pointed out how in most industrial sectors trade unions play a significant 
role in addressing the issues of improving general labour conditions and OHS standards by 
participating in the development of the regulatory infrastructure. The author highlighted the 
way in which trade unions help in lobbying and representing workers’ interests in the 
negotiation of OHS and the overall labour conditions within national and international 
legislative bodies, such as at the International Labour Organisation.
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Walters (2006) also pointed out that at a second level the role of trade unions can also be 
understood better as a promoter of collectivism among the workforce. Trade unions help 
present the workers’ views to the management and thus play a vital role by engaging in 
collective bargaining with the employers in which issues such as general labour conditions 
including minimum wages, maximum working hours, staffing level and job security are 
addressed better. Improvement to OHS forms a part of the overall labour conditions but 
may also be the focus of collective bargaining. In making this argument, the author also 
referred to historical evidence of industrial relations with regard to how trade unions played 
significant roles in redressing the imbalance between capital and labour.
At a third level, Walters (2006) also showed how trade unions play an important role in 
negotiating working conditions through local intervention at the shop-floor. He pointed out 
how the presence of trade unions supports workers in learning about hazards, in 
communicating risk and in contributing to the management of OHS more generally. Such 
issues were well documented in several other studies. Nichols et al. (2007), for example, 
re-analysed the data set from the 1995 UK Workplace Industrial Relations Survey (WIRS) 
and found that organisations in which trade unions played an important role at the shop 
floor level in providing support to workers’ representation performed better on OHS than 
those organisations where there was either no worker representation or worker 
representation was without the support from the union. The matter was also evident from 
research conducted in other parts of the world. In Canada, for example, Lewchuk et al 
(1996) studied the impacts of the introduction of new legislation and the joint health and 
safety committees. There the authors found that the establishments with joint health and 
safety committees with the support from trade unions at the shop-floor level suffered less 
number of cases of lost-time injuries than in those establishments where there was either no 
such committee or where such committees were largely ineffective. The study showed that 
with effective union participation there is increased likelihood for workers to communicate 
risk and present their views and concerns to the managers, and have an effective support 
for negotiating and meeting their demands.
However, the trade union organisation in the maritime industry is different to land-based 
models because of the nature of its workplace among other features. Therefore conclusions 
drawn from land-based studies are not so easily applied in the maritime context.
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The different types of employee participation
Studies on self-regulation also point to the intricacies associated with the ways the term 
employee participation is used in the literature and practice. Tucker’s (1992) work on the 
practice of OHS regulation in Sweden, for example, pointed out that, in the traditional 
sense, employee-participation is representative in nature following a bottom-up procedure. 
This typically includes a well-organised workforce choosing their representatives for 
presenting their OHS concerns to their employers. Representative participation of 
employees has an industrial relations origin emanating from practices such as collective 
bargaining agreements, elected trade union representatives and corresponding legislative 
requirements supporting the operation of these mechanisms. In effect, this form of 
participation is designed to give employees an autonomous influence on their employers 
for the purpose of their labour conditions and OHS. The need for autonomous influence 
originates out of the conflict of interest theory which highlights that employers aiming for 
economic success might do so at the expense of employees’ OHS (Nichols, 1980; Kochan,
1988).
In fact, research from the perspective of industrial relations shows that employees’ 
representative participation not only requires an organised workforce but also presupposes 
an active support from the employers (pointed out in the previous section). Several 
empirical studies show that workers’ participation yields positive results in safeguarding 
OHS in organisations where employers incorporate employees’ views in the OHS decision 
making process. Mechanisms to incorporate such views typically include joint health and 
safety committees which provide the opportunity for workers to discuss their concerns and 
views, and provide suggestions to their employers. Walters et al.'s (2005: 114-117) 
comparative analysis of five chemical and another five construction companies pointed out 
that organisations in which senior managers showed commitment in involving workers in 
the representation and consultation on labour conditions and OHS showed better standards 
of OHS. Such arrangements encouraged trade unions and health and safety representatives 
to function effectively which promoted a suitable atmosphere for employees to build 
representative form of employee participation in organisations.
However, ‘employee participation’ also has other meanings. Walters and Frick (2000: 54- 
57) in the review of the literature on OHS management systems, discussed how the same 
term can also have different origins and motives. The authors pointed out that a 
‘managerial view’ of the term can be used simply to attune the workforce to their
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objectives. This form of participation -  identified as direct participation -  is largely driven 
by the employers and bears little resemblance to the bottom up approach discussed above.
Critical discussions on the practice of direct participation shows the persuasive powers of 
the employers which parallels more closely with quality management system type of 
business objectives (Marchington, 1995). Studies show that a section of employers tend to 
bring in such form of employee participation by using business jargons such as ‘workplace 
autonomy’, ‘team working’ and ‘employee empowerment’ (see Summers, 2004; Sinclair, 
1992: 621-622; Walton, 1985). However, by critically evaluating the impacts of direct 
participation, a number of authors have pointed out that in effect direct participation 
coerces employees to put in more intense work often requiring them to work longer hours 
and assume greater responsibility at work (sometimes) against incentives such as increase 
in pay or promotion (Marchington et a l , 1994). In other words, this form of participation 
promotes the business aim of increased production and profit. Counter to the popular claim, 
direct participation does not increase workplace autonomy -  it only makes employers’ 
control over the employees more effective (Barker, 1993).
With regard to the direct form of worker participation and decision making, Cunningham et 
al. (1996) and Hyman (2006) also revealed that whatever little employee empowerment 
takes place as a result of this form of participation, it occurs at the lower level producing no 
impact on organisational decision making.
In fact, McNabb and Whitfield (1999: 128-134) in their study highlighted that 
representative participation and the direct form of participation were implemented in 
fundamentally different types of organisations. They showed that direct participation was 
common in high employer-controlled establishments which were espoused by 
comparatively smaller and newer types of organisations. While, representative 
participations were largely associated with bigger and more stable firms which showed 
signs of employee involvement in OHS decision making process.
With regard to the practice of employee participation in the maritime industry, however, 
the available data and views in the industry paint a sombre picture. Academic research 
conducted in the maritime industry pointed to the lack of trade union support in the 
implementation of OHS. Kahveci and Nichols (2006), in their study on working conditions
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on car carriers22, highlighted the fact that, although the International Transport Workers’ 
Federation (ITF) provided union support to the seafarers at the global level, the role of 
trade unions at the organisational or shipboard levels was considerably weak. By 
interviewing seafarers on car carriers the authors found that the seafarers despite being 
members of trade union organisation in their home countries did not benefit from them in 
safeguarding OHS. They played no role either at the employer level or at the shipboard 
level. In particular the authors pointed out that there was no practice on bargaining with 
employers on providing a safer and healthier working environment. Ethnographic study by 
Sampson and Thomas (2003b) similarly noted an absence of trade unions’ influence 
onboard ships. The authors in fact revealed that in practice the seafarers were 
systematically discouraged from being associated with any form of union activity.
Moreover, the views from the practitioners in the maritime industry indicate that the 
practice in the industry is largely focused on the need for seafarers’ motivation and in their 
training and education. Hawkins (2001: 99) for example, discussing different ways of 
improving the safety standard in the maritime industry in the Asia Pacific region, 
highlighted why greater focus should be paid on seafarers’ training. The author, for 
instance, argued that ‘good performance is a function of good training and good working 
conditions’ and that ‘training provides the requisite knowledge and skills’. Such advises are 
common in the practitioners’ literature in the maritime industry. While these views are 
arguably important, they, however, ignore the importance of seafarers’ participation or the 
importance of trade union support or the significance of representative form of employee 
participation in the maritime industry.
Furthermore, contrary to what the studies in the land-based industries and other guidelines 
show (such as the European Union Framework Directive or the occupational health and 
safety guideline developed by the ILO), the ISM Code does not give any importance to 
seafarers in assessing risk. By going through the text of the Code it appears that it limits the 
role of seafarers to adhering to the procedural requirement set by the employers and merely 
requires them to comply with them. Also, the Code does not state the need for involving 
seafarers in the organisations’ OHS decision making process. It, for instance, makes no 
reference to the importance of involving seafarers in the risk assessment process, nor does 
it make any reference to features such as safety representative or safety committees.
22 Car Carrier: These are ships which transport vehicles typically four wheel passenger cars from one port to 
another.
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The lack of seafarers’ input in the organisations’ risk assessment is also reflected by the 
popularity of the use of readymade off-the-shelf SMSs in the maritime industry. On several 
occasions the industry press has pointed out that it is common to find ship-owners buying 
readily available generic SMSs for immediate implementation. Such SMSs are generally 
produced by commercial entities which produce standard ship-operating policies and 
procedures along with non-specific checklists and forms that fit a wide variety of maritime 
organisations and trades. They do not take into account the specific requirements of the 
organisations or the ships or acknowledge the importance of the seafarers’ views in the 
decision making process of the management of OHS (Lloyds List, 1998a, 2002a, 2004b).
Thus, from these accounts it appears that in the maritime industry there is a 
disproportionate level of interest in developing seafarers’ competence, training and 
motivation. In contrast to what is widely acknowledged in the research literature as one of 
the prerequisites, the maritime industry places very little focus on the benefits of 
representative form of seafarers’ participation. Moreover, there is also evidence that the 
industry suffers from lack of trade union support at the workplace level and at the level of 
bargaining with employers. As a result, seafarers also lack the infrastructure that supports 
workers’ representative form of participation. These descriptions on the whole indicate that 
seafarers have limited opportunity to participate in the management of OHS -  which 
suggests that it is an area of particular concern. One of the major emphases in this research, 
therefore, will be to identify the practice of seafarers’ participation in the operation of the 
ISM Code and investigate the influences that determine their participation.
2.1.3 The role of regulators: regulating self-regulation
Research on regulation also points out that despite the move away from State controlled
prescriptive approaches to safeguarding OHS, the States continue to play an important role 
in the effective implementation of process based approaches to self-regulation. In this 
discussion the regulators’ role is pointed out as both to carry out effective surveillance of 
the outcome of such implementation and also to provide the regulatory support to the 
implementation process of systematic OHS management.
With regard to the surveillance of OHS standards, studies have identified the importance of 
the role played by the States to oversee the implementation process of the management of
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OHS. Gunningham (1999), for example, in his discussion on management systems and 
OHS regulations, highlighted that complete reliance for the management of OHS on 
employers is not appropriate for any type of organisation. The author noted that it is ideally 
suited for firms who are capable to provide the necessary support for employees’ OHS and 
also feel morally responsible to do so. However, employers who are unwilling to or 
incapable of protecting their workers from workplace hazards in particular require State 
surveillance.
Expanding on the role of State surveillance, Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) advocated that 
States should settle for the right mixture between self-regulation and governmental 
regulation, and that the government inspectors should have a range of sanctions at their 
disposal and should be prepared to use them in a ‘responsive’ way. They pointed out that 
government inspectors needed to deal with each organisation on its own merit. The 
inspectors should be prepared to use the appropriate sanction ranging from appealing to the 
social responsibility of employers to suspending trade license (see figure below). This way, 
self-regulation as well as State-regulation could exist side by side.
--------- License Revocation
License Suspension
y /  C rim inal Penalty
y /  C ivil Penalty \
y /  W arning Letter \
Persuasion \
Figure 6: Pyramid strategy o f  responsive regulation 
Source: Ayres and Braithwaite (1992).
The state of regulatory influence in the maritime industry has already been discussed in the 
previous chapter (section 1.2). It highlighted how FOC, which gained prominence as a 
consequence of increased activities of free market capitalism, had relatively weak 
regulatory infrastructures. The discussion also showed how increased flagging out resulted
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in a competitive environment among the regulators which further weakened the role of 
States. As a consequence of these developments the regulatory implementation and 
surveillance mechanisms in the maritime industry were significantly undermined.
The discussion also highlighted how in an effort to revive the regulatory surveillance 
mechanism the maritime industry brought in the Port State Control (PSC) inspection and 
control regulation in which States were given the right to inspect foreign ships calling their 
ports (see section 1.3.1). However, authors such as DeSombre (2006), Boisson (1999) and 
Ozcayir (2001) studying the effectiveness of the PSC inspection argued that PSC 
inspection was a special case of ‘State’ surveillance but did not have the same potential as 
compared to what the Flag States was meant to deliver. They argued that PSC inspection 
was more akin to policing at sea and not an alternative to State regulatory surveillance 
(Knapp, 2004).
Critically looking at the role of PSC inspections, Ozcayir (2001), for example, pointed out 
that PSC did not inspect all ships every time they called their ports. Countries or a specific 
group of countries, such as countries within the Paris Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU)23, use their own protocol to target ships for inspection where approximately 25% of 
the ships calling the ports get inspected (Lloyds List, 1994c; Paris MoU, 2008). Also, 
though PSC inspections are acknowledged as valuable contributors to OHS surveillance, 
they are also widely criticised as a reflection of inspectors’ subjectiveness (Bloor et al, 
2004). The criticisms point out that the outcomes depend on the inspectors’ interpretation 
and professional judgement on what constitutes a deficiency and which deficiencies are 
serious enough to warrant ships’ detentions (Ozcayir, 2001; Lloyds List, 1996; Nieuwpoort 
and Meijnders, 1998).
The underlying factor for the effectiveness of the PSC inspection mechanism, however, is 
located in its public nature. As pointed out in section 1.3.1 the results of PSC inspections 
are made available on a public website named ‘www.euqasis.org’ (Equasis, 2007) and also 
on websites of some of the individual countries or organisations of groups of countries 
conducting the inspection, such as the ‘Paris MoU’ (2008). With the intention to make the 
OHS standards of the ships (and its management companies) accessible to the public, these
23 Paris MoU: The Paris MOU consists o f 27 participating maritime Administrations and covers the waters of  
the European coastal States and the North Atlantic basin from North America to Europe, including UK, 
France, Germany and Canada.
55
websites provide details of the results of PSC inspection. The information on these 
websites includes the identities of the ship, the shore-based management unit of the ship 
and the ship-owner. This free to access ‘naming and shaming’ mechanism is widely 
acknowledged in the maritime industry as one of the strengths of the operation of PSC 
Inspections (Lloyds List, 2001; 2003c).
The second role of the State is to implement statutory provisions that support the 
implementation of the management of safety. In the previous section the discussion already 
identified how States play an important role, for example, in worker participation. Several 
authors such as Genn (1993), Wilthagen (1994), Hutter (1997) and Nichols (1997) have 
also identified how regulatory provisions which give powers to trade unions is important 
for workers’ participation. The authors in their respective studies argued that it is those 
organisations in which employers who do not appreciate the views of their employees in 
the decision-making process of the management of OHS need the necessary regulatory 
drive most.
Regulating through Safety Case approach
A particular form of regulatory involvement in the regulation of self-regulation can be 
found in what is commonly known as the Safety Case Approach. In this, employers are 
first required to submit their proposed SMSs to the State regulators for approval. Only after 
the regulators are satisfied with the employers’ arrangements for safeguarding workers 
from hazards do they provide the necessary accreditation. Gunningham (2007) called this 
strategy a meta-regulation and pointed out that although it brings the regulators back in the 
frame it leaves the managements to draw up their own self-regulating procedures. 
Subsequently, the regulators are then required to check that the organisations are following 
their own SMSs and also whether the ultimate objectives of self-regulation are being met.
Parker (2002) and Wilkinson (2002) are among those who are supportive of this 
mechanism. In their studies, the authors critically evaluated the impact of Safety Case 
Approach and argued that such mechanisms support employers to self-evaluate the 
effectiveness of SMSs. It has the potential to improve employers’ understanding of 
workplace hazards. Moreover, it also enhances the knowledge of the technical and 
managerial controls required to self-regulate while providing the opportunity for a better 
oversight by the State regulator.
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The maritime industry also operates a particular version of the Safety Case Approach. As 
pointed out in section 1.3.3, the ISM Code requires the ship-managers to prepare and 
present the organisations’ SMSs to the State regulators for initial verification. Only on 
passing the State audit and acquiring the requisite certificate can the shore-management 
and the ship start trading as a team. This mechanism also requires States to regularly verify 
the effectiveness of the implementation through regular State audits -  commonly known in 
the industry as external audits.
Views from the industry commentators, however, remind the readers of the general 
weakness in the State regulation in the maritime industry. They show that lack of 
effectiveness in the State regulatory system is also reflected in the way States audit and 
certify organisations’ SMSs. The maritime press articles have repeatedly pointed out that 
although the ISM Code certification mechanism was meant to drive out the unsafe ship- 
operators from business, most of such ship-owners are still present in the business. They 
showed that during the initial phasing in of the ISM Code and also at the times of 
subsequent verifications, the States continued to certify ships and management units 
despite ‘obvious weaknesses’ in the operating practices of a noticeable section of the 
maritime industry (Lloyds List, 1998b; 2000; 2003b).
Regulatory pluralism
In certain industrial sectors players other than the States have also contributed in regulatory 
functions. They usually include different industry stakeholders, such as the head of supply 
chains. Studies, such as by Teubner (1994), Furger, (1997) and Gunningham (1998a, 
1998b, 1999) pointed to the benefits of industry-stakeholders playing crucial 
complimentary roles in regulating the standards of OHS. Gunningham (1999), for instance, 
showed how third-party oversight contributed in regulating through industry-based 
programmes, such as the ‘Responsible Care’ found in the chemical industries. Using this 
particular programme as an example, the author argued that the head of the supply-chain 
can complement the State regulations by voluntarily engaging in managing OHS. They do 
so typically by demanding high safety standards from others lower down in the supply 
chain and rewarding them through economic incentives in return.
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Regulatory pluralism is well established in the maritime industry. The industry 
practitioners and maritime press in general acknowledge that a number of entities also 
make positive contributions in regulating the industry. Arguably, the three most prominent 
players who complement State regulation are: International Association of Classification 
Societies (IACS), Protection and Indemnity (P&I) Club and commercial hirers of ships, 
such as the Oil Major in the oil tanker sector.
IACS consists of a group of 12 major Classification Societies24 who set their own high 
regulatory standards on surveying and certifying on behalf of the Flag States (DeSombre, 
2006). They carry out the ground work on the structural and mechanical elements of 
applicable regulations of the State. However, they also have their own stringent 
mechanisms for the inspection process. They collectively handle 94% of the world tonnage. 
It is widely acknowledged that the regulatory mechanism of the IACS makes a significant 
contribution in harmonising a high standard of structural requirements in the maritime 
industry (Payer, 1998: 91-102; IACS, 2007).
Second, the insurance companies, known in the maritime industry as the P&I Clubs, 
conduct their own rigorous ‘condition surveys’ (Riley, 1998: 107-114) primarily on 
shipboard structural and mechanical features. P&I Clubs cover for damages arising out of 
pollution, loss of cargo and death or injury to seafarers. P&I Club insurance is an integral 
part of the industry with around 95% of ships on international trade insured by them. Their 
standard required for admission of ships is considered rigorous and thus provides another 
layer of independent regulatory control on OHS in the maritime industry (DeSombre, 2006; 
Bennett, 2000; 2001; Boisson, 1999; Couper et al., 1999).
Third, certain sectors in the industry -  such as the oil and chemical sectors -  are also 
inspected and controlled by the supply chains. In the case of the oil sector, for instance, the 
Oil Companies International Maritime Forum (OCIMF), which is a voluntary association 
of oil companies (such as British Petroleum pic), routinely conducts inspection of tankers 
through Ship Inspection Report Program (SIRE). In the recent past they have extended 
their inspection system in verifying the managerial capacity of the management units 
through a programme called: Tanker Management and Self Assessment (TMSA). The
24 Classification Society: Independent organisations who conduct surveys, inspections and provide 
certifications on behalf o f  the flag state to comply with various international regulations. Lloyds Register of 
Shipping is one such organisation.
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rigour of the inspection (of both the ships and the management units) and its benefits in 
terms of safeguarding OHS is widely acknowledged in the industry to the extent that due to 
the active involvement of the Oil Majors the oil sector is often regarded as the one of the 
safest in the maritime industry (Oldham, 1998; Lloyds List, 1997; 2004c; 2005b; 2007b). 
The role of the major oil companies deserves a special mention in the thesis and is 
discussed in the subsection below.
Oil Majors
The role of the Oil Majors is widely regarded as one of the most influential in the maritime 
industry (see for example Oldham, 1998). One noticeable characteristic in the global 
seaborne oil trade is that a significant part of the business is operated by a small number of 
major multinational corporate (MNC) bodies widely known as the Oil Majors. These 
include British Petroleum pic (BP), Royal Dutch Shell pic (Shell) and ExxonMobil 
Corporation (ExxonMobil). They have wide-ranging interests in the business of crude oil 
and petroleum sectors. The upstream segment of the business includes crude oil 
exploration, production, transportation and refining, while their downstream segment of the 
business includes transportation, distribution as well as marketing of the oil products. Their 
business is also long standing and spans across continents.
BP, for example, has been in the oil business since the early part of the twentieth century 
and in 2006 had an annual turnover of US$ 262 billion. It currently has active explorations 
in 26 countries and has proven reserves of 18.3 billion barrels of oil and gas. It partly or 
wholly owns 19 refineries around the world and has a major interest in the business in 
Europe and USA. It produces a total of 2.8 million barrels of refined products per day out 
of which 1.5 million are produced in the USA and another 0.9 million in Europe. Their 
presence in the oil transportation is also evident. In 2006, BP transported around 5% of 
crude and oil products using company’s fleet and hired another 465 ships on spot charter25 
for transporting approximately another 5% of the global oil trade. In the same year their 
products were also retailed in over 28,500 service stations around the world (BP, 2007).
In 1998, for instance, except for the state run oil companies of Saudi Arabia, Mexico, 
Venezuela and China, these large MNCs were ranked among the top oil companies in the
25 Spot Charter: Also known as Voyage Charter where the charter hires a ship for one or more voyages.
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world. BP alone, for example, produced 963 million barrels followed by ExxonMobil and 
Shell (see table below).
Rank Company Worldwide oil production in million barrels per year
1 Saudi Arabia Oil Company 3028
2 Petroleos Mexicanos 1278
3 Petroleos de Venezuela 1258
4 China National Petroleum 1168
5 BP pic 963
6 ExxonM obil Corporation 894
7 Royal Dutch Shell pic 859
8 Nigerian national Oil Company 772
9 Iraq National Oil Company 770
10 Kuwait Petroleum 757
11 Chevron Corporation 756
Table 5: The largest oil companies in the world, 1998. 
Source: Gabel and Bruner (2003).
These oil companies are not only giants in their own field of oil industry but also rank 
among the top MNCs in the world. In the year 2000, three of these oil giants were ranked 
as 1st (ExxonMobil Corporation), 6th (Royal Dutch Shell pic) and 7th (BP pic) among the 
world’s largest MNCs based on their corporate revenues.
Rank among World MNCs Multi National Company Corporate Revenue in million USD
1 ExxonMobil 210,392
6 Royal Dutch Shell 149,146
7 BP 148,062
Table 6: Oil Majors in relation to worldwide MNCs, 2000. 
Source: Gabel and Bruner (2003).
The corporate revenues of these companies have also increased over the last 20 years 
which has risen exponentially since 2000. Shell, for example, more than doubled its profit 
from US$12,313 million in 2003 to US$26,261 million in 2006.
Oil Major Companies 2000 2003 2006
ExxonMobil 17,720 21,510 n/a
Royal Dutch Shell n/a 12,313 26,261
ChevronTexaco 7727 7230 n/a
BP n/a n/a 22,278
Table 7: Available data o f net income o f Oil Majors (in million US$) 2000-2006. 
Source: Compiled from the websites o f these Oil Majors.
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The Oil Majors also maintain the top positions in the tanker chartering market. In 2006, 
Shell ranked first among all the tanker chartering companies. For transporting crude oil and 
oil products Shell hired 755 ship voyages on spot market (single voyage contract as 
opposed to long term time charter) which amounted to 7.6% of the world total. The second 
and the third spots were also claimed by the Oil Majors. While ExxonMobil hired 514 
ships, BP hired 465 ships -  which were 5.2% and 4.7% of the world’s total spot market 
chartering respectively (Lloyds List, 2007c).
The Oil Majors’ interest in both upward (crude oil) and downward (oil product) directions 
of the refining process helps them in extending their authority in the tanker sector of the 
maritime industry (Hamilton, 1986). For instance, in various places in the world Oil Majors 
own and operate crude oil and oil product loading and unloading oil terminals and thus 
have a significant influence in the oil transfer activities. On other occasions one or more 
Oil Majors may directly hire ships transporting the cargo. On yet other times Oil Majors 
may only buy the oil cargo from or sell it to the State owned or other private oil trading 
companies. There may be other times when a single Oil Major may be controlling the 
entire transporting activity.
Thus, the oil business is largely a vertically integrated supply chain controlled by the Oil 
Majors. However, the transportation element of the business involves hiring ships of third 
parties. As a result, the Oil Majors place a significant importance to ensure that the supply 
chain is not affected due to the presence of the external players in the business. The Oil 
Majors’ concern is reflected in the way in which they conduct inspections of tankers and 
their management units. As the controller of the supply chain, the Oil Majors use their 
economic leverage to regulate the trading activities including the standards of OHS in the 
oil tanker sector of the maritime industry.
Moreover their reputation and corporate image are largely conditional on the safe 
transportation of their oil which relies heavily on the safe operation of tankers. In recent 
years with the increasing public awareness on protecting the environment, regulating the 
standard of safety on tankers, thus, is of significant importance to the Oil Majors. Fire, oil 
pollution or any other form of shipping disaster has the potential to bring particular Oil 
Major Companies (associated with the tanker) to disrepute which could lead to massive
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loss of revenue. This goes some way to explaining why Oil Majors take a keen interest in 
regulating the oil sector of the maritime industry.
The review of the literature conducted in this chapter thus points out how effective 
management of OHS assumes the presence of a set of prerequisites. These studies show 
that commitment from the employers and participation from the employees are the two 
prerequisites for effective management of OHS. The last section added a new element to 
this discussion. It highlighted that the regulators, too, have a major role to play in the 
implementation and surveillance of processed based approaches to self-regulation. 
Summing up the importance of all of these three players Nichols and Tucker (2000: 291- 
292) thus called management of OHS a ‘three-legged strategy’.
In the case of the maritime industry, however, available information indicates that there are 
significant inadequacies in the way the three players contribute in the operation of the 
management of OHS. Information largely based on anecdotal evidence suggests that 
commitment from the managers and participation from seafarers are largely inadequate. It 
illustrated, for example, how a large section of employers fail to look beyond short-term 
profit making, and how lack of trade union support is one of the main impediments to 
seafarers’ participation in the management of OHS. With regard to the role of the 
regulators, the discussion in the previous chapter (section 1.2) already highlighted their 
major weaknesses. It showed how flagging out resulted in a general decline of the 
regulatory standards which as the discussion showed is also an important element of the 
implementation of OHS regulation and its surveillance.
The evidence on the practice in the maritime industry nevertheless was largely based on 
anecdotal information which needs academic verification -  which further reiterates the 
importance of carrying out this research. However, in order to better understand the factors 
that influence the roles played by the managers and seafarers it is important that a wider 
body of literature is discussed. In the following section therefore I draw on studies which 
highlight how underlying issues -  such as social and economic factors -  have major 
influences on roles played by managers and employees and on the management of OHS.
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2.2 Socio-economic factors influencing the management of OHS
The discussion in this section identifies some of the main underlying social and economic 
factors that play important roles in effective management of OHS. It starts by looking into 
the importance of involving employees in the organisations’ OHS decision-making 
process. It reviews the literature that identifies how assessment of workplace risk -  which 
is central to the notion of self-regulating OHS management -  is socially constructed and 
particularly requires input from employees. The discussion also identifies how trust and 
communication between employers and employees play a significant role in 
operationalising OHS management. It draws attention to how successful implementation is 
also conditional upon effective communication between employers and employees. The 
discussion at the end of this section also highlights how economic globalisation throws 
further challenge at the management of OHS. In particular it reviews the literature that 
looks into how lack of job security among the workers acts as a significant barrier to 
effective upward risk communication.
2.2.1 Risk Assessment: a social construction
There is an ongoing debate in the academic literature as to who should have an input to 
assess risks posed by sensitive industrial plants (such as nuclear installations) -  the 
management and the experts or the employees and the public. Authors such as Krewski 
(1987), Mandeloff and Kaplan (1989) and Margolis (1996) argue that risk assessment 
should be conducted by experts as they possess the logical, scientific and analytical minds 
to judge the risks involved. They point out that experts can provide the objective 
assessment of risks that the public may face as a consequence of large-scale industrial 
accidents.
The most popular argument in favour of not involving the public in risk assessment comes 
from the notion that the public lack scientific understanding of the subject matter. Cross 
(1998), for example, claimed that the general public are too inaccurately informed to 
contribute to risk assessment in the event of a large-scale catastrophe. Their knowledge 
about the objective risk is limited and that they are largely driven by the media and 
misguided emotions. Experts on the other hand can produce superior and definitive guide 
to risk assessment by using scientifically verifiable probabilistic tool.
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However, this form of argument has met with severe criticism. A growing number of 
authors (such as Fischhoff et al., 1981; Flynn et al., 1994; Toft, 1996; Slovic, 1999) argue 
that risk assessment is socially constructed and it is far more complex than what the purely 
scientific models claim it to be. They argue that every individual influenced by their race, 
gender, social status and such other variations sees the same risk differently (Lupton, 
1999). These researchers continue to highlight that risk assessment is yet another function 
of human activity and as a result the organisational and social contexts within which they 
are embedded play a vital role (Horlick-Jones, 1998). They highlight that although 
objective science definitely has its place in risk assessment, it provides a partial picture. 
The authors stress that the process of risk assessment is not free from human values and 
judgement as ‘psychological, social, cultural, and political factors’ are elements that 
constitute human values, play a major role in the result of risk assessment (Slovic, 1999: 
699).
Pidgeon (1998: 12) also supported this argument. He pointed out that even when the 
‘impartial experts’ or the ‘well informed’ managers carry out risk assessment there is a 
considerable scope of them reflecting their bias and subjectiveness. By studying the 
importance of risk perception, the author argued that ‘experts cannot be viewed as unbiased 
gold standard of judgement’ as risk assessment inherently involves a degree of personal 
interpretation. In the same way, debating on the relative importance of perceived risk 
against probabilistic-based risk assessment, authors, such as, Freudenburg (1988) 
highlighted that although the experts are trained to conduct risk assessment objectively, 
they draw from their personal experience and their own interpretation of knowledge when 
using their professional skills.
Some authors, such as Jasanoff (1998) and Bohle and Quinlan (2000: 471) make a further 
point that the popular model which attempts to objectively quantify risk by simply 
multiplying the degree of harm with the probability of the harm occurring not only distorts 
the result of the assessment but also provides a false sense of numeric comfort. They argue 
that these quantitative tables are far too clinical for assessing OHS risk particularly when 
such tables are filled in without the employees’ input. Moreover, this form of risk 
assessment stands in between participatory and inclusive styles of decision-making which 
involves wider players. Jasanoff (1998: 98) argues further and cautions that this method 
simply reduces risk assessment to a ‘box filling’ mechanical process which fails to take
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into account the vast uncertainties of human perception and points out that human beings’ 
natural faith in numeric objectivity hides the frailty of the very process of quantitative risk 
assessment.
Although most of the above debate has centred on risks posed to the public at large from 
industries such as the nuclear power plant installations, there is a recognisable parallel to 
risks posed to workers within the confines of workplaces. Walters and Frick (2000: 59-60), 
for example, argued that democratisation of decision-making as discussed against the 
general context of risk faced by the public should be even more pertinent in the case of 
workplaces. In the case of workplaces, the workers should be involved in conducting risk 
assessment because of their knowledge of the workplace hazards. Moreover, the authors 
argue that the workers should also be involved due to the unequal distribution of risk. In 
the event of an incident, it is the workers who face greater likelihood of encountering the 
dangers of workplace hazards than the managers or the risk-experts. Thus, the central 
reason for involving workers in risk assessment and in OHS decision making processes is 
in appreciating the variation of risk perception that exists in our societies.
However, as pointed out in an earlier discussion (section 2.1.1), the regulation in the 
maritime industry does not clearly state the roles of the seafarers in the process of risk 
assessment. A study conducted by Bailey (2006) on the impact of risk perception among 
the managers and different ranks of seafarers on board pointed out that in the maritime 
industry formal risk assessment was largely carried out either by the shore-based ship 
managers or by external contractors. The author, using qualitative interviewing technique, 
found that although the perception of risk in the industry varied considerably among the 
different ranks of seafarers and managers, the assessments were almost invariably skewed 
towards the managers’ line of thinking.
Arguably, the difference of risk perception between the seafarers and managers is 
potentially wider in the maritime industry. Unlike most shore-based industries, here the 
seafarers spend all their working time as well as their off-work time in their workplaces 
(Alderton et al., 2004). In other words, it is the seafarers who live with the hazards at work 
while the experts and the managers located ashore are likely to take a distant view of the 
risks faced by the seafarers. Thus, in the maritime industry Walters’ and Frick’s (2000) 
argument discussed above has even greater relevance.
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2.2.2 The importance of trust and communication
A number of studies also discuss the importance of positive social relationships between 
employers (managers) and workers in workplaces. They show how features such as trust 
and communication between managers and workers play important roles in an 
organisation’s day-to-day business. Although these studies do not focus on regulated self­
regulation per se, the relevance of these social relationships is arguably critical to its 
effective implementation.
Fox (1974), for example, in his classical work: Beyond Contract: Work, power and Trust 
Relations, discussed issues affecting work and work organisation. There he argued that 
trust is institutionalised between managers and employees through the roles the latter are 
required to play under the rules set by the managers. Discussing the different levels of 
institutionalised trust, the author showed that in an organisation where managers entrust 
workers with a high degree of discretionary role it promotes a high-trust relationship. These 
are typically characterised by managers who show long-term obligations towards their 
workers, the presence of personal commitment from workers and the convergence of the 
organisation’s and employees’ goals.
Expanding further, Fox (1974) showed that in high-trust relationships, managers’ long-term 
interest in the workers is typically reflected by offering long-term employments. It is also 
found in the way managers give workers a relatively high degree of freedom to use their 
skills and expertise to carry out their tasks. In such situations workers also demonstrate 
dedication and tend to develop long-term personal commitment towards their employers. 
On the other hand a low-trust level in employments exhibits divergent interest between 
workers and managers in which both parties have short-term agendas. In such relationships, 
workers are typically given limited leeway and asked to comply with the managers’ 
specific requirements using specific work procedures. The author argued that such low- 
trust relationships between managers and workers generally result in both workers and 
employers limiting their obligations to the contractual requirements.
The relationship of reciprocation between managers and workers has also been highlighted 
by a number of other authors. In another well-known piece of work, Blau (1964), in his 
theory of social exchange, described how social relationships are based on a social
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exchange process. The author argued that in social relations people show tendencies to be 
motivated by expectations of returns. In its rudimentary form low-trust relationships 
typically resemble economic exchange process where both managers and workers engage 
in immediate and measured reciprocation. Such relationships are seen as myopic and not 
conducive for long-term relations between managers and workers. Arguably, this kind of 
social relationship between managers and workers also do not support effective 
management of OHS. The author also pointed out that on the other hand, high-trust 
relationships initiated by managers are likely to be reciprocated by higher levels of social 
exchanges. Typically such relationships go beyond short-term reciprocation, as employers, 
for example, tend to look into workers’ welfare and include them in their long-term 
business plans. Also the employers neither expect their workers to reciprocate immediately 
nor do so in a measured way. Similar virtues of high-trust levels are also reciprocated from 
the workers’ perspective. In such situations workers typically also show trust in their 
managers which, for instance, enables them to better communicate their views and 
concerns to the managers.
By viewing this argument in the light of the discussions in the previous section, it shows 
that a high-trust relationship between managers and workers has the potential for the 
involvement of the employees in the organisations’ OHS decision-making process. It also 
creates a suitable environment for workers to share their skills and expertise and thus freely 
communicate their views with the organisations’ managers.
Looking at how trust plays an important role in organisational communication, O’Reilly 
(1978), for example, showed that workers need to develop trust in their managers before 
they can communicate freely and effectively. Such trust-building needs to be initiated from 
the managers, based on which the workers open up and communicate their views. 
Conversely in organisations where workers have limited trust in their managers, they tend 
not to communicate the unfavourable yet potentially important information to their 
managers. In such cases the upward communication is largely filtered and thus made 
significantly ineffective.
Reviewing a large body of literature on various forms of employee programmes used in 
North America, Seibold and Shea (2001) also pointed out how various forms of employee 
participation programmes required both upward and downward communication. The
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authors showed that regardless of the type of participation programmes used, the common 
building-block for successful employee participation was better communication between 
workers and managers.
Studies in organisational management also point out how effective communication leads to 
increased motivation, self-efficacy and empowerment. Conger and Kanungo (1988), for 
example, reviewing the literature from organisational management and psychology 
backgrounds, highlighted how improved communication within organisations could 
successfully empower workers and make them feel like important members of the 
organisation. The authors specifically highlighted the way managers needed to provide 
opportunities for communication and information-sharing for workers to get closer to the 
organisation and increase their self-determination.
In the same way, studies have also identified effective communication as a prerequisite for 
successful OHS management. By reviewing the literature on factors acting as barriers to 
effective OHS management Gallagher et al. (2003: 71), for example, highlighted the 
importance of effective communication. The authors pointed out open and free 
communications was one of the prerequisites for effective worker participation.
In the maritime industry, however, reports and publications from the industry stakeholders 
and maritime press generally point to lack of trust and communication within 
organisations. They indicate that one of the greatest hindrances in safeguarding OHS 
through self-regulation can be seen in how seafarers show reservations in communicating 
with their shore-based management units. One such example can be found in a report from 
the Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB)26. In its 2001 annual report, it 
highlighted lack of trust and cooperation between those at sea and ashore within the same 
organisation and pointed out how it affected the implementation of the ISM Code (MAIB, 
2001).
Similar views are also available in the maritime press where by taking the example of the 
practice of incident reporting in the maritime industry, articles claim that the seafarers’ 
limited trust in their managers fail to encourage them to report OHS related incidents (see 
for example Lloyds List, 2002b; 2006a; 2007d). Such reports and articles suggest that lack
26 MAIB: It is an UK agency examining and investigating maritime accidents to or onboard ships registered 
in the UK or to foreign ships meeting with accidents in the UK territorial waters.
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of trust and communication between managers and seafarers fail to promote effective 
implementation of OHS management in the maritime industry.
2.2.3 The impact of globalisation on job security
Moving on, the discussion now looks into a more contemporary issue affecting the 
implementation of regulated self-regulation. It points out how economic globalisation has 
resulted in job insecurity among the workforce, and how in turn it affects the workers’ 
participation in the implementation process.
Quinlan (1999), for example, conducted a review of a large number of studies to determine 
the impacts of economic globalisation on labour market restructuring and changes to work 
arrangements on OHS. The author found that the implementation of arrangements for 
health and safety management was noticeably affected by these changes. Since mid 1970s 
there was, for instance, a significant increase in work outsourcing and subcontracting, 
growth of temporary, casual and part-time-workers (widely identified as precarious 
employment), and an increase in the young and female workforce. Along with these 
changes there has also been an increase in shift and night work, widespread downsizing 
and work intensification. The author pointed out that some of these changes not only 
affected workers’ OHS as a direct consequence, but also had a serious impact on the 
conditions that are important for the management of OHS.
In this regard, Dwyer (1994), in his work on the impacts of precarious employment, 
pointed out how temporary workforce generally does not enjoy the benefit of collective 
representation or protection from trade unions. Their fear of lack of continuity of their 
employment places serious constraints on their ability to communicate with their 
employers on issues on OHS and labour conditions more generally.
A number of empirical research studies also consistently point in the same direction. Bohle 
et al. (2001), for example, analysed 48 studies conducted by different researchers on 
precarious employment in over nine countries. The authors found that in 44 of them, 
workers suffered from significant job insecurity which prevented them from 
communicating their concerns to the managers. Subsequently, such lack of communication 
resulted in comparatively inferior outcome in workplace safety.
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In the same way, studies from the psychological perspective have also demonstrated a link 
between precarious employment and job insecurity. Naswall, and De Witte (2003), for 
example, based on a combination of postal and telephone survey from nearly 4000 
respondents in four European countries, found that workforce employed under temporary 
contracts felt more insecure and vulnerable with regard to their future employability.
In yet another study, Aronsson (1999) re-examined a stratified representative sample from 
Sweden’s Labour Market Survey of over 1500 employees to find out how full-time 
employees and employees in precarious labour market compared on effective participation 
in the management of OHS. The author determined that non-permanent employees 
perceived it much harder to criticise their working conditions or to get their voices heard 
due to their precarious employment structure, as compared to their counterparts employed 
on a full-time basis.
Investigating the concerns from regulatory perspective, Johnstone et al. (2005) were among 
those who pointed out that the restructuring of the labour market and changes in the 
workplace setting make management of OHS more challenging. The authors argued that 
legislative strategies towards regulating self-regulation essentially assume large 
organisations offering full-time permanent employment. It also assumes that workers can 
present their views to the employers through their representatives and are actively 
supported by trade unions operating in a setup that has a strong regulatory drive supporting 
these mechanisms. However, the authors pointed out that the developments in the labour 
market in the last three decades made it harder for workers to be represented or made it 
more complex for them to access their rights. Workers employed on short-term temporary 
contracts having limited support from the trade unions thus find it harder to communicate 
their employment concerns, including OHS concerns to their managers. The authors 
concluded that underlying these concerns is the weak labour condition and lack of 
regulatory protection because of which workers feel intimidated by the possibilities of 
losing their jobs.
The current employment conditions in the maritime industry, too, corroborate these 
findings. The discussion in section 1.2.2 revealed how economic globalisation significantly 
weakened the position of labour in the maritime industry. It showed that in the last three 
decades the employment pattern in the maritime industry shifted considerably to short-term 
contractual employment through crewing agencies along with downsizing and work
70
intensification. An ethnographic study of the labour conditions of seafarers on car carriers 
conducted by Kahveci and Nichols (2006) also pointed to similar practices. It reported that 
a very high percentage of seafarers worked for over 14 hours per day and were engaged in 
fixed short-term contracts lasting between six and 12 months depending on the rank of the 
seafarers. From survey data of 627 seafarers working on car carriers, the authors found that 
96% of them were employed on short-term contracts.
Anderson’s survey (discussed in section 2.4) on the usefulness of the implementation of the 
ISM Code also indicated that seafarers were anxious about losing their jobs (Anderson el 
al, 2003). The survey, which looked into the practice of various elements of SMSs, 
suggested that the primary reason why seafarers chose not to report shipboard incidents or 
near-miss occurrences to their managers was because they feared that they would be 
victimised as a consequence of reporting and may even lose their jobs. Although studies in 
the maritime industry do not categorically identify how precarious employment weakens 
the scope for seafarers’ participation in the management of OHS, analogy with the studies 
conducted in shore based industries points in the same direction.
The discussion in this section thus demonstrated how social relations and social and 
economic factors have major influences on managers and employees -  who are the main 
players in managing OHS. It showed, for example, a high-trust relationship between 
employees and workers is a prerequisite for effective employee participation in 
safeguarding workplace health and safety. While employers’ commitment and employee 
participation are essential elements in the effective management of OHS, it is the positive 
social relationships between these players that act as the building block. The discussion 
also identified how the impact of economic globalisation weakened the labour conditions 
which in turn hindered the management of OHS. Throughout the section the discussion 
also reviewed the literature that examined the practice in the maritime industry. Due to the 
limited research, however, the underlying social factors in the maritime industry could not 
be established. Yet, based on the available information, the overall impression in the 
maritime industry indicated that the social relationship between the managers and seafarers 
lacks some of the preconditions that support participative approaches to OHS management.
Thus the review of the literature shows that roles played by the employers and employees 
(identified as the two prerequisites) for effective management of OHS were essentially
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conditional upon social relations between them and on socio-economic factors prevalent in 
the industry. These underlying elements, therefore, are important in understanding what 
influences the managers and seafarers in the practice of the implementation of the ISM 
Code and will thus be the crucial focus of this study.
The theoretical perspectives discussed in this chapter helps in understanding a range of 
causal factors that could influence the management of workplace (health and) safety 
generally. The purpose of presenting them is to be able to embark on an innovative 
empirical study in an informed way and be receptive to a range of factors that could be 
affecting the implementation of the ISM Code in the maritime industry. These theoretical 
perspectives have been used as heuristic devices to facilitate an in-depth analysis of the 
finding of this study. It helps the readers become aware of the various types of issues that 
could require further exploration during the course of the analysis of the empirical work. 
Equally, the interview schedule too used in this study is largely drawn on the discussion on 
these theoretical perspectives.
However, in order to better appreciate the practice of the management of the ISM Code it is 
important to identify what constitutes the Code. In the next section, therefore, I identify its 
different elements and describe their core functions and locate its practice in the maritime 
context.
2.3 Safety Management Systems
With the introduction of regulated self-regulation, various forms of Safety Management 
Systems (SMSs) emerged as popular tools to implement it. Authors such as Bluff and 
Gunningham (2004) and Gunningham (2007), pointed out how SMSs potentially facilitated 
employers systematically manage OHS in their organisations. They argued that SMSs 
provide an opportunity for employers to incorporate the various elements such as risk 
assessment, incident reporting and audit in managing OHS. They also argued how SMSs 
give regulators a legitimate tool to verify whether employers carry out their role of general 
duties to safeguard OHS. Moreover, Bluff and Johnstone (2005) exploring the role of 
regulators in the management of OHS in the Australian context pointed out that 
increasingly the courts’ interpretation of the legal term of employers’ general duties 
towards safeguarding OHS presupposes that in practice organisations follow SMSs.
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Studies looking into the development of SMSs identified how they have parallels with 
quality management systems used more generally in businesses. Bohle and Quinlan (2000: 
296-300), Frick and Wren (2000), Nielsen (2000) and Zwetsloot (2000), for example, 
discussed how the overarching influences of quality management systems seeped into the 
developments of SMSs. The authors argued that around the time when employers were 
required to develop strategies for systematically managing OHS, privately developed and 
promoted quality management systems were increasingly gaining popularity in business 
organisations and were thus also adopted in the management of OHS.
Teubner (1983), Creech, (1994), Mottel et al, (1995), Hill, (1995), Gunningham and 
Johnstone (1999) and Reiley, (1997) are among those who also presented similar 
arguments. They pointed out that as employers are expected to systematically manage OHS 
along with systematically managing other business activities, they see OHS management in 
the same light as with the rest of their managerial tasks. Thus, they find an appeal to 
integrate the features of quality management systems in the management of OHS.
However, there is a wide body of literature which criticises the influence of quality 
management systems in the development of SMSs. Nichols and Tucker (2000: 292), for 
example, pointed out that the new wave of OHS management systems with ‘all- 
encompassing’ elements, such as performance benchmarking and self-improving 
techniques, on the surface appear to offer technically sound mechanisms in safeguarding 
OHS, but in reality they may not play any role in persuading the employers to accomplish 
the fundamental requirements of providing safe and healthy working environments for their 
workers.
Similarly, Frick et al (2000), in the review of the literature on the effectiveness of SMSs, 
argued that subscribing to SMSs does not automatically assure safeguarding of OHS or 
constitute compliance with the requirements of regulated self-regulation. They pointed out 
that SMSs merely offer a set of tools and stressed the point that employers should make use 
of these tools keeping the focus on systematically managing OHS to safeguard workers 
from workplace hazards.
It has been argued by a number of scholars (see Bennett, 2002; Frick, 2007) that due to the 
influences of quality management system, however, the structure or purpose of safety
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management systems used across the different industries located around the world have not 
been uniform. They pointed out how a number of systems have been developed and 
marketed by private organisations often by auditing firms which only take into account the 
managerial perspective ignoring the benefits of including the views of the employees or 
trade union representatives in the management of OHS.
From the different enforced and voluntary guidelines that are available for safeguarding 
occupational health and safety, the European Framework Directive (EEC, 1989) and the 
ILO Guidelines on the management of occupational health and safety (ILO, 2001b) are 
widely acknowledged as the two which are built on the principles of effective OHS 
management system. As discussed in the review of the literature (section 2.1 and 2.2) they 
exhibit three principle features. Firstly, the central to the EU Directive and ILO Guidelines 
is a participative style of management of OHS. This includes ‘worker participation’ which 
requires workers or their representatives to have the legal rights to participate on all matters 
relating to OHS in their workplaces (Vogel, 1994). As discussed in section 2.1.2 it is also 
important to reiterate that the participation that the EU Directive and the ILO Guidelines 
require is essentially a bottom-up form where typically elected worker representatives 
contribute in the management of OHS and not direct form of participation where managers 
use it merely to persuade workers to follow the corporate objectives.
Secondly, the EU Directive and the ILO Guidelines both lay stress upon upstream 
management of OHS based on the principles of risk assessment. As discussed in section 
2.1.1 the EU Directive (Article: 6), for instance, categorically requires employers to follow 
a safe place approach in which it requires them to provide a safe working environment by 
first considering ways to avoid risks at workplace, then evaluating those risks which cannot 
be avoided followed by combating risks at source (EEC, 1989). Thus the emphasis is on 
making the workplace safer and not on ways to transform the workers’ behaviour with the 
intention to change them into safer individuals. The EU Directive and the ILO Guidelines 
also clearly places equal emphasis on managing workers’ occupational health in the same 
way as occupational safety. The ILO Guidelines (section 3.11), for example, points out 
employers should conduct ‘surveillance of workers’ health, where appropriate, through 
suitable medical monitoring or follow-up of workers for early detection of signs and 
symptoms of harm to health in order to determine the effectiveness of prevention and 
control measures (ILO, 2001b: 14).
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Finally, the general principle of both the EU Directive and the ILO Guidelines is to achieve 
the final outcome of effectively safeguarding workers from workplace hazards. In other 
words they are target oriented which implies that although complying with the means (i.e. 
the different procedures of SMSs) is important, the critical objective is to purely use the 
means to facilitate reaching the end (Frick, 2007). In this respect there is a minor difference 
between the EU Directive and the ILO Guidelines. While the latter incorporates self-critical 
mechanisms such as auditing and reviewing to ensure continuous improvement to the 
SMSs used in organisations, the EU Directive, on the other hand, does not mention the 
requirement of such procedures and sticks to the more fundamental mandated principles of 
OHS management.
In the maritime context, however, the principles of the ISM Code shows significant 
difference in its focus from the three principle features of the EU Directive or the ILO 
Guidelines discussed above. As highlighted in sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 the ISM Code 
places little importance to worker participation or the benefits of including workers or their 
representatives in contributing to the management of OHS on ships. The only mention on 
workers in the ISM Code relates to promoting their motivation, training them and checking 
their medical fitness. Also, what is different in the ISM Code from either the EU Directive 
or the ILO Guidelines is the way in which the Code places no emphasis on the employers 
to ensure that shipboard risk is effectively assessed (see discussion in section 2.1.1). It 
avoids detailing, for instance, how risk should be evaluated, avoided or combated at source. 
Moreover, in a stark contrast to the EU Directive or the ILO Guidelines, the Code 
completely ignores issues related to occupational health or its management. Finally, from 
the review of the literature it also appears that the ISM Code places heavy emphasis on 
complying with the intricate details of the several procedures of the SMSs. While this in 
itself is not an indication of success or failure of the effectiveness of the Code, it remains to 
be seen in this study whether in practice it helps in making shipboard work any safer.
As such the company managers are required to develop their own SMSs based on the 
infrastructure of the ISM Code. The way the Code is presented it allows a great degree of 
flexibility for managers of the shipping companies to interpret it and develop SMSs 
suitable for their style of management. The discussion in chapter 4 presents in detail the 
layout of the SMSs of the two companies (in which I conduct my case studies) indicating
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how the two organisations have interpreted the ISM Code and laid out the foundation of the 
management of occupation (health and) safety.
For the benefit of the empirical research I have identified three main components of the 
ISM Code. They are risk assessment (ISM Code sections 7, 8 and 10), incident/ near-miss 
reporting (ISM Code section 9) and audit and review of the SMS (ISM Code section 12). 
From the broad objective of the thesis -  which is to understand the practice of the ISM 
Code, the focus is narrowed down to evaluate the operation of each of these three 
procedures of SMSs. In the following section therefore the discussion draws on studies that 
point out the main features of these SMS procedures and highlight their practice in the 
maritime industry.
2.3.1 Risk Assessment
Risk Assessment is a central component in the management of OHS (see for example EEC,
1989). It provides the mechanism to employers to systematically identify, assess and 
control workplace risks. The UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE), for example, points 
out how employers are required to examine what hazards could harm their employees and 
how hazards could arise as a consequence of carrying out their jobs. The whole process of 
appreciating the hazards, determining how they could harm employees and the controlling 
mechanisms is regarded as risk assessment. It also highlights that the risk-assessors should 
have the knowledge of hazards at work as well as the knowledge of working activity and 
work practices (HSE, 1997).
In the maritime context the Code of Safe Working Practices (CSWP) offers a guide to 
how risk assessment should be conducted (MCA, 2006). It states that the responsibility for 
conducting risk assessment lies with the individual employers and that it should be carried 
out by ‘suitably experienced personnel, using specialist advice if appropriate’ (2006: 4) 
The main part of the publication enumerates hazards that are likely to be encountered 
during different types of work on ships and offers a list of predetermined risk assessments. 
It includes, for example, the risks associated with hot work and indicates the set of controls 
that should be in place.
27 Code o f Safe Working Practices is a Government o f UK publication which is required to be complied with 
as per the UK statute and is required to be carried on all UK merchant ships. This publication, however, is 
widely regarded as a standard industry guideline globally.
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The second part the CSWP points out how risks should be assessed especially for those 
tasks which are not enumerated in the main part of the guideline. Drawing on the British 
Standard 8800: 200428, the CSWP guideline shows how risks should be assessed by 
determining the severity of harm and the likelihood of the harm occurring for each of the 
hazards at work. The three following tables are reproduced from CSWP to explain the 
point.
Category Slight Harm Moderate Harm Extreme Harm
Health Headache, temporary ill-health Dermatitis, asthma Occupational cancer, acute fatal 
disease
Safety Superficial injury, minor cuts Bums, minor fractures Amputation, fatal injury
Table 8: Examples o f how to categorise severity o f harm 
Source: MCA (2006).
Category Very Likely Likely Unlikely Very Unlikely
Typically occurring Once every 6 
months
Once every 5 years Once in a working 
lifetime
Less than 1% 
chance
Table 9: Examples o f  how to categorise likelihood o f harm 
Source: MCA (2006).
Severity
Likelihood
Slight Harm Moderate Harm Extreme Harm
Very Unlikely Very Low Risk Very Low Risk High Risk
Unlikely Very Low Risk Medium Risk Very High Risk
Likely Low Risk High Risk Very High Risk
Very Likely Low Risk Very High Risk Very High Risk
Table 10: Risk Estimator Table 
Source: MCA (2006).
There is however very little information available on the practice of risk assessment or in 
general on the implementation of the ISM Code in shipping companies. However, from the 
available sources discussed in the review of the literature (Bailey, 2006), it suggests that 
there is an emphasis on the quantitative approach and a reliance on risk experts’ knowledge 
in assessing risk for day-to-day jobs onboard.
28 British Standard BS 8800: 2004 is an Occupational Health and Safety Management Systems Guide 
published by a private British organisation.
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Maritime press articles are by and large critical about the way risk assessment is conducted 
in the industry. They indicate that in the ship management offices and among seafarers risk 
assessment is synonymous with ‘tick-boxing’ checklists and mechanically filling-in risk 
assessment forms. The articles point out that as a consequence there is an added burden on 
seafarers to comply with paperwork but it remains a question whether or not it actually 
contributes to the assessment of risk (Lloyds List, 2002c; 2004b).
2.3.2 Incident Reporting
Incident Reporting entails a systematic way of reporting incidents and near-miss 
occurrences at workplaces. It serves as a mechanism to check the effectiveness of SMSs by 
learning from errors. The UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE, 1997), for example, 
identifies incident reporting as an effective technique to determine the shortcomings in the 
way OHS is managed in organisations. It suggests that by analysing the cause of incidents 
or near-miss occurrences, organisations get the opportunity to learn their root causes and 
make sure that such mistakes are not repeated. It also provides an opportunity to identify 
inadequacies of organisations’ risk assessment techniques or even companies’ policies. 
Incident reporting in most industries also forms part of a legislative requirement (EEC, 
1989: Article-9). It serves the purpose of developing accident databases at the industry, 
national and in some cases even at the supranational levels.
The importance of reporting near-miss occurrences is also argued in several studies. 
Heinrich’s (1931) and Bird’s (1966) works point out that for each serious incident, such as 
an employees’ fatality due to a fall from a height, there takes place a number of less severe 
incidents, such as a similar fall but resulting only in spraining of the leg. The argument 
highlights that as injuries and serious incidents are relatively less in number, managers 
should make use of analysing near-miss cases (which are relatively more in number) and 
learn from the ‘common’ root causes. While there are critics to this common root cause 
argument (see for example Wright and Van der Schaaf, 2004), the importance of reporting 
near-miss occurrences is widely acknowledged.
Based on empirical studies conducted in the UK oil, food, construction, health and 
transport sectors, the UK HSE indicated the following ratio between major accidents, 
minor injuries and non-injury cases to support the argument why near-miss occurrences 
should also be reported (HSE, 1997).
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1 M ajor incident o r over 3- 
day lost-tim e injury
For every 7 m inor injuries
For every 189 non-in juries 
(near-m iss occurrences)
Figure 7: Accident Triangle 
Source: HSE, (1997: 8).
The available data on the practice of incident and near-miss occurrence reporting in the 
maritime industry shows that it is an area of concern. It indicates that the industry suffers 
from underreporting due to seafarers’ fear of being victimised from the reports. The 2001 
annual report from the MAIB, for example, highlighted that seafarers fail to report because 
of their fear of being blamed as a consequence of reporting. The report stated that 
‘throughout the industry, mariners are genuinely frightened that if they were known to be 
reporting safety deficiencies, they would almost certainly lose their jobs. This climate of 
fear is not conducive to the establishment of a safety culture at sea’ (MAIB, 2001: 9).
2.3.3 Audit and Review
The UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE, 1997: 68) states that audit and management
review mechanisms are ‘feedback loops for a systematic check of efficiency’ of one or
more activities of an organisation. It defines audit as:
The structured process of collecting independent information on the efficiency, 
effectiveness and reliability of the total health and safety management system and 
drawing up plans for corrective actions
Similarly, the ILO guidelines on the management of occupational health and safety (ILO, 
2001b) also points out that audit programme should check all the elements of SMSs to 
locate whether appropriate management arrangements are in place in relation to the risks 
encountered. It points out that audits among other things should establish whether SMSs 
are capable of emergency prevention, preparedness and response, risk prevention and 
control measures, and equally are successful in promoting effective worker participation 
and fulfilling the goals of continual improvement.
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The guideline (ILO, 2001b) also points out how SMSs should be subjected to regular 
review. It suggests that for the purpose of the review, managers should consider the results 
of risk assessment, incident reports and audit outcomes besides considering input from 
regulators, employees and other industry stakeholders. All these different inputs should be 
taken into consideration when updating an organisation’s SMS.
In the case of the maritime industry, however, there is a lack of instruction in the ISM Code 
on the operation of these two proactive elements. In its absence, industry norms as per 
guidelines set by Flag State Administration, Classification Society and such other key 
stakeholders (IACS, 2005; NKK, 2007; MCA, 2007) provide some information. They 
indicate that audit and review should be conducted at least once every year. With regard to 
the audit, these guidelines recommend that among other objectives, organisations should 
identify the training requirements for their auditors who should establish how well 
organisations’ procedures are being followed. With regard to ‘who should conduct 
reviews’, these guidelines indicate that the ships’ captains are expected to play an 
important role in the review process.
Similar to the two previous cases, there is limited information on how these two elements 
are practised in the maritime context. The available evidence from press articles is, 
however, critical about the way they are operated. Some maritime press articles suggest 
that the way audits are conducted on ships are merely to secure the ISM certification which 
is mandatory for their trading. One such article stated that audits are ‘gradually becoming 
more symbolic than real and often undertaken by the use of the same checklist, over and 
over again’ (Lloyds List, 2003b).
This discussion thus highlighted the main features of the three central elements of the ISM 
Code and from the available data presented a sketchy picture of how they are practised in 
the maritime industry. Through out the review of the literature it however revealed the lack 
of academic studies conducted on OHS in the maritime industry generally and on the 
implementation of the ISM Code in particular. Nonetheless, there have been a few studies 
conducted in this field which specifically attempted to understand the effectiveness of the 
implementation of the different elements of the ISM Code. The two studies which are
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widely acknowledged in the industry as most relevant in this field are Anderson’s (2002) 
and IMO’s (2006). They are examined in the following sections.
2.4 Earlier studies on the impacts of the ISM Code
Anderson undertook a research project to study the benefits of the implementation of the 
ISM Code (Anderson et al., 2003). In 2001 he sent out nearly 70,000 questionnaires to 
seafarers and other industry stakeholders, such as shore-based managers, State regulators, 
surveyors and maritime educational institutes. The main objective of the questionnaire was 
to inquire into the perceptions of the individuals on the usefulness of the implementation of 
the ISM Code. The author used a series of multiple-choice questions to elicit respondents’ 
perception on the effectiveness of the different elements of the Code. Besides, at the end of 
the questionnaires, the respondents were also encouraged to express their views on the 
impact of the Code. Additionally, a dedicated website -  www.ismcode.net -  containing the 
same survey format was launched to invite a broader participation from across the maritime 
industry. Over 3000 completed questionnaires, of which around two-third were from the 
seafarers, and another 800 comments were received and used to analyse the findings.
The study concluded that the ISM Code has the potential to work, but different companies 
and individuals experienced different levels of achievement. It revealed how the 
perceptions of seafarers differed significantly from the managers or other shore-based 
personnel in the industry. The main findings pointed out that for the success of the 
implementation of the Code, leadership, commitment from the top, continuity of 
employment and good communication between shore and ship were some of the most 
important factors. Besides, education and training programmes for seafarers were also 
essential for its implementation.
The author, however, also admitted that the study failed to infer any definitive answer on 
whether the ISM Code was perceived as ‘working or not’ and consequently whether or not 
it made the industry any safer. In the conclusion he also suspected that the lack of ‘verdict’ 
was due to the different culture across the globe that produced a cluster of different results. 
While seafarers from OECD countries, such as the UK, were upfront and dismissive of the 
values of the Code, their counterparts from places like India and Philippines gave 
favourable response in the questionnaire implying that the Code was beneficial.
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Thus, the research was a piece of work that was largely a presentation of the perceptions 
and views of seafarers and other industry stakeholders. In fact, in the study the author 
stated that the intention of the survey was not for ‘pure academic’ purpose but to reflect on 
the implementation of the first phase29 of the ISM Code and make such feedback accessible 
to the industry personnel around the global maritime industry.
Two years after the 2nd phase of the implementation of the ISM Code, between 2004 and 
2005 a similar study was conducted by the IMO. It set out to identify the impact of the ISM 
Code and its effectiveness in the enhancement of safety of life at sea and protection of the 
marine environment by engaging an independent group of experts comprising of 32 
professionals from the academia and industry (IMO, 2006).
This group used a similar questionnaire based survey for eliciting the perceptions of the 
members of the Flag State Administrators, shore based managers and seafarers. The group 
sent out 162 questionnaires to the Flag State Administrators and received 32 responses. For 
the shore based managers and seafarers it used various professional bodies to distribute the 
questionnaires. In all, the group received 118 responses from shore-based personnel and 
2959 responses from seafarers.
The study showed an overwhelmingly positive perception from all three professional 
groups. Nearly all the respondents from the Flag State Administrators, for example, 
suggested that the Code is useful and starting to work (2006: 15). Similarly, 99% of the 
shore-based personnel believed that the SMS used in their companies was either useful or 
very useful (2006: 20). Equally, 95% of the seafarers who responded indicated that as a 
consequence of the implementation of the ISM Code the ships are now safer places to work 
(2006: 26). From the results, the group of experts concluded that the ISM Code was 
beneficial to enhance the safety and pollution prevention standards and revealed that, 
‘where the ISM Code is embraced as a positive step toward efficiency through safety 
culture, tangible benefits are evident’. It also identified a number of issues such as the need 
for better motivation of the seafarers, streamlining and reducing paperwork, greater use of 
technology and involving seafarers in the continuous improvement of SMSs (2006: 29).
29 The first phase o f the implementation was in 1998 in which the international tanker, bulk carrier and 
passenger ship sectors were required to comply with the Code. The remaining types o f ship were required to 
comply with the ISM Code in the second phase o f the implementation in 2002.
82
However, the group of experts was sceptical about the overwhelming positive response of 
the survey. It believed that ‘interest in taking part in the study was highest among those that 
had generally enjoyed some benefit from the implementation of ISM’. Thus, the group 
concluded that the response was not a representation of the industry. It also acknowledged 
that such methodological problem ‘could only be addressed by investing in a study 
employing researchers in the field to ensure that the views of the non-supporters could be 
specifically captured’ (2006: 28). t
Both these studies, thus, suffered from methodological weaknesses, although they were 
greatly significant and major attempts on a global scale to understand the impacts of the 
implementation of the ISM Code. The questionnaire based survey technique proved useful 
in revealing some of the main impediments to the operationalisation of the Code, but failed 
to elicit the underlying factors, such as what caused the impediments and how were they so 
important. It thus had acknowledged limitations to determine underlying factors that 
influenced the operation of the ISM Code. The method, for instance, was not able to 
consider issues relating to social relations or to look into the socio-economic factors, 
which, as pointed out in the earlier discussions play a major role in the practice of 
implementation of SMSs.
In the wake of this discussion, the present study thus attempts to address these issues by 
taking a different methodological stance. The discussion in the following chapter identifies 
the appropriate methodological approach for the study keeping in mind how best this study 
can determine the underlying factors influencing the implementation of the ISM Code.
Summary
The discussion in this chapter presented a review of literature based on international 
findings on the implementation of regulated self-regulation of OHS. It discussed the roles 
of employers, employees and regulators in relation to the management of OHS and argued 
that commitment from the managers in providing a safe working environment and 
participation of the employees in the management of organisation’s OHS are two main 
prerequisites for effective management of OHS. It also pointed out how trade unions’ 
support is central to employee participation. The discussion further highlighted how 
regulators were vital in providing a regulatory steer for the implementation of regulated 
self-regulation as well as in conducting surveillance of workplaces.
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In the second section the discussion drew on the literature that showed how some 
underlying social and economic factors affecting managers, employees and organisations 
have major influences on the management of OHS. It revealed, for example, how a high 
level of trust and good communication between managers and employees provided the 
foundation for effective management of health and safety in organisations.
f
The third section introduced the SMSs and discussed their relevance to the management of 
OHS. It presented the central elements of the ISM Code (risk assessment, incident 
reporting, and audit and review) and described their main features and highlighted their 
practices in the maritime industry.
The final section of the chapter discussed studies specifically focused on the 
implementation of the ISM Code. It pointed to their limitations and noted that these studies 
themselves acknowledge a need for further research concerning underlying social factors 
affecting the operation of the ISM Code.
What emerges most forcefully from the review in this chapter therefore concerns the 
importance of the social relations of employment in underpinning the operational aspects of 
systems to apply OHS management in practice. Yet research in the maritime industry has 
so far failed to adequately investigate these issues in relation to the implementation of the 
ISM Code. There is therefore an opportunity to further explore the role of factors inherent 
in employment relationships in the maritime industry in mediating the impact of the ISM 
Code on occupational health and safety management on board ships.
This is the aim of the research as reported in the following chapters. It focuses on the 
perceptions of shipping company managers concerning the operation of various procedures 
to implement risk assessment, incident reporting and audit and review as required by the 
ISM Code and compares and contrasts them with the perceptions of the seafarers involved 
in the operation onboard ships. It seeks to understand the findings that emerge from this 
process in terms of both the social relations on board ships and between seafarers and their 
managers as well as in terms of the wider context of the organisation and relations of 
employment in the maritime industry as a whole.
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Chapter-3: Methodology
Introduction
The purpose of the thesis is to address the question “what is the impact of the International 
Safety Management (ISM) Code on the management of OHS in the maritime industry”. 
Although occupational safety and occupational health are the two interrelated factors which 
affect workers’ wellbeing generally (see discussion by Nichols, 1997: 6), the discussion in 
section 1.1.3 revealed how the two are treated very differently in the maritime context. 
Such skewed focus on issues related to safety and its management also affects in the way in 
which the empirical study as well as the methodology on which the empirical data 
collection and analysis are based is also compelled to focus on factors affecting shipboard 
safety and the way its management is practised.
In the previous chapter the discussion drawn on the extant literature identified that the 
management commitment and employee participation are the two key prerequisites for 
effective implementation of SMSs generally. Moreover, it also showed that the 
effectiveness of these prerequisites is largely reliant on social underpinnings, such as 
employment relations and social relations between managers and employees in an 
organisation. Thus, in order to determine how such social influences worked in the 
maritime context and address the research question it is important that my research took an 
appropriate methodological approach.
In this chapter the discussion focuses on the research process followed in this thesis and 
provides an account of how the research was conducted. It incorporates the different stages 
of the empirical work, from justifying the choice of research methods to my experiences of 
using the data analysis techniques.
The first section of this chapter therefore provides a justification of how from the different 
available methods used in studies on organisational health and safety, a case study method 
using qualitative techniques was the most appropriate for its purpose. It then points out the 
process of selecting the two case studies and presents an account of the hindrances faced in 
the process of getting access to the two organisations. The second section describes the 
detail of the data collection process, which was divided into two stages: shore-based 
management office and research voyages, and illustrates the different research techniques 
used at each stage of the fieldwork. The third section presents an overview of the research
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data analysis where it shows how computer-based data analysis program ‘N-Vivo’ 
facilitated the analysis process. The fourth and final section presents how the study took 
into account the ethical dimensions of the research.
3.1 Research methods commonly used in earlier studies
The studies which have attempted to establish the effectiveness of the implementation of 
various elements of OHS management systems used different research methods. The 
review of these studies indicates that three of the most commonly used methods are:
1. studying objective indicators
2. safety clim ate surveys
3. qualitative m ethod using case study approaches
The following subsections critically assess the use of these three methods.
3.1.1 Objective Indicators
One of the common approaches adopted in such studies is to look into certain objective 
indicators of the performance of the management of OHS. It typically includes 
investigating the number of incidents in workplaces or injuries affecting employees. A high 
rate of incidents in organisations, in general, indicates a poor standard of occupational 
health and safety and vice-versa. By establishing the causal factors, for instance, with a 
high rate of workers’ injuries, it can identify the weaknesses in the management of OHS. 
This method can facilitate longitudinal analysis of such data and also offer comparative 
analysis across different industries or organisations.
One such study which used objective indicators was conducted by Spangenberg et al. 
(2003) in a research on workers’ OHS. By comparing the data from two groups of workers, 
the authors found a significant difference in their injury rates. The study revealed that the 
group of workers who were better trained through an apprenticeship programme had a 
comparatively lower injury rate. The authors concluded that one of the causal factors for 
higher injury rate for the second group was the lack of such training.
While such examples show the benefit of using objective indicators to establish the causal 
links of injuries or other workplace incidents, it is not straightforward. One of the most 
serious impediments with using this methodology is underreporting of industrial injuries
86
and incidents. Powell et al. (1971), for example, in their study on industrial injuries and 
incidents revealed the extent of the problem. By observing reportable cases and comparing 
them with the number of cases actually reported by the workers, the authors estimated that 
as high as 70% of the cases were not reported. Such studies point to the weakness of using 
such method in my study.
Moreover, studies also show that the rate of underreporting of incident or near-miss 
occurrences is inconsistent across industries. An analysis of the UK Labour Force Survey 
by Nichols (1997: 201), for example, estimated that the rate of underreporting differed 
from one industry to another. The author estimated that while in the agriculture sector 
underreporting of personal injuries was as high as 85%, the corresponding figure in the 
energy sector was at a moderate 30%.
Also, with regard to assessing the effectiveness of the implementation of OHS management 
systems, the problem with focusing on objective indicators of causal factors is not just 
limited to the lack of such indicators or their accuracies, but also the complexities 
associated with the interpretation of the data. By way of illustrating this point, Hughes and 
Ferrett (2003), for example, pointed out that a rise in the number of reported near-miss 
occurrences could mean poor implementation of OHS management systems. However, it 
could also be unrelated to the performance of the systems, because of a shift in the 
definition of what constitutes a near-miss occurrence. Yet another alternative explanation 
could be that it signifies a positive effect on the system’s performance, for example, if the 
system prompts active reporting where hitherto a culture of ‘non-reporting’ might have 
been prevalent.
The studies in the global maritime industry indicate that carrying out research based on the 
number of incident, injury or near-miss occurrences or such other figures on OHS 
performance is significantly more challenging (see Ellis, 2007). Besides the weakness of 
underreporting, they point out that in this international industry it is hard to establish the 
occurrence rate of these incidents owing to the lack of the knowledge of the number of 
seafarers employed at an international level. Wu and Winchester’s (2005) study, for 
example, exposes the problem. Their work on the global labour market of seafarers pointed 
out that the paucity of data on the total number of seafarers employed from each nation 
makes it nearly impossible to find out the rate of incident or injury in this industry with any
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certainty. Nielsen and Roberts (1999) in their study also revealed how some of the FOC 
administrators refused to share data or cooperate with their research. Basic information, 
such as the number of seafarers employed by them and the number of fatalities occurred on 
ships under their registry, was denied. Thus, research with numeric values conducted in this 
global industry at best is likely to produce a tentative result.
Conducting a study on non-fatal injuries or occupational ill-health in the maritime industry 
is significantly more speculative. As pointed out in the review of the literature (section 
1.1), major incidents in this industries causing noticeable pollution or resulting in large 
numbers of fatalities are generally reported and analysed, while a less severe incident, for 
instance, which only causes personal injuries do not draw the same attention. The lack of 
focus on non-fatal injuries or occupational ill-health thus leads to the second difficulty in 
using such data for study. Research in fact shows nearly a total absence of systematic study 
on non-fatal injuries or occupational ill health in the maritime industry. Moreover, Jensen 
et al.'s (2004) analysis on self-reported occupational injury cases pointed out that even the 
national authorities which process these reports and make them available for research 
barely facilitate a worldwide comparative analysis. Besides the lack of detailed information 
of the cause of the incidents, the different data processing and analysis standards used by 
each maritime flag states played as a major hindering factor.
Notwithstanding the problems of underreporting, the use of this approach would have been 
particularly challenging to determine the social underpinnings that affect the 
implementation of the ISM Code in the maritime industry. While such data could have 
provided valuable information on factors affecting seafarers’ injuries and ill health, it 
would not have been useful for the purpose of this study.
3.1.2 Safety Climate Studies
Another type of methodology commonly used in such studies relies on revealing the 
perception of organisational safety culture. The researchers taking this approach focus on 
the managers’ and workers’ perceptions of the standard of organisational safety. They point 
out that within working environments positive safety cultures relate closely with a good 
level of safety awareness among the managers and workers and their willingness to adopt 
safe working practices and vice-versa. Thus, the researchers argue that if human qualities, 
such as beliefs, values, priorities, norms and practices that are prevalent in social groups
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can be measured they should provide a reliable indicator of the effectiveness of the 
management of OHS (Pidgeon, 1991; Hudson, 1999).
According to Reason (1997) this form of research method integrates well with preventative 
management of organisational safety. It is a proactive concept which helps explore a set of 
latent conditions -  an approach which in the last two decades has gained significant 
prominence. Studies using questionnaire surveys conducted on offshore oil industries 
(Rundmo, 1993), chemical processing plants (Hofmann and Stertzer, 1996) and British 
Railways maintenance (Farrington-Darby et a l , 2005) indicated that managers’ and 
workers’ perception of safety standards has close parallels with the number of 
organisational injuries and near-misses occurrences.
However, a number of studies point to serious weaknesses of this method. Williams et al. 
(1989), for example, conducting a study on cultural influence on organisations, pointed out 
that safety perception is not a firm indicator of the standard of safety in the entire 
organisation. The authors highlighted that responses of individuals to perception studies 
differed from department to department and workgroup to workgroup and pointed in the 
direction of the presence of multiple safety cultures within an overarching corporate culture 
in each organisation.
Gherardi and Nicolini (2000) on the discussion on communities of practice identified a 
similar feature. The authors argued that organisational safety culture is largely a product of 
local influence. As a result, within a single organisation there could be traits of different 
cultures, each exhibiting specific work practices and therefore possessing specific safety 
cultures.
In discussing another weakness of this form of study, a number of researchers have argued 
that the use of questionnaire surveys to investigate employees’ perceptions is particularly 
ill-suited for identifying the effectiveness of the management of health and safety in 
industries which are globally spread. Saari (1998), for example, discussing the various 
methods of safety intervention programmes pointed out how safety climate measurement 
tools were not transferable from one physical location to another. The researcher 
highlighted how a set of survey questionnaire meant to identify the safety perception 
among the employees in an American construction industry prepared by Dedobbeleer and
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German (1987) could not be used effectively in his own research which was conducted in a 
completely different setting in Canada. He argued that safety climate studies require 
incorporating the special requirements of each industry besides taking into account the 
cultural idiosyncrasies of each location.
In this context, Anderson el aV  s (2003) remark on the findings of his work on the 
implementation of the ISM Code is of particular relevance. As discussed in the previous 
chapter (section 2.4), the authors revealed that the questionnaire survey used for the 
research failed to answer the research question. The authors believed that due to the 
dispersed geographic origin of the seafarers (Indian and British, for example) the use of a 
single questionnaire survey may not have been appropriate. They speculated that different 
cultural backgrounds played a major role in generating clusters of different and often 
contradictory results to his questionnaire.
The discussion so far has described two types of research method which have been used in 
studies identifying organisational safety standards. It however showed that the weaknesses 
of these methods were particularly pronounced in conducting research in the maritime 
setting and thus were not considered in my study. As outlined in the beginning of this 
chapter, the review of the literature revealed the intricacies associated with the management 
of OHS and pointed to the importance of looking into various underlying factors that affect 
it. Such studies commonly take a qualitative research method using a case study approach -  
which is discussed below.
3.1.3 Qualitative research method using a case study approach
The discussions in the previous chapter identified how the management of OHS is
dependent on a number of issues. It includes for example socio-economic factors affecting 
the organisation and the social relation between the employers. Earlier studies, such as by 
Kochan (1998) and Vaughan (1999) show that for appreciating issues related to 
workplaces, it is important to look into the wider context and investigate the central as well 
as some of the peripheral issues.
Similarly, Yin (2003) pointed out that because different factors affect workplaces in 
varying degrees no two workplaces are the same. As a result the research subject gets 
heavily embedded in the context, so much so, that the boundary between the context and
90
the subject becomes blurred. Thus, matters pertaining to workplaces must also be studied 
along with the factors affecting the core subject. Eisenhardt (1989), too, highlighted that an 
in-depth study of the subject in its natural setting leads to a good understanding of the type 
and the strength of the ‘unknown’ variables.
Whipp (1998), too, provided a similar argument. The author pointed out that for 
understanding the problems in the world of work each workplace needs to be looked at 
separately and deeply by getting under the skin of the organisation. Hidden features of 
employment relations, for instance, are likely to be revealed only if individual attention is 
paid to each of the cases. An apparent single problem may have its roots extended to a 
number of social issues. Following this argument, Kochan (1998) pointed out that for a full 
appraisal of the social elements within a workplace or industrial setting, the ‘case study’ 
approach is most suited.
Similar claims can also be made in the case of my study. It can be argued that the 
‘numerous’ factors that affect the operation of the ISM Code cannot be removed from the 
context in which they occur. As a result, for a better appreciation of what affects the 
operation of the Code an understanding of the context is equally important. Thus a case 
study approach involving field trips to the ships in particular is considered a very important 
element of my research.
Selection of Case Studies
The argument that naturally follows is ‘how then does a detailed study of the dynamics 
within a unique case add to the knowledge of a broader phenomenon in question?’ And if 
that is the question in hand, the other related issue that also needs to be addressed first is: 
‘how do researchers choose the appropriate case or cases in the first place?’
For the selection of the case studies, research has pointed to the importance of having a low 
level of prior knowledge of the organisations where case studies are to be conducted. This, 
as pointed out by Miles (1979), gives an opportunity to the researchers to enter the field 
with some supporting structure about the organisations in mind. Yet it does not prejudice 
the researcher preventing him or her from ‘learning’ and building theoretical construct. 
Moreover, it also provides the opportunity for the researcher to decide on the types of 
organisations to approach and the sources of data to explore. In fact, a number of
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researchers, such as Mintzberg (1979), Eisenhardt (1989), Gersick (1988) and Harris and 
Sutton (1986) have recognised its benefits and advocated an ‘in-between’ route of applying 
a limited yet informed knowledge on the subject matter and the phenomenon of research at 
the outset of case study. They point to the importance of the choice of organisations as 
cases should not be random. The cases chosen should reflect a well informed and 
purposeful sampling based on all known typologies that include balance and variety of the 
industry and most importantly the ones that provide the opportunity to learn (Stake, 1980; 
2000).
Now, the argument on the detailed case studies of one or more cases for the understanding 
of the bigger picture is discussed. In the wider literature this issue is described as 
generalisability of case study research. The critics question the usefulness of the detailed 
study of a case which does not represent the population of the study. The proponents of this 
form of study acknowledge this as a problem and provide their counter argument. Yin 
(2003), for example, pointed out that the strength of this form of study draws on the 
detailed investigation which allows the researcher to immerse in the ‘thick description’ 
(Geertz, 1973) of the case. The research engages in thorough analysis and at the end of the 
research it leads to the development of theories. Unlike statistical generalisation, where the 
analysis may be transferred from the representative sample to the population of the study, 
each of the case studies gives the opportunity to create theories, and it is the theory that 
may be generalised and extended beyond the immediate case and applied to other cases 
(Meredith, 1998).
Many authors, such as Stuart et al (2002) and Bryman (2004), have gone on to argue that it 
is entirely possible to generalise from even a single case study. The criticism for not 
studying a sufficient number of cases does not wane if two, four or even ten organisations 
are studied. These are still very small numbers. The authors point out that attempting to 
evaluate the merit of case studies through numbers of cases is a cardinal error and an 
invalid criticism in the first place. No matter how many cases are studied, it is the evolving 
theory that is of significance, and not the number. Stake (2000) further highlighted the 
dangers of getting obsessed with generalisation from case studies. He pointed out that the 
essence of any particular case, even when it demonstrates atypical features, should not be 
lost in pursuit of generalisation. He emphasised on giving priority to learning from 
whatever each case has to offer and not consider its representativeness or typicality.
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I considered these arguments when choosing the two case studies in my research. The 
selection process was based on purposeful sampling that took into account the type of ships 
the companies operated and the businesses they conducted.
In order to avoid the complexity of excessive variation which could have posed problem at 
the analysis stage, I looked at the better end of the market and chose the oil tanker sector. 
As pointed out in the review of the literature the tanker sector of the maritime industry is 
widely acknowledged as one of the safest (see for example Lloyds List, 2005b). By 
studying this sector the aim was to identify the general issues that affect the 
implementation of the ISM Code across the industry while accepting that other sectors may 
face specific challenges. Arguably, it could also expose certain best practices in the 
industry and show how these have contributed to making the tanker sector one of the safest 
in the maritime industry.
Then, for the purpose of bringing in variety I searched for large and small companies -  in 
terms of number and/or size of ships operated (see section 2.1.1) and their type -  
ownership-based30 and third-party management based31 (see section 1.2 concluding 
remarks). These factors were considered as pertinent as the discussion in the literature 
review indicated that they may have influences on the organisations’ standard of OHS.
SHORE-BASED
FIELDW ORK
Company Company
A B
RESEARCH
VOYAGES
Studied Company SMSs
Conducted interview with Director, Marine &
Technical Managers and Superintendents,
Designated Person Ashore (DPA), Managers in
the Purchase and Crewing Dept and Secretaries in
the Quality Departments
Examined ship SMS files on Risk Assessment,
Incident Reporting, and Audit & Review etc.
Examined company safety programmes and
initiatives
Analysed Ship SMS files 
Conducted interview with all ranks, 
including: Captain, Senior Officers, Junior 
Officers and Ratings.
Observed meetings and drills, berthing and 
anchoring stations, cargo operations, as well 
as everyday operation and maintenance tasks.
Figure 8: Overview o f the fieldwork.
30 Ownership: Shipping companies which own and manage the ships in their fleets.
31 Third-party management: Companies which are outsourced management units o f  ship-owners.
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In the selection I did not pay any attention to the ‘generalisability’ of the cases, instead I 
chose the two companies which offered me unrestricted access to the fieldwork. The two 
organisation in my study have been identified as Companies A and B. The fieldwork was 
split between the shore-based management office of the company and two of its ships. 
Thus the four ships where I conducted my research are identified as Ship-Al, A2, B1 and 
B2 (see figure: 8).
Although the registry of ships was initially considered as an important factor for case study 
selection, but soon it proved difficult because very often one company had ships in its fleet 
registered in different maritime nations. Therefore, in most cases the companies per se did 
not indicate where their ships were registered.
Thus, the choice of the two case studies had to meet the following set of criteria (see table 
format below). Firstly, I tried to locate two companies which operated oil tankers trading 
on a typical oil trade. Secondly, the two companies had to have diverse fleet sizes, and 
thirdly, they had to have two different management styles. Considering these options, I 
looked for two shipping companies which fit into either of the following criteria:
Criteria Company-A Company-B
Ship type Tankers Tankers
Company size Big Small
Company type Management/ Ownership Ownership/ Management
Table 11: Criteria for case study selection
'X')Based on these criteria, I looked into databases of global shipping companies and 
identified several companies which fit into either the Company-A or Company-B type. In 
all, I identified nearly 30 shipping companies around the world.
However, the difficulties of getting access to the fieldwork became apparent soon after I 
started requesting companies for access. The complexities of approving researchers on 
ships are particularly acute in this industry. For accommodating a researcher, a shipping 
company needs to overcome a number of hurdles before it can permit a researcher to sail 
on its ships (discussed later in this section). Therefore I could only send request letters to a 
pair of companies (one from each type) at a time to allow them time to respond. I followed
32 Database used: Lloyds Shipping List and Fairplay Register 2004.
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it up with subsequent requests on phone calls and e-mails till they either accepted or turned 
down my request. I also exploited my prior contact in the industry hoping to get a prompt 
response but soon realised that getting access to the fieldwork was going to take a long 
time.
From the large number of negative responses that I received, I could identify three main 
reasons for the delay in getting access to my fieldwork. Firstly, the focus of my research 
which attempted to look into the organisations’ practice in the operation of SMSs was 
particularly sensitive in the maritime industry. From the response of the companies, which 
declined my request, it showed that the practice of the management of OHS in those 
companies was classed as confidential. For example, one gatekeeper of one such company 
said: ‘we don’t want to draw high profile attention unnecessarily’, while another said: ‘it’s 
(managing OHS) our internal business, we don’t want people meddling it up’.
This corroborated Smith’s (2001) work on the challenges of conducting ethnographic 
studies in workplaces. In the study the author pointed out conducting research on 
organisational practices is often considered as a threat as researchers can potentially 
disclose operational deficiencies to the regulators or pass on the operational tricks to the 
organisation’s competitors.
Secondly, getting access to conduct research on board ships is considerably more complex 
than shore-based industries because of a series of procedural and logistical problems 
involved. For instance, the company manager has to determine whether the insurance 
company insuring the seafarers would also insure me, and if it does what would be the 
additional premium involved. Also, very often modem ships sail with minimum amount of 
life saving equipment. Thus, the manager had to determine whether the ship had space and 
equipment to accommodate me. Furthermore, the manager also had to take into account the 
various immigration mles that I was likely to be subjected to. He or she needed to ensure 
that I not only had the appropriate travel documents (such as a visa) for the country in 
which I would join the ship but also of all the places that the ship subsequently visits 
during the research including the port from where I would disembark.
Thirdly, some companies may have viewed my prior knowledge of the industry as an 
additional threat. My intimate association with the practice of the implementation of the 
ISM Code, both from shore-based management as well as ships, may have been one of the 
reasons for deterring them. Indeed when conveying rejection over the phone, one of the 
managers, for instance, stated: ‘we did not want us to get inspected by you’.
Lack of academic research in the maritime industry has been revealed in a number of 
places in the review of the literature. The difficulties of access I experienced also go some 
way to explaining this dearth.
Finally, after getting rejection from around 20 shipping companies between December 
2005 and July 2006,1 finally received access to the fieldwork from two companies which 
matched the criteria set for the two types of organisations. The following table provides an 
overview of the two case studies selected for the research.
Criteria Company-A Company-B
Ship type Oil tankers Oil tankers
Trading Typical location Typical location
Company size Relatively Large Relatively Small
Company type Management Ownership
Location Europe Europe
Table 12: Key features o f the two companies.
My experience of getting access to the case studies suggests that the two companies 
represent the better end of the industry. It can be argued that these companies operated 
within the requirements of various maritime regulations and allowed me access because 
they did not have anything to hide. The next chapter provides an outline of the two case 
studies in more detail, while the focus of this chapter returns to the discussion on the 
method used in each stage of the fieldwork.
331 have more than 15 years o f experience in the maritime industry. During this period I served on tankers in 
different capacities including two years as ship’s captain and one and half years as a safety manager in a 
management-unit o f a shipping company.
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Use of Qualitative method
Stake (2000) emphasised the point that the choice of case study approach has no direct 
bearing on the methods used in the process. Both quantitative and qualitative methods have 
their places in this mode of inquiry. Bryman (2004) supported this and argued that although 
the methods commonly used in case studies tilt the scale towards qualitative forms of 
inquiry, in case studies quantitative methods too have been successfully used.
The strength of using qualitative methods has been revealed by authors who have 
compared its benefit over the use of quantitative questionnaire based studies on topics 
related to the management of OHS. Lin and Mills (2001), for example, revealed significant 
differences between using qualitative and quantitative studies by comparing data between 
two particular studies in the construction sector in Australia. The authors used self-assessed 
questionnaires in their studies which according to them failed to expose the underlying 
factors influencing the performance of OHS. Whereas, a few years earlier, Monk’s (1994) 
study, which used a qualitative approach on a similar setup, was successful in locating 
several underlying hindrances to successful OHS outcome. After their experiment Lin and 
Mills (2001) concluded that studies using quantitative questionnaires face the danger of 
receiving exaggerated reports on OHS performance from the respondents.
Strauss and Whitfield (1998) pointed to the suitability of qualitative methods for 
understanding the dynamics of workplace relations and its ability to draw out causations. 
By applying different techniques from qualitative methods hidden features in employment 
relationship may be revealed. In one such example Kunda (1992) successfully used 
observation and documentary analysis techniques in his research to reveal the 
contradictions between documented company procedures and actual practices. The author 
pointed out that such cross checking and triangulation provided rich sources of data and 
careful analysis of such contradiction resulted in locating the underlying explanation to the 
research question.
By taking the argument further, a number of authors highlighted the importance of 
ethnographic studies on organisational research. Roethlisberger and Dickson (1939) and 
Roy (1954) argued how social relations at work, motivations of the workforce, social 
norms that govern workers rate of production are some of the examples which can be best 
understood by using an ethnographic approach. Kanter’s (1977) work on diversity in 
organisation; Piore’s (1983) research on acquisition of new technological skill; and
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Zuboff s (1988) work on impact of computers at work have all used extensive ethnography. 
Van Maanen (1988) also pointed out how the ethnographic approach has been successfully 
used to uncover underlying causes that are unique to the workplace, the industry and the 
culture of the workforce. Similarly, Piore (1983) showed how studies using qualitative case 
study approach using ethnographic methods open up new avenues of interpretation in the 
world of work which could not have been possible through methods that use fixed question 
and answer structure. By allowing the subjects to express their views in interviews and by 
observing them in their natural settings, the researcher takes the opportunity to connect 
different problems in the same arena. To the researchers such methods open up the 
workers’ logic, their rationale, their interpretation of the rules and their views and values 
that inform their actions. Besides, such methods provide an opportunity to understand the 
dynamics of a hierarchical society, social relations among workers and the varying degree 
of worker solidarity that form within all workplaces (Piore, 1983; Friedman, 1994).
The above arguments thus provide a rationale for the use of a qualitative method in my 
study. In particular Kunda’s (1992) example of using different techniques of qualitative 
method to understand the actual work practice is particularly relevant in my study. 
Moreover, following Goffman’s (1961) argument the use of this methodology is highly 
suitable in the case of my research. As a ship is seafarers’ place of work and off-work 
where they live, eat and also spend the lighter moments of their days, it becomes their 
temporary home. The author argued that studies on subjects in such ‘total institution’ is 
best captured by understanding the context in which they live and therefore the most 
appropriate method to capture such context is by being in the field and spending time 
amongst the subjects.
Thus, by looking at the focus of my study and in particular its attempt to bring to light the 
underlying social constraints in the implementation of the ISM Code, the benefit of the use 
of case study approach using qualitative methods is evident. It uses two case studies and 
within those it employs research methodology that uses ethnographic techniques involving 
qualitative semi-structured interviews, observations and documentary analysis.
In a retrospective way I can fully appreciate the arguments presented in this section and the 
benefits of following this approach in this study. The underlying factors affecting the 
practice of OHS management in the two case studies could only be understood by studying
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the practices in the two companies and analysing the rich qualitative data which I gathered 
by following this method.
However, studies have also revealed how this form of research is not without practical 
weaknesses. Bryman (2004), for example, pointed out how ethnographic research is by 
nature extremely time consuming and labour intensive. Besides, this type of research is 
considerably invasive which relies heavily on appropriate access at various stages of the 
fieldwork. It also involves a relatively small group of respondents with whom the 
researcher spends a considerable amount of time and takes researchers too ‘close’ to the 
data. To alleviate this problem the author pointed to the benefit of the use of multiple 
research techniques and the importance of confirming and contrasting data from each of the 
techniques by the means of ‘triangulation’.
There were other constraints too. Like most doctoral studies, this also had limited financial 
support and a fixed period of sponsorship within which to complete the study. Although a 
wider perspective involving various regulatory authorities, trade union organisations or 
other industry stakeholders may have helped in generating a better understanding of the 
research question, completing the research within the given time frame and with the 
available resources was also important.
3.2 Research techniques used in fieldwork
This section is divided into two; the first subsection describes the research techniques used 
in the two shore-based management units, while the second subsection describes the 
research technique used onboard the four research ships.
A total of 59 days of fieldwork was undertaken which included 10 days in the shore-based 
management units of two shipping companies and another 49 days of research voyages on 
the four ships (see table below for breakdown). Qualitative interview methods and 
documentary analysis were used in both cases, while additionally observation technique 
was used during the research voyages.
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Location o f fieldwork Total days o f fieldwork
Shore-based study in Company-A 5
Research Voyage o f  Ship-A1 13
Research Voyage o f  Ship-A2 16
Shore-based study in Company-B 5
Research Voyage o f  Ship-Bl 9
Research Voyage o f  Ship-B2 11
Total 59
Table 13: Duration o f my fieldwork.
3.2.1 Fieldwork in the companies’ shore-based management office
In both companies I conducted the first stage of the fieldwork in the shore-based
management offices where I used documentary analysis and qualitative semi-structured 
interview techniques.
Document analysis
In each case study, I first investigated a set of documents to get an overview of the 
company’s business, its OHS policies and specifically its operating procedures on risk 
assessment, incident and near-miss occurrence reporting and audit and review. The main 
source of this information came from the company’s Safety Management System (SMS). 
These were presented in several bound volumes and were also available in electronic 
format. The company’s SMS included company policies, operating procedures, shipboard 
emergency procedures, incident and near-miss reporting mechanisms, cargo operating 
instructions, and accompanying checklists and forms.
I also looked into the company’s filing room, where for two days I studied the company’s 
archived checklists and forms and correspondence with administrators and ships. These 
also included archived reports from ships of onboard safety meetings and subsequent action 
taken by the managers, reports on risk assessment, incidents and near-miss occurrences, 
audits and reviews. The analysis of these documents helped me familiarise myself with the 
two organisations in general and gave me an overview of the companies’ policies, 
procedures and practice on the three elements of SMSs in particular.
The importance of document analysis is supported by several authors. Prior (2003), for 
instance, reviewing the role of documents in social science research pointed out that
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documents introduce researchers to a social setting. They provide a structured 
understanding of organisations and also help in supporting or contradicting data gathered 
through other research techniques.
While these documents were useful in familiarising me with the companies’ working 
procedures, they offered only a partial view of how each of the SMS elements was 
practised in the two organisations. They did not, for instance, provide explanation on why 
the managers responded to the reports from the ships in the way they did.
In this context Atkinson and Coffey (1997), for example, analysing the role of document 
analysis in social science research, also pointed to certain weaknesses of this research tool. 
They argued that as these documents carry with them the organisational identity the 
persons who produce them generally do so keeping in mind the wider organisational 
objectives. Thus, documents alone do not offer the absolute ‘black and white’ reality.
In both companies, during the course of the document analysis I was confronted with a 
number of questions which I noted down for clarifying during the subsequent semi­
structured interviewing with the managers.
Semi-structured interviews
The interview technique I used in the company management offices was semi-structured as 
it allowed me to retain a degree of flexibility in developing the ongoing conversation 
against a fixed outline of topics. While I followed the general framework of the interview 
schedule (presented in Appendix-E) I also allowed the conversation between me and the 
interviewee to drift, It helped me clarify issues raised by the interviewees. The semi­
structured interview technique in general also facilitated a detailed investigation and 
allowed the managers to express their views in their own languages. For instance, during an 
interview, a manager who conducted audits on ships remarked that he had to ‘produce 
objective evidence for every audit finding’. On getting such a reply I raised several 
questions to learn why there was so much emphasis on producing documented evidence. It 
allowed the manager to explain the underlying factors that influenced the practice of audit 
in the organisation. On occasions I also used ‘probes’ and ‘prompts’ to engage the 
interviewees or to start a fresh discussion. For instance, on one occasion during an 
interview with a superintendent in one of the companies I used an article from the maritime
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press. The article highlighted the risks of operating ships in the coastal trade with reduced 
number of seafarers on board. It helped me elicit from the superintendent how their 
company addressed this concern. It, as pointed out by Johnson (2001) in the discussion on 
in-depth interview research, helped me in drawing out the respondents’ views.
The purpose of conducting semi-structured interviews with the managers in the shore- 
based management units was to learn how each of the three elements of the SMSs was 
practised. For each of the three SMS elements, I focused on inquiring how the managers 
viewed their roles in implementing them and the impediments faced by them in the 
implementation process. I used questions for instance, ‘how does the company assist the 
ships in making risk assessment’, ‘what problems does it face in receiving the incident 
reports’ and ‘what does one expect to learn through audit?’ While these were some of the 
fundamental questions from the interview schedule, through subsequent probing and 
discussions I attempted to elicit whether there was a commitment from the top management 
in the organisations in operationalising the ISM Code. I tried to locate if there were any 
underlying social constraints and factors such as social relationships between the managers 
and seafarers that affected the implementation of the SMS elements.
Benefits of semi-structured interview technique were also pointed out in the literature. 
Rubin and Rubin (1995), for example, in their overview of the qualitative interviewing, 
pointed out how semi-structured interviewing allows for detailed investigation. It focuses 
on the interviewees’ personal beliefs and insights and lets them elaborate which may 
otherwise get lost in structured interviewing.
On average, each interview lasted between an hour and an hour and half. While some of the 
interviews were organised in the office conference rooms, many were conducted at the 
interviewees’ work desk. On several occasions these were disrupted by phone calls and 
other sources of interruption and thus had to be conducted over several sessions. In both 
setups for the majority of the interviews I used a tape-recorder as that allowed me to 
concentrate on thinking about the next question. However, in some cases, the interviewee 
did not give me the permission to record in which cases I resorted to hand-written notes. 
The following table provides the gist of the number of interviews I conducted during the 
first phase of my fieldwork.
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Director 2 1 0.75 2 1 1.50
Manager 2 2 5.50 3 2 3.50
Superintendent 4 3 3.50 4 3 4.00
Support Staff 2 1 1.25 1 1 0.75
Total 10 7 11.00 10 6 9.75
Table 14: Key information o f  the interviews conducted in the two management units
Towards the end of the fieldwork at the shore-based management offices, I discussed the 
plans for the second stage of the research with the managers who were in charge of 
arranging my research voyages. While I short-listed a few ships from the companies’ fleet 
lists based on their trading patterns, the final decision on allocating the two ships for my 
research rested with the company’s managers.
3.2.2 Fieldwork onboard research ships
For joining each ship the company’s managers advised me when and to which port I should 
proceed to. On each occasion I travelled to a different port and sailed with the ship 
wherever the ship went. The following table provides an outline of my four research 
voyages.
Ship- A 1 Ship- A2 Ship- B 1 Ship- B2
Area Asia N. America Europe Europe
Duration 13 days 16 days 9 days 11 days
Table 15: Outline o f the four shipboard research voyages
On joining each ship, I first discussed the scope and purpose of my research with the 
captain and generally spent a significant amount of the first few days with him. This helped 
me in getting the captain’s confidence which I felt was crucial in getting access to the rest 
of the seafarers besides getting permission to conduct observation and look into ship’s 
documents. I also took formal permission for interviewing him and observing the activities
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of colleagues. As pointed out in the subsequent findings chapters, it was evident that the 
captain had significant powers on ships. As a result I felt that it was prudent to take the 
captain’s permission before, for instance, looking into a file or speaking to other seafarers 
on board. In certain cases, such as for being on the bridge34 during manoeuvring35 it was 
apparent that I needed the captain’s explicit permission but in several other occasions, such 
as before interviewing other seafarers, I also asked for his consent only to ensure that I did 
not offend the captain in any way. The importance of staying on the ‘right side of the 
captain’ was also pointed out by Sampson and Thomas (2003b) in their account of 
ethnographic work conducted on board ships. Similar to what was described by the authors 
I found that for the benefit of the study it was imperative that I maintained a good rapport 
with the captain throughout my stay on the ship.
In the three following subsections the discussion shows how I conducted fieldwork on 
board the ships by using three different research techniques.
Semi-structured interviews
During the research voyages I used the semi-structured interview technique extensively. 
The objective of interviewing seafarers was to find out their perspective on the 
management of the ISM Code. With the help of this method I wanted to elicit what roles 
the seafarers played on the ships in the management of each of the three elements of the 
SMSs. For instance, I wanted them to describe how they assessed risk in their workplaces, 
and how they practised the company’s incident and near-miss occurrence reporting 
procedures. From the seafarers I also inquired, for instance, their views on the use of 
SMSs, their experiences with shipboard safety meetings and safety trainings and drills. The 
underlying purpose of these discussions was to identify whether they participated in the 
decision making process of the management of OHS and their social relationships with the 
managers and how social factors, such as the nature of onboard communication affected the 
day-to-day implementation of the ISM Code on their ships.
On each research voyage, for the first two days I only engaged in familiarising myself with 
the ship and its activities. During this period I did not engage in any interviewing as I let 
the seafarers get used to my presence on board. Various port chaplains, who are widely
34 Bridge: Navigation control centre o f a ship, normally located on the top o f accommodation block
35 Manoeuvring: Term used to indicate critical moments of ship navigation.
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regarded as sympathetic and experienced listeners, have also pointed to the importance of 
allowing long periods of rapport building time before seafarers feel comfortable with their 
presence and start to talk to them freely (Kahveci et a l , 2003).
Also, in a majority of the cases I interviewed the seafarers in their cabins or in common 
rooms after their work. This, I felt worked particularly well for the ratings as it made them 
feel more at ease during the interviews. In the case of the officers, I adjusted the timings of 
the interviews as per their convenience. While some chose to be interviewed during their 
rest periods, many found that it was best to be interviewed while they were on watch. In 
some cases, I even interviewed junior officers in the middle of the night during their watch 
on the bridge. On all occasions the interviews with the senior officers, especially the 
captains, were spread over several sessions. Besides the formal interviews I also spent a 
significant amount of time talking to the seafarers informally (as part of data collection), 
which generally took place during meals or while watching videos in the common rooms.
On reviewing Angrosino and Perez’s (2000) discussion on how practitioner turned 
researchers face potential threat of non-cooperation from respondents when they return to 
their original field of work, I was particularly anxious at the start of my first research 
voyage. I was worried that due to my prior knowledge in the industry the seafarers on Ship- 
A1 may not cooperate with me, or worse even become annoyed on being asked questions 
on the ISM Code -  answers to which they may believe that I already have. However, in my 
experience I did not face any such hostile environment. In general, the response from the 
seafarers’ was extremely frank and cooperative. On a number of occasions in their 
interviews both officers and ratings narrated stories to illustrate their experiences on 
workplace hazards, incidents and near-miss occurrences. Some seafarers after completing 
the interview with me even requested to speak to me a second time for sharing more 
experiences with me. One rating on one of the ships, for example, came to me and said: ‘I 
forgot to tell you how we nearly had an accident four months ago, may I come in?’
The number of interviewees on board varied from ship to ship. While the maximum 
number was 24 (on Ship-A2), the minimum was 10 (on Ship-Bl). In any case, each 
research voyage offered a full spectrum of views which included views from the captain, 
senior and junior officers as well as ratings. During the interviews I realised the particular 
benefits of interviewing the ratings -  as they were directly exposed to workplace hazards.
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They offered rich data on the practices of the different elements of SMS onboard their 
ships.
The benefit of interviewing an organisation’s blue collar workers has been underlined by a 
number of researchers. Wilson Jr. and Koehn (2000), for example, in their interview-based 
study on the American construction industry, noted how workers’ views contributed 
significantly in portraying the practice of OHS management systems. Similarly, Hutter 
(2001: 23) in her study on the practice of implementation of OHS regulation in the British 
Railways found that views of employees from every level, particularly from those who 
were directly exposed to workplace hazards, were vital in bringing out the underlying 
concerns.
The following table provides an outline of the interviews conducted during the second 
stage of my fieldwork. It shows that the majority of my respondents permitted me to record 
their interviews which on an average lasted over an hour.
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Senior Officer 4 3 3.50 4 3 6.50 4 4 6.00 4 4 7.50
Junior Officer 4 2 1.75 7 5 4.50 1 1 1.25 3 3 4.00
Rating 11 6 4.25 13 1 2 11.25 5 5 4.00 7 6 5.50
Total 19 11 9.50 24 20 22.25 10 10 11.25 14 13 16.00
Table 16: Key information o f  the interviews conducted on four research voyages
Next I discuss the way I conducted observation of seafarers’ work activities as the second 
research technique. It shows how it made a significant contribution to answering the 
research question and consolidated the data already collected through interviews.
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Observation of onboard activities
A considerable section of my time on board was spent observing seafarers engaged in 
various work activities. These activities included their day-to-day maintenance and upkeep 
work on different parts of the ship. On one ship, for instance, I observed how the seafarers 
worked on repairing a hydraulic crane or prepared cargo tanks for subsequent cargo, while 
in the engine room how the engineers overhauled a diesel generator or carried out gas 
cutting and welding. I also observed the activities of the seafarers during various critical 
operations, such as the starting of cargo loading or unloading operations or manoeuvring of 
ships in and out of harbours. Besides, on all ships I also attended a number of safety and 
other operational meetings. These were of particular significance as they were referred to in 
the companies’ SMSs as important opportunities to discuss the practices of safeguarding 
OHS, and particularly for ratings to bring out their OHS related concerns. Moreover, I also 
participated in the safety trainings and drills, which included simulated fire rescue 
operation, lowering of lifeboats into the water and watching safety videos.
Before carrying out observations, I first ensured that it was safe for me to be in the vicinity 
of such activities and equally that I was not causing any impediment to others. I dressed 
myself in overalls and wore appropriate personal protective equipments. On all occasions I 
took the permission from the individuals as well as the captain and the head of the 
department.36
Through the observations I could better locate how social processes influenced the 
operationalisation of the ISM Code on board the ships. It helped me to identify how certain 
beliefs and constraints were translated into the ways the seafarers worked and thus shaped 
the implementation process of the ISM Code on these ships. By observing, for instance, the 
ways the seafarers communicated with each other provided an indication of the social 
relationships onboard. Equally, by noting the senior officers’ ways of organising the day- 
to-day work I could appreciate some of the major factors that influenced their decisions. 
However, as Atkinson et al. (2003) pointed out that interpretation of qualitative data 
requires a long period of familiarity with the data, it also took me several observations to 
appreciate the complexity and richness of the social influences that affected the 
implementation of the ISM Code. Only after conducting several observations could I better
36 Head of the Department: Generally, on ships the Head o f the department o f the deck side is the Chief 
Officer while in the engine room it is the Chief Engineer.
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appreciate the social factors that influenced these human actions, such as their contribution 
to risk assessment.
Although I am discussing the two qualitative techniques separately, on ships I often 
seamlessly switched between the two. In fact, on most days I used a combination of the two 
methods. On an average I interviewed two seafarers per day and spent the remaining time 
conducting observation and generally socialising and talking to the seafarers informally. 
Besides, every day I also spent around an hour writing down my experiences of the day in 
the field notes.
The field notes from the observation alone provided a rich source of data eliciting several 
underlying social features affecting the implementation of the ISM Code. Thus it qualified 
as an independent source of information and stood in its own right as an effective research 
technique. However, as described by Hammersley and Atkinson (1995: 131), by combining 
it with the data collected through interview I presented a richer collection of data. Such 
combined sources of data allowed for better analysis of social values and priorities 
influencing the practice of the implementation of the ISM Code at the shipboard level. It 
also allowed me to move away from relying excessively on one technique. As Shipman 
(1997: 106) and Ackroyd and Hughes (1981: 137) argued, the use of multi-technique 
approach or triangulation was vital for me to remove any inherent bias that may have been 
in either of the two techniques.
Although interview and observation were the two main research techniques used on ships, 
a small part of the fieldwork on all four ships also included documentary analysis. In the 
final subsection I shall discuss how this technique further contributed in identifying the 
factors influencing the operationalisation of the ISM Code.
Document Analysis
The main purpose of conducting document analysis as part of the second stage of the 
research was to investigate the different documents related the implementation of the ISM 
Code and to look at the nature of the written communication between the ships and their 
shore-based offices. These archived copies of communication reflected the seafarers’ 
contribution in the implementation of the ISM Code. While the documentary analysis 
conducted in the first stage of the fieldwork provided an overview of the working
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procedures, the purpose of repeating it on each ship was to get a better understanding of the 
practice on each ship and the nature of communication between each of the four ships at its 
management office. It was a considerably effective technique as its primary contribution 
served to reinforce or contradict data obtained through the two other techniques.
Archived e-mails and letters as well as filled-in checklists and forms as part of the 
requirements of the companies’ SMS implementation were vital sources for this purpose. 
By studying these documents and taking their photocopies and notes from them, I was able 
to form a better understanding, for instance, of the way risk assessments were recorded on 
these ships. Likewise, several years of archived documents on ‘incident reporting’ also 
indicated the types and frequencies of incident and near-miss occurrences that were 
reported from these ships. Also, letters and e-mails written by the managers of the shore 
units suggested the managements’ priorities and factors that influenced their instructions to 
the ships. The tone of these messages also carried with them an indication of the managers’ 
communication style. Thus, by reviewing these documents I could offer a new perspective 
to identify the social factors that influenced the implementation of the ISM Code in the two 
case studies.
The importance of using different techniques (triangulating) in organisational fieldwork has 
been pointed out in earlier studies. Kunda (1992), for example, used in-depth interviews, 
observation and documentary analysis as research techniques to understand the 
organisational culture of an American corporation in his well acclaimed work of 
Engineering Culture. It was similarly beneficial in my research. It gave me the opportunity 
to reveal the contradictions between what was meant to be done and what was actually 
done. I achieved it for example by observing what the seafarers entered in the safety 
checklists and what precautions they actually took at work.
Having completed the discussion on the data collection methods and presenting the 
experiences in the fieldwork the discussion in the following section provides an overview 
of the data analysis process used in this thesis. It draws on analysis techniques used in 
research and justifies how they were appropriate for the purpose of my study.
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3.3 Analysis of data
From the fieldwork I interviewed a total of 87 people, of which I used tape-recording for 
67 interviews. The total duration of the recorded interviews was around 80 hours. I took 
hand-written notes for the remaining 20 interviews which on an average also lasted for an 
hour. Besides, on each of the research voyages, I wrote a copious amount of field notes. In 
all, the field notes from the four research voyages consisted of around 200 A4 pages. 
Finally, in addition I also took photocopies of some of the documents from the 
management units and ships for the purpose of analysing.
During the fieldwork I used a digital tape-recorder and downloaded the recordings on 
computer for subsequent transcription. The majority of the managers and seafarers who I 
interviewed did not have English as their first language. They came from places such as the 
Far East and East Europe. Some of the interviews were thus a little difficult to transcribe. 
In all I took around four months to transcribe all the interviews.
The interview transcripts and copious field notes produced a large bank of data. For ease of 
analysis I made use of computer assisted data analysis software ‘N-Vivo’. As a first step I 
imported the transcripts and field notes into the N-Vivo program. Then, in order to make 
the data more manageable and easier to retrieve, I started assigning various codes to the 
data bank. Each of these codes signified an idea or a topic that emerged from the interview 
transcripts or field notes. While in some cases these ideas were captured in a few sentences, 
at other times they were presented in considerable detail which ran into several pages. This 
process of assigning codes took me approximately another two months. Ten such common 
codes from my thesis were:
• Seafarers fear of being blamed
• lack of time for conducting risk assessment
• paperwork unnecessary/ superfluous
• importance of oil major inspection
• importance of budget
• unresponsiveness of managers
• focus on paperwork checking
• importance of keeping to schedule
• complying with paperwork protects from blame
• ISM Code induces mechanisation of tasks
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Having assigned the codes I started examining them and identifying the ones which were 
most significant. With the help of the N-Vivo program I also flagged potential regularities 
and patterns for the purpose of identifying conceptual links and thematic guides (van 
Maanen, 1988). For instance, I identified whether certain ideas emerged only from a 
particular group of managers or seafarers. I found out whether, for example, they only 
occurred in Company-A or were viewed by seafarers of one particular rank, such as ratings, 
or were common with seafarers who were employed under a particular type of contract.
Also, I utilised the N-Vivo program for the purpose of conducting ‘between-method’ 
triangulation (Denzin, 1970). With its help I analysed whether the findings of the different 
data collection techniques used in the same stage of the research were reinforcing or 
contradicting each other. In the second stage of the research, for instance, I found out how 
the findings from the documentary examination complemented the findings from 
interviews or the observations.
The next step of the analysis was to group these codes together into categories based on 
their common attributes. The purpose of doing so was also to manage the data in such a 
way so that it led to answering the research question. This helped in building a robust 
argument, often including views from the managers, officers as well as ratings. One such 
example on how a set of codes was grouped together to form into a category can be seen 
from the example below.
• (managers’ emphasis on) focus on procedural compliance
• ignore SMS instructions
• importance of skill utilisation and work experience
• understudying seniors/ need sea experience
• learning to work through experience
• SMS instructions assume shipboard tasks are circumscribable
The six above codes featured in several interview transcripts, both from the managers and 
seafarers, as well as in the field notes. By thoroughly scrutinising the contents and studying 
them in conjunction with the arguments made in the literature, I identified a common 
thread. The underlying theme running through all these codes was the importance of the 
‘shipboard communities of practice’ which contributed in safeguarding seafarers’ OHS.
I l l
This particular category is pointed out and analysed in section 5.3.4 and subsequently 
discussed in section 8.2.3 of this thesis.
In this way I determined several categories, such as:
• fear of unemployment (section 6.3.1)
• concerns with hierarchy (sections 5.3.5; 6.3.3)
• bureaucracy (sections 5.2.2; 5.3.2)
• commercial influence (sections 5.2.2; 7.2.2)
• nature of communication (sections 5.2.1; 5.3.4)
These categories have given rise to the themes that are discussed in the three subsequent 
findings chapters. The development of the categories from the codes however was an 
iterative process. It was developed by revisiting the literature, discussing the findings with 
my supervisors and writing and re-writing the findings from my fieldwork. This process of 
interpreting and reinterpreting the data as described by authors, such as Coffey and 
Atkinson (1996), helped me better analyse the data and produce my findings from the 
fieldwork. Roughly the entire process of analysing the data took six months.
Having discussed the data collection and analysis method, the subsequent discussion will 
reflect on the ways I considered the ethical dimensions of the study.
3.4 Ethical considerations
The methods used in this research were in strict compliance with the British Sociological 
Association’s Statement of Ethical Practice (BSA, 1992) and the requirements of the 
School of Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee (SREC) at the Cardiff University. 
As per the rules of the university, prior to embarking on the project I sought approval from 
the SREC. For that purpose, in February 2006,1 provided the committee with an outline of 
my research project including the detail of the persons who I proposed involving in the 
project, how I planned to obtain their consent, whether the research could potentially harm 
the persons involved and, if so, how I planned to protect their identities. After reviewing 
my proposal, in April 2006 my proposed research was deemed suitable by the SREC which 
subsequently gave me the approval to proceed with the study37.
37 Ethical Approval: The ethical approval form along with the outline o f the research proposal and subsequent 
permission from the SREC are attached in the Appendices of this thesis.
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For the purpose of getting access to the companies I provided the detail of the project and 
also at the start of each of the stages of the fieldwork I discussed it with the managers and 
ship-captains. Moreover, prior to conducting each interview I took around five minutes 
describing my research project with each interviewee. With each manager and seafarer I 
first discussed the aim of the research, its method and answered any questions that he or 
she had. I also described how each participant was assured of anonymity and reminded 
each of them that he or she could refrain from answering my questions or even stop the 
interview at any stage. At this stage I also asked whether I could record the interviews. 
Equally, on ships I took explicit permission from the captains, the heads of the department 
and the persons involved before conducting observations. In the same way I took explicit 
permission from the managers, captains and heads of departments, as the case may be, 
before looking into any logbooks, files or such other written material. Thus, only on 
obtaining clear permission and informed consent did I start my fieldwork. As pointed out 
by Hammersley and Atkinson (1995) social science research should not be conducted by 
compromising the ethical elements of our societies. Obtaining an informed, unconstrained 
and voluntary consent of all the individual respondents thus was the foundation of the 
ethical dimensions of my research.
On completion of the interviews, hiding the identities of the interviewees was thus an 
important ethical element of the research. As a first step I disguised the names of the 
interviewees by allocating random numbers against their interview transcripts. For the 
purpose of analysing the fieldwork, however, I retained only the ranks of the interviewees, 
the identity of the shore-based management units (Company-A or B) and the identity of the 
ships (Ship-Al, A2, B1 or B2). In the subsequent finding chapters in most cases I used 
language such as: ‘one rating from one of the research voyages said’, when quoting 
interviews, while in some cases for the purpose of emphasising a particular feature of the 
case study I had to mention, for instance, ‘one of the managers in Company-B said’.
Concealing the identities of the organisations as well as the four ships in my thesis was thus 
integral to making the managers and seafarers anonymous. This has been pointed out by 
several scholars as an important ethical element of research. Christians (2005: 145), for 
example, in the discussion on the codes of ethics in social science research discussed how 
‘shielding all personal data ought to be secured or concealed and made public only behind
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a shield of anonymity’. There the author also warned how insiders to organisations can 
recognise pseudonyms and disguised locations. Keeping this in mind, I took extra 
precaution for the purpose of protecting the identities of all individuals and organisations 
featured in this thesis. In some cases, thus, it has been necessary to be somewhat vague 
about the detail of the companies and the ships, the voyages I took and the seafarers’ 
nationality.
114
Chapter-4: Introducing the Case Studies
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the two case studies, Company-A and B. In 
order to do so more effectively the two companies are first located within the tanker sector 
of the maritime industry. The chapter begins with a discussion of the main features of the 
two companies, such as their business, management structure, responsibilities of their 
managers and seafarers and then provides an overview of their Safety Management 
Systems (SMSs). It also highlights the standards of OHS of the two companies in reference 
to the maritime industry. Finally some key features of the four research ships: Ship A-l, A- 
2, B-l and B-2 are presented.
4.1 The Tanker sector of the maritime industry
As a primary carrier of world trade, the maritime industry is closely associated with the 
world economy and growth. Between 2000 and 2005, for instance, the worldwide 
economic output maintained an annual growth rate of around 4.5%. During the same period 
the world trade also grew at the rate of above 5.0% and seaborne trade increased at about 
4.0%. In fact, the seaborne trade has grown from 2763 million tons in 1972 to 6808 million 
tons in 2005, which is an increase of approximately 2.5 times (ISL, 2006).
2000 -  2005 Growth rate Growth rate in the year 2004
Worldwide economic output 4.5% 5.3%
World trade 5.0% 9.0%
Seaborne trade 4.0% 6.6%
Table 17: The relation between worldwide economic output and trade. 
Source: ISL, (2006).
4.1.1 The world oil trade
The bulk of the seaborne commodities are oil and coal, which are the main sources of 
energy, and iron ore, which is the main raw material for the steel industry. Other key 
commodities in the seaborne trade are grain and containerised merchandise forming part of 
the ‘other cargoes’ (see table below). In the last 20 years the combined trading volume of 
crude oil and petroleum products has risen steadily contributing to an increase in the 
total seaborne trade volume. Roughly, these two have formed one-third of the total volume
38 Crude Oil is naturally occurring flammable liquid which requires refining before it may be used 
commercially.
39 Petroleum products are processed by refining crude oil. These include Jet Fuel, Gasoline and Furnace Oil.
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in seaborne trade. The figures also suggest that the combined volume of crude oil and 
petroleum products in seaborne trade has nearly doubled during this period (ISL, 2005b; 
ISL, 2006).
Year Crude
Oil
Product
Oil
Total
Oil
Coal Iron
Ore
Grain Other
Cargoes
Total
Seaborne
Trade
1985 871 288 1159 272 321 181 1360 3293
1995 1415 381 1796 423 402 196 1895 4712
2005 1820 485 2305 690 650 242 2894 6808
Table 18: Volume o f seaborne trade (Figures in Million tons), 1985 to 2005. 
Source: ISL (2005b) and ISL (2006).
Furthermore, despite the increasing importance and availability of alternate sources of 
energy, the use of petroleum oil has remained the most popular source and is predicted to 
remain so for a considerable period of time (see table below).
Year/ 
Fuel type
1985 1995 2005 2015
(projection)
2030
(projection)
Oil 125 145 160 195 235
Coal 80 80 100 130 180
Natural Gas 60 75 100 125 170
Renewable 20 25 35 40 55
Nuclear 5 20 20 25 25
Table 19: World marketed energy use by fuel type Unit: Quadrillion BTU, 1985-2030. 
Source: EIA (2007).
The discussion thus shows that seaborne oil transportation feeds into the lifeline of the 
world trade by providing essential fuel for the growing world output. This makes the oil 
tanker sector within the maritime industry a mature and stable sector.
In order to introduce the two case studies the discussion now focuses on the global 
seaborne oil trade areas. It points out how crude oil export from the Persian Gulf and 
import into the North America (as in Company-A), and the oil product trade in Europe (as 
in Company-B) occupy significant importance within the wider oil sector transportation of 
the maritime industry. The purpose of the discussion is to point out that the business 
activities of the two case studies and in particular the trading areas of the four ships were 
part of main stream seaborne oil trade.
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International crude oil trade
The international oil trade involves a complex arrangement of oil transportation as there are 
a number of geographically dispersed nations involved in the production of crude oil, its 
refining and its final consumption. From the complex trading patter, the figures below 
show the top five crude oil exporting and importing regions of the world.
■ 2004
M iddle East C aribbean  W est Africa N orth Africa South East 
Gulf Asia
Figure 9: Leading Crude Oil Exporting regions in the world, 1995 and 2004. 
Percentage of the world total. Source: ISL, (2006).
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Figure 10: Leading Crude Oil Importing regions in the world, 1995 and 2004.
Percentage of the world total. Source: ISL (2006).
The world route map (see next figure) provides a diagrammatic indication of the major 
crude oil seaborne trade routes. It shows that the Middle East Gulf is the primary crude oil 
exporting region, while Western Europe, North America and Japan are the largest 
importers of crude oil.
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Crude oil seaborne trade
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Figure 11: Crude oil seaborne trade in million metric tonnes
Source: Oceans Atlas (1994).
These distinctive features of the crude oil trade were taken into account when choosing the 
two research ships in Company-A. The Ship-A1 was engaged in exporting crude oil from 
the Middle East Gulf while the Ship-A2 traded in North America.
The European oil product trade
The other significant area of seaborne oil trade is the oil product trade in Europe (see graph 
below).
W orld O utp ut o f  refined  products , 2 0 0 5
25,000.00 -I----------------------------------------------------------
■  Africa
■  Asia & Oceania
■  M iddle East
■  Eurasia
■  Europe
■  Central & South America
■  North America
Figure 12: World Output of Refined Petroleum Products, 2005. 
Unit: Thousand Barrels per day. Source: EIA (2006).
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The production of refined oil products and its transportation depends on the interplay of 
complex elements of oil business involving storage, refining and exporting capabilities of a 
country as well as the demands of petroleum products in domestic and foreign markets. 
From this intricate business structure, the following graph shows that Asia and Oceania, 
North America and Europe are the three leading regions of the world for output of product 
oils. They also have the significant amount of crude oil refining capabilities (see the global 
distribution of crude oil refineries).
Global Distribution o f  Crude Oil Refineries
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Figure 13: Global distribution of crude oil refineries, 2005. 
Source: EIA (2006).
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Figure 14: World Import and Export of Refined Petroleum Products, 2005. 
Source: EIA (2006).
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The same three regions also lead the way in the import and export of refined petroleum 
products, with Europe leading the list (see graph on the previous page).
Thus it shows that Europe is a major source as well as destination of product oil. With 
regard to setting up the criteria for selecting the second case study, the product oil trade in 
Europe was therefore taken into account. Company-B was located in Europe with its fleet 
mainly engaged in the trading of refined petroleum products in the European waters.
4.1.2 Oil Tankers
In the maritime industry, tanker is a generic term used for crude oil and oil product carriers. 
In comparison to the other sectors in the maritime industry, statistical data show that the 
tanker sector is the largest both in terms of the number of ships and also their cargo 
carrying capacities (see table below). The figures in 2005, for instance, indicate that the 
highest percentage of ships (19.2) were tankers followed by bulk carriers which constitute 
15.5% of the world fleet. Similarly, in the same year the oil tankers constituted 37.9% of 
the world cargo carrying capacity followed by the bulk carriers at 34.8% (ISL, 2005b).
Year Percentage o f  number o f  ships in the world fleet Percentage o f DWT o f ships in the world fleet
Tanker Bulk Carrier Container Tanker Bulk Carrier Container
2005 19.2 15.5 8.1 37.9 34.8 11.2
Table 20: Percentage o f  number and DWT share o f worldwide tanker, bulk carrier and container fleets, 2005. 
Source: ISL (2005b).
Also, a significant proportion of world’s larger ships are tankers. In 2005, for instance, the 
tankers of the size of 90,000tons DWT and above formed a staggering 64% in terms of ship 
numbers and 67.3% in terms of their cargo carrying capacities (see table below).
Ship Type Total Numbers 
(% in bracket)
Total DWT 
(% in bracket)
Oil Tanker 1305 (64.0) 237.5 (67.3)
Bulk Carrier 633 (31.0) 104.3 (29.5)
Combination Carrier 47 (2.3) 6.2 (1.8)
Container 50 (2.5) 5.1 (1.4)
Total 2039 (100.0) 353.1 (100.0)
Table 21: The different types o f  ship o f size 90,000 DWT and above in number and DWT, 2005 
Source: ISL (2005b).
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However, tankers are also a significant threat to the marine environment. In the last 30 
years they have been involved in large-scale maritime oil pollution incidents polluting 
different coastlines around the world (see table below).
Tanker Year Location Spill size in Metric Tons
Atlantic Empress 1979 Tobago, West Indies 287,000
Castillo de Bellver 1983 Saldanha Bay, South Africa 252,000
Amoco Cadiz 1978 Brittany, France 223,000
Torrey Canyon 1967 Scilly Isles, UK 119,000
Braer 1993 Shetland Islands, UK 85,000
Sea Empress 1996 Milford Haven, UK 72,000
Prestige 2002 Spanish coast 63,000
Exxon Valdez 1989 Alaska, USA 37,000
Table 22: Major Marine oil spills since 1967. 
Source: ITOPF (2008).
With growing awareness of the preservation of the marine environment the tanker sector of 
the maritime industry has thus been the major focus of the industry’s policy-makers as well 
as other stakeholders. The policy-makers have introduced a number of new measures on 
tanker construction (see IMO, 2002b; 2009) and (as pointed out in the review of literature) 
the Oil Majors as the heads of the supply chain in the oil trade have taken active initiative 
in regulating the operation of tankers globally.
4.2 Case Study: Company-A 
Introduction
In this and the following sections, the discussion presents some of the important features of 
the two case studies. It highlights:
•  the key features o f  the com panies and their businesses
•  com panies’ m anagem ent structure and responsibilities o f  the managers
•  the shipboard structure and seafarers’ responsibilities
•  the operational requirements o f  the SMS used in the tw o organisations
•  the safety standard o f  the organisations
•  the key features o f  the ships where I conducted the fieldwork
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This data is collected from the following three sources:
1. The SM S o f  the tw o com panies
2. Interview w ith the managers o f  the tw o companies
3. Information available on the tw o com panies’ and other’s w ebsites
Company-A, was a branch office of a relatively large third-party ship management 
company. The shore-based management office of Company-A was located in Europe and 
was responsible for managing between 25 and 35 ships40. The Head Office of the entire 
group was located in another city while the other branch offices (shore based management 
units) were located in various places around the world. The main details of Company-A are 
provided below in tabulated form.
Location Europe
Type o f company Third party ship management
Types of ship managed Tankers and Bulk Carriers
Number o f ships managed Between 25 and 35
Size o f ships Between 2500 and 60,000 GRT
Ship trading area Worldwide
Flag States Both TMN such as UK and FOC, such as Liberia
Total number o f office employees Around 30
Total number o f seafarers Sailing around 450
Table 23: Kay features o f  Company-A.
Company-A managed the ships on behalf of the ship-owners without having any ownership 
stake on those ships. To Company-A these ship-owners were its clients who paid fixed 
service charges in advance on a monthly basis. The relationship between them and the 
ship-owners was contractual which could be terminated by either party at a short notice.
4.2.1 Company Function
Although Company-A belonged to a wider group of companies, each of the shore-based 
management units was responsible for operating the ships that belonged to its own fleet. 
Thus, Company-A operated its ships independent of the way its sister offices operated 
theirs from other parts of the world.
40 As pointed out in section 3.4, some o f the data are deliberately presented in this thesis in a vague way in 
order to protect the identity o f  the organisations studied.
122
Around half of the ships managed by this company were tankers, while the remaining were 
dry cargo ships41. As the study only looked into the tanker fleet, the detail of the dry bulk 
fleet is not presented. The tankers carried crude oil as well as oil products and sailed all 
over the world, such as the Mediterranean Sea, Persian Gulf, Asia, Australia and America. 
The tanker fleet had several different owners and were registered with different Flag States 
including TMN as well as FOC.
In the case of Company-A, the ship-owners were responsible for selecting the Flag States 
of their ships, their ship’s commercial employment and for providing logistics support for 
their ship’s commercial ventures. However, the managers of Company-A were required to 
protect the ship-owners’ commercial interests besides managing the safety and technical 
operations of the ships and providing support to their day-to-day operational needs. In 
particular, the ship-owners required the managers to ensure that the tankers were vetted and 
approved by as many Oil Majors as possible because the owners were keen to have the Oil 
Majors as their clients.
Flag Technical
State Management
(Company-A)Ship
Owner
Cargo Bunker &
Chartering Port Agency
Figure 15: Business relationships between Company-A and its ship-owners.
The type of services offered by Company-A is widely acknowledged in the maritime 
industry as total technical management service, which includes providing services for 
crewing, technical support, insurance, accounting, stores and supplies, as well as being 
responsible for the safe operation of ships and prevention of shipboard pollution (as 
required by the ISM Code). An overview of the functions of Company-A is presented 
below.
Although the selection of the Flag State was the ship-owners’ obligation, Company-A was 
responsible for liaising with them for complying with the regulatory requirement for each
41 Dry Cargo Ships trade cargoes such as containers, grain and iron ores.
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of the ships. It also required coordinating with a number of Classification Societies for 
carrying out surveys and inspections on all its managed ships. As pointed out earlier (in 
section 2.1.3) in the maritime industry the Classification Societies play an important role 
mainly in looking into the ships’ structural and technical aspects.
Flag State
Classification
SocietyInsurance
Technical
Management
(Company-A)
Day-to-day
operationCrewManagement
ISM Code 
OperationStores and 
Supplies
Ship and Crew 
Accounts
Figure 16: The different functions o f Company-A.
A significant part of Company-A’s task entailed providing the day-to-day technical support 
to the fleet. This included advising the ships’ crew on technical matters and monitoring 
ships’ maintenance schedule. It also required them to occasionally liaise with technical 
experts, such as manufacturers of shipboard machineries. As part of the technical 
assistance, Company-A was required to arrange for supplying machinery spares and 
consumable stores as well as victuals and drinking water to the ships. As the fleet was 
scattered around the world, supplying stores and provision involved a significant logistical 
challenge.
The other major task of the managers of Company-A involved the operation of the ISM 
Code. It included operationalising the different functional requirements of the Code (see 
section 1.3.3) such as monitoring risk assessment, conducting audits, reviews and also 
getting appropriate certification from the Flag States.
The accounting element of the service involved keeping a detailed account of the fleet’s 
running expenses. It included maintaining a record of expenses related to the seafarers’ 
wages, their travel, as well as the ship-related expenses such as their maintenance, surveys,
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and communication costs. Detailed account keeping was deemed essential for negotiating 
the fleet’s operating budget with the ship-owners.
The crew management aspect of the service included selecting and appointing seafarers in 
the fleet and relieving them at the end of their contract period. It also involved providing 
seafarers with certain trainings (which were in excess of the regulatory requirements) and 
among other things conducting their pre-joining medical checkups.
Finally, the insurance aspect of Company-A’s function involved obtaining Hull and 
Machinery (H&M) and Protection and Indemnity (P&I) insurance covers for each of the 
ships in the fleet. The former insured the ship’s structure and its machinery equipments 
while the latter provided protection against the liability of seafarer or cargo related matters.
4.2.2 Overview of the managers’ responsibilities
The managers at the Head Office of the group of companies were in charge of 
administrating the SMS and overseeing the safety and pollution prevention standards in all 
its fleets. They also took the major business decisions, scrutinised the financial statements 
and employed the top management teams in the shore-based management units of 
Company-A and its sister offices.
Head Office Responsibilities
• Administer the overall ship management business
• Implement the SMS and oversee safety and pollution prevention standards
• Monitor profit/ loss from all the branch offices such as Company-A
• Employ and train Managing Director and Senior Managers in all branch offices
The responsibility of the managers in Company-A (and all such other sister units) included 
managing the day-to-day operation of the ships in their own fleet. To carry out these tasks 
effectively, there were three layers of managerial posts.
Branch Office (such as Company-A) Responsibilities
• Provide day-to-day technical management functions to the fleet
• Monitor OHS and pollution prevention for the entire fleet
• Take into account the ship-owners’ (clients’) commercial needs
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• Be self-sufficient in terms of company balance sheet
• Employ and train Middle level managers and all support staff
The Company-A’s managers’ responsibilities are now presented. The organisation’s core 
staff included Director, senior-level and middle-level Managers, Superintendents and 
Secretaries (see diagram below).
Secretaries
Managing
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Group Marine and 
Technical Managers
Marine
Superintendents
Dry Fleet 
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Technical
Superintendents
Marine
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Technical
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Figure 17: The organisation chart o f Company-A.
The office staff came from different parts of the world although English was used as the 
working language. Except for a few secretaries and accountants in the office, the rest were 
male. All managers and superintendents had a seafaring background and had been 
employed in the organisation for around ten years.
The Superintendents were responsible for monitoring the day-to-day activities of the ships. 
Each one of them was responsible for a minimum of one and a maximum of four tankers, 
and was the first point of contact from ships. While the Marine Superintendents were 
responsible for overseeing the safety, pollution prevention and operational aspects of the 
ships, the Technical Superintendent was responsible for overseeing machinery related 
matters, such as planned maintenance of mechanical and electrical equipments and supply 
of spare parts. On an average once every three to six months these technical and marine 
superintendents visited the ships that they were responsible for.
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These superintendents were responsible to the Fleet Managers who in turn were responsible 
to the Group Managers. The Fleet Managers were mainly involved in liaising with the ship­
owners, charterers, insurers, ship repair yards and other entities involved in the business. 
They were also the Designated Persons (DPA) (see section 1.3.2) for the entire fleet 
although for all practical purposes it was the superintendents who were contacted by the 
ships as a first point of contact. They were also in charge of coordinating with the crewing 
offices located in different parts of the world, such as in the Far East, for the employment 
of seafarers. The Group Managers on the other hand were common to both the dry and oil 
tanker fleets. They represented the office at the wider company level and were more 
involved in the group’s business. One of their major tasks was to vie for new business and 
liaise with the existing clients.
The Managing Director was in charge of the office and among other tasks was responsible 
for ensuring company’s SMS compliance. The commercial success of the company and the 
employment of managers and superintendents were also his responsibility. It also included 
reviewing and approving all budget and contract documents, maintaining close contact with 
clients and ensuring that the services provided to them were in accordance with the clients’ 
expectations.
Finally, the secretaries of the company liaised with the Head Office and were thus 
considered a link between the Head Office and Company-A. One of them in particular was 
responsible for maintaining a record of the ISM Code related matters including gathering 
information for incident and accident statistics and audits.
4.2.3 Overview of the seafarers’ responsibilities
The contract between the ship-owners and Company-A also specified the nationalities of 
the seafarers who could be employed in each rank. Although there was flexibility in terms 
of the junior officers and ratings, the ship-owners had strict requirements with regard to the 
nationality of the senior officers and especially captains. They even required Company-A 
to send a copy of the employment history of the senior officers for their approval before 
they could be appointed.
In Company-A the seafarers were employed with the help of the company’s global network 
of crewing offices. They came from over ten different countries of which the majority were
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from Far East, South Asia, and Eastern Europe. The local crewing offices also offered in- 
house training to seafarers with short courses -  which were attended by seafarers when on 
leave. The exact number of seagoing employees was not fixed due to the frequent changes 
in the number of ships managed by Company-A, but could be estimated as 450.
Company-A employed all its seafarers on short term contracts. While the senior offices 
were contracted for four to five months, the junior officers were employed for six months 
and the ratings were employed for nine months. None of them, however, were paid when 
they went on leave. As a result, the seafarers who were on leave did not strictly form part 
of the list of employees. Nonetheless, the interviews later revealed that a significant 
percentage of the officers and ratings regularly returned to work in Company-A, and on 
some occasions were even employed on the same ship time after time.
Deck Rating
BosunPump Man
Junior Officers
Chief Officer
Catering Rating
Chief Cook
Second Engineer
Chief Engineer
Engine Rating
Junior Engineers
Captain
Figure 18: Shipboard organisation chart.
The Captain of the ships was given the responsibility and authority to ensure the overall 
safety and pollution prevention from the ship and the safety and welfare of the seafarers. 
On each ship the captain was in charge of ensuring that the ship implemented the 
company’s SMS and the local and international regulations and complied with the ship­
owner’s commercial endeavours. He42 was also specifically responsible for ships’ safe 
navigation and communicating with all external organisations including the company 
managers.
The Chief Officer was regarded as second in command on each ship and was required to 
assume all of the above responsibilities in the absence of the captain (through some
42 All my interviewees (in management offices and on ships) were male.
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exceptional circumstances, such as the captain’s incapacitation due to an accident). He was 
the head of the deck department and was responsible for the day-to-day maintenance work 
on deck and all operations related to cargo including the stability of the ship. In certain 
cases the chief officer was also required to keep navigation watch when required by the 
captain. Being the head of the deck department, he was particularly responsible for the 
safety of the junior officers and ratings employed in the deck department.
The Second Officer and the Third Officer (junior officers) were responsible to both the 
Captain and Chief Officer of the ship. Their general duties included navigation and cargo 
operation watch-keeping for between eight and twelve hours a day. The second officer’s 
tasks included monitoring the conditions of the navigational equipment and planning and 
preparing ships for safe navigation between ports, while the third officer’s specific 
responsibility included maintaining the safety and fire-fighting equipments on ships.
The Chief Engineer was in charge of the engine department. He was responsible for all 
technical operations on ships. He was particularly responsible for smooth operation of the 
most critical engineering operations, such as ship’s bunkering operation and manoeuvring. 
His duties included systematic maintenance and survey of ship’s machinery and electrical 
equipments.
The Second Engineer was responsible to the Chief Engineer and his responsibilities 
included day-to-day planning and execution of technical maintenance and operation. He 
was also responsible for the safety of the junior engineers and ratings working on 
machineries. On some ships, when required by the chief engineer, the second engineer was 
also expected to carry out watch-keeping duties for up to eight hours a day.
The junior engineers, i.e. the Third, Fourth and Electrical Engineers were responsible to the 
ship’s chief engineer as well as the second engineer. Their responsibilities included watch 
keeping for between eight and twelve hours a day and safe operation and maintenance of 
machinery equipments. The electrical engineer was responsible for providing assistance to 
technical operation and maintenance activities.
Among the ratings, the Bosun was the senior-most. He was responsible to the chief officer 
for ensuring proper and safe execution of operation and maintenance tasks in the deck
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department. The tasks included supervising the deck ratings and ensuring that they comply 
with the company’s safety procedures. The Pump-man was also a senior member of rating. 
He was responsible to the chief officer for all operation and maintenance tasks in the deck 
department. His particular responsibilities included assisting the chief officer in planning 
and executing loading and discharging of cargo.
The other ratings in the deck department were A.B. (able seaman) and the O.S. (ordinary 
seaman). They were responsible for assisting in the navigation of the ship, the cargo 
operation and in the maintenance of the deck department. They reported to the watch- 
keeping officers during navigation and cargo operation or to the bosun during ship’s 
maintenance work. Similarly, the ratings in the engine room department, namely the Fitter 
and Motorman, were responsible to the second engineer. Their tasks included maintenance 
of the machinery and providing assistance to the engineers during watch-keeping. The 
Chief Cook was responsible to the captain and chief officer for the day-to-day catering and 
housekeeping tasks. The Mess-Man reported to him; his tasks included serving meals to the 
officers and cleaning the accommodation to maintain hygiene.
4.2.4 Outline of the Company’s SMS
The policies, procedures and instructions written in Company-A’s SMSs were common for 
the entire group of companies. The SMS was broad and incorporated the different types of 
ships, such as oil tankers and bulk carriers, and different shipping trades, such as coastal 
and deep sea. It provided procedures and instruction for standard shipboard operations as 
well as specific cargo handling instructions. Such policies, procedures and instructions 
included:
•  com pany’s drug and alcohol policies
•  com munication and reporting procedures
•  safe navigating procedures
•  risk assessm ent procedures
•  incident and near-miss occurrence reporting procedures
•  audit and SM S review  procedures
•  cargo loading, stow ing and discharging procedures for tankers
In addition, it also included emergency procedures for different eventualities. The SMS 
also included a folder containing forms and checklists which complemented these
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procedures and instructions. Most of the procedures made explicit reference to the form(s) 
and checklist(s) that were required to be filled in. These forms and checklists were 
available in both hard copy and electronic format.
The Head Office prepared the SMS and amended it approximately once a year and sent the 
revised bound-volumes and CDs to all its branch offices (including Company-A). 
Subsequently, the responsibility of implementing them at each branch office and in its fleet 
was given to the managing director. At the ship-level the captain was required to play a 
major role in the implementation of the SMS. With the assistance from the senior officers, 
the captain was expected to ensure that the all the elements of the SMS were implemented. 
The process of implementing the SMS thus took a complex route which is described using 
the following schematic diagram.
Head Office All Branch Offices
• Prepares SMS as per ISM Code I \ (e.g. Company-A)
• Updates as per feedback from 
Company-A and all other branch - -- • Managers provide technical and
offices operational support in
• Monitors overall OHS trends by v-—7 y implementing SMS policies on
preparing OHS statistics with data the fleet operated from the branch
from branch offices. r office
• From time to time it sends revised • They also provide instructions,
SMS for implementing in the guidelines and operational
branch offices and ships checklists.
All Branch Offices All managed ships
(e.g. Company-A) (e.g. Ship-Al)
• Receives feedback, in the form of • Captain and senior officers along
operation checklists, incident with the rest of the seafarers
report, audit reports, SMS responsible for implementing
reviews from ships. company’s SMS.
^  \ • It includes risk assessment,
• Prepares office-wide OHS reports reporting incidents and near-miss
including SMS review and occurrences, audit and review of
incident data to send to the Head \  1 the SMS
Office \/
Figure 19: Flow diagram showing implementation o f Company-A’s SMS.
The following table shows the main requirements and the key actions to be taken at the 
shipboard and management levels of the operating requirements of risk assessment, 
incident reporting and audit and review elements of the SMS. In particular, it points out 
when and how often should the tasks be conducted, and the persons responsible for
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conducting the tasks and the nature of action required both at the shipboard and 
management levels.
Principle Requirement Main tasks on ships Main tasks in Company-A
(1) Risk Assessment: 
Use Checklists, or use 
shipboard risk 
assessment forms. 
Degree and possibility 
of harm is to be 
considered in assessing 
a task in order to reach 
any of the five levels o f  
risk: minimal, tolerable, 
moderate, substantial & 
intolerable. Work not to 
start if risk intolerable
How often:
Prior to all critical as well as day-to- 
day tasks
Person Responsible:
Senior Officer responsible for the task, 
while the Captain remains overall 
responsible 
Support:
Input from Junior Officers and ratings 
who are involved in the task 
Send to managers:
For Checklist type: A selection 
For Shipboard type: Only if  risk is 
intolerable
Person Resoonsible:
Superintendent
Action:
Review assessment with intolerable risk and 
arrange for risk mitigating steps.
Superintendents when visiting ships are 
required to review all risk assessments 
conducted onboard.
(2) Incident/ Near-miss 
Occurrence Report: 
Require detailed account 
of circumstances o f  
ships and seafarers 
involved. Reporting 
form to be filled in by 
Captain and Safety 
Officer.
Near miss occurrence 
may be reported 
anonymously by any 
seafarer on a one-page 
form.
How often:
After any incident/ near miss 
Person Responsible:
Seafarer to report to his/ her line- 
manager. Chief Officer, Chief Engineer 
or Captain is required to fill in report. 
The Captain responsible for 
communicating it to managers. 
Although, it is possible to report near 
miss reports anonymously, the Captain 
remains responsible for posting them 
SuDDort:
Required from all seafarers 
Send to managers:
All reports to be sent
Person Resoonsible:
Reports to be reviewed by Marine 
Superintendent.
Action:
Marine Superintendent/ Fleet Manager/ 
Group Manager (as the seriousness of the 
case may be) conduct root cause analysis to 
understand causes deeper than immediate 
and direct cause. It involves filling in a form 
with checkboxes and a list o f suggested 
causes. Preliminary analysis to be sent back 
to ship and entire report with analysis sent to 
the Head Office.
(3a) SMS Audit: 
Annual Audit. The 
auditors need to locate 
supporting evidence, 
such as checklists, 
forms, logbooks to 
highlight deficiencies.
How often:
Once a year by auditor appointed by 
Company-A. May be superintendents 
or auditors from hired organisation. 
Person Resoonsible:
Auditor responsible to carry out 
onboard audit. The seafarers are
Person Resoonsible:
The audit report is reviewed by Marine 
Superintendent. If report contains major 
deficiencies then report is reviewed by the 
Group or Fleet Managers (as the seriousness 
o f the case may be)
Action:
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expected to co-operate 
Send to managers:
Auditor sends report to the 
management office
All deficiencies pointed out by auditors 
needs to be rectified within a stipulated time 
period, which is usually three-months
(3 b) SMS Review: 
Captains are urged to 
review once in every 
contract.
How often:
Once in every contract or twice a year, 
whichever is more 
Person Responsible:
Captain
SuoDort:
Senior officers 
Send to Companv:
Each time a captain signs off
Person Responsible:
Reports to be examined by Marine 
Superintendent.
Action:
Scrutinised and then forwarded to manager’s 
annual meeting where reviews from ships as 
well as managers are discussed. Deficiencies 
pointed out by auditors/ regulatory/ 
commercial inspectors also included. Then 
all such reviews are forwarded to the Head 
Office.
Table 24: Overview o f the implementation o f three main elements o f the ISM Code in Company-A.
The above table points to the importance of a close cooperation between the managers and 
seafarers. In particular it presupposes an effective upward communication from ships to the 
managers. Equally, the SMS assumes that the senior and junior officers as well as the 
ratings communicate their views freely and extend their support to the ship’s captain for 
effective implementation of the company’s procedures and instructions on ships.
4.2.5 OHS indicators
This subsection presents some of the records of OHS in Company-A and by comparing it 
with data from the wider maritime industry it estimates the standard of OHS of Company- 
A. However, as pointed out in section 3.1.1, such data has significant inherent weaknesses 
and should only be used as in indicator.
The Company-A did not maintain any statistics indicating the standard of OHS for its own 
fleets. Instead, the group of companies maintained a list of all the accidents, incidents, 
fatalities and Port State Control (PSC) detentions at the wider company level (see 
discussion on PSC in section 2.1.3). The most recent set of data (between 2001 and 2005) 
showed improvements in the absolute number of incidents as well as PSC detentions for 
the whole fleet although there were fluctuations along the way. Moreover, despite the 
increase in the number of ships managed by the group of companies (which rose by around
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40% during the same period), the absolute number of incidents and PSC detention for the 
Group has dropped.
Key OHS indicators, 2001-2005
2005 
2004 E 
2003
2002
2001
20 40 60
Number of Incidents
80
□ Of which Tankers
□ No. of PSC 
detention
■ No. of Fatalities
□ No. of Incidents
Figure 20: Key OHS indicators of Company-A, 2001-2005.
Compared to the world maritime statistics (Casualty Report), the Group fared considerably 
better. While between 2001 and 2005 the annual worldwide fatality ratio of the seafarers 
was roughly at around 1.8%, the ratio of fatalities in this group of companies stood 
between nil and 0.5% during the same intervening period.
The group of companies also performed better than the industry-wide average in terms of 
the PSC detention rate. The data from the Paris MoU43 group of countries indicate that in 
2005, for example, 4.7% of all ships inspected had significant safety deficiencies and were 
thus detained in their ports. While in the same year the rate of PSC detention based on 
global PSC figures for all ships managed by the group of companies was much lower at 
2 .0%.
Year Paris MoU PSC overall 
detention rate %
Group of companies PSC 
detention rate %
2003 7.1 1.5
2004 5.9 1.5
2005 4.7 2.0
Table 25: Company-A PSC detention rate in relation to the Paris-MoU PSC detention rate, 2004-2005. 
Sources: Company data and Paris, MoU (2008).
43 Some PSC operates in group of nations with mutual understanding between them. One such group is 
known as the Paris Memorandum of Understanding which started in 1982 and presently consists of 25 
participating maritime in Europe and North America. It is considered one of the most effective groups of 
countries in conducting PSC inspections. It conducts over 20,000 inspections annually (Paris MoU., 2006).
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While there was no statistical report available for the fleet managed from Company-A, an 
internal memo indicated that Company-A’s rate of incident and PSC detention rate in 2005 
matched the group’s average.
4.2.6 Ship-A1
Having discussed the details of Company-A, the following two subsections highlight some 
of the important features of the two ships (Ships A1 and A2) belonging to Company-A on 
which I conducted research. Ship-A1 was one of the largest ships in the management of 
this company. Its size was approximately 50,000 GRT and was capable of carrying around 
90,000 tons of oil cargo. In relation to the global standard, Ship-Al was comparatively 
large falling within the top 17% in terms of its cargo carrying capacity (see ISL, 2005b).
The ship was a crude oil carrier and carried different varieties of crude oil on international 
trade. For the last year the ship traded in different parts of Asia. On most voyages it loaded 
in Persian Gulf and discharged its cargo in different Asian ports. The owner contracted the 
ship out to oil trading companies (known in the industry as ‘charterers’) for the commercial 
utilisation of the ship on a voyage-by-voyage basis. In other words, after every cargo 
unloading operation the ship-owner had to negotiate for a fresh contract. However, the 
records from the previous one year suggested that the ship did not have any waiting period 
between any two successive voyage charters.
The ship was built in the early 1990s and was registered with one of the FOG. A reputable 
Classification Society conducted its statutory survey on behalf of the State. The 
construction of the tanker was single-hulled44 -  which placed certain restrictions in its 
trading capability. Due of its construction the ship was not allowed to trade for instance in 
the European waters. Some of the important features of the ship are shown in the table 
below.
44 Single-hull: It is a type o f ship construction where there is no intermediate compartment between the cargo 
carrying space and the sea. As a result these ships are more prone to polluting the sea as a consequence of 
structural damage.
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Flag FOC
Ship GRT 50,000 tons approximately
Ship DWT 95,000 tons approximately
Size in relation to worldwide fleet Top 17% o f worldwide fleet
Built Early 1990
Type o f cargo carried Various types o f crude oil
Current trading area Persian Gulf, Asia and Australia
Number o f seafarers Around 21
Nationalities o f  seafarers From East Europe and Far East
Table 26: Key information o f  Ship-Al.
The OHS records from the PSC data suggest that the ship was regularly inspected by the 
PSC inspectors and performed better than the average in the wider group of companies. 
Between 2000 and 2005, the number of deficiencies per inspection was 0.63 in the case of 
Ship-Al while the corresponding ratio at the group level was 1.15. Also, none of these 
deficiencies were of the seriousness resulting in the ship’s detention45 (see table below). 
Thus, it indicates that the ship may be considered as one of the safer ships in the wider 
group of companies.
Group o f Companies 
PSC deficiency per inspection ratio
Ship-Al
PSC deficiency per inspection ratio
2000-2005 1.15 0.63
Table 27: Position o f Ship-Al in the overall PSC records o f Company-A, 2000-2005.
4.2.7 Ship-A2
I conducted the second research voyage on another ship (Ship-A2) belonging to Company- 
A. It was also built in early 1990s and was of similar size as Ship-Al. It was registered 
with one of the FOC and classed with a reputable Classification Society, but unlike Ship- 
Al, this ship had a double-hull construction which did not impose any such trading 
restriction on it. For the last two years Ship-A2 was time-chartered46 by a multinational 
company involved in crude oil transportation in the North American region. Some of the 
important features of the ship are presented in the table below.
45 These data were obtained from the publicly available website ‘www.equasis.org’.
46 Time chartered: Hired by chartering companies on a daily rate and the contract usually lasts at least one 
year
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Flag FOC
Ship GRT 55,000 approximately
Ship DWT 90,000 approximately
Size in relation to worldwide fleet Top 17% of worldwide fleet
Built in year Early 1990
Type o f  cargo carried Various types o f crude oil
Trading area North America
Number o f seafarers Around 22
Nationality o f  seafarers From East Europe and Far East
Table 28: Key information o f  Ship-A2.
Finally, the data on PSC inspections and company records show that Ship-A2 held an 
above average record in the fleet. Except in the year 2004, for the period between 2000 and 
2006 the PSC inspectors did not point out any deficiency nor did they ever detain the ship. 
Thus, it suggests that the safety standard of Ship-A2 was also better than the fleet’s 
average.
Company-A 
PSC deficiency per 
inspection ratio
Ship-A2 PSC 
deficiency per 
inspection ratio
Company-A 
PSC detention per 
inspection ratio 
expressed in %
Ship-A2 PSC 
detention per 
inspection ratio 
expressed in %
2000 1.67 0.00 6.67% 0.00%
2002 0.28 0.00 0.00% 0.00%
2004 1.17 3.33 0.00% 0.00%
2006 1.45 0.00 0.00% 0.00%
Table 29: Position o f Ship-A2 in the overall PSC records o f Company-A, 2000-2006.
With this overview of Company-A and its two ships the discussion now moves to highlight 
the important features of Company-B and the Ships-Bl and B2.
4.3 Case Study: Company-B 
Introduction
Company-B was a technical ship management unit of a ship-owning company which only 
owned tankers. It was located in Europe and employed a group of managers and technical 
experts to operate the ship management unit of the business. The company also had a 
separate tanker chartering unit which looked into the commercial activities of the tankers. 
The ship management unit of the company is specifically identified as Company-B (see 
figure below).
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Figure 21: Company-B within the company’s wider business setup.
Although Company-A, which offered third-party ship management services to different 
ship-owners, and Company-B, which managed the company’s own ships, had significantly 
different approaches to the business of ship operation their functions were very similar.
4.3.1 Company Function
Company-B managed between 8 and 15 tankers which predominantly operated in Europe. 
For the purpose of calculating the balance sheet, Company-B was considered a separate 
entity within the wider company. It acted as a service provider as it did not bring in any 
revenue to the business. The costs incurred by this unit in operating the ships were 
considered as ‘expenses’ to the ship-owning business. The main costs included:
1. The tax, repair, survey and maintenance cost of the tankers
2. The wages and training expenses of the seafarers and their travel costs
3. The wages and training expenses of the managers
4. The cost o f maintaining the office premises
The tankers of Company-B carried clean petroleum products47 and operated in various 
ports in Europe. The size o f the tankers ranged from 3000 to 9000 tons GRT. About half of 
the fleet was registered with TMN and the other with FOC. All ships in the fleet carried 
company’s logo on their funnels and their names followed a particular pattern. All the ships
47 Clean Petroleum Product (CPP) is a range o f oil products obtained after refining and distilling crude oil. 
CPP starts from Gasoil and get finer. It is used by finer machineries such as cars (gasoline) and aircrafts (Jet 
A -l)
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in the fleet were between five and fifteen years old. The key features of the ships managed 
by Company-B are shown in the table below.
Location Europe
Type o f company Company’s own management
Total number o f tankers Between 8 and 15
Size of ships Between 2000 and 10,000 GRT
Ship trading area Mainly European waters
Flag States Both TMN such as UK and FOC, such as Liberia
Total number o f office employees Around 40
Total number o f seafarers Sailing around 180 and on leave another around 120
Table 30: Kay features o f Company-B.
Company-B was a Public Limited Company (PLC). It had a number of shareholders which 
included even international fund management groups. The company’s share index over the 
period between 2001 and 2005 indicated a significant rise. Its data also showed that during 
this period its turnover and revenue grew by around 20% although during the same period 
its asset dropped by around 10%. However, the company’s annual report highlighted that 
the decrease in the ship-owning asset was due to the company’s current fleet renewal 
programme.
In 2005, the fleet carried out over one thousand voyages by calling over 2000 ports in 
Europe and transported over four million tons of oil-product. The company document also 
indicated that a substantial percentage of its business was chartered by the Oil Majors, such 
as BP, Shell and Exxon. It showed that Company-B had nearly two-thirds of its business 
through Contract of Affreightment (CoA)48 with the Oil Majors.
The implementation of the SMS and the chartering procedure were common to the entire 
fleet. Although this section focuses on presenting the important features of the Company-B, 
for the purpose of appreciating its functions better, some of the main functions of its 
chartering counterpart are shown first. The chartering unit of the company was responsible 
for maximising the employment opportunities of the ships. The interview of the managers 
revealed that one of the major aims of the chartering unit was to secure Co A with the Oil
48 Contract o f Affreightment (CoA) was between the shipper (Oil Major) and the ship-owner (Company-B) 
under which the latter undertakes to carry a specific quantity o f commodity (oil product) on particular routes 
over a given period o f time on its company ships.
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Majors. CoA gave Company-B assured business with the Oil Majors which was 
significantly more lucrative than if the tankers were hired on voyage or time charter.
The chartering unit of the company had to liaise with a number of players in the oil trade 
business on a daily basis. It needed to have a close appreciation of the supply and demand 
situation in the region and with the hiring requirements of the charterers (Oil Majors) at all 
times. Their task also included liaising with the chartering and brokering companies. By 
liaising with these entities the chartering unit collected information on the supply and 
demand situation of the product oil and matched this information with the size, suitability 
and availability of all the tankers in the fleet to decide on the best combination for the 
entire fleet and put together a schedule for the fleet once a week.
In this way the chartering organisation controlled the commercial ventures of the fleet. It 
instructed the captains of the tankers directly and also kept the managers of Company-B in 
the picture so that the latter could provide the necessary managerial support to the tankers 
to maintain the schedule. However, due to a number of changing variables such 
programmes had to be revised frequently, sometimes even more than once a day. The 
interviews of the managers revealed that for the entire company it was imperative that the 
fleet maintained the schedule as any lapse from any of the tankers could result in a knock- 
on effect on the rest of the fleet thus disrupting the entire schedule. If the schedule was 
disrupted it could upset the schedule of the Oil Majors or the oil refineries as well as result 
in paying damages to them or even to the owners of other ships affected as a consequence.
Company-B, thus, was heavily influenced by the operations of the chartering arm. The 
following diagram offers a schematic explanation of the different entities involved in the 
operation of the tankers. It shows how Company-B had to liaise with the Chartering Unit, 
the Board of Directors as well as a number of external entities, such as the Flag State and 
the Ship Insurance Companies. It also shows the lines of communication and instruction 
that existed between and among them.
140
Flag State
Board o f Directors
Ship
Insurance
Oil Charterers 
and Brokers Classification
Society
Oil Com. 
including Oil 
Majors
Repair and 
MaintenanceCompany-BChartering
Unit
ISM Code 
ManagementOil Terminals 
(Load/ Unload)
Crew
Management
Tankers
Ship & Crew 
Accounts
Stores and 
Supplies
Tasks and liaisons between the organisations and various entities
Direction o f  flow o f instruction 
Figure 22: Wider organisational structure o f Company-B.
Alongside such commercial responsibilities, Company-B remained fully accountable for 
the technical management of the fleet, which included the implementation of the ISM 
Code. Although it belonged to an ownership company in which its role was significantly 
different from the set up in Company-A, the functions of Companies-A and B were 
remarkably similar. These functions have been discussed in the description of Company-A 
(section 4.2.1) and thus are not repeated here.
4.3.2 Overview of the managers’ responsibilities
The core office staff of Company-B shared a single floor of an office. The four departments 
of the office: operational, marine, technical (along with purchase) and personnel (along 
with administration) were seated in groups. There was also a separate room where all the 
office documents were filed and archived.
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Figure 23: The organisation chart o f Company-B.
The Directors, Managers and Superintendents were all male and ex-seafarers with sailing 
experiences o f around 15 years. On an average the senior members of the staff worked in 
the Company-B for seven years.
The company’s ISM Manager was in charge of overseeing the administration of the ISM 
Code and Quality Management certification of the fleet. He was responsible to the 
Operations Manager, whose tasks involved a wide range of functions including the 
company’s subsidiary functions. The ISM Manager was required to conduct the company’s 
audit and ensure that the Company’s SMS was regularly reviewed and kept updated. The 
records suggested that the SMS was amended frequently -  approximately three to four 
times every year. The ISM Manager liaised with the Marine and Technical 
Superintendents, Managers and Directors of Company-B in preparing different types of 
OHS reports and statistics. It included data on Loss Time Injury (LTI49), pollution incidents 
and personal injuries. Safety bulletins and reports, which contained description and 
analysis of safety related incidents, were also prepared by the ISM Manager and 
promulgated in the company.
The marine department consisted of Superintendents, Manager and Director. The 
superintendents who were responsible to the marine manager oversaw the safety and cargo 
operations of the entire fleet. They liaised with the ship captains on the day-to-day
49 LTI: Loss-Time Injury refers to any work-related injury or illness which prevents an employee from doing 
any work for one day after an incident.
1 4 2
operation of ships and, among other function, ensured that the captains were following the 
company’s SMS and complying with the requirements of the chartering unit. The SMS of 
the company required them to visit the fleet on an annual basis for carrying out operational 
inspection.
The Marine Manager was also the Designated Person Ashore (DPA) for the entire fleet. 
His main tasks involved coordinating with the Flag States and the Classification Society. 
The Marine Director on the other hand was the key connection between Company-B and its 
chartering counterpart. He was the key contact between Company-B and the clients, such 
as the Oil Majors. With the help of the Marine Manager, he was responsible to ensure that 
the tankers operated safely and to the satisfaction of its clients.
The technical department of Company-B was responsible to oversee the technical operation 
of the fleet. The Technical Superintendents and Managers were required to liaise with the 
ships, arrange for supplying stores, spares and provisions as well as organise technicians’ 
visit to the ships. The Superintendents were the first point of contact from the ships on 
technical issues and were responsible for between one and three tankers in the fleet. The 
SMS required them to carry out technical inspections on the entire fleet once every year. 
The Technical Manager, on the other hand, was in charge of the entire department and was 
primarily involved in making the major decisions with regard to the fleet’s technical 
matters, such as major repair work.
The personnel department was responsible for crew selection, training and recruitment. 
They Were also required to organise crew change including their travel arrangements. For 
the seafarers located overseas, this department liaised with crewing agencies in the 
countries overseas. These agencies were contracted and were subjected to regular audit by 
the crewing manager.
4.3.3 Overview of the seafarers’ responsibilities
At the time of the study, the total number of seafarers in Company-B was approximately 
300 of which around 180 were sailing on ships while the remaining 120 were on leave. The 
senior officers in Company-B were predominantly employed from different parts of 
Europe. The managers’ interviews revealed that the company’s policy was to employ more 
and more senior and junior officers from the East European countries in place of the
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existing pool of officers from Western European countries. All officers, irrespective of 
their country of origin, were employed on continuous terms, but due to the pattern of 
seafarers’ work and leave arrangement, they typically worked for six weeks at a stretch and 
went on (paid) leave for a period of four weeks.
The ratings on the other hand were either from East Europe or Far East. They were 
employed on temporary contracts which spanned between six and nine months. The ratings 
were not paid when on leave. Also, there was no specific leave period for them but they 
were expected to return to work after around two to three months of leave.
The interviews with the managers also revealed that despite the significant difference in the 
employment pattern, there was little turnover for both senior officers and ratings, while the 
turnover from the junior officers was slightly higher. The seafarers’ salary structure was 
largely based on their nationality. Thus, on an average the salary for an East European 
officer was two-thirds of his West European counterpart.
The structure of seafarers’ responsibilities was very similar to what has already been 
discussed in the case of Company-A, and thus is not repeated here. However, there were 
fewer seafarers employed on the ships of Company-B resulting in reorganisation of 
responsibilities. As Company-B did not have Mess-men, for instance, his tasks were shared 
by the Cook and an AB.
4.3.4 Outline of the Company’s SMS
Having pointed out the major features and the responsibilities of the key employees of the 
Company-B, the discussion now moves to highlight the main features of the company’s 
SMS. The SMS was divided into several volumes which covered the policies and routine as 
well as emergency operating procedures. All these were available in the office and on ships 
in the form of CD and hard bound files.
It, for example, described how to ensure safe access between ships and wharfs or quays. 
The instructions on tanker operation included pump-room safety checks, cargo tank 
preparation and procedures to be followed before commencing to load or unload. Similarly, 
the instructions on navigational operation included company’s requirements on minimum 
under-keel-clearance and the requirements for safely manning the navigation bridge under
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different conditions of visibility. It also highlighted the procedural requirement to 
implement the different elements of the ISM Code as well as the procedures for the Quality 
Management System.
The following table presents an overview of the procedural requirements of the operations 
of risk assessment, incident/ near-miss occurrence reporting and audit and review from the 
SMS of Company-B. It is presented in a tabulated form which also highlights the persons 
responsible for conducting the tasks in the management office and ships. It shows the 
detailed arrangements in place for the management of safety in the organisation and 
indicates that for effective implementation of each of the elements, there is a need for 
extensive communication and participation at every level of hierarchy in the organisation.
Principle
Requirement
Main tasks on the ship Main tasks in Company-B
(1) Risk Assessment: 
Use Checklists or 
shipboard risk 
assessment forms. 
Identify hazards and 
then the degree and 
possibility o f harm to 
calculate the level o f 
risk. Measures to be 
taken for reducing 
risk level, however 
work is not to start if  
risk remained 
intolerable
How often:
Prior to all critical as well as routine 
tasks. Earlier assessments may be 
referred to if  working conditions are 
similar. Minimum o f  one to be 
conducted during each safety meeting 
Person Responsible:
Suitably experienced seafarer is to 
conduct risk assessment 
Support:
Input from others involved in the task 
Send to manager:
For Checklist type: A selection 
For Shipboard type: All
Person Responsible:
ISM Manager is required to review the 
assessments and file it in the office.
Action:
Only if  the ship informs that risk assessment 
cannot be conducted due to the complexity of a 
task, then the managers need to get involved 
for conducting assessment.
Feedback to ships:
None mentioned
(2) Incident/ Near- 
Miss Occurrence 
R eport:
Every incident to be 
reported. Captain and 
other investigator(s) 
as well as the safety 
officer are required to 
contribute and sign 
the report.
How often:
After any incident/ near miss 
Person Responsible:
Seafarer to report to captain for official 
reporting and investigation. Details 
such as sketch and narrative are also to 
be submitted.
Support:
Required from all seafarers including 
Safety Officer. However the Captain 
needs to communicate them to the
Person Responsible:
Reviewed by the Marine Manager.
Action:
Reports first classified as per potential loss. 
They may be referred to the Marine Director, 
who in consultation with the Fleet Director 
decides the future action. The ISM Manager is 
responsible for processing the investigation till 
finally closed out.
Feedback to ships:
The Marine Manager is required to respond to
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managers.
Send to manaeer: 
All such reports
the ships. He also has to send analysis to the 
fleet using safety bulletins. Safety reports 
highlighting the ‘lessons learnt’ should be 
prepared in conjunction with the ISM Manager
(3a) SMS Audit:
ISM Manager is 
responsible for 
planning and 
conducting audits. 
Detailed steps for 
auditing are shown in 
the SMS. The auditor 
needs to look out for 
supporting evidence 
to point out 
deficiencies.
How often:
Once a year.
Person Resnonsible:
ISM Manager.
Support:
Required support from all seafarers 
Send to manager:
Auditor sends report to office
Person ResDonsible:
Reports are reviewed by the Marine Manager 
and the Marine and Technical Superintendents. 
Action:
Superintendents are required to support the 
ship staff to rectify the deficiencies pointed out 
by the auditor. ISM Manager responsible to 
ensure that the deficiencies mentioned in the 
reports are closed out typically in 3 months 
Feedback to ships:
ISM Manager liaises with the captain to 
process the rectification o f any deficiency 
identified during the audit
(3 b) SMS Review: 
Captains and Chief 
Engineers to conduct 
review and offer 
comments/ 
suggestions once in 
every contract. The 
office staff may also 
initiate reviews
How often:
Conducted once every contract and sent 
along with the Captains’ and Chief 
Engineers’ handing over notes.
Person Responsible:
Captains and Chief Engineers 
Support:
Everyone encouraged 
Send to manager:
All reviews on separate company form 
accompanying the handing over notes
Person Responsible:
Reviews are examined by the ISM Manager. 
Action:
Suitable reports are forwarded to the Marine or 
Technical Superintendent. Then with further 
comments forwards to the Marine or Technical 
Manager and discussed in the management 
office meeting. Other sources of input to SMS 
Review include external inspection reports. 
Feedback to ships:
Managers are required to return copy of the 
SMS review comments to the ship.
Table 31: Overview o f the implementation o f  three main elements o f the ISM Code in Company-B.
4.3.5 OHS indicators
This section indicates the Company’s OHS standard. It compares the statistical data 
produced by the Company and the data available publicly from the PSC inspection reports 
(Paris MoU, 2006). However, as pointed out earlier, such data carries with it the general 
weaknesses of underreporting.
The incident reports received from the fleet were first categorised into three levels of 
severity: 1, 2 and 3, where 1 indicated the least and 3 indicated the most severe incident.
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Parameters for deciding on the overall incident severity included the extent of personal 
injury, damages to the environment and the focus of the media. The following table was 
used to determine the severity.
Severity - 1 Severity -  2 Severity -  3
Personal LTI Loss o f limb or One or more
Injury Multiple injuries fatalities
Environmental Short Term Medium Term Long Term
Impact
Media Local media National Media International
Impact Interest Interest Media Interest
Table 32: Determining Severity o f Incidents in Company-B.
The company’s OHS statistics indicated a decline in the number of incidents between 1998 
and 2004. The record showed that between 1998 and 2004 there was a decline from 38 
incidents of Severity-1 to 21 in 2001 and further reduced to 13 in 2004. Similarly, in the 
case of incidents of Severity-2 the numbers were reduced from nine to five between 1998 
and 2001 and again to four in 2004. Incidents of Severity-3 category however were very 
few and remained low consistently.
1998 2001 2004
Severity 3 1 1 0
Severity 2 9 5 4
Severity 1 38 21 13
Table 33: Incident figures in three levels o f severity in Company-B, 1998-2004.
Moving to the data from the PSC inspection report (for appreciating how the company 
performed against the worldwide safety standard), it showed that the tankers in Company- 
B had better standards of OHS than the industry-wide average as well as the tanker fleet of 
the industry (Paris MoU., 2006). The result showed that the ships of Company-B 
consistently achieved this distinction between 1999 and 2004. For example, in 2000 while 
the industry-wide average on the number of deficiencies observed per inspection was 3.65, 
the corresponding figure for the fleet of Company-B was only 0.90 (see table below). 
Moreover, in this period the fleet did not suffer a single detention in the hands of the PSC.
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Figure 24: PSC figures of Company-B compared to worldwide figures, 1998-2004 
Sources: Paris MoU (2006) and Equasis (2007).
4.3.6 Ship-B1
The discussion in this sub-section presents the important features of the two tankers of 
Company-B on which I conducted my fieldwork. The first tanker in Company-B, 
henceforth called Ship-Bl, was one of the medium-sized tankers in the fleet with 
approximate 5000 ton GRT and built in early 1990s. It was a double hulled tanker engaged 
in trading clean petroleum product in Europe and was approved by five Oil Majors. Some 
of the main details of Ship-Bl are tabulated below:
Flag FOC
Ship GRT 5000 approximately
Ship DWT 6500 approximately
Built Early 1990
Cargo Various Clean Petroleum Product
Number of seafarers Around 10
Nationality of seafarers West and East Europe and Far East
Table 34: Key figures of Ship-Bl.
The OHS records showed that the standard of OHS on Ship-B 1 was similar to the average 
fleet-wide figures. It, for instance, recorded one injury in 2005 during which time the fleet 
wide annual average was 1.3 injuries per ship. Similarly, while the annual average of the 
fleet was reported at around seven near-miss occurrences per ship, the number reported by 
Ship-B 1 was eight. In the same way, the total period since the last LTI for this ship was 
around four years which was again close to the fleet wide average.
Industry-wide 
deficiency/ 
inspection 
ratio
Company-B
deficiency/
inspection
ratio
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
1 48
Company-B 
PSC deficiency per 
inspection ratio
Ship-Bl 
deficiency per 
inspection ratio
Company-B 
PSC detention per 
inspection ratio 
expressed in %
Ship-Bl 
detention per 
inspection ratio 
expressed in %
1999 1.14 0.00 0.00 0.00
2000 0.90 1.00 0.00 0.00
2001 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.00
2002 2.44 2.50 0.00 0.00
2003 0.56 2.00 0.00 0.00
2004 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.00
2005 1.92 1.67 8.33 0.00
Table 35: Position o f Ship-Bl in the overall PSC records o f Company-B, 1999-2005.
Also, as per the PSC inspection, it shows that Ship-Bl performed similar to the average in 
the fleet. In 2000, for example, it was inspected twice in two different PSC inspections. In 
total there were two deficiencies pointed out resulting in an average of one deficiency per 
inspection. In the same year across the fleet there were a total of nine deficiencies 
identified from a total of ten inspections. In 2005, the deficiency per inspection ratio was 
1.67 for Ship-Bl while the corresponding fleet wide figure stood at 1.92. Between 1999 
and 2005, like most of the other tankers in the fleet, Ship-Bl was never detained during any 
of the PSC inspections.
4.3.7 Ship-B2
I conducted the fourth and final research voyage on Ship-B2 which was around three years 
old. It too was engaged in transporting clean petroleum product in the European waters. In 
the last one year and half the ship has been inspected and approved by eight Oil Majors. 
Some of the main details of the ship are tabulated below:
Flag FOC
Ship GRT 8500 approximately
Ship DWT 13,000 approximately
Built Early 2000
Cargo Various Clean Petroleum Product
Number o f seafarers Around 15
Nationality o f seafarers North America, West and East Europe and Far East
Table 36: Key features o f Ship-B2.
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Despite being one of the newer ships in the fleet, Ship-B2 reported more incidents and near 
miss occurrences reported than the average in the fleet. A recent report indicated that in a 
12-month period Ship-B2 reported four cases of injury which was the highest in the fleet 
and much above the fleet average of 1.3 injuries per ship. Similarly, there were two counts 
of significant incidents and another nine counts of near miss incidents during 2005 which 
were all higher than the fleet-wide average of 0.7 and 6.7 respectively. Ship-B2, however, 
had no LTI in the last three years.
Company-B 
PSC deficiency per 
inspection ratio
Ship-B2 
deficiency per 
inspection ratio
Company-B 
PSC detention per 
inspection ratio 
expressed in %
Ship-B2 
detention per 
inspection ratio 
expressed in %
2005 1.92 1.67 8.33% 0.00%
2006 1.75 0.00 5.00% 0.00%
Table 37: The standard o f Ship-B2 in the overall PSC records o f Company-B, 2005-2006.
The PSC record for this ship is presented in the table above. However, as the ship is 
relatively new there is very limited data to determine the standard of safety of the ship in 
relation to either the fleet or the worldwide average generally. However, at the time of the 
fieldwork the ship was inspected four times by different PSC inspections. In all there were 
five deficiencies identified but none of them resulted in its detention which indicates that 
the standard of OHS of the ship was generally above the industry-wide average.
Summary
This chapter presented the main features of the two case studies including the business 
focus, management structure and responsibilities of the managers and seafarers, and safety 
standards of the two companies. It also highlighted some of the important elements of the 
two ships in each organisation on which I carried out my fieldwork.
It showed that the two companies were relatively well established and financially robust. 
Their businesses were longstanding, widespread and involved Oil Majors as their main 
clients. Moreover, in both companies the SMSs were well-developed for the purpose of 
implementing the ISM Code. The managers had detailed procedures and instructions in 
place along with checklists and forms to assist in the implementation process of each of the 
main elements of the SMSs.
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The data from the PSC inspection reports indicate that the standard of safety in the two 
companies is better than the industry-wide average. Although the data has limitations, they 
nonetheless suggest that the two case studies are examples of the ‘better’ segment of the 
maritime industry. This argument also corroborates the earlier discussion in section 3.1.3 
where, drawing on my experience on getting access to fieldwork, I pointed out that the 
companies which offered me access most probably belonged to the better end of the 
industry.
The overview of the requirements for implementing the SMSs also pointed to the implicit 
requirement of a significant amount of cooperation between the different layers of 
hierarchy in the two companies. It showed that for a systematic implementation of the 
different elements of the ISM Code, there was an especially important need for upward risk 
communication within each ship and its management office as well as between the ratings 
and senior officers.
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Chapter 5: Risk Assessment
Introduction
Within the literature review (chapters 1 and 2) it was discussed how the move to regulated 
self-regulation led to the development of different forms of management system as means 
to manage workplace risk systematically. There, it was also discussed how the International 
Safety Management (ISM) Code in the global maritime industry provided the framework 
for ship-owners (managers) to develop their own Safety Management Systems (SMSs) for 
managing occupational health and safety (OHS) in their organisations.
As discussed in the methodology (section 3.2), this thesis explores the practices of the three 
main elements of SMSs: risk assessment, incident and near miss occurrence reporting and 
audit and review. These elements were also identified as central to the implementation of 
the ISM Code. In this and in the subsequent two chapters I shall present the findings of my 
fieldwork which was undertaken in two shipping companies in the maritime industry. 
These findings aim to illustrate the extent and the manner in which these three elements 
were operationalised. In so doing, they further attempt to draw out the factors which 
influence the ways in which individuals act in relation to the working requirements of their 
company’s SMSs.
Discussion of the wider OHS literature showed that the concept of risk assessment is 
central to successful systematic safety management and an important step towards 
safeguarding workers from workplace hazards. As such, employers responsible for 
workplace OHS are required to lay down procedures based on a systematic assessment of 
the hazards liable to be encountered at the different stages of any work process. This 
chapter examines the practice of risk assessment in the maritime sector in compliance with 
the ISM Code.
The chapter is organised into three broad sections. It begins by discussing the requirements 
of risk assessment as developed in the SMSs of the two companies. Detailed description is 
provided of the two SMSs to illustrate the specific roles assigned to managers and seafarers 
in implementing the requirements of risk assessment and highlights the main influences 
that led to their respective developments. Then, it analyses managers’ accounts presented in
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their interviews on how they operationalised these requirements and the constraints they 
faced in the process. Finally, the chapter analyses the perspective of the seafarers from 
interviews, informal discussions, documentary analysis and ethnographic observations. It 
locates the influences that affected the seafarers’ participation in the practice of risk 
assessment. By synthesising the data from the three sections, the discussion at the end of 
the chapter draws attention to a number of key findings that will be explored more fully in 
chapter-8.
5.1 Risk Assessment procedures in Company-A and Company-B
Risk assessment was identified as a central feature of the SMSs in the two companies 
studied. It was primarily implemented through the production of written procedures and 
instructions for various onboard operations. These included regular everyday activities, 
such as navigation and cargo operations, as well as operations which were carried out less 
frequently, like dry-docking or major repair work. In each case the company’s SMS made 
explicit reference to the hazards associated with these tasks which ranged from large-scale 
maritime hazards such as collision, flooding and explosion, to occupational injuries to 
individual seafarers, which included asphyxiation, chemical bums and injury from falling. 
The procedures and instructions went further than just identifying the hazards -  they also 
listed risk mitigating steps or risk control measures that must be taken for each of the 
hazards identified.
One of the companies, for example, had procedures and instmctions on navigation in 
general and navigation at particular times and highlighted the various hazards that may be 
encountered. For instance when navigating in coastal waters the potential hazards were 
identified as:
• anchored ships, yachts and small crafts in the vicinity
• shallow water
• pronounced effects of wind and tide in the proximity of shore
It also stated how these hazards should be controlled or mitigated by, for example:
• officers using the largest scale chart to better appreciate the hazards
• captains specifying the maximum position fixing interval
• officers positively identifying navigational objects or marks for position fixing
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5.1.1 Risk control measures using checklists
For a number of tasks, the instructions in the SMSs already contained risk assessment and 
enumerated the risk mitigating measures that the seafarers were required to comply with. 
These were made available to the seafarers in the form of work permits and checklists both 
in hard copies (known as the forms folder) and electronic format. Thus, for example, in the 
case of providing guidelines to seafarers on safe working procedures in ‘enclosed spaces’, 
in the SMS of one of the companies there was a section in the main manual describing the 
areas onboard considered as enclosed spaces. These included certain tanks, store rooms and 
void spaces. It then emphasised that entering into these spaces was dangerous as these 
could have oxygen-deficient atmospheres. It warned that these spaces could even have 
poisonous cargo fumes or engine exhausts -  all of which could lead to asphyxiation. 
Having discussed this, it then highlighted several control measures including checking the 
atmosphere prior to, and at frequent intervals during, an entry; the donning of necessary 
personal protective equipment and the use of appropriate communication methods.
The instructions in the main manual also directed the seafarers to a specific work permit 
(located in the forms folder) that required filling in and signing by the leader of the team 
entering the space and also either by the Chief Officer or Chief Engineer before it could be 
submitted to the Captain for his final approval. Moreover, it pointed out that all answers in 
the work permit must be answered with a ‘yes’ unless there were legitimate reasons for a 
‘no’ -  for which a valid explanation was mandatory. The work permit used for ‘enclosed 
space entry’ in one of the organisations is shown below:
Item Yes No Item Yes No
Space segregated by blanking o ff Linkman designated and standing by
Lock-out/tag-out in use Officer o f watch advised
Space cleaned Rescue harness positioned
Thoroughly ventilated Breathing apparatus positioned
Oxygen and hydrocarbon readings taken Arrange for further atmosphere checks
Emergency escape procedures identified Access illumination adequate
Evacuation method agreed Communication procedure agreed
Oxygen % Volume Hydrocarbon % Volume
Toxic gas Name PPM50
Signatures (1) Team Leader (2) Chief Officer/ Engineer (3) Captain
Table 38: Checklist for enclosed space entry in one o f the organisations.
50 PPM (Parts per million): which is a common unit to determine the concentration o f toxic gases, such as 
benzene.
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A careful inspection of the procedures, instructions, work permits and checklists of the two 
companies showed that were all heavily influenced by the contents of a few standard 
maritime publications, such as the ‘Bridge Procedures Guide’ published by International 
Chamber of Shipping (ICS) and the ‘Code of Safe Working Practices for Merchant 
Seamen’ (CSWP) published by UK Maritime Coastguard Agency (MCA). For example, 
the checklists for different stages of navigation, such as ‘Preparation for departure from 
port’, ‘Anchoring and Anchor Watch’ and ‘Navigation in heavy weather or in tropical 
storm areas’, used in both organisations were all virtually identical to what was found in 
the Bridge Procedure Guides (ICS, 1998).
The most commonly referred to publication in both the SMSs was the Code of Safe
Working Practices (MCA, 2006). At several places the company’s instruction pointed out
that the seafarers should refer to the original CSWP in order to better appreciate the
complexities of the hazards associated with the task. For example, one of the SMSs stated:
Further guidance is contained within Chapter 1 of the Code of Safe Working 
Practices for Merchant Seamen’.
Likewise, the instruction on how to conduct ‘hot work’ safely stated that:
It is essential that all personnel who use oxygen/ acetylene cutting equipment and/ 
or electric arc welding equipment are fully aware of the potential risks and 
hazards... the Code of Safe Working Practices for Merchant Seamen details the 
safety precautions to be taken when using this equipment.
Analysis of the data revealed that managers in both companies focused on developing 
generic procedures, guidelines and checklists suitable for implementing across their entire 
fleets. In doing so they clearly utilised popular industry-wide publications which had been 
produced on the basis of existing maritime standards, experiences and developed over 
many generations. The utilisation of such an approach suggests that managers considered 
shipboard jobs as finite and repeatable tasks for which a set number of procedures based on 
standard risk assessments and with a specific set of risk control measures were suitable. In 
other words, it showed that the managers assumed considerable stability in the functions 
and tasks undertaken by seafarers and that they would be performed under stable 
conditions.
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This high level of emphasis on the production of procedures and instructions based on 
generic risk assessment has important implications for the way in which SMSs are 
implemented in the maritime sector and will be explored in more detail in the following 
sections. As such, generic risk assessment and risk control have some limitations in the 
assessment of risks that are specific or peculiar to particular situations. It also has the 
danger of ignoring workers’ experience in the mitigation of risks.
Similar practices have also been reported in land-based industries. Gadd et al. (2004), for 
example, studying a range of UK industries identified the ‘use of generic risk assessments’ 
as one of the most commonly identified pitfalls in risk assessment. The authors found that 
on many occasions managers used common risk assessments in different worksites (owned 
by the same management) without any addition or modification to them. This, they pointed 
out, was one of the main reasons why they were considerably ineffective.
5.1.2 Shipboard risk assessment
While the managers relied heavily on generic risk assessments, they also appreciated that
there could be some variation in the working methods which required the personnel on
ships to conduct their own risk assessments. In their instructions they pointed out that for
certain types of jobs, checklists alone were not sufficient and required seafarers to conduct
additional shipboard risk assessments or refer to previous assessments conducted and filed
on the ship. In this regard the instruction in the SMS of one of the companies stated:
Shipboard risk assessments must be conducted for which no valid risk assessment 
exists... Risk assessments should be archived and re-used for repetitive tasks so 
long as they are reviewed and updated as necessary.
To comply with the company’s shipboard risk assessment procedures, the seafarers in both 
organisations were required to conduct onboard risk assessments by quantifying risk using 
a probabilistic method. It drew heavily on the risk assessment procedures laid down in the 
Chapter-1 of Code of Safe Working Practices (MCA, 2006) -  discussed in section 2.3.1.
As per the instructions in the two companies, for each of the hazards identified, the 
assessor was required to determine the existing control measures and the levels of risk. In 
case any of the hazards showed risk level of ‘moderate’ or worse, the assessor was required 
to apply additional control measures to reduce the risk level. Only when the level of risk
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was brought down to ‘tolerable’ the task could be started. The entire sequence is shown in 
the following table with a practical example from one of the ships studied.
Stage Risk assessment sequence Example
1 Identifying Hazard One hazard identified as ‘contact with electricity’ during 
the job
2 Existing Control Measures The control measure used for this particular hazard was 
‘electric isolation o f equipment’
3 Determining Risk
(by using ‘severity/ likelihood
table’ for each hazard)
Severity: Harmful 
Likelihood: Unlikely 
Result: Moderate level o f risk
4 Additional Control Measures 
(only when risk level is moderate or 
higher)
Use o f proper Personal Protective Equipment
5 Final level o f  risk for this hazard Tolerable level o f risk for this hazard and also for all 
hazards identified for the task
Table 39: Onboard risk assessment structure anc sequence used on one o f the research ships
5.1.3 Risk assessment responsibilities
The formal procedures in both companies specified the ranks responsible for ensuring that 
those undertaking the particular tasks adhered to the risk control measures identified in the 
assessments. Overwhelmingly the senior officers, i.e. chief officers, chief engineers and 
second engineers were identified as the persons responsible. In addition, in a number of 
cases, the captain was required to authorise the tasks and accept the overall responsibility. 
Prior to carrying out hot-work on deck, for example, the captain in both companies was 
required to authorise the work after the chief officer assumed responsibility for it. For 
certain other jobs which were mostly related to their watch-keeping duties, however, duty 
officers or engineers were also given responsibilities. The following table provides an 
illustration of the different persons responsible for conducting the risk assessment tasks in 
the two companies.
Company Job detail Responsible/ In-charge Authoriser
A Working Aloft Chief Officer/ 2nd Engineer Captain
A Deck preparation for departure Duty Officer Captain
A Bunkering operation Chief Engineer/ Captain None
B Engine Room checks port departure Duty Engineer None
B Enclosed Space Responsible Officer Captain
B Hot-work permit Chief Officer/Chief or 2nd Eng. Captain
Table 40: Examples o f person(s) responsible for conducting different types o f risk assessment.
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Also, the SMSs specified who should be conducting the shipboard version of risk 
assessments. Here, however, the two SMSs differed in their approaches. Company-A SMS 
required that a senior officer conduct the assessments with contribution from the captain 
and others who were able to make a positive contribution. By contrast, the SMS of the 
Company-B suggested that any person who was suitably experienced in the job could 
conduct the necessary assessments.
Company Main Risk Assessor Who to consult
A Senior Officer Captain and anyone else with any input
B Suitably experienced personnel No requirement
Table 41: Person(s) responsible for conducting onboard risk assessment.
The managements also maintained surveillance over both types of risk assessments. Both 
companies required around one in three completed work permits and checklists to be 
returned in post for the managers’ scrutiny. Likewise, a selection of completed shipboard 
risk assessments forms were to be dispatched to the management offices. The detail of the 
risk assessment procedures followed in the two organisations are presented in sections
4.2.4 and 4.3.4 respectively and, thus, is not repeated here.
5.1.4 Additional initiatives
The SMSs in the two organisations also pointed to the use of safety committee meetings for 
discussing risks associated with different jobs onboard. The requirements in the two 
organisations were very similar. They stated that such meetings should be conducted at 
least once a month and that the captain, chief engineer, safety officer and representatives 
from officers and ratings should attend it. They identified safety committee meetings as a 
platform for discussing and sharing safety related concerns and required the captains to 
utilise the occasion to disseminate the contents of safety bulletins and circulars issued by 
the companies to the rest of the seafarers. In addition, the Company-B’s SMS specifically 
required that at least one shipboard risk assessment should be conducted for any routinely 
undertaken work during such meeting. Both companies required that the minutes of these 
meetings were documented and sent to the managers.
In addition, both companies required that an officer onboard each ship in addition to his 
primary responsibilities as a ship’s officer serving in a particular rank also took the
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responsibility of the ship’s safety officer. His job as safety officer was to promote hazard 
identification and encourage awareness of risk assessment among fellow seafarers.
Both companies also placed noticeable emphasis on training of seafarers to identify hazards 
and prepare for eventualities. It was done by conducting safety drills on various operational 
and emergency matters and also by showing seafarers training video programmes on 
various safety topics aimed at improving seafarers’ awareness of hazards in their day-to- 
day tasks. From the records it showed that seafarers in both companies regularly 
participated in safety drills and watched safety videos.
Furthermore, in both organisations the managers pursued various additional safety 
initiatives with the intention to improve shipboard safety. One such example was the 
‘Behaviour-based Safety Programme’ followed in one of the companies. It required the 
onboard senior officers to observe the junior officers and ratings at work and identify their 
‘unsafe behaviours’. The objective of the exercise was to improve the seafarers’ rule 
following tendencies and thus reduce workplace injuries and incidents. The managers in 
their interviews also acknowledged that the company took this initiative as it was a 
requirement set by one of the Oil Majors with whom they conducted business.
However, the review of the literature (see Bohle and Quinlan, 2000) showed that in the 
management of organisational safety an excessive focus on workers’ rule following 
behaviours may take the employer’s attention away from providing a safe working 
environment and address the OHS concern in a participative way.
From the discussion in this section it shows that the two companies developed detailed 
procedures for conducting risk assessments and also took additional initiative in an effort to 
increase safety awareness among the seafarers. The procedures also assumed free 
communication across the organisation with particular input from the seafarers. Having 
presented the overview of the risk assessment procedures, the two following sections 
describe how this element was operationalised in practice. While the next section looks at it 
from the managers’ perspective the third looks at it from the seafarers’ perspective.
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5.2 Risk Assessment from the managers' perspective: top-down 
management
The managers and superintendents in the two companies felt that their understanding of the 
company’s operating system along with their seafaring experience make them capable of 
handling their tasks as managers which included managing the organisation’s health and 
safety. Nearly every interviewee in both management units pointed out that the policies, 
procedures, instructions, work permits and checklists used in their company’s SMS were 
appropriate for the types and trades of the ships in the fleet. They insisted that the SMSs 
were adequate as they were developed after carrying out substantial research on safety and 
pollution prevention. The managers indicated that their SMSs were frequently upgraded to 
keep pace with developments in the industry, regularly updated to incorporate changes 
within the company and routinely improved from one version to the next through 
suggestions and recommendations received from various sources including the seafarers.
The managers further claimed that their SMSs were so well developed and advanced that
there was limited scope for any further improvement to them. They felt so strongly about
the comprehensiveness of their SMSs that they insisted that for the day-to-day jobs
seafarers should simply follow what is written in them. One superintendent from one of the
two companies, for example, said:
Frankly speaking the SMS we have is very good and all types of risks are covered. 
If you follow it you would be safe because it provides a full cover for each and 
every job and each and every problem that comes from these jobs. But just as the 
rest, the effectiveness of the SMS varies from ship to ship which entirely depends 
on them (the seafarers onboard) and how they handle it [ref: 60].
As these interviews pointed out, to the managers it was imperative that seafarers followed
the policies and procedures laid down in the SMSs for their own safety. From the two
companies nearly every manager revealed that one of their main tasks was to ensure that
seafarers and in particular captains followed the SMSs closely, as, in their understanding,
incidents occurred onboard ships only when the seafarers made a departure from the stated
procedures. From the interviews it showed that they believed that more the seafarers
followed the instructions on the company SMSs, especially risk assessments, the safer their
workplaces would become. In fact, the managers spoke of motivating the seafarers and
training them more to achieve a better compliance with the procedures written in the SMSs.
These, for example, were apparent from the interview of one superintendent, who stated:
Our job here is to ensure that the seagoing staff follow our procedures and work as 
per the requirements in the SMS. It is a constant battle (for us) -  sometimes we
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even have to train them to set them on the right track. Time after time we have 
traced back root causes of accidents to (seafarers’) non-compliance with our 
procedures [ref: 87].
Moreover, there was another angle to why managers required their seafaring colleagues to 
strictly follow companies’ written policies and procedures. Some of the managers in their 
interviews revealed their concern with issues related to the ever-changing workforce 
onboard. Despite the difference in the employment structure51 (as discussed in the previous 
chapter) the managers from both companies mentioned that unlike the managers and 
superintendents who were employed on a permanent basis for several years in an 
uninterrupted manner, the seafarers were employed in a short-term and discontinuous 
manner. The seafarers worked onboard and stayed ashore away from work in a cyclic 
process as a result of which the managers believed that the seafarers were not indoctrinated 
to the company’s ways of working as much as they themselves were. As a result, the 
seafarers did not have the benefit of the continuity of knowledge. One manager, for 
example, explained:
We call them (senior officers) part of the management team -  but some of them are 
here today gone tomorrow. They come and go, we (managers and superintendents) 
don’t... even if they return to the same ship it could be months in between... 
whereas we are continuously taking care of repair, dry-dock, Oil Majors [ref: 19].
Talking about ensuring compliance, a number of managers and superintendents from both
case studies pointed out that the ratings were most reluctant among all seafarers. In way of
justifying their claims, they highlighted how ratings refused to speak up during safety
meetings, or ask questions during onboard safety training programmes, or fill in
anonymous near-miss incident reports. The managers from both case studies spoke openly
about their views on ratings’ apathy. Such a notion was evident from the interviews of the
superintendents who routinely visited the ships or conducted audits, as well as from the
directors and managers who echoed the general perception within their companies. A
senior manager of one of the companies described this feeling when he said:
I don’t know why they (ratings) sit quietly... it could be because they can't speak 
English or perhaps they don’t know what's happening around them due to lack of 
training. Maybe it’s their nature from (the countries they come from)... could be 
lack of motivation -  who knows? [ref: 45]
51 Only officers in Company-B were on permanent employment, the rest were on temporary short-term 
contract.
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Some managers further added that although safety meetings gave seafarers the opportunity 
to put forward their views it was futile to expect ratings to be as responsive as officers. For 
this reason they, along with the senior officers, needed to monitor the ratings’ compliance 
with the company’s SMSs. Nevertheless, they seemed keen that the ratings avail 
themselves of safety meetings and other SMS procedures to participate because they gave 
the opportunity for them to state their concerns and more importantly allow them to 
identify with the wider company philosophy.
However, because of the distance between the management office and the ships, the
managers also recognised that the key to getting the ratings and junior officers to feel part
of the company was mainly in the hands of the captains. As a result the managers felt
compelled to rely mostly on the captains to pass their instructions to the rest of the
seafarers. One manager spoke his views on this and remarked:
We need participation from everyone and we hope to see that in safety meetings 
captains can convince the rest to work safely...there is only so much we can do from 
here... like any other activity onboard ship crew participation is also hinged on the 
enthusiasm of the captain [ref: 87].
The managers’ interest in seafarers’ compliance with the procedures and instructions
written in the companies’ SMSs was clearly a positive step. However, from the managers’
interviews it was evident that a significant section of them had a narrow notion of
seafarers’ participation. To them, participation simply meant following procedures and
requirements written in the SMSs and being receptive to the safety decisions that are
already taken at the management level. The following interview of a superintendent, for
instance, highlighted how a majority of the managers viewed seafarers’ participation:
The chief officer and chief engineer are the people who matter and are the ones who 
are running the ship and telling the others what to do. Let’s be realistic, Bosun and 
below cannot and are not supposed to talk. They are supposed to be guided... 
captains should ensure participation from everyone onboard... take the lead, read 
the safety bulletins and convey to them what is right and what is wrong [ref: 24].
Such views point out how managers in the two companies followed a top-down style of 
management which essentially required them to pass down instructions through different 
levels of the company hierarchy. Because of the distance from the shore-based 
management units, the captains were given this additional responsibility of passing down 
the managers’ instructions to the rest of the seafarers.
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However, various scholars in the field of OHS have pointed to the weaknesses of top-down 
style of management of OHS. As discussed in the review of the literature, Gallagher 
(2000), for example, in her research on the effectiveness of OHS management systems 
found that top-down management approach was one of the main reasons for relatively poor 
OHS outcomes. By comparing the safety outcome of 20 Australian organisations with the 
results of an audit system52, the author pointed out that the companies which did not allow 
employees to contribute in the management of OHS showed comparatively weaker results. 
On the other hand, the audit outcome showed that the companies which allowed employee 
involvement in hazard identification and control, performed comparatively better.
On the whole, the analysis of the managers’ interviews showed that managers followed a 
top-down style of OHS management, but, at the same time were not convinced that their 
seafaring colleagues followed the procedures written in the SMSs. They felt that on many 
occasions their encouragement to comply with these requirements was not persuasive 
enough as seafarers routinely deviated from the procedures. While most managers 
criticised the seafarers for being negligent and filling in the required paperwork 
mechanically, some pointed out that seafarers were wilfully paying no attention to these 
mechanisms and even accused them of hiding the real picture by falsifying documents.
5.2.1 Distance from ships: surveillance through paperwork
As a consequence of this complexity, to the managers it was imperative that they carried
out some form of surveillance and utilised measures to ensure that seafarers were 
complying with the procedural requirements of the companies. However, because of the 
distance from the ships, the shore-based office managers could not frequently avail the 
traditional form of physical surveillance.
There was however a difference in the ways in which the managers in the two companies 
perceived the subject of distance from their ships. As the ships in Company-A operated 
internationally the management office and the ships were on different time zones. Thus, the 
communications between the managers and captains were largely confined to e-mails. 
Also, for the same reason organising visits by superintendents to the ships in foreign ports 
were more complex. From the reports and interviews it showed that the superintendents 
visited ships only around once every six months and stayed onboard mostly for the duration
52 Gallagher (2000) compared with the results o f Victorian SafetyMAP audit.
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of the ship’s stay in ports -  which was typically around one or two days. Overall the 
managers of Company-A appeared to operate with only a sketchy picture of the daily 
activities on their ships. However, this did not seem to bother them as in their interviews 
they regarded it as ‘the norm in the industry’.
The ‘distance’ was of lesser problem in the case of the managers of Company-B as they 
could keep in touch with the fleet -  sailing within a few hundred miles from them -  even 
on terrestrial mobile phones. However, despite this proximity the superintendents barely 
managed to comply with the requirements of the SMS on the maximum interval between 
visits by superintendents. They managed to visit each ship once in around three months and 
stay onboard at the most only for one full working day. Thus, physical surveillance even in 
Company-B was infrequent. The managers and superintendents from both companies, thus, 
found physical inspection as an inadequate means to determine whether or not seafarers 
were complying fully with the company’s procedures and instructions.
This influenced the managers to focus on checking paperwork for verifying whether or not
seafarers were complying with the company’s procedures. From their interviews it showed
that the managers routinely checked work permits and checklists on risk assessment as well
as other paperwork such as work completion reports and onboard drills and trainings
records to determine the seafarers’ level of compliance with the company’s procedures and
instructions laid down in the SMSs. The extent to which the reliance on verification of
paperwork was widespread is more apparent from the seafarers’ interviews (discussed
later) but even the managers’ interviews revealed the veracity of the focus on paperwork
verification. One superintendent, for example, said:
We have to know what's going on there (on ships)... you know the crew (seafarers) 
are always having a tendency to take short-cuts and my job is to spot this. We can 
find that out from paperwork, reports etc... we can’t get onboard on a daily basis -  
how else do we know -  you tell? (ref: 65)
This method in which verification of paperwork was seen as an integral part of the 
managers’ approach turned the focus on to the bureaucratic outcome of implementation of 
the SMSs.
5.2.2 Bureaucracy as a way of management
In fact, the reason for managers’ interest in ensuring that seafarers met the bureaucratic 
requirements (by filling in the checklists, forms and logbooks) was not just confined to
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managers’ requirements. There were also commercial reasons for this documentation. The
managers in their interviews pointed out that the Oil Major Inspectors routinely examined
checklists, permits and logbooks as part of their inspections. Their inspection was crucial
(as discussed in section 2.1.3) in deciding on the ship’s suitability for commercial use.
Furthermore, Port State Control inspectors (discussed in sections 1.3.1. and 2.1.3), who
could potentially detain ships in foreign ports, also required similar documentary evidence.
These were pointed out by several managers, one for example said:
We are tired of this allegation that we make them (seafarers) fill in paperwork -  
that's not true. Everyone needs paperwork... port state control inspectors want to see 
records, Oil Majors ask for documents even sometimes safety officers at different 
terminals -  all continuously ask for checklists and various logbook entries [ref: 71].
Thus it shows that ‘proper and up-to-date’ documentation was an essential part of ship 
management. It not only ensured managerial compliance but was also crucial from the 
commercial as well as regulatory viewpoints.
The negative impact of bureaucracy in the implementation of the ISM Code in the maritime 
industry has already been pointed out in the review of the literature. Anderson, for 
example, in his research pointed out how excessive formalisation of management 
procedures resulted in unnecessary paperwork (Anderson et al., 2003). Such bureaucracy 
did not contribute to the implementation of the ISM Code. A number of industry 
commentators (see for example Lloyds List, 2002d; 2006b; 2007e) also identified 
bureaucracy as a major hindrance to effective practical operation of the ISM Code. 
Research in shore-based industries has also indicated that in many organisations, 
implementation of SMSs resulted in unnecessary bureaucratisation often taking the focus 
away from effective management of organisational safety (see for example Frick et al, 
2000).
Although in both companies bureaucracy was deeply ingrained in the ways their ships were 
operated, the managers also revealed concerns as to whether or not the bureaucratic 
systems actually fulfilled the requirements of surveillance. Interviews with managers 
showed that they did not always believe the seafarers’ paperwork. Nearly every manager 
who was interviewed pointed out that most seafarers simply ticked boxes in work permits 
or blindly filled in checklists. In their interviews the managers commented that they 
believed that some of the paperwork was fabricated and merely depicted what should 
happen rather than what actually happened onboard. One manager, for instance, said:
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I have a hunch that this Master (captain) of Ship-X never follows procedures, but I 
have no means to verify that. All his paperwork looks too perfect... But there is 
nothing much that I can do... paperwork is important but sometimes there is too 
much gap between paperwork and reality [ref: 30].
Criticism over seafarers’ non-compliance to the requirements of SMS and lack of trust in
the veracity of the paperwork was widespread. A significant section of managers and
superintendents even believed that some captains and chief engineers were routinely
falsifying SMS paperwork. They felt that as a consequence the managements were unable
to appreciate what went on the ships. Thus they feared that their personal standing in the
company or the company’s reputation could also be compromised. One manager, for
instance, revealed how captains disregarded company’s SMS in their day-to-day tasks;
citing one case, he said:
I had one captain who welded on deck without my permission when the ship was 
loaded with Naphtha53. His paperwork was always false... Now what can you do 
sitting in the office? ...we (management) can hardly control what happens on ships 
[ref: 12].
The views suggest an appreciation that unsafe practice and non-compliance cannot be 
prevented by the bureaucratic means alone, yet the system remained vital to the way in 
which managers understood and implemented the SMSs. The reason given for this was that 
by ensuring the production of paper trail, the managers had ‘objective’ evidence of their 
system working, and given the distance between the office and workplace this was 
perceived to be important for the reasons given above.
5.3 Risk Assessment from seafarers' perspective
In all four research voyages the senior officers (i.e. captain, chief engineer, chief officer 
and second engineer) were conversant with the layout and the contents of the different 
manuals of their company’s SMS. The ratings and junior officers, on the other hand, 
appeared to be more familiar with the risk control measures found in the checklists. 
However, they possessed limited understanding of the procedures and instructions given in 
the SMSs -  to the extent that many ratings did not even know where to locate the SMS 
manuals on their ships.
53 Naphtha: A highly explosive and volatile petroleum product routinely carried on product tankers.
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During the interviews with the seafarers the most common theme that emerged on the
general topic of the implementation of the Code was the voluminous paperwork
accompanying risk assessment. Every officer in all four research voyages criticised that
because of the elaborate procedural requirements of risk assessments they spend a
significant amount of time filling in paperwork. They pointed out that such paperwork, for
instance, compelled them to divert their attentions during watch-keeping and also took
some of their leisure time away. They also complained that on many occasions they had to
repeat the same entries in different log books, checklists and work permits for facilitating
inspectors to cross-check. The following comment made by one junior officer in his
interview summed up the concern with paperwork generally expressed on all four ships:
Before arriving at this port the captain, the chief officer and I each spent around an 
extra six hours every day for a whole week filling in and signing forms, checking 
and cross checking them -  all because we were expecting an Oil Major Inspection... 
we were clearing paperwork backlogs basically [ref: 10].
These comments on paperwork were hardly surprising as in general the maritime press has 
identified how seafarers have been overwhelmed by a plethora of paperwork associated 
with the implementation of the ISM Code (see for example Lloyds List, 2005c; 2007a). 
The excess of paperwork was also pointed out in the study conducted by Bailey (2006) in 
his ethnographic work on ships. As highlighted in the review of the literature, the author 
found that seafarers felt inundated with paperwork and considered paperwork associated 
with the implementation of the ISM Code no more than a formality. Similarly, Anderson’s 
survey on the factors affecting the implementation of the ISM Code revealed that excessive 
paperwork was one of the greatest concerns of the seafarers (Anderson et a l, 2003).
While paperwork was considered unnecessary, the importance of being aware of workplace 
risks, nevertheless, was appreciated from all ranks onboard. A great majority of the 
seafarers when interviewed downplayed the importance of the SMSs or the formal risk 
assessment procedures as having relevance to their day-to-day activities. Instead, they 
insisted that the SMSs were only meant to take care of the ‘official requirement’. In fact, 
almost every seafarer stated that they gained their awareness of workplace hazards almost 
entirely from their earlier work experiences and not from the instructions and procedures 
written in the SMSs. They also referred to safety posters and placards posted throughout 
the ships, safety training videos and safety drills conducted onboard at regular intervals as 
being useful in improving the overall safety on ships.
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5.3.1 One size fits all SMSs: no room for experience
In the first section of this chapter the discussion pointed out how in both case studies many
of the procedures and instructions of the SMSs were borrowed from standard industry
sources and applied to the entire fleet. Criticising this practice a number of senior officers
in their interviews pointed out that although the procedures and checklists written in the
SMSs were not wrong per se their usefulness was limited because they failed to address the
specific issues with their ships. They argued that most of the generic checklists, cautionary
notes and instructions that made up their SMSs were no more than bread and butter
information for which they did not need to ‘turn the pages of the SMS manuals’. This claim
was particularly evident in the interview of one of the experienced chief officers who
explained that the introduction of SMSs did not alter his professional practice; he said:
Even 15 years ago (before the implementation of the ISM Code) I used to consult 
the ship manuals, especially the P&A (Procedure and Arrangement) Manual54 and 
of course the handing over notes (from my predecessor) on joining a ship, and the 
Code of Safe Working Practices when required... and I still do the same. I wonder 
whether anything has really changed (since the implementation of SMS) [ref: 07].
In other words the seafarers stressed the importance of the know-how of the operation of 
the specific ships they sailed on -  which however was not made available to them in the 
company’s SMSs. These SMSs were generic as the same set of operational procedures and 
instructions, forms, checklists and work permits was used across the entire fleet regardless 
of the make or model of the equipments onboard, size of the ships or the specific 
requirements of the trade the ships were engaged in. In Company-A, for instance, one of 
the ships which was around 95,000 ton DWT crude oil carrier trading in North America 
shared the same set of generic procedures and instructions with another ship in the fleet 
which was around one-tenth of its size, manned by less than half the number of seafarers, 
had a different set of machineries onboard and traded oil products under significantly 
different operating conditions in the Mediterranean Sea. While the seafarers’ interviews 
pointed to the importance of getting acquainted with the operating procedures of each ship, 
what came out even more strongly was their unequivocal reliance on their own knowledge 
and experience for working safely.
On all four research voyages the senior and junior officers as well as ratings referred to the 
importance of using their professional skills for working safely. When describing their 
ways of working and safeguarding their and their colleagues’ OHS they drew on their
54 P&A (Procedures and Arrangements) Manual: is a booklet found on tankers to assist the ship’s officers to 
identify the onboard arrangements and equipments for cargo operations.
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experiences from earlier occasions including those from previous ships. At no point did any 
of the seafarers mention that the procedures written in the company’s SMS helped them 
perform their job better. Instead, they emphasised that their work-based experiences and 
professional skills were their main strengths -  almost all of which they learnt through 
practice.
Taking the discussion further, nearly all senior officers, particularly the more experienced
ones, pointed out that the company’s procedures along with the work permits and
checklists from the SMSs did not replace the knowledge and skill required to carry out
work. What was even more interesting is that some of them indicated that the company’s
hazard identification and combating methods (entry-permits and checklists) were at times
counter-productive. This notion was captured in several interviews. One of the senior
engineers, for example, said:
When one learns the job through experience one also learns risk assessment. You 
must listen to senior people who will teach you the job as well as the risk 
assessment. The two are one and the same. No matter how much these juniors use 
their theoretical knowledge they need to develop their practical skills... the 
checklists and the forms sometimes actually stop you from thinking or drawing on 
your experiences [ref: 26].
Arguing further, these senior officers also pointed out that particularly for long and
complicated jobs formal risk assessments were far too simplistic to appreciate all hazards
that could arise during the course of the jobs. In their argument, experience, skill, good
level of communication and leadership overshadowed the benefits of simply following
formal paper-based risk assessment systems. By citing the complexities involved in the
practice of main-engine liner renewal, one chief engineer, for example, explained:
One-page of company tick boxes is like the green signal to start the work. There is a 
lot of preparation that goes before that and a lot that goes after -  both of which may 
only be accomplished through experience... For example, when you want to take 
(Main engine) liner out -  you don’t rely on risk assessment -  you think and gather 
all your life experiences together... Everyone needs to switch-on as things may 
change very rapidly, snags may develop from nowhere and even the ship may start 
to roll all of a sudden... The (formal) assessment that you are talking about does not 
work with these crucial jobs [ref: 21].
These interviews showed how seafarers placed their experiences and skills over the formal 
requirements of the SMSs. They reiterated that ‘capable’ and ‘skilled’ seafarers were the 
most important element for working efficiently and safely, neither of which could be 
achieved simply by following formal procedures written in the SMSs. As a matter of fact,
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these views indicated how seafarers sensed the procedures and instructions of the SMSs as 
an imposition on their natural ways of working. While no one in the case studies claimed 
that the procedures and instructions written in the SMSs were wrong, they simply failed to 
see how it added value to the safe working skills they developed through their work 
experiences.
The value of professional experience has been highlighted in other industries too. Jeffcott 
et al. (2006), for example, conducting qualitative studies from over 500 British train 
company employees, identified the importance of professional expertise in the safe 
working culture. The authors found that these railway employees placed considerable 
importance on learning through practical experience and on-the-job apprenticeship 
programmes as opposed to class-room based training or by simply complying with the 
employers’ written procedures.
The distinction between the companies’ formal risk assessment procedures and the use of 
workers’ professional skills to identify hazards at workplaces has also been identified in 
various literatures. Hopkins (2005), for example, in his study of the culture of the rail 
organisations in Australia and the Australian Air Force aircraft maintenance units, 
described this distinction in terms of “workers’ risk awareness”. The author pointed out 
that formal risk assessment alone was insufficient to safeguard workers from workplace 
hazards. Instead, it also required risk-aware workers to complement the formal procedures 
by using their professional skills and experiences to identify workplace hazards and be 
better prepared to take actions to prevent them.
Ethnographic observation and informal discussions during the research voyages in fact
revealed a high level of risk awareness among the seafarers. On most occasions the
seafarers were frequently engaged in assessing risk and finding ways to work safely. Very
often they brought in their experience and skills to conduct informal risk assessments. On
several occasions I found the seafarers engaged in discussions and exchanging ideas on
hazards and ways to combat them. These were regular topics of conversation among the
ratings during coffee breaks or in the changing rooms. One such example written in my
research diary is shown below:
During the 10 o’clock coffee break, one of ABs brought up the topic of colour- 
coding the cargo pipeline segregation valves on the main deck. He pointed out that 
since the pipelines were painted a couple of months back the valves have not been
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re-coded. The bosun agreed and narrated his previous experience on the importance 
of colour-coding. He said how on another ship a lack of colour-coding nearly led to 
an accident.
At other times such informal risk assessments were also conducted across the ship’s
vertical hierarchical divide. During the fieldwork there were many such instances. On one
occasion I found the captain, chief officer, bosun, pump-man and an AB engaged in a
discussion on the safety of a group of deck ratings who were due to start working in the
pump room. The diary entry read:
(Before the start of work) the second engineer spent 20 minutes with the crew 
drinking coffee and clarifying a number of issues raised by them. The Fitter, Bosun 
and the OS raised a lot of questions, including the sequence of dismantling the 
hydraulic pipes and various hazards, such as pressure in the hydraulic line. This 
informal discussion took place long after the formal ‘permit-to-work’ was filled in 
and signed.
Such informal procedures clearly ran in parallel with the more formalised and bureaucratic 
procedures embodied in the SMSs. At the very least they complemented the SMS-based 
procedures but at times they also stood alone in contributing to the real work of day-to-day 
safety. In other words, it was apparent that the seafarers used their knowledge and 
experience to conduct risk assessment, but, in their own way.
Indeed they went further than this and produced their own documents and procedures that
operated in parallel with company’s formal procedures and instructions. On one research
voyage I saw that instead of using the guidelines and procedures written in the SMS, the
ship’s engineers were actually referring to a parallel set of guidelines and procedures
developed by one Chief Engineer who had sailed on this ship previously. The following
diary entry depicted this point:
On this ship the engineers followed a special manual which was a compilation of 
instructions for various engine room maintenance works. It enumerated the 
different hazards and contained diagrams and step-by-step guidelines for each job, 
such as maintenance of the purifiers. Some of these schematic diagrams and 
sketches were drawn by hand. When I inquired about the ‘special manual’ with the 
engineers it was revealed that this manual particularly appealed to them because it 
was detailed and ship specific... something that the company’s shipboard 
maintenance manual failed to put together.
From this it can be seen that the parallel manual filled in the void left by the company’s 
official procedures and guidelines which were not modified for the individual workplaces.
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It once again highlighted that the imposition of standardised procedures, such as the use of 
common risk assessment checklists across the fleet, has limitations.
Various shore-based studies have also identified similar results. A large questionnaire 
survey conducted by Shannon et al. (1996) on 718 manufacturing workplaces located in 
Canada, for example, found that greater worker involvement in the management of OHS in 
the organisations as opposed to literal compliance with management instructions resulted in 
fewer lost-time injuries.
Overall then the seafarers pointed to the importance of:
1. Their practical experience and general skills of working safely and efficiently
2. Their knowledge of operating the specific ship they worked on.
5.3.2 Bureaucratisation leads to focus on paperwork
A vast majority of the seafarers in their interviews also indicated a wide gap between the
procedures written in the SMSs and the actual processes of safeguarding OHS. In both
interviews and informal discussions, seafarers pointed out that they were convinced how,
before undertaking any work, it was important to reflect on the hazards associated with the
tasks. However, the practice of documenting it in the form of formal risk assessment did
not carry the same weight. To many of the officers the time required to document the
assessment was not justified, as, in their views, it only reduced the time for conducting the
actual work. Explaining this view one chief officer, for instance, commented:
I do the job first then I do paperwork. I don’t care -  tank entry checks I do first -  do 
the job then once job is complete I do the paperwork, maybe much later. We save 
time like this -  we can do the paperwork in the evening. We can’t work in the 
evening, can we? [ref: 70].
In fact, documenting risk assessments properly was claimed to be important for reasons 
other than safeguarding OHS. It was considered to be necessary to take one’s time over it 
because the paperwork had to be accurate. In the seafarers’ explanations, it was paramount 
that these documents were filled in diligently and legibly, and filed in accordance with the 
SMS requirements. Most of the officers pointed out that ideally they preferred completing 
the paperwork leisurely, and if suitable, after the actual tasks were completed. To many of 
them, the main and often the only purpose to carry out paperwork on risk assessment was 
to adhere to the bureaucratic requirements of the company’s SMS.
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Similar to the managers’ views, the officers also pointed out that comprehensive
documentary evidence was essential not only for company’s procedural compliance but
also for doing well in other inspections, such as by the Oil Majors or Port State Control.
From the interviews during the four research voyages, it was apparent that everyone
onboard took these inspections seriously. In particular, the senior officers from both
companies indicated that their reputation in the company depended on how well they
performed in these inspections. They also highlighted that for each deficiency pointed out
during these inspections they had to prepare explanations and be answerable to the
managers -  which was something that they did not want to get drawn into. A captain, for
example, in his interview said:
I have to do the paperwork because I am expected to pass Oil Major Inspections -  
you could say that's the bottom-line... I agree that internal audit, external audit 
(State Inspection) and PSC inspections and the rest are all important -  but our aim 
is to prepare the ship for passing Oil Majors because they are the toughest... If I 
pass Oil Majors the managers will be happy [ref: 86].
Indeed during onboard ethnographic observations there were several occasions when it 
became apparent that the officers were simply filling in risk assessments forms even when 
the tasks were not carried out. Earlier research in the maritime sector also found similar 
evidence of seafarers’ practice of mere paper compliance. Kahveci and Nichols (2006: 
135), during their ethnographic study on the working lives of seafarers’ onboard car 
carriers, for example, pointed out how seafarers routinely falsified logbooks and checklists 
and documented events that were not carried out but were filled in because they were 
required as per the procedures laid down in the SMSs.
In my study, interviews supported by onboard observations also suggested that some
officers carried out such practice on a routine basis merely to comply with the bureaucratic
requirements. During one research voyage, I wrote in the diary based on my observation
and informal discussion with the chief officer:
During the passage, the chief officer filled in a number of checklists, such as the 
gangway log book and pump room entry and hydro-carbon content checklists55 
when the ship was in the previous port. When on the job, he explained that these 
were part of standard watch keeping practices and made no sense in recording them 
separately, yet the SMS required it -  so he was fabricating the entries.
55 Hydro-carbon content is checked to ensure that an explosive atmosphere is not being generated in any 
compartment due to an oil leak.
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From these data it emerged that compliance with company’s bureaucratic requirements was 
perceived by those onboard as separate from and running in parallel to the actual ways of 
working onboard. The impacts of over-bureaucratised systems have been discussed in the 
wider literature (see Frick et al., 2000). There is considerable parallel here, where it can be 
seen how managerial focus on meeting procedural requirements increased the notion of 
bureaucracy but did not necessarily contribute to safeguarding workers’ OHS.
Discussing further the sensitive issue of falsifying documents the senior officers on all four
ships in their interviews also revealed how they associated documentation with the fear of
criminalisation. They pointed out that incomplete or wrongly documented risk assessments
could indicate their non-compliance with company’s procedural requirements. The officers
believed that in case of any untoward event, regulatory inspectors, such as the Port State
Control Inspectors would start verifying paperwork and by so doing they would determine
whether procedures written in the SMS were being followed or not. Any error in the
paperwork thus potentially could be taken as evidence of their professional negligence
leading to their criminalisation and arrest. This was yet another reason why senior officers
perceived documenting risk assessment as a significantly important task. One senior
engineer, for example, in his interview pointed out:
We are fighting multiple enemies every day. You do paperwork because you need 
to please the Oil Major, pass the PSC (Port State Control) inspector, internal 
auditor, external auditor and another twenty others... these are all too much work 
but also what many of the young chaps don’t understand is that you do it most for 
protecting yourself from the lawyers, you know CYB? [ref: 76].
The interviews and informal conversations with the senior officers from both companies 
showed that their fear of criminalisation was a significant issue. By pointing to the 
increasing number of cases of seafarers’ criminalisation in foreign ports and by 
highlighting the lack of protection from being prosecuted, the senior officers indicated that 
they were genuinely concerned about being prosecuted in foreign countries. In fact their 
concern was so intense that the senior officers did not consider falsifying documents, such 
as false logbook entries, as an offence, but believed them to be necessary evils in their 
professions.
As such fear of criminalisation has been widely highlighted in the maritime press (see for 
example Lloyds List, 2005d; 2006c; 2008b) as one of the major issues for seafarers 
especially captains and other senior officers. In recent times it has also been acknowledged
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by various industry stakeholders as a major issue which has serious implications in the 
maritime sector. By criticising this practice, the industry commentators point out that it 
promotes unnecessary paperwork, potentially prevents proper investigation of incidents, 
and even derogates the merchant navy as a profession (Gard, 2005; ITF, 2005).
5.3.3 Shipboard risk assessments
With regard to the shipboard risk assessment one of the first things that became apparent 
was their limited number. The onboard risk assessment file on one of the ships, for 
example, revealed that the seafarers struggled to document the minimum number of 
assessments as required by the company’s SMS. Over a period of seven years, this ship 
conducted only 49 assessments. The interviews and onboard observations also revealed that 
the ratings and junior officers did not know much about these onboard assessments while 
the senior officers had little faith in the assessments conducted by the previous officers.
Interview accounts from senior officers from both case studies revealed that they had
limited understanding of the ways of calculating the severity or the likelihood of each
hazard. One senior engineer, for example said:
I don’t know whether it (the hazard) can happen once every ten years or once every 
year56 (for calculating the likelihood of the harm)... we just put something such that 
the result comes as ‘moderate’. We don’t want too much fuss [ref: 46].
As a matter of fact, most of these senior officers felt that for all their day-to-day tasks they 
were expected to come up with a risk severity of either ‘moderate’ or less so that they could 
simply ‘get on with their jobs’.
Moreover, it was apparent that the seafarers had limited interest in referring back to the file 
of already conducted assessments -  which unfortunately was the purpose behind filing the 
completed assessments. The analysis of their interviews revealed two separate reasons as to 
why they did not refer back to earlier assessments. Firstly, the seafarers did not consider 
that earlier assessments were conducted sincerely enough to merit a second look -  as in 
their views they were conducted solely to satisfy the requirements of the SMSs. Secondly, 
the officers also pointed out that they worked under such dynamic work conditions that
56 Company-B provided three options for calculating the likelihood o f each hazard: 1) once in 10 years, 2) 
once in a year, or 3) once in a month or more frequently.
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previous assessments were of limited value to them. In his interview, one junior engineer,
for example, said the following rather sarcastically:
Yes, I think we have a file and it is thick too... Do you expect me to believe 
anything that’s written in that? ...those must have been eyewash -  just as we always 
do -  filled and filed for the sake of it.... We never look up the file [ref: 09].
Furthermore, documentary analysis coupled with onboard interviews with the seafarers
suggested that for as long as their assessments showed an acceptable level of risk or did not
require the managements to spend time or money addressing their assessments, the
managers were pleased to accept them. On the other hand, if the result of an assessment
required managers to spend money or other resources, then the managers were unlikely to
pay any serious attention to them. In other words, in the perceptions of these seafarers the
managements lacked genuine commitment. One captain, for example, explained this during
an interview on the bridge, when he said:
I have been Master on this ship from the time she was delivered and I know her 
inside out. We need the echo sounder57 display here (next to the steering wheel on 
the bridge58) and not there (in the chart room). For sure someone would be here at 
the wheel at all times but it would take someone to leave navigation to get to the 
chart room during which time we may either hit a jetty or, if not, run aground. I 
assessed the risk involved and asked for a technician and an extension cable -  it is a 
doable job. But it has been nine months since and no response yet... they 
(managements) don’t like such assessments which require them to spend money 
[ref: 85].
These accounts showed that these seafarers did not feel that the shipboard risk assessment 
system was particularly effective. Although it provided an opportunity for the seafarers to 
make use of their professional knowledge and actively engage with the SMSs, in practice it 
did not work the way it was intended for reasons discussed above. Instead, it was 
interpreted as another bureaucratic exercise which merely paid lip service to seafarers’ 
knowledge and experience in assessing risk.
The managers’ failure to respond to suggestions made in risk assessments by seafarers 
requesting additional economic support is analogous to instances found in the wider 
literature. Genn (1993), for example, studying 40 industrial and agricultural industries in
57 Echo Sounder: Instrument which shows the height o f the column o f water between the sea/river bed and the 
ship’s lower most keel plate, i.e. the ‘under-keel clearance’.
58 Bridge: Place where ship navigation controls are located, such as engine speed control steering etc. On this 
ship it was approximately 30 feet x 15 feet while the chart room was an adjoining space at the aft o f the 
bridge of approximate size 15 feet x 5 feet.
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the UK found that managers’ commitment in OHS management was limited. The author 
pointed out that although the managers in these organisations appreciated the employees’ 
suggestions and the need of improving the OHS standards, they were constantly engaged in 
a crude cost benefit analysis before investing in safety. Such analysis turned the managers 
myopic and prevented them from investing in safety to reap benefits in the long-term.
5.3.4 Distance revisited
In the previous section the interviews with managers showed that the distance between the
management units and their ships appeared as a concern for effective surveillance of the
seafarers. The same issue of ‘distance’, however, took a completely different meaning from
the seafarers’ perspective. The interviews with senior officers and especially captains
demonstrated that they actually enjoyed working at a distance from the managers. They
were keen that the latter never intervened in their day-to-day working practices including
the ways they managed risk. One captain even suggested that it was ‘his’ ship and he was
able to manage shipboard concerns all by himself. He exclaimed that:
This is not a chemical factory (ashore), where the managers instruct the operators 
what to do -  this is my ship where I have to take the decisions. No matter how much 
good intention the office (management) has they can't control us from a distance... 
we need to look after ourselves [ref: 86].
The consequence of distance was also appreciated by ratings who felt that the managers
were at a distance and too far away from all the hazards that they encountered on a day-to-
day basis. The following quote from the interview of an AB indicates how the seafarers in
general perceived the distance from their management units:
When we fall from the gangway we drown in the water, or when we slip from the 
ladder we fall dead in the bottom of the tank or on to the deck from the top of the 
mast -  but when they (managers) fall they only need to get back on their chairs [ref: 
50].
Seafarers from both case studies felt equally distant from their managements, although 
interestingly as pointed out earlier, the seafarers on Company-B ships typically sailed only 
within a few hundred miles from the office of their management unit and could even 
contact their managers on terrestrial mobile phones. This common perception of the 
seafarers from both companies, therefore, was due to their unusual working conditions. It 
made them feel considerably independent and gave them a degree of self-sufficiency. 
During the interviews they insisted that their profession required practical experience and 
competence which could only be passed on from one seafarer to another and shared among
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onboard colleagues. They believed that input from managers was superfluous and 
sometimes even counterproductive.
Moreover, the seafarers from both companies in their interviews also felt that their working 
(and living) conditions on ships were extraordinary and considerably different from what 
was experienced by their manager colleagues. They argued that they were required to 
endure the elements of nature, such as extreme temperatures, humidity and rough seas, and 
work odd hours and lead lives away from their families, while the managers and 
superintendents did not experience any of these conditions as they led comparatively 
routine and physically secure working lives.
By reflecting on these interviews one can see why the seafarers felt considerably distant 
from their managers and had difficulty in associating with the ways the managers required 
them to safeguard from workplace hazards. They did not feel that their ways of working on 
ships could be dictated by managers sitting at a distance. It showed that the distance gave 
seafarers a sense of being part of an independent community with a great degree of 
autonomy. As a result they refused to consider the managers in the same boat as them or 
believe that their managers faced the same concerns in their working lives as them.
In this context, the analysis of Gharardi and Nicolini (2000) is relevant. In their theoretical 
discussion on safety learning practice, the authors argue that safety is best viewed in terms 
of how it is constructed and learnt by workers in a community. They point to the 
importance of how a community develops its own safety culture by its actions and 
consequence which is achieved by collective and participatory behaviour that goes on 
within it. Taking their discussion further the authors also argue that within a single 
organisation there exist several communities, each following specific work practices and 
therefore possessing specific safety cultures.
5.3.5 Hierarchy: Ratings’ concerns
Moving to the perspective of ratings, the analysis of their interviews and ethnographic 
observations revealed that onboard hierarchy was a major issue in the management of 
onboard safety. It placed the ratings under direct subordination to the senior officers and as 
a result they were heavily influenced by the operating practices followed by the senior
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officers. The following interview of an AB pointed out this general feeling found in both 
companies:
On every ship we have different rule. Some chief (officer) says bosun must go in 
the tank first, this one says bosun must stay on top and AB must go down... last 
captain says minimum four people for gangway securing, this one has no rules... 
with every captain and chief officer our cargo duties change, (maintenance) jobs 
change and watch-keeping rules change. We just have to follow it [ref: 33].
Yet from the interviews and observations in both case studies it was also abundantly clear 
that these seafarers had an overall appreciation of all the different hazards associated with 
different types of onboard tasks. The junior officers and ratings, especially Bosuns and 
Pump-men, not only possessed the necessary skills for working efficiently but were 
constantly engaged in safeguarding onboard OHS. In this respect their ways of applying 
their work experience and knowledge to safeguard OHS were no different from the ways 
the senior officers presented themselves as risk aware professionals.
In the two companies it was also apparent that while these seafarers used their professional
knowledge to work safely, they were also intimidated by the senior officers. The ratings in
particular were keen not to challenge the ways the senior officers worked or to show signs
of disrespect or confrontation while working with them. During the interviews the ratings
disclosed that it was very important to carefully weigh their knowledge of the hazards and
being forthright about it. One AB, for example, said:
With some chief mate we can discuss, with some we can't... with this one it is very 
good. With last one ‘no’ he decided and we followed. But we check our flashlight, 
helmet, walkie-talkie... When he speaks ok we go down (in the enclosed space). But 
we know the dangers and if we smell gas we come up and then tell chief... this is 
the practice. But normally we can talk to chief mate and we are ok... [ref: 82].
The matter of fearing the senior officers was common in both organisations but was more 
pronounced in Compariy-A. A number of ratings as well as some junior officers from this 
company explained how their performance appraisal system was a particularly hindering 
factor. These ratings were concerned that senior officers or captains who appraised their 
performance at the end of their contract could use the appraisal system as a tool to report 
their ‘behaviour’. In their understanding, thus, it was important that throughout their stay 
onboard they remained respectful towards their senior officers. This deterred them from 
freely communicating their concerns in the open particularly if such behaviour could be 
construed as arguments or dissent. One OS, for example, explained:
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Some captains don’t like argument, maybe not good for report, maybe (he will put) 
bad remark in confidential appraisal... so I don’t speak much in the meeting or in 
the drill because with bad report it is very difficult to get new job as there are a lot 
of people waiting for my job... In my country it is important that report is good [ref: 
83].
The lack of ratings’ contribution was also apparent from the practice of safety meetings in
the two companies, which, as per the two companies’ requirements and as per the
managers’ views, was meant to promote participation from across the hierarchy. On one
ship I observed the proceedings of one safety meeting which turned out to be far from ‘a
forum type of discussion’. Instead it was a unidirectional communication where managers’
ideas and decisions were disseminated to the seafarers by the captain. The following extract
from my research diary illustrates the point:
The safety committee meeting was a formal occasion which was convened in the 
ship’s office. It was chaired by the captain and attended by all other senior officers, 
3rd officer, bosun and four other ratings. The captain read out previous meetings 
minutes and various safety bulletins. The meeting lasted for 15 minutes, out of 
which the captain spoke for over 13 minutes. While the chief officer and chief 
engineer spoke for a minute or two, the others did not speak at all. At the end the 
captain asked: ‘any questions?’ but no one spoke.
Yet, these ratings were aware of the concerns on work safety and discussed them among 
themselves. A group of ratings during an informal conversation on one research voyage 
spoke to me about their concern on safety-belt -  which was a particular type of personal 
protective equipment (PPE). The ratings’ decision to keep their concern to themselves 
came to me as a surprise as in their interviews all along they appeared to be very particular 
about their PPEs. Moreover, during the shipboard observation on most occasions I found 
them wearing PPEs diligently and also asking for replacement for their worn-out PPEs 
from the second engineers or chief officers.
In this particular case, however, the ratings were provided with safety-belts (worn round 
the waist, which has a line and a hook at the end of the line) for protecting them from 
falling down from a height above the deck or over the side of the ships. However, they 
pointed out that the line attached to the belt obstructed their movements and the belt in 
itself could make them fall. Also, they appeared fearful that in the event of a fall, instead of 
protecting them, the safety-belt could actually break their waists due to the sudden jerk 
associated with such falls.
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Also, interestingly, they were all aware that instead of safety belt ‘full body harness’ (worn
like a jacket with multiple restraint points having line and a hook at the end of the line59)
offered a better protection. On inquiring how they learnt about this new type of PPE, these
ratings explained that they had either used full body harnesses on their previous ships or
heard about them from their colleagues or seen them on training videos. These were
captured in one of the rating’s interviews, who said:
I don’t wear (safety belt) because I am not comfortable, the line is actually 
obstructing and also it may break my back if I fall down. If I fall, I maybe hanging 
above the water but with a broken back. So maybe (the safety belt provides) no 
safety at all. Sometimes I am wearing only to show the captain... but yes I wear 
lifejacket... Also, you know on my last ship safety belt is not in use any more. They 
change to full-body harness. I hope this company changes here also [ref: 25].
However, in their interviews, these ratings also revealed that they discussed this particular
concern among themselves but were not prepared to take the matter up any further. When
probed they appeared fearful of inciting unnecessary interrogation from their senior officers
and were worried that such suggestions could brand them as ‘trouble-makers’. The
following quote from an engine rating of one of the ships revealed the point:
I can tell 2nd engineer that I don’t like safety belt...but I haven’t told yet... Maybe 
he will get angry, I don’t know. Maybe they (senior officers) will think that I am the 
leader and the trouble-maker and I don’t want to do the work as this is a difficult 
job and I am making excuses [ref: 53].
These interviews, informal discussions and ethnographic observations highlighted 
compelling reasons why the shipboard ratings failed to contribute to the risk assessment 
procedure although they clearly showed signs of having the knowledge and skills to 
augment safe working practices. It showed that on ships where hierarchical barriers were 
excessive to the point that ratings and junior officers deliberately kept a low profile it 
prevented a free flow of upward communication and acted as a barrier to their contribution 
to risk assessment.
In other industries too, such as in civil aviation, (see for example Tjosvold, 1990) studies 
have found that strong hierarchical setups result in poor communication. It prevents 
effective upwards risk communication which fails to assist in improving safety. Looking at
59 Code of Safe Working Practice also recommends use o f full body harness instead o f safety belt (without 
belt spring) for working at a height o f  2 meters or more or for working over the side (MCA, 2006).
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it differently, this also reiterates the importance of acknowledging the role of workers 
sharing their experiences and skills in contributing to the management of safety.
Summary
This chapter thus shows that the managers and seafarers in the two case studies were 
operating with fundamentally different understandings of their company’s SMSs. The 
managers assumed a great degree of stability in the seafarers’ work environment and 
believed that shipboard tasks could be carried out safely by following a set of fixed 
procedures. Their focus on implementing these procedures was also influenced by the ever- 
changing workforce at sea who did not enjoy the continuity of knowledge in the workplace. 
As a result of these, managers felt it necessary to take a top-down approach to managing 
OHS which paid emphasis on passing down instructions to the seafarers and ensuring that 
they complied with the company’s procedures. However, the analysis also revealed that the 
managers’ top-down approach to ensure compliance combined with the distance from the 
workplace resulted in bureaucratising the whole system. The purpose of following a 
bureaucratic system not only facilitated managerial control but also assisted in the 
commercial as well as regulatory modes of inspection.
On the other hand seafarers relied heavily on their experiences and skills in working safely 
in an active and dynamic environment on ships. They found the generic set of risk 
assessments too limiting and as a bureaucratic overlay. Moreover, the shipboard risk 
assessment which in theory provided an opportunity for seafarers to make use of their 
professional knowledge was in practice yet another form of bureaucratic exercise. The 
main reason why managers’ and seafarers’ perceptions were in conflict was because the 
level of seafarers’ participation that was required under the formal procedures left no room 
for the seafarers to bring in their professional skills and work experiences. Yet, seafarers 
due to various pressures of work complied with the bureaucratic requirements which had 
limited connection with the actual shipboard work practices. Moreover, the distance from 
the management offices made the seafarers feel alienated from the managers and more 
specifically from their ways of managing OHS.
As a consequence, in the two organisations there was limited participation from the 
seafarers in the management of OHS. In the review of the literature such lack of 
participation, however, was found as a major impediment to effective management of
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workplace safety. Authors, such as Gallagher et al. (2003) and Walters and Frick (2000) 
have discussed how workers’ knowledge and expertise can offer practical help in finding 
hazards and in the ways to mitigate them, and can also bring in workplace democracy -  all 
contributing to the effective management of OHS. The importance of workers’ 
participation was also discussed from the perspective of the perception of risk. The review 
of the literature in section 2.2.1 also pointed out how risk was perceived differently by 
different groups of people. There it argued why workers should be particularly involved in 
the assessment of risk (Somers, 1995; McLain, 1995).
However, in the maritime context it was noted that the ISM Code made no explicit 
reference to the role of seafarers in the practice of risk assessment instead it placed all its 
focus on managerial initiatives to safeguard risk (see discussion on section 2.1.1). From 
these findings too it can be seen that neither of the two SMSs promoted the involvement of 
seafarers in risk assessment nor was it practised in the two organisations.
Moreover, the discussion in this chapter also raises question on whether the 
implementation of the ISM Code contributed in providing support to captains on 
discharging his responsibilities with regard to safety and the protection of the marine 
environment. The analysis of the data showed that the captains did not believe that their 
colleagues in the management units offered adequate support for the purpose. However, as 
pointed out in section 1.3.2, one of the main objectives of the Code was to create a 
mechanism in managing OHS that provided captains with active support from their 
management units.
The discussion in this chapter pointed out a number of other concerns that influenced the 
practice of risk assessment in the two companies. These were:
•  The im pedim ents to  upward risk com m unication due to shipboard hierarchical 
arrangements
• seafarers’ fear o f  crim inalisation as a result o f  not fulfilling com pany’s bureaucratic 
requirements
•  commercial and regulatory inspectors’ indirect pressure on com pliance with company’s 
bureaucratic requirements
All these themes will be discussed in chapter-8.
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Chapter 6: Incident Reporting
Introduction
This chapter discusses the practice of incident (and near-miss occurrence) reporting in the 
two companies studied. Incident reporting, as described in the literature review (section: 
2.3.2), is one of the main elements in SMSs. It requires workers to report to their managers 
on unintended OHS events, such as work related injuries. It provides an opportunity for 
managers to analyse the factors causing such events and use the analysis as a tool to 
improve the effectiveness of the existing policies, procedures and instructions in their 
companies. This element also helps managers quantify the number of these instances by, 
for example, comparing fatality figures over a period of time. Moreover, it also allows 
managers to fulfil their statutory obligation by reporting such incidents to their regulatory 
authorities, i.e. the flag states in the case of maritime industry.
This chapter is organised into three broad sections. First, it outlines the general 
requirements of incident reporting as laid out in the SMSs of the two companies. The 
second section focuses on the practice of incident reporting from the perspectives of 
managers by drawing on interview data and documentary analysis conducted at the two 
management offices. It points out the roles managers play in facilitating incident reporting 
and analysing the reports, and examines the influences affecting their practice. The third 
section uses documentary analysis, interviews, informal conversations and ethnographic 
observations on board four research voyages to analyse seafarers’ practice of incident 
reporting and point out the factors that influence their practice. The discussion is presented 
by synthesising the companies’ requirements and the views on the practices from the two 
perspectives.
6.1 Incident Reporting procedures in the two case studies
Both companies in their safety and environment policies stated that their principal objective 
was to provide a safe working environment. Preventing incidents, such as personal injuries 
and pollutions, was thus on top of their agenda. However, they also recognised that the 
need for setting up procedures so that they could respond to any such eventuality in a 
professional manner. Both companies laid down policies, procedures and instructions on 
how to report incidents, analyse them and learn from the analysis so as to prevent
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recurrence. These instructions required captains to promptly report all such incidents to 
managers by using the telephone before sending in reports on incident reporting forms by 
facsimile or e-mail. On receiving these reports the superintendents and managers were 
required to take appropriate action and if required bring them to the notice of the 
company’s senior management team.
In both organisations the importance of preventing incidents was also considered the key to 
successful business. At several places in the SMSs it was pointed out that company’s 
success was heavily dependent on the fleet’s standard of safety and pollution prevention. 
They highlighted that safety or pollution-related incidents, or deficiencies reported by Port 
State Control or Oil Major Inspectors were all damaging to the company’s image and their 
business prospects. One of the two companies, for example, identified a set of Key 
Performance Indicators to self-evaluate the performance of each ship in its fleet and use the 
system to promote and market its business. Using around ten indicators, it produced a 
weighted score sheet in which incident frequency rates and Port State Control and Oil 
Major Inspection deficiency rates were given the maximum importance.
One of the two companies also took an additional initiative to reduce Loss Time Injuries 
(LTI) in the fleet by running a safety incentive scheme which kept count of the days since 
the previous LTI occurred on every ship in the fleet. It regularly promulgated this 
information to the entire fleet. The purpose of the exercise was to appreciate the seafarers’ 
safe working practice. As a token, the managers also rewarded the ships with gold, silver 
and platinum award certificates -  depending on the degree of their achievements. These 
certificates were required to be displayed at prominent locations in the management office 
and also on public notice board of the ships which received these awards.
However, informal discussions with the senior officers of this company later revealed its 
limited success. During the interviews they pointed out that as the incident-free award was 
awarded to the ship and not to the individual seafarers they did not consider it as their 
achievements. Moreover, the seafarers also pointed out that on most occasions every time 
they returned from leave they were assigned duty on different ships in the fleet. As a result, 
they never developed ownership of these awards.
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The procedures in the two organisations also emphasised on the importance of reporting 
near-miss occurrence. They defined near-miss occurrence as an event that could have 
resulted into an incident but did not. The instructions emphasised that if properly analysed 
near-miss reports had the potential to reduce serious incidents such as those resulting in 
LTI or fatality. Thus, the SMSs stressed the need for seafarers to give near-miss 
occurrences the same importance as incidents.
6.1.1 Statistical Analysis
On receiving incident and near-miss occurrence reports, one of the main tasks of the 
managers in both companies was to get an overview of the number and type of incidents 
occurred in the company. The company instructions required the managers to produce 
statistical analysis of the incident reports received from the ships. The two companies used 
different methods -  which have been pointed out in the sections 4.2.5 and 4.3.5 
respectively and thus are not repeated here.
Generally they produced quarterly statistical analysis reports. One such example (shown 
below) produced the number of cases of different types of incidents every quarter.
Number of oases of different types of 
incidents occurred in one quarter
Fatalities
LTI I
Medical Treatment Oases I
Restricted Work Oases -------1
First Aid Cases 1
Non Injury Cases 1
O 10 20 30 40 50
Figure 25: Statistical analyses of ‘different types of incidents’ in one of the organisations.
The other way in which the statistical analysis was presented was by categorising the data 
in three levels of severity -  see an example below.
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Statistical Analysis of Incident Reports
2005
2004
□ Severity 1 
■  Severity 2
□ Severity 3
2003
2002
2001
2000
10 20
Number of Incidents
30 40
Figure 26: Statistical analyses of ‘different severity of incidents’ presented longitudinally in one of the
companies.
6.1.2 Lessons Learnt
Both organisations in their SMSs highlighted that the purpose of reporting was not to 
‘blame’ the seafarers but to use the reports to learn their cause. They identified them as 
‘valuable sources of information’ which provided opportunities to learn and make their 
organisation safer by conducting analysis of incident to identify their direct as well as root 
causes. This was deemed the way forward to prevent recurrence of similar incidents or 
near-miss occurrence. The instructions also stated that for most cases, the reports sent by 
captains could be used for analysing them in the office, however, for more serious incidents 
the managers should carry out their own investigations by visiting ships.
The benefits of using reporting mechanism to identify the underlying concerns, or root 
causes, are widely discussed in the literature. Reason (1997), for example, pointed out how 
by analysing incident and near-miss reports, managers can identify the weaknesses in 
organisation’s operating procedures. The causal factors generated from conducting 
effective analysis can provide an effective ways of preventing future incidents. The author, 
however, acknowledged several challenges to implement the reporting system effectively. 
He pointed out that in order to overcome them, the employees should, among other things, 
be offered confidentiality and be made immune to disciplinary proceedings.
The section on incident reporting in the two companies’ SMSs also indicated certain 
examples of immediate and root causes prompting the managers to look out for them. The 
examples of the immediate causes included:
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• Failure to follow rules and regulations
• Failure to use personal protective equipment
• Failure to follow repair/maintenance instructions
• Safety devices by-passed or inoperative
• Influence of drugs or alcohol
The examples of the root cause included:
• Inadequate Physical/Physiological Capability
• Inadequate Mental/Psychological Capability
• Lack of Knowledge
• Lack of skill
• Improper motivation
These examples, however, suggest that the instructions in the SMSs were skewed towards 
identifying the weaknesses in seafarers’ performance. They show that in both organisations 
there was an emphasis to locate shortcomings of the seafarers’ professional and personal 
qualities. The implication of such an approach will be revisited later in this chapter.
The instructions further required the managers to disseminate the findings to the whole
fleet if they considered that there were lessons to be learnt from them. The names of the
ships or the persons involved, however, were to be concealed. One of the companies, for
example, stated in its SMS:
...in order to increase safety awareness among the company personnel, improved 
safe working practices on ships and prevent from recurrence of the incident, 
“lessons learned” if considered relevant for the fleet must be forwarded to all 
concerned in the form of a Circular Letter.
The examples of such circular letters showed that they included the events leading to the
incident, description of the incident including its consequences, the immediate and the root
causes of the incidents and the lessons learnt. Selected sections of one such example from a
circular letter is reproduced below:
On one of our company ships, one engine room rating and one junior engineer were 
engaged in overhauling a diesel generator. During this job the rating’s right index 
finger got cut... the immediate cause of the incident was: incorrect use of tool... the 
root cause was: lack of skill... Lessons learnt was: more time to be given to assess 
risk and more stringent compliance with company procedures.
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The instructions in the SMSs also stated that the captain was required to discuss the lesson 
learnt from the circular letters during safety meetings and post them on the ship’s public 
notice boards. During the fieldwork it was revealed that nearly every seafarer including the 
ratings found such safety circulars letters with ‘lessons learnt’ useful. They considered 
these as valuable real-life examples which made them more aware of day-to-day hazards at 
work.
6.1.3 Reporting to  Third Parties
Incident reports also served the purpose of reporting incidents to the flag state 
administration of the ship. Although every flag state had its own reporting procedures, 
reporting cases of seafarers’ injury, incidents of pollution and damage to the ship’s 
structure, for example, were common requirements. Both companies operating ships of 
several flag states were required to comply with the different reporting requirements and 
fill in different types of forms. The form for reporting to the Liberian authorities60, for 
example, required the particulars of the ship, the names of the captain and other individuals 
involved, detail of the incident along with the corrective actions taken. In most cases, the 
managers were required to fill in the relevant reporting forms based on the information 
provided in the incident reports sent in by captains.
The instructions in both companies also stated that a detailed report was essential for 
presenting their cases to insurance companies. They pointed out that captains should 
provide as much information in the incident reporting forms as is possible by sending 
additional data such as photographs and sketches in support of the entries in the reporting 
forms for them to make effective claims. In one of the companies this section of the SMS 
also discussed some of the procedural arrangement of ship insurance. It explained how in 
the event of an incident, a large deductible amount could not be recovered from the 
insurance companies and also how the insurance premium went up after every claim. After 
stating these salient points, the instruction in the SMS stated:
...it is therefore in everyone’s interest to ensure that risks are not taken, that the ship
operates safely and that accidents and incidents are avoided.
60 Liberian Authority: One of the largest ship registering authorities in the world. At least one ship in each of 
the two companies was registered with this Flag State.
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The requirements of incident reporting with regard to insurance claims showed that the 
managers demanded a detailed picture in order to fulfil the procedural obligations of the 
insurers. Moreover, it also indicated that managers used these instructions to forewarn 
seafarers about the potential economic consequences of incidents.
Thus, the discussion so far showed that both companies were keen to avoid incidents in 
their establishments. The instructions in the SMSs pointed out that it was vital for the 
companies to operate without incidents in order to maintain good reputation in the industry 
and for the purpose of economic benefit. They also revealed that on the one hand these 
reports were required by the managers -  who were meant to use them to identify the weak 
areas and improve the standard of safety in the company, while, on the other, these could 
also be used to inform external entities who required considerably detailed information 
including the identification of the individuals involved in the incidents.
6.1.4 Reporting form s
The instructions in the main procedures folders of the two SMSs also directed the readers 
to fill in specific forms from the forms folders. The two companies followed different 
reporting structures. Company-A used two different forms for incident and near-miss 
occurrence reporting, while Company-B had a single form for reporting both types of 
events.
The incident reporting forms (excluding the near-miss occurrence reporting in Company- 
A) required the captains or safety officers to fill in descriptive information of the incidents. 
They required the names of the ship and the persons involved and the date of the incident, 
the description of the events, the details of the damage or injury, the list of all parties 
involved and the actions taken to mitigate damage. The form in Company-A in particular 
demanded detailed information with over 60 questions most of which required a ‘yes’ or 
‘no’ answer. These included:
• Were short-cuts taken?
• Were regulations ignored to complete operation?
• Were personnel experienced in their use?
• Was the quality of PPE adequate?
• Was the person/personnel pre-occupied with other thoughts?
• Did the person misunderstand instructions?
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• Identity of the person authorising the work.
• What level of supervision was provided for the job?
• Was training required for the job?
• In light of accident is additional training needed?
While the form used in Company-A was more probing, both companies nonetheless 
required detailed reports on incidents (and also for near-miss occurrences in case of 
Company-B) from the ships including details of the persons involved in the events. They 
not only required identifying the victims and their supervisors involved in the incidents but 
also placed a significant focus on locating the professional shortcomings of the seafarers 
involved and whether or not the seafarers deviated from the company’s laid down 
procedures and instructions. The questions used in the forms resembled very closely with 
the suggested direct and root causes provided in the main manual -  indicating that for the 
purpose of identifying the underlying causal factors of incidents, both companies placed a 
heavy emphasis on locating seafarers’ flaws and weaknesses.
The single-page near-miss occurrence reporting form in Company-A, however, only asked 
for a basic description of the incident and did not ask for the names of the ship or the 
person(s) involved. As per the company’s requirements, the form could be filled in 
anonymously by anyone onboard and dropped in the ship’s mail box61 for the captains to 
dispatch them to the managers. Its purpose, as written in the Company-A’s SMS, was to 
‘encourage seafarers to report without being fearful of blame’. Thus, while the reporting 
procedure in Company-A took two extreme approaches, the common reporting 
requirements in Company-B followed an in-between path.
The importance of anonymous and confidential reporting has been identified by various 
researchers. In the aviation sector, for example, research conducted by O’Leary and 
Chappell (1996) showed that in order to encourage reporting from the employees it was 
essential to offer confidentiality and an indemnity against disciplinary proceedings among 
other things. The authors pointed out that without these preconditions incident or near-miss 
occurrence reports may be reduced to selective reporting which may result in giving a 
cursory glance to cases requiring serious analysis.
61 Ship’s Mail Box: Where all outgoing personal mails are stored for dispatching from next port.
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Similarly, in the area of health-care, research conducted by Stump (2000) pointed out how 
an anonymous paper-based incident reporting system when introduced to an American 
hospital was a major success. Within the first six months of bringing in this change in the 
reporting procedure, the number of reported cases increased by more than five times.
With this information on the two companies’ requirements on incident reporting, the 
discussion now proceeds to locate how managers and seafarers of these companies used 
these procedures in practice. With the help of illustrations, their relative perspectives are 
discussed in the next two sections.
6.2 Incident Reporting from the Management's perspective
As with the risk assessment, the managers from both companies asserted that their 
procedures and instructions supported by company forms were comprehensive and 
adequate for their fleets. They were particularly keen to receive near-miss occurrence 
reports from the ships because they believed that an increase in such reports gave them a 
greater chance to prevent serious incidents, such as fatalities. However, the managers’ 
interviews portrayed an overall picture of discontent with regard to the way in which the 
seafarers operated this system.
6.2.1 Lack o f reporting: seafarers not com plying with procedures
The superintendents and managers from both companies pointed out that the reporting
procedures used in their companies conformed to the requirements of the ISM Code and
were in use in their companies long before the Code became mandatory. They added that as
a result of the implementation of the Code the reporting mechanisms were merely
formalised with an added emphasis placed on the reporting of near-miss occurrences. The
marine managers, who were involved in conducting the analyses of the reported incidents,
in their interviews pointed out that the job of analysing the incident reports required
seafaring skills as well as managerial expertise. They also stressed on how they devoted
considerable time and resources to this job particularly in developing statistical analysis for
monitoring their progress and identifying the areas that required special attention. One
manager, for example, said:
We have had it (reporting procedure) since the 1980s, reporting, analysing 
incidents, preparing statistics for the fleet and sending circulars to all ships are 
nothing new... it takes the required experience to analyse these reports -  a lot could 
be at stake... you see, the system here is very mature [ref: 24].
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Overall, the managers in both companies were confident about the ways in which they 
operationalised the incident reporting systems but showed great disappointment in the ways 
in which they were supported by their seafaring colleagues. In their interviews the 
managers emphasised that the success of this element of the SMS almost entirely depended 
on the seafarers. They pointed out that only after the incidents were reported by the 
seafarers, could they get involved. Based on this argument, the managers focused on the 
need to persuade the seafarers to report incidents and near-miss occurrences. Such 
persuasion was evident from the number of letters and fleet circulars that were sent by the 
managers to the captains urging them to report more incidents and in particular more near- 
miss occurrences. This suggested that underreporting was a major concern in the two 
organisations.
Every manager and superintendent however appeared most concerned that despite their
robust structure and repeated encouragements, the seafarers were not fully utilising the
company’s reporting systems. They suspected that their seafaring colleagues were holding
back most onboard near-miss occurrences and even some instances of onboard incidents.
One senior manager in one of the companies, for example, pointed out:
We do our best to implement it (incident reporting). It is fully implemented here in 
the office... we have the expertise to look into the reports and dig out the root 
cause... But we know that ship-staff don’t follow everything we set rolling here [ref: 
45].
Although the managers did not have any means to know the number of unreported
incidents or near-miss occurrences, they were convinced that their seafaring colleagues
were not reporting a considerable fraction of them. The argument of the managers in both
companies was rooted in the popular theory of the accident pyramid which was discussed
in section 2.3.2. One of them, for example, said:
You’re right, we are not mind readers. But we have been around long enough to 
know that there is a lot more going on the ships than what we are told... At one 
stage we used to get inverted accident triangle, now things are getting better... it 
looks more like a rectangle perhaps [ref: 62].
They pointed out that as per the number of serious incidents and injury reports -  which the 
seafarers had to report due to the seriousness of the cases -  the seafarers should be sending 
in many more reports on near-miss occurrences. In this regard the managers of Company-A
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did not sound any different from their counterparts in Company-B despite the fact that the 
two companies used different reporting forms for reporting near-miss occurrences.
The managers’ views coincided with various studies conducted in different occupational 
fields. Stanhope et al. (1999), for example, conducting a retrospective review of case notes 
of 500 deliveries in two London obstetric units identified 196 cases of reportable adverse 
incidents in accordance with the hospital’s protocols. However, the study showed that only 
less than a quarter of these cases were reported by the staff. Moreover, the study also 
showed that when these cases were grouped into serious, moderate and minor events, the 
staff reported nearly half the serious incidents, only around quarter of the moderate events 
and just 15% of the minor events.
6.2.2 S elected  in c id en ts reported: the c a se  o f m anipulated reporting
The managers appeared convinced that it was because of seafarers’ poor participation in the
company’s reporting mechanism and the lack of respect towards its procedures and
instructions in general, that this element of the SMS was not working effectively. In way of
justifying their perception the managers pointed to seafarers’ manipulative practice of
reporting selected types of incidents and near-miss occurrences while suppressing others.
Some managers also offered to share their understanding of why seafarers acted this way.
They pointed out that the seafarers chose not to disclose those events which could be
construed as their professional failures, but were happy to report personal injuries or such
other untoward events arising out of technical problems or mechanical breakdowns. One
senior manager in one of the companies carefully articulated the problem and said:
Their (seafarers’) favourite is the obvious ones: accidents... then they report 
illnesses and injuries especially for which they required doctor visit and then the 
machinery breakdowns and finally loads of minor concerns... I feel a large portion 
of in-between block of operational errors... their faults and oversights are not 
reported [ref: 30].
While many managers and superintendents pointed out that compared to a decade ago more 
reports on near-miss occurrences were being sent to them, some were sceptical about this 
apparent success of their campaign for more near-miss occurrence reports. This latter group 
of managers looked at it from another angle and emphasised that although the lower section 
of the accident pyramid was beginning to swell, these were actually examples of 
manipulated reporting. They pointed out that captains were now sending reports which 
were typical examples of supervisory issues. These did not require any analysis from the
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managements, as they could simply be addressed on ships by disciplining the seafarers.
One senior manager in one company, for example, stated:
All near-miss reports that our ships send are like ‘2nd officer seen on deck without 
safety shoes if he had slipped he would have broken his legs’. I get like this all the 
time... we don’t want these as these are disciplinary issues. There are more serious 
issues happening all the time, such as: mooring rope-parting, slips and trips, close 
quarter situations (in navigation)... but we never get to know them [ref: 12].
The discussion shows that although the managers succeeded in getting more near-miss 
occurrence reports they did not receive as many of the sort they expected. The sort of report 
they were interested in were instances of operational failures which required managers to 
analyse the underlying reasons. By probing into the matter further, it emerged that a section 
of the managers believed that the main reason behind seafarers’ poor compliance with 
reporting was due to their fear of being blamed as a consequence of reporting.
This corroborates the finding of Anderson et al. (2003: 180-190). In the questionnaire 
survey of shore-based ship managers, the authors found that nearly two-thirds of the 
managers believed that seafarers were reluctant to report for reasons such as their fear over 
their jobs. The following section discusses this issue in more detail.
6.2.3 The ‘n o-b lam e’ culture
When discussing this issue of lack of reporting and selected reporting, in both companies a
section of the managers, who appeared most defensive about the ways their companies
operated, insisted that their companies ran a ‘no-blame’ culture and that the seafarers were
unnecessarily concerned with the fear of blame. These managers and superintendents added
that even though the seafarers’ identities were entered in the reporting forms these were
superfluous in analysing the root cause. They emphatically added that such reports did not
make any negative impact on seafarers’ career or even on their promotion prospects. One
superintendent, for example, claimed:
Although reports point out seafarers’ mistakes, we don’t aim at that. We have a 
robust no-blame system. We trust it and believe in it... all we want to know from the 
reports is the underlying cause... which is not about the individual -  it’s about 
learning from the mistakes [ref: 65].
However, not all his colleagues were convinced about the genuineness of the presence of 
the ‘no-blame culture’ in their companies. Around one in three pointed out that they were 
not surprised that their colleagues at sea were sceptical about their company’s ‘so-called
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no-blame initiative’. They revealed that seafarers’ fear of being questioned about the 
reported incidents and subsequently being blamed was understandable. One manager, for 
example, explained:
It would be a bit angelic to expect ships to produce a list of mistakes... There are 
some natural defence systems that take over internally... they must be thinking ‘am 
I right or am I wrong, should I report or not, if I report what would they (managers) 
question’. There is always that fear in them of questioning or finger-pointing [ref: 
71].
Further discussion on this subject revealed that the seafarers’ fears were in fact well
grounded. A number of managers and superintendents in their interviews admitted that it
was impossible for them to disregard the contents of the reports when judging the
professional performance of the seafarers, especially the senior officers. One of them used
the example of seafarers’ promotion and said:
No matter how much I try, I cannot promote a chief officer to captain who had had 
more than his share of accidents. Can you? Not that we wish to spy on them 
through this reports, it is just that I would be uneasy... we tend to overlook it for a 
regular re-employment but promotion is different I must admit [ref: 34].
This presented a paradox for managers and superintendents. They were aware of the
importance of exonerating seafarers from the fear of blame to promote incident and near-
miss occurrence reporting. They also knew that the purpose of reporting was to learn from
the mistakes by locating the underlying reasons and progressively improving the operating
practices in the companies. Yet, for each incident they strongly believed in apportioning
blame to individual seafarers. Driven by the philosophy that suggest that ‘a significant
proportion of incidents occur due to human-failure’, the managers were drawn into
identifying human errors that caused incidents and near-miss occurrences in their
companies. In other words the practice was about identifying how seafarers deviated from
the company’s procedures and instructions. This paradox was well articulated by one
superintendent, who said:
As a superintendent we are fire-fighters, we need to know the cause of the 
problems, which is the people in most cases... (Although) we strongly recognise 
that we are not here to blame them, we are here to analyse the reports and learn 
from the root causes, but I am sorry, my first job is to find what's going wrong... 
perhaps someone needs some extra training... It’s a catch 22 situation, I am afraid 
[ref: 60].
Moreover, by scrutinising the final reports of 50 incident and near-miss occurrence 
randomly chosen from both companies, I found that 42 instances the managers identified 
various forms of error on the part of the seafarers. On the eight other occasions, the reports
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identified faults either due to mechanical failures or third-party mistakes. From these 50 
reports, the three most common immediate causes stated in the examples were:
•  seafarer’s failure to fo llow  SM S instructions
•  seafarer’s failure to use Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) properly
•  seafarer’s improper position for carrying out task
While the three most common root causes stated in the same set of 50 examples were:
•  lack o f  seafarer’s skill
•  lack o f  seafarer’s mental capacity
• inadequate leadership/ supervision
On most reports, the managers also stated that the seafarers needed further training for 
‘improved safety behaviour’.
The stated aim of incident reporting in the two companies was to analyse the incidents and 
near-miss occurrences to locate the immediate and the root causes, so that the managers 
and the seafarers in the company could learn from them and apply the knowledge to 
improve safety in their establishments. The procedures also pointed out that the purpose of 
incident reporting was not to blame the individuals but to analyse them and learn from the 
mistakes. However, the findings revealed that the practice was considerably different. The 
analysis of the managers’ interviews as well as the documentary analysis of the companies’ 
suggestions on immediate and root causes (discussed in section 6.1.2) and of the type of 
questions asked in the reporting forms (discussed in section 6.1.4) showed that the 
managers were disproportionately inclined to find faults and apportion blame on the 
seafarers. In this regard the managers’ views on incident reporting and risk assessment 
followed a common thread. In both cases it showed that the managers placed a low level of 
trust on their seafaring colleagues, requiring them to follow specific work procedures and 
identifying faults with them in the event of an incident or near-miss occurrence.
These findings are not unique with these two case studies. Various authors studying 
different industries have pointed to the caveats of following this approach in which 
managers take a narrow view of accident investigation methodology. Carroll, (1998: 713), 
for example, examining the learning practice in organisations in chemical and nuclear 
industries pointed out that ‘among other things blaming and disciplining particular
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individuals, intended to encourage accountability, can create an environment in which 
people do not report problems’.
In the next section the discussion moves to identify the seafarers’ perspective on the 
practice of incident and near-miss occurrence reporting procedures onboard the four 
research voyages.
6.3 Incident Reporting from seafarers' perspectives
The practice of incident and near-miss occurrence reporting on the four research voyages 
were analysed from the data collected through seafarers’ interviews and informal 
conversations, as well as from onboard documentary analysis and ethnographic 
observations. Overall it showed that seafarers readily distinguished between safe and 
unsafe acts. They brought in their experiences of incidents and near-miss occurrences in 
their daily conversations and work practice and discussed it among their colleagues. 
However, as the analysis in this section would unfold, many of these events remained 
confined onboard and were not reported to the managers as required by the formal system. 
From the comments and views presented, the following subsections describe the main 
influences that affected the way in which the seafarers practised incident reporting.
6.3.1 Seafarers’ fear of blame
The seafarers’ fear of being blamed as a consequence of reporting incidents or near-miss 
occurrences was a major factor hindering the implementation of this element of the ISM 
Code. They were particularly apprehensive that they could be victimised by the managers 
and even lose their jobs. Irrespective of their ranks, the fear of blame emerged as the most 
common fear in the seafarers. From their interviews, it showed that every seafarer from 
both companies was thoroughly dismissive of their managers’ ‘no-blame’ claim.
From the fieldwork, the two following examples demonstrate how seafarers’ fear of being 
blamed by their managers prevented them from reporting cases of incidents or near-miss 
occurrences. In the first case, on one of the ships I witnessed an oil pollution incident. 
Subsequent informal conversation with the officer involved in the incident revealed how he 
was worried that reporting the incident could ruin his career. The research diary entry read:
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Last night during loading, cargo tank high level alarm went off and soon after cargo 
sprayed from the PV62 valve of the tank. Around 200 litres of oil escaped from the 
tank of which around 20 litres went overboard... other than me, only the duty officer 
and AB saw it. The officer did not raise alarm, instead started a rapid cleaning-up 
action... a few days later... I asked the same duty officer whether or not he informed 
the incident to the captain or planned to report it to the managers, to which he 
replied: ‘why should I volunteer to report such incident to the managers or anyone 
else for that matter...it could ruin my career or create unnecessary hassle for the 
ship’
In another example the captain on one of the ships narrated an instance where he chose not
to report a near-miss occurrence to the managers. He believed that by reporting the
particular event he would put one of his colleagues’ professional reputations at stake. The
captain explained that on this particular occasion, while the ship was navigating, an
engineer made an error of judgement which caused disruption to the ship’s power supply.
Subsequently, the ship lost control and came perilously close to colliding with another ship.
Recollecting this near-miss occurrence, the captain said:
It was very dangerous and should never have happened...but I did not report 
because I knew that after reporting the managers would inquire and find out who 
that engineer was. Then they would have singled him out and spoilt his career [ref: 
85].
In this respect there was no difference in the views of the seafarers of the two companies. 
Despite the fact that the seafarers from Company-A could use anonymous near-miss 
occurrence reporting procedure they were not confident that such reporting mechanism 
truly offered anonymity. The interviewees pointed out that firstly as the forms were 
dispatched to the managers along with other official documents the identity of the ship 
could not be concealed. Secondly, the procedures in the company’s SMS required a copy of 
such reports consecutively numbered and filed on board. Its purpose was to demonstrate to 
various inspectors, such as the Oil Majors, that the seafarers complied with the company’s 
reporting procedures and instructions. However, some of the junior officers and ratings in 
their interviews pointed out that it was feasible for captains or other senior officers to refer 
to earlier anonymous reports and identify who wrote them. A junior officer on one of the 
Company-A ships, for example, called this reporting form ‘a trap’.
Moreover the ratings -  whose main concern was how the senior officers would react to 
their reports -  also felt that the consequence of reporting could have a much more serious
62 PV Valves: Pressure Vacuum Valves are fitted to cargo tanks. Their purpose is to prevent tanks from 
getting over/ under pressurised
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outcome if the senior officers included their names in the incident or near-miss occurrence
reporting forms. In their interviews this group of seafarers revealed that their future
employment prospects could be at stake if the crewing managers in their home countries
came to know about it. On one ship, an AB, for example, said:
Sometime we have some problem like close-quarter situation with another ship in 
the channel... but better if captain doesn’t report, because if he does then he may put 
my name as lookout man as well and may be make me sign as a witness... It is not 
good for my job -  sometime it is bad for getting next job [ref: 41].
While the junior officers’ and ratings’ responsibility of reporting incidents remained 
confined to bringing them to the attention of the senior officers, they, nevertheless, faced a 
different set of concerns which will be discussed later in this section.
The senior officers, on the other hand, appeared most concerned about the consequences of 
reporting incidents or near-miss occurrences to the managers. They felt that because they 
assumed responsibility o f most tasks on ships, they were more likely to be singled out and 
reprimand by the managers. They feared that as a consequence they could easily lose their 
jobs.
Although the senior officers of Company-B were employed on permanent contracts, they
too appeared equally uncertain about their job security. During the interviews they revealed
their fear of being made redundant. They felt that the managers could bring in replacements
from other nations drawing comparatively lower wages. As a result they believed that they
needed to exercise greater caution when deciding on which incidents to report. One senior
engineer from Company-B, for instance, in his interview said:
We are constantly worried as we keep seeing more and more engineers (from X 
nation) taking over. Although they (management) have promised not to kick us 
out... but who knows... now the time has come for me to stay quietly, keep a low 
profile and of course not draw anyone’s attention by having an accident or 
something [ref: 31].
Such general perceptions thus impacted upon the senior officers’ willingness to report 
incidents or near-miss occurrences. The interviews with the senior officers from both 
companies together with the documentary analysis showed that their fears were indeed 
well-founded.
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After incident or near-miss reports were sent to the managers, the senior officers were
subjected to a series of intimidating interrogation from their managers seeking further
detail of the events. The analysis of the e-mail correspondence between the managers and
senior officers showed that subsequent to the reporting and as part of the investigation,
managers asked for explicit descriptions related to the events. These were clearly
faultfinding exercises by which the managers established accountability for each event.
During the interviews one senior engineer, for exarhple, expressed his anxiety about being
blamed by the managers for an incident for which he felt no responsibility:
On this ship I had near death accident but it was not my fault. But they (managers) 
are asking for many explanations. After every reporting they keep asking why this, 
why that, and why like that, looking at which, I find that there is a tendency to 
locate the guilty person... In their analysis they blamed that I did not work as per the 
SMS and said that I did not have the necessary skills and leadership qualities -  may 
be I am on their hit list ...if I can avoid I wouldn’t report the next time [ref: 18].
From this discussion, seafarers’ fear o f being identified and subsequently reprimanded by 
the managers emerged as a significant barrier to the effective operation of the incident 
reporting systems. While some managers acknowledged this concern it was not clear that 
they appreciated the true extent of the problem. From the analysis it can be seen that the 
managers failed to ensure the basic prerequisites necessary to promote incident reporting.
These findings corroborate the industry views on seafarers’ fear of being victimised as a 
consequence of reporting. As pointed out in section 2.3.2 the chief inspector of the Marine 
Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) in one of the annual reports explicitly pointed out 
that the prevalent blame culture in the industry was not conducive for seafarers to report 
incidents or near-miss occurrences (MAIB, 2001).
The workers’ fear of blame is more widely reported in the shore-based context. Adams and 
Hartwell (1977), for example, in their study on a number of plants in the steel industry 
found that fear of attribution of blame was a major factor that prevented the employees 
from reporting incidents and near-miss occurrences. They identified that information 
related to incidents were selectively filtered before they reached the higher authority in 
organisations.
Studies by van der Schaaf (1995), Phimister et al. (2003) and van der Schaaf and Kanse 
(2004), also supported this argument with similar finding. Van der Schaaf and Kanse’s
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(2004) work on locating hindrances to reporting set in the chemical industry, for example, 
found that workers feared that reporting of incidents or near-miss occurrences could bring 
them to disrepute or lead to direct or indirect disciplinary actions. They concluded that such 
fear was a major reason for underreporting.
The analysis of the interviews from my study also revealed that the senior officers’ fear 
went further than just losing their jobs. It showed that they were concerned that certain 
types of report, such as a report on oil pollution, could lead to a more complex problem of 
criminalisation. During the interviews, a number of the senior officers, especially the 
captains, pointed out that although the reports were sent to the management offices there 
was no assurance that they would be read only by the managers. They felt that these reports 
could be read by various interested parties, such as Port State Control Officials.
This inherent tension was pointed out in the way in which the incident reporting system
was arranged in the two companies (see section 6.1.3). It shows that such a system did not
help seafarers report more freely. From a number of interviews disclosing the senior
officers’ fear of being criminalised as a consequence of reporting incidents or near-miss
occurrences, the following interview with one of the captains is especially noteworthy:
Who goes to jail? It’s me, the chief engineer or chief officer... it’s me for sure. Look 
at all the cases around the world.... Am I crazy to report and invite these lawyers 
from the P&I Clubs and inspectors from the Port State Control to step on board and 
arrest me in some foreign port... If I can hide, I’ll hide -  For small cases it’s far 
more prudent to remain quiet... once you set the ball rolling you never know where 
you would end up [ref: 86].
The general perceptions from these interviews showed that the senior officers were not just 
fearful about losing their jobs, they were also greatly anxious about making themselves 
vulnerable to criminalisation. Their fear of criminalisation thus acted as an added hindrance 
in operationalising the incident reporting system in the maritime industry.
6.3.2 Filling in reporting forms: the practical constraints of reporting
The interviews and informal conversations with senior officers, especially the captains and 
safety officers from both companies led the discussion to incident and near-miss reporting 
forms used in their companies. They drew my attention to the nature of information 
required in the forms. In the views of all these officers, the forms were too extensive and 
deliberately worded to find faults with the victims. The majority of such resentful
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comments came from the senior officers of Company-A ships, one of whom, for example, 
said:
Have you seen the form? It’s a four-hour job and requires a team of police officers 
to fill it in... If we start to report every small incident that happens on the ship then 
we would need a special man to report, with a rank of a reporting officer. So, we 
report what is important... may be something like the injury compensation [ref: 02].
Such comments have close parallels with the discussion in the first section of this chapter 
(section 6.1.4) where it showed that the forms were far too probing and skewed towards 
locating professional shortcomings of the seafarers.
The senior officers did not enjoy filling in the detailed information required in the incident
reporting forms although the matter was most acute in the case of incident reporting form
used in the Company-A. In their interviews they revealed that on most occasions the
information required in the forms was not available to them, as a result of which they filled
in ‘whatever was safe to report’ for them as well as for those whose names appeared on the
reports. Some of the interviewees also pointed out that there could be no definite answers
to a number of such probing questions. By way of example, one senior officer said:
What would you answer if I asked you ‘Was any part of the task forgotten about?’... 
It is a plain stupid question as no one can say for sure what the answer should be 
[ref: 70].
Such concerns were not unique in the maritime industry. Researchers investigating practice 
of incident or near-miss occurrence reporting have indicated the time taken to fill in 
incident reporting forms and the nature of detail asked in them act as hindrances to the 
effective operation of this system. Reason (1997: 202), for example, identified this as a 
problem and pointed out that one practical way to motivate reporting was to ensure that 
workers do not get deterred by the length of the reporting form or by the type of questions 
asked in them.
Similarly, Hutter (2001: 206) found how underreporting was prevalent ‘across all grades of 
staff from all departments’ in the UK railway industry. The author reported that one of the 
impediments to reporting was the time consumed to fill in reporting forms.
These views help in explaining why the length of the reporting forms and the probing 
nature of the questions contained in them failed to facilitate the operation of incident and 
near-miss reporting system in the two companies. However, at this point it also raises the
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question that if form-filling constraint was such an important issue on the ships of 
Company-A, then why was the one-page near-miss occurrence reporting form on the same 
ships not effective either?
Nearly all officers and around half the ratings on Ships-Al and A2 knew that near-miss
reporting forms were available in the public spaces on these two ships. However, other than
the captains and safety officers none of them ever filled them in. One engine room rating,
for example, during an interview disclosed:
I have been working for 25 years on ships and I never made any report... I know we 
can fill that (one page near-miss occurrence report) form but if I fill that in everyone 
can read my handwriting and someone can catch me, it is better to tell (report 
concerns) to second engineer or bosun and let them decide [ref: 63].
Such views did not emanate from the ratings alone. A number of officers, including one 
who had been sailing in this company for several years and acknowledged witnessing 
several near-miss occurrences, revealed that he never used the form even though he knew 
that it was short and could be filled in anonymously. In general, from all the interviews it 
reiterated the point that the seafarers of this company did not believe in the claim of 
anonymity made by the managers with regard to this form which is why they did not use 
them.
However, the interviews of the two captains also revealed that they were persuaded by the
managers to report more near-miss occurrences. As a result they took the responsibility on
them and periodically reported ‘suitable’ near-miss occurrences. This practice was
described by one of them, who said:
I fill around two (near-miss occurrence) forms per month -  just to keep something 
going to the office... but again I make them such that they don’t harm anyone (other 
colleagues on board) [ref: 43].
In this respect the argument presented by the captains and safety officers in the two 
companies was similar -  all of them indicated that they knew that their managers were keen 
to get more near-miss reports, yet they were aware that these reports could potentially 
disrepute them or their colleagues. As a result the captains were involved in manipulating 
the reporting by carefully selecting near-miss occurrences which were important yet not 
serious enough to harm their colleagues’ reputation. Consequently, the system was 
operated as little more than a bureaucratic exercise. The analysis of these views explains 
why some of the managers believed that the captains in their fleets were reporting more
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‘disciplinary issues’ (see section 6.2.2) as opposed to the type of near-miss occurrence 
reports they were expecting to receive.
Discussion in this section showed that the length of reporting forms and the intrusive nature 
of the questions in them were yet another discouraging factor for seafarers and particularly 
for the safety officers and captains. However, while these were clearly a noticeable factor, 
the overpowering reason for not reporting was still the original concern of seafarers’ fear of 
being identified, blamed and reprimanded as a consequence of reporting.
6.3.3 Ratings’ constraints: additional hindrances in reporting
The discussions so far has predominantly looked into the views of the ship’s senior
officers. However, ethnographic observations during the research voyages showed that 
nearly all shipboard hazardous jobs were carried out by ratings. For example, during the 
study I saw ratings entering into cargo tanks for cleaning purposes, working on top of 
masts and even going over the ship-side to rig pilot ladders. Thus, arguably it was this 
group of seafarers who in the normal course of work were likely to encounter the most 
number of incidents and near-miss occurrences. Therefore their perceptions and views are 
equally important to get the complete picture of the practice of reporting in the two 
companies.
Overall, the ratings’ interviews indicate a considerable amount of underreporting. It 
showed that they did not want to report events that typically indicated their personal 
failings or caused only minor injuries that did not require medical attention from ashore. As 
reported in section 6.3.1, the ratings generally feared being associated with incident or 
near-miss occurrence reports. They felt that it identified them as ‘accident prone 
individuals’ and to them it was a matter of considerable concern because in their views it 
reduced their chances of getting subsequent employment.
Moreover, a number of ratings also indicated that they were apprehensive that reporting of 
incidents might make them stand out from the rest of their colleagues. They, in their 
interviews, revealed that by reporting they would draw attention to themselves and be 
subjected to their colleagues’ disapproving comments. One engine room rating from one of 
the ships narrated this concern during his interview. He said:
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I don’t like to tell any problem (to officers/ engineers)... because we (ratings) 
always meet in the smoke room and talk. May be there someone can comment: why 
you report -  now second (engineer) will start new system for more checking [ref: 
53].
This indicates that reaction from peers played a negative role in the context of reporting
particularly in an environment where reporting from ratings was not considered as the
norm. These seafarers in their interviews also pointed out that during the course of their
daily work they regularly encountered near-miss occurrences and minor incidents leading
to cuts and bruises which only required first-aid. However, they did not consider them
worth reporting to their seniors as they believed that such ‘minor’ incidents were part of
their hazardous profession. In way of explaining this particular view, a Pump-man on one
of the ships described the following situation during his interview:
...like yesterday I had my fingers jammed during valve overhauling -  it bled from 
under the nails but the work had to be done so I continued. I can’t tell the chief 
mate that I have a problem and start complaining. But if it is a bigger problem then 
I’ll tell the chief... this is how I have been working for the last 36 years [ref: 69].
Such events did not remain restricted to minor injuries alone. The ratings’ interview
showed that they used their own judgement to decide which events to report. During the
interviews a number of ratings kept referring to ‘minor problems’ as events which were
clearly either near-miss occurrences or in some cases even incidents. However, they did not
consider these as reportable because they believed that these cases were detected in good
time and successfully recovered before they could cause any serious and immediately
noticeable damage. From the interviews it showed that they considered the act of recovery
as part and parcel of their job. The Bosun on one of the ships, for example, described the
following when explaining how he routinely used his professional skills to recognise
hazards and thus manage to recover from potentially serious impact:
Many times I smell (hydrocarbon) gas when going inside the cargo tank. Although 
the chief (officer) checks with the meter, there are sometimes these areas with gas. 
See my nose is more sensitive than the meter. So when I smell gas I quickly run up 
along with others... This is regular and there is no need to report because there is no 
accident [ref: 61].
From the interviews and informal conversations with the ratings of both companies it 
showed that their reasoning to report clearly depended on their appreciation of what is safe 
and what is not. Such appreciation was largely based on their experience who were skilled 
seafarers working in circumstances in which they were familiar and in control.
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The findings presented in this section therefore shows that these hindrances to report arose 
out of professional pride, co-workers’ acceptability and the macho-culture of the profession 
—which are again not unique to the maritime industry. They have been highlighted by a 
number of other authors. Powell et al. (1971), for example, conducting reviews of over 
2000 accidents on four different types of industry sectors found that on many occasions the 
employees considered incidents and near-miss occurrences that did not result into serious 
injuries or cause delays to the production process as part of their regular jobs. Also, Webb 
et al. (1989) investigating the filtering process in workers’ injury reporting system 
highlighted how workplace specific prevailing norms and acceptability by co-workers were 
among some of the early filters in the sequence of incident reporting. Similarly, Clarke 
(1998) conducting research on British Railways found that those events which were 
considered part of the day-to-day work were less likely to be reported. By analysing data 
from 128 train drivers, the author showed that the most commonly occurring reasons (32%) 
for not reporting were those which the train-drivers considered ‘a part’ of their job.
Summary
The findings presented in this chapter reveals that the procedures and instructions for 
incident and near-miss occurrence reporting as written in the two SMSs differed 
considerably from what were actually practised in the two companies. It shows that 
although the managers were aware of the significance of reporting and also appreciated the 
underlying principles on how to facilitate reporting, in practice they were driven by 
influences which contradicted these principles. The managers believed that shipboard 
incidents were principally caused by seafarers’ lack of skill and non-compliance with the 
company’s procedures and instructions. Thus, driven by this notion, the managers believed 
that they should scrutinise the reports in order to locate the ‘deviant’ individuals. Making 
these individuals accountable was thus considered integral to the management of OHS.
Looking at it from the seafarers’ perspective, the discussion showed that as a consequence 
of such management practice they were highly sceptical of reporting incident or near-miss 
occurrences. It showed how they devised ways to evade and manipulate reporting incidents 
and near-miss occurrences. The seafarers believed that by communicating incidents and 
near-miss occurrences to the managers they risked their reputation or worse their chances 
of re-employment in the company while standing to gain very little from it.
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The discussion in the chapter in effect also demonstrated the widespread underreporting in 
the two companies. It clearly showed that a significant fraction of incidents and near-miss 
occurrences were not reported to the managers, who held the responsibility to report the 
pertinent cases to the responsible Flag States. As discussed earlier, underreporting is also a 
well documented concern in other industrial sectors. Nichols (1997), for example, 
reviewing the literature supported by empirical work in the UK manufacturing plants 
highlighted the endemic nature of underreporting. In his work he pointed out how pressures 
of production and fear of being held accountable were among the main reasons that 
prevented workers and their foremen from reporting incidents to persons higher up in the 
authority.
In the case of the maritime industry, the discrepancy between the number of reports 
received by the Flag States and the actual number occurring onboard has been highlighted 
by Jensen et al, (2004). The authors studying self-reported occupational injuries on an 
international scale estimated the rate of injury to seafarers was nearly three times higher 
than what was officially reported to the maritime authorities.
A number of authors have argued that for incident reporting systems to be effective it is 
important to provide adequate protection to workers from being recriminated. Reason 
(1997), for example, reviewing the factors facilitating incident reporting pointed out 
workers’ indemnity from disciplinary proceedings and their anonymity in the reports were 
most important. Similarly, studies have also drawn attention to the importance of using the 
appropriate methodology of analysing incident reports. Fahlbruch and Wilpert (1999), for 
example, reviewing the literature on issues related to the workplace safety pointed out that 
accident investigation procedures that remain confined to locating workers’ faults fail to 
elicit the underlying causal factors of the accidents.
In this study, however, the managers of the two organisations in practice failed to provide 
indemnity to the seafarers from disciplinary proceedings and were clearly inclined to 
apportion blame on their seafaring colleagues. In addition, the data in this chapter also 
revealed further hindrances to the implementation of incident reporting. These included the 
senior officers’ fear of criminalisation, the ratings’ peer pressure and their tendency to 
accept risk as a part of their work. All these factors will be further developed in chapter-8.
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Chapter 7: Audit and Review of the SMS
Introduction
The third and final finding chapter focuses on the practices of audit and review of SMS in 
the two case studies. As discussed in the review of the literature (section 2.3.3), both these 
elements have proactive qualities that aim to improve the management of health and safety 
in organisations. While audit helps to identify whether or not appropriate management 
arrangements are in place and are being followed in relation to the occupational risks 
encountered, review of SMS helps amend or improve the company’s existing procedures 
and instructions based on various sources of input including the results of risk assessments 
and analysis of incidents (ILO, 2001b). In effect, both these elements can be used as tools 
to systematically investigate ways to improve the effectiveness of organisation’s working 
procedures. Their common purpose is to provide employees and managers opportunities to 
amend or improve company’s policies, procedures and instructions for a safer and healthier 
workplace.
This chapter is organised in a format different from the previous two finding chapters, as 
these two elements are management tools and as such the focus in these cases is primarily 
on the company’s managers. The chapter is divided in two sections. The first section looks 
into the practice of audit in which I start by presenting a general overview of the procedural 
requirements stated in the two companies. It draws principally on the documentary analysis 
of the two companies’ SMSs. It then analyses the perspectives of the managers and 
seafarers largely through interviews. The second section, which focuses on the practice of 
the review of the companies’ SMSs, is organised in a similar way. The discussions in both 
sections develop from comparing and contrasting the procedures stated in the companies’ 
SMSs and the perspectives of managers and seafarers, and identifies the main factors that 
influence the manner in which these processes are implemented.
7.1 Audit: procedures and instructions in the two case studies
Both companies laid down procedures and instructions in their SMSs as to how audits 
should be conducted. They pointed to audit as a tool to examine the implementation of the 
SMS and emphasised that it was not meant to assess seafarers’ individual ability or to
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locate technical defects on ships. The instruction in one of the two companies, for example, 
pointed out:
Through audit it is important to ensure and verify that the SMS is properly 
implemented and is being used effectively in the company fleet... it is the system 
that is being examined, not individuals.
The instructions in the SMSs also placed considerable focus on checking whether or not the
company’s procedures and instructions were being effectively complied with. It required
auditors to establish the level of compliance by examining a sample of records during
audits. One of the company’s SMS, for example, stated:
It is important to ensure and verify that the company’s SMS is correctly 
implemented for which audit must be conducted by checking for objective evidence
Although the ISM Code did not specify the frequency of audit, both companies required it 
conducted annually. As discussed in section 2.3.3, this coincided with industry norms and 
guidelines set by key stakeholders, such as Flag State administrations and Classification 
Societies.
As per the procedures in the SMS of Company-A, the Marine Manager was required to 
plan out the annual schedule of the audit and decide on who should be auditing each ship in 
the fleet. The audits in this company were to be conducted either by ‘suitably qualified staff 
among the managers’, such as the Marine Managers or Marine Superintendent, or by 
‘qualified auditors hired from ‘external safety inspection companies’. In the case of 
Company-B, on the other hand, the responsibility for scheduling as well as conducting the 
audits in the entire fleet rested on the company’s ISM Manager.
The instructions in both companies also pointed out that all the areas covered by the
company’s SMS should be subjected to audit. These not only included the areas covered by
the functional requirements o f the ISM Code (see section 1.3.3) such as shipboard
operations, emergency preparedness and accident reporting, but also areas such as store
purchasing and company insurance. They pointed out that audits were meant to verify the
overall management of SMS -  which besides the requirements of the ISM Code also
included the requirements of the quality management systems, such as the ISO 9000 and
14000. One of the two SMSs, for example, stated:
The audit procedure applies to verifying implementation of the Quality and Safety 
Management Systems and procedures.
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Moreover, the audit requirements of the two SMSs also included checking effective 
compliance with shipboard security arrangement which was governed by a separate piece 
of maritime regulation: the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code). 
Thus, the requirements stated in the companies’ SMSs showed that audit had a broad 
application in which issues associated with OHS was only one part.
Also, both companies developed their own checklists and forms to facilitate auditors to 
comply with the company’s procedural requirements. Although the structures of the 
checklists and forms in the two companies differed, their overall layouts were similar. The 
checklists in each of the two companies contained over one hundred questions which the 
auditors were required to use as cues during their shipboard audits. The following five 
examples are randomly selected from the SMSs of the two companies:
1. C heck shipboard em ergen cy  drills are being  conducted as per the SM S requirements
2. C heck C aptain’s and C h ie f  E ngineer’s standing orders are in place and are also in 
com pliance w ith  the S M S requirem ents
3. C heck w hen last shipboard security drill w as conducted
4. C heck all SM S ch eck lists  and form s used onboard are the current version
5. C heck that the E n g in e R oom  A larm  T esting  Record is in com pliance w ith com pany  
procedures
In both companies the auditors were required to use the audit checklists and fill in 
company’s audit report forms. They needed to fill in narrative description of the 
deficiencies, and for each deficiency, identify the specific section of the SMS against which 
the deficiency was raised. The form also required the auditor to state the follow-up action 
and the due date for closing out each deficiency. The table below shows one item from one 
the shipboard audits.
Item
No.
Items to be 
checked
D eficiency
details
Refer to 
SMS 
Section 
violated
Required
Follow-up
Action
Due date 
for closing 
out
Rectified by 
& completion 
date
1 Emergency Stop 
prior to cargo 
discharge checked
N o record o f  
check prior to 
X  Port (dated)
SMS Vol.: 3 
Section 12.4
Follow SMS 
procedure
3 months (to be filled)
Table 42: Audit Report form used in one o f  the case-studies
In both companies the auditors were required to discuss the audit findings with the ship’s 
captains and also send the findings to the marine superintendent in charge for overseeing
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the ship. The captain and superintendent were required to coordinate with each other and 
rectify and close out the deficiencies. The requirements in the company’s SMS also stated 
that if serious deficiencies were pointed out, then the Marine Manager or even the 
Managing Director should be informed.
Having presented the overview of the procedural requirements of audit in the two 
companies, the discussion now looks into the details of their practices drawing mainly on 
the interviews of the managers and senior officers.
7.1.1 The practice of Audit: focus on checking compliance
A detailed look at the procedures and instructions on conducting audit indicated that the
two companies appreciated the purpose of audit only partially. They interpreted audit as a 
task merely to measure the level o f implementation of the existing procedures and 
instructions. They required the auditors to find out the seafarers’ level of compliance with 
the management procedures but failed to make use of audit as a tool to inquire the overall 
adequacy of the risk assessment and control measures that were in place. In other words, 
the instructions in both companies placed considerable emphasis on using audit merely as a 
surveillance tool.
The discussions in the review of the literature (section 2.1.1), however, showed that audits 
should not be limited to checking workers’ compliance with existing policies or procedures 
but also used for verifying their appropriateness for protecting workers from workplace 
risks. The ILO guideline on OHS management (ILO, 2001b: 15), for example, stated that 
the auditor should ‘determine whether the OHS management system and its elements were 
in place, adequate, and effective in protecting the safety and health of workers and 
preventing incidents’. It is the two latter elements that, unfortunately, did not feature in the 
procedures and instructions of the SMSs of either of the two companies.
In general, the managers’ interviews clearly reflected what was stated in the company’s 
procedural requirements. They believed that audits were management tools which were to 
be used to establish whether or not their seafaring colleagues were complying with the 
company’s procedures and instructions written in the SMSs. Every superintendent and 
manager who was interviewed stated that the objective of audit was to measure the extent
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to which the seafarers deviated from them. One superintendent, who had recently
concluded an audit, during his interview, indicated his method of auditing. He said:
I have this checklist to follow... What I do is try to find out how much they 
(seafarers) deviate from the SMS procedures, are they working correctly? Did they 
do things right... this is the purpose of audit [ref: 30].
These views were not just perceived by the persons directly involved in conducting the
audit but were also generally shared by the senior management teams of the two
companies. One senior manager in one of the companies, for example, said:
We consider the SMS as the bible and what the auditors do is find out how much 
you deviate from it [ref: 65].
Moreover, none of the superintendents or managers believed that the auditors could pass 
any judgement on the adequacy of any of the elements of the SMS or on its effectiveness in 
safeguarding work-related risks. When asked, the interviewees explicitly pointed out that 
audits were meant to check that the SMS was being complied with properly. One of them, 
for example, said:
How can they (auditors) tell that if risk assessment system is not good? That is not 
what it (audit) is about... this is about checking whether the system is being 
followed correctly [ref: 62].
As discussed in the review of the literature (section 2.1.1) a number of studies have 
evaluated the operation of audit. Vinten (1991) and Hawkes and Adams (1994) reviewing 
the practice of audit in a number of shore-based industries pointed out that audits on OHS 
management have mostly been associated with the narrow meaning of financial audits. The 
auditors largely confine themselves in appraising systems, checking whether there is 
compliance with the existing controls and highlighting deviations. They fail to look at the 
bigger picture on whether the SMSs used in the organisations are actually contributing to 
safeguarding OHS. Latzko (1994) and Stazyk (1992) also presented similar criticisms. 
They argued that this type of auditing does not suit operational management setting as it 
encourages auditors to use the existing system written in the SMS as the starting point. The 
auditors, thus, merely remain focussed on improving the existing practices.
7.1.2 Verifying paperwork: the test of bureaucratisation
The fieldwork also revealed the way audit was put into practice in the two companies. It
showed that in both companies the auditors focused almost entirely on checking shipboard 
paperwork, such as log-books, checklists, entry-permits and several other forms of written
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records. The instructions to the auditors categorically required them to scrutinise entries in
the ship’s documents and also to crosscheck them with one another in order to detect
deficiencies. The instructions in one of the SMSs, for example, stated:
When conducting an audit, samples of evidence will be sighted. These may include 
the likes of logbooks, checklists, work permits etc. The auditor will closely examine 
the entries made and may cross-check against other documentation where required 
to determine whether SMS have been effectively implemented.
The focus on checking paperwork was also evident from the way audits were actually 
practised in the two companies. During onboard fieldwork, I analysed ten recently 
concluded audit reports -  five from each company -  and found that nearly all the 
deficiencies entered in them were identified by checking shipboard documents. One 
deficiency from each of the ten reports is shown below.
Deficiency (action plan for rectifying each deficiency) Source o f Evidence
1 Work permits checklists for working aloft not consecutively numbered 
(must be numbered as per instruction on the checklist)
Checklist file
2 Deck Log book entry not containing sea water temperature entry (all 
columns o f  deck log book must be filled in)
Deck Log book
3 No evidence o f  testing o f  crane (to be tested in consultation with technical 
superintendent)
Ship certificate file
4 One item raised in the safety meeting has not been addressed by 
superintendent -  item overdue by over 3 months
Correspondence file 
between ship & office
5 Life boat emergency drill launched but not recorded as per SMS (record 
as per the Emergency response plan)
Drill record file
6 Captain not reviewing C hief Officer’s handover notes (Captain to read 
and review deck officers’ hand over notes and sign)
File o f  handing over 
reports
7 Damage Stability calculation not carried out prior to departure (must be 
conducted and recorded as per the SMS)
Records o f Damage 
Stability calculation
8 No record o f  calibration o f  hand-held alcohol content meter (date o f  
calibration must be entered on the instrument)
Entry on calibration tag on 
instrument
9 One security deficiency identified during previous audit not closed out in 
the allowed time (deficiencies must be closed out on time)
Audit file
10 Intervals between successive shipboard risk assessment exceed the 
maximum six week limit
Shipboard risk assessment 
file
Table 43: Ten audit deficiencies randomly selected from recent records in the two companies
Moreover, the interviews of managers and seafarers also showed that in both setups, audits 
were clearly construed as a paperwork verification exercise. The superintendents in
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Company-A and the ISM Manager in Company-B (who routinely carried out audits)
stressed that their most important task as auditors was to look into different types of
logbooks and checklists to identify deficiencies. They revealed that although during audits
they occasionally found out certain deficiencies by holding informal discussions with
seafarers, they could not refer to any such finding as deficiencies unless they had objective
evidence to support their claim. One of the superintendents, for example, during his
interview articulated his perception of conducting audit and said:
Checking documentation is in fact the only thing I do. I say is ‘are you following 
our policies? If so, please show me the piece of paper’. I start by cross checking 
checklists... check the dates, check the names, they should all be same -  a bit of 
detective work... For example, by asking for hot-work permit and enclosed space 
permit together I can relate one paper-work with the other as a means of cross 
checking... I need evidence everywhere because in my report I can't write ‘I think 
there is a problem’, I have to have hard evidence and attach the photocopy of that 
faulty checklist as objective evidence [ref: 60].
The senior management teams of both companies offered similar views. Although they 
were not involved in auditing, in their interviews they placed an unequivocal importance to 
checking paperwork as the only method of conducting audits.
The seafarers too portrayed a very similar picture on ways audits were conducted on the 
ships they sailed on. The senior officers in their interviews were particularly forthright in 
describing the way the auditors placed a significant emphasis on verifying the ship’s 
paperwork for the purpose of conducting audits. They also revealed that as verification of 
paperwork was central to the auditing mechanism, they too focused on matching the 
demands of the auditors. As a result they produced properly filled in logbooks and ticked 
checklists even when such entries did not depict the reality.
Some of the senior officers in their interviews also complained that the audit mechanism in
their companies was meant to identify faults with the seafarers. They described the
auditors’ task as ‘a fault-finding exercise’. In one such interview a senior officer remarked:
Audits focus fully on paperwork checking... Most come down just to check the files 
and somehow raise around ten deficiencies... but they will always find faults with 
us: this is not done as per procedure such and such. It keeps them in the clear, you 
see. We try to make sure that all our checklist, permits and logbooks are correct -  
just fill them in, you know [ref: 07].
Interestingly, however, the officers from both companies did not consider audit inspections 
demanding especially in comparison to the Port State Control or Oil Major Inspections.
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They in their interviews revealed that the latter types of inspection were much more
rigorous and required a much higher level of onboard preparation. In their views it was also
far more important to do well in the Port State Control or Oil Major Inspection than the
audits. One of the officers, for example, mentioned:
Every year we have around eight Oil Major Inspections and on an average roughly 
around four PSC (Port State Control) Inspections and one internal audit... so you 
can see the difference... there’s nothing harder than Oil Major Inspections and we 
need to pass them... the same goes with the PSCs -  we just have to pass them [ref: 
13].
As a matter of fact the association between paperwork and audit and its importance
compared to the Oil Major Inspections were so evident that they were also apparent even to
the ratings on ships. One of them, for example, in his interview remarked:
During the last internal audit we (ratings) did not have to do anything... it is only 
with captain and officers. The whole day he (auditor) checked many files and left 
by evening. It (the audit) was very easy compared to inspections by Oil Majors for 
which the chief (officer) tells us to prepare this and prepare that, but we did not 
have to spend any time preparing for that one (audit) [ref: 75].
From the discussion this far it shows that both companies placed considerable focus on the 
audit process and on using audits to establish seafarers’ level of compliance with the 
company’s procedures and instructions. The audit system was not designed to tease out 
how well seafarers were safeguarded from workplace hazards or, for instance, whether or 
not the risk identification or risk control measures used in the organisations were effective. 
In effect, the practice of audit in the two companies provided very little opportunity for 
auditors to contribute towards improving from what was already written down in the 
company’s SMS. The whole mechanism was designed to preserve the SMS as it was, and, 
by using it as a point of reference, judge seafarers’ compliance and performance. In other 
words, the audit process as it was practised in the two companies did not lend itself to its 
principle of cyclic self-improvement.
Instead, the managers used it as a tool to conduct surveillance of the seafarers’ activities 
and in the process reinforced managerial control over their employees. In the process, both 
companies institutionalised auditing as a paperwork verification exercise which encouraged 
seafarers to focus on getting their paperwork right. It thus increased the prominence of 
paperwork and promoted bureaucratisation in the two organisations.
216
A number of authors conducting studies on the management of OHS have also revealed the 
weaknesses of companies’ auditing mechanism. Gallagher et al. (2003: 75-77), for 
example, by reviewing the literature and conducting interviews in an Australian study 
highlighted how audits were not used to identify the effectiveness of the SMSs or find out 
whether or not the workers were being safeguarded from workplace hazards. Instead, they 
followed a tick-box approach to audit which merely assisted in detecting workers’ 
compliance with procedural requirements. Such an approach, the authors pointed out, has 
the danger of ignoring the ‘softer preconditions’ affecting the effectiveness of SMSs, such 
as the level of manager’s commitment and the extent of effective worker participation in 
the management of OHS. In other words, the authors cautioned of the danger of paying too 
much attention to the audit process and too little to use audit in identifying the presence of 
the prerequisites for effective implementation of regulated self-regulation.
7.2 SMS Review: procedures and instructions in the two case 
studies
Having discussed the practices of audit, this section focuses on the practice of review of
SMS. In both organisations the instruction on SMS Review emphasised the importance of
input from the ship’s officers. In particular it highlighted that the captain and other senior
officers should advise the managers on how to improve the company’s policies and
operating procedures. In one o f the companies, for example, it stated:
One of the most important methods of improving the SMS used in the company is 
by receiving feedback from the actual users of the system; i.e. the ship’s staff. It is 
important that the ship masters review the company SMS...
The instruction in the two companies identified that the company managers should also 
avail a number of other sources to supplement the SMS review. It enumerated a list of such 
supplementary sources which included:
1. Customer requirements, feedback and satisfaction and changes to market strategies
2. Findings of audit
3. Findings of Flag State audit and Port State Control and Oil Majors inspections
4. Analysis of accidents, incidents and near misses
5. Recurring / repetitive claims from charterers
6. Reports on ships’ security measures
217
Due to the differences in the management structures of the two companies the procedural 
requirements for reviewing SMSs were different (refer to sections 4.2.4 and 4.3.4). As with 
the requirements for preparing the company-wide statistical analysis report, the procedures 
for reviewing the SMS in Company-A also involved the Head Office of the group of 
companies. The mechanism involved three stages: ship, management office and Head 
Office of the group of companies.
STAGE- 3  
Directors reviews it 
and makes changes 
to the SMS
STAG E-  1 
Captain’s Review  
with input from other 
senior officers
STA G E- 2  
Manager reviews with 
additional input from 
sources like Oil Majors
Head 
Office 
of the 
Group of 
Com panies
(Companies a  and a are part o f  the group o f  companies having similar functions to Company-A)
Figure 27: Company-A’s SMS Review sequence within the wider organisational setup.
In the first stage (see diagram above), the ship’s captain with input from the senior officers 
was required to conduct reviews of the SMS and send it to the management office. After 
obtaining reviews from the whole fleet, at the second stage, the superintendents and 
managers were required to identify the relevant reports. At this stage they were also 
expected to include various supplementary sources of input, such as the Oil Major 
Inspection reports. After consulting with the Managing Director they were then required to 
consolidate the review reports and forward them to the company’s Head Office. At this 
third stage the company directors at the Head Office were required to scrutinise the reviews 
received from all the management units and execute changes to the company’s policies, 
procedures and instructions as deemed necessary. The requirements of Company-A also 
stated that annually two audit reports should be sent from each ship and specified that once 
a year the company’s SMS should be reviewed.
Ship-A 1
Ship-A 2
Ship-A 3
Ship-a 1
Ship-a 2
Ship-a 3
ShiD-a 1
ShiD-a 2
Shio-a 3
C om pany-A
C om p an y-a
C om pany- a
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The procedure in Company-B on the other hand was comparatively straightforward. There 
were only two stages of SMS review: the ship stage and the management office stage. For 
the ship stage, the SMS Review instruction required captains and chief engineers to carry 
out review of the SMS at the end of their tours of duty, i.e. once in every six to eight 
weeks, and send them to the ISM Manager of the company. It also urged the management 
staff and other seafarers to contribute to the company’s review system. The ISM Manager, 
in consultation with the marine and technical managers, was required to put in place a 
review of the SMS. In addition to the captain’s review reports he was also required to take 
into consideration the various supplementary sources of input.
Overall, the procedural requirements of the review of the SMS in the two companies 
showed that they were detailed and well planned out. It gave opportunity to the seafarers to 
contribute in the improvement of the policies, procedures and instructions of the 
company’s SMS. The requirements were also consistent with the popular guidance on the 
review of SMSs, such as the UK Health and Safety Executive Guidance (HSE, 1997) and 
the ILO guideline on occupational safety and health management (ILO, 2001b).
7.2.1 Hindrances to conducting shipboard SMS Review
However, the managers’ and seafarers’ interviews pointed to a number of hindrances in
conducting reviews of the SMSs in the two companies. In their views the mechanism to
review SMSs was the least effective among all the different elements of SMSs. The
managers pointed to the lack of good quality reviews from captains and claimed that it was
because of this reason the effectiveness of this element was considerably weak. One
manager, for example, in his interview, mentioned:
We have around thirty captains at any time -  their reviews don’t really suggest 
anything, they couldn’t care less about SMS reviews... the burden is totally on us 
[ref: 45].
A number of managers and superintendents also supplemented their critical comments by 
pointing to recent examples of reviews received from ships. One of them in his interview, 
for example, said:
Look at this review, it says ‘on (x) manual page: 32, line: 10 a comma is missing’. 
They point out such silly mistakes and typos. Is that the job of a captain? But that's 
all we get from the ships round the year [ref: 12].
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The captains and other senior officers from both companies also acknowledged that they
were not keen to spend their time and effort on reviewing SMSs. In their interviews, they
pointed to Tack of time’ as the most apparent factor that prevented them from reviewing
SMSs. The senior officers from both companies in their interviews mentioned that the
review of the SMSs was very low in their priority as they had a long list of mandatory
paperwork to attend to first. One chief officer, for example, said:
I have deck logbook, oil record books, garbage record book, pump-room log book, 
arrival, departure, tank cleaning, entry permit, loading plan and many, many more 
checklists to fill in. When will I get time to review the (SMS) manuals or even read 
them? [ref: 70].
Elaborating further on the lack of time, captains and chief engineers from both companies 
in their interviews indicated that reviewing SMS was a formidable task particularly because 
the company policies, procedures and instructions have been around for several years and 
that suggesting changes to them would require strong arguments. They pointed out that 
although there were occasions when they wanted to share their views with the managers, 
they felt intimidated to do so. On inquiring further, these officers argued that reviewing the 
SMSs was also a high time consuming task and was thus not rewarding enough.
Nonetheless, the captains (and also the chief engineers in the case of Company-B) knew
that reviewing the company’s SMS was one of their duties and thus felt compelled to send
in reports on a routine basis. As a result these reports had few original comments or
suggestions and largely comprised of superficial observations, such as typographical errors.
This, in fact, has close parallels with the discussion in section 6.3.2 on the type of near-
miss occurrences and the reasons for reporting them. One captain, for example, from one of
the companies in his interview explained:
The SMS has been around for many years now, so why challenge it? Although I 
know some areas can be changed and many others can be improved, where is the 
time to describe the point and fill in the forms?... that’s why most times I don’t 
write about serious issues... just show small points... or end up writing ‘no 
comments’ [ref: 43].
The concern with excessive burden of filling in paperwork in the two organisations has 
already been discussed (see section 5.3). They are also widely reported in the industry as a 
major concern to seafarers. Smith et al. (2007), for example, in their research on seafarers’ 
fatigue revealed the extent of the concern. By using completed survey questionnaire from 
1857 seafarers and around 200 self reported diary entries the authors found that the burden
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of paperwork filling was one of the major factors for seafarers’ fatigue and was thus 
counterproductive to shipboard safety.
While managers from both companies were generally critical in their interviews about the
lack of reviews from ships, a small number of them also acknowledged that one of the
problems was due to the high workload on ships sailing on coastal trade. They pointed out
that due to the quick turnaround of such ships the captains and chief engineers onboard
were less likely to find the time to review the company’s SMS. They also suggested that
younger captains and chief engineers were more likely to contribute compared to their
senior colleagues. One manager from one of the companies, for example, said:
Always more reviews come from ships which have comparatively longer 
voyages.... and the interesting ones generally come from the newer generation. 
They have a lot of hot blood and tend to review very interesting things... squat 
calculation was a recent example, where this young captain turned around and 
showed us the procedure we recently adopted (on the form) was not in accordance 
with our instruction on the SMS. So then we amended the SMS... but these are very 
rare [ref: 12].
A documentary analysis of the reviews of the SMSs in the two companies corroborated the 
first of the two issues. It showed that the suggestions in the review of the SMSs from ships 
on coastal voyages mostly contained typographical errors or comments such as ‘all found 
in order’ or ‘no comments’. While the majority of the reviews which were considered by 
the managers came from their counterparts sailing on deep sea voyages. The following 
table highlights the point which was drawn from the reports received by the two 
management companies over a one-year period:
No. o f  review reports 
dispatched
No. o f  suggestions accepted by 
managers from the reports
% o f reports accepted
Coastal trade 170 4 2
Deep Sea trade 28 11 39
Table 44: SMS Review received from ships on different types o f  trade.
This particular issue, however, affected Company-B more acutely as nearly all its ships 
were engaged in coastal trade. The impact of seafarers’ excessive busy schedule in the 
coastal trade has been pointed out in earlier studies. Allen et al. (2005), for example, in 
their research on fatigue in commercial shipping on coastal trade pointed out the distinctive 
features of high workload on coastal ships. The authors revealed how seafarers on ships
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engaged in coastal trade worked excessive hours and were fatigued particularly due to 
ship’s quick port turnarounds and frequent port calls.
Although my research did not include the age factor in its analysis, the views presented by 
the managers has close parallels with what Anderson found in his survey (Anderson et al., 
2003). His survey on the effectiveness of ISM Code identified a difference between the 
older and younger seafarers with regard to compliance with the requirements of the ISM 
Code. The author indicated63 that younger seafarers were more likely to accept and be more 
open to follow the requirements of the different elements of the SMSs.
The analysis in this section showed that overall the senior officers’ lack of time was the 
main hindrance preventing them to contribute in the SMS review process. Although the 
captains and other senior officers appreciated the importance of SMS review and knew that 
their contribution could be important, they had more pressing jobs to deal with first. Yet, 
they filled in the SMS review forms simply for the purpose of complying with the 
company’s requirements. Such suggestions, however, contributed very little to the purpose 
of continuous improvement of SMSs. The practice of reviewing SMS in the two 
companies, thus, showed that the compliance with company’s bureaucratic procedures was 
entrenched and considered essential regardless of its relevance.
7.2.2 Other inputs to SMS Review: the presence of Oil Majors
From the discussion in the last section it showed that in both companies, reviews conducted 
from ships were largely ineffective. However, interviews from managers also indicated that 
from the list of supplementary sources of input the inspection reports of the Oil Majors and 
PSC were the two most important sources. One manager from one of the companies, for 
example, said:
If you look at the records, you will find that most of the sources (for the SMS 
review) were Oil Majors -  either through inspection reports or their direct 
instructions to us... PSC Inspection reports were also important... but mostly it’s the 
Oil Majors [ref: 03].
As discussed in the review of the literature (section 2.1.3) and in the analysis of findings in 
sections 5.2.2 and 5.3.2, the Oil Majors routinely inspected their fleets as a standard
63 Anderson et al.'s  (2003: 200) study did not inquire about the age o f  the respondents. The authors could 
only assume their age from the nature o f  the comments made in the descriptive section o f  the questionnaire 
survey.
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practice to evaluate suitability of their hire. Passing such inspections successfully was of
great significance as this was the gateway for ships to earn competitive freight rates.
Moreover, the managers also revealed how a single negative result of an Oil Major
Inspection could potentially have a significant knock-on effect on the entire fleet. It could,
for instance, jeopardise the ship’s chances of getting hired by other Oil Majors or even by
second-tiered charterers and also dent the company’s chances of securing business with the
same Oil Major in the future. One of the managers in his interview, for example, said:
One non-acceptance and we’ve had it. Alarm bell starts ringing everywhere... you 
could say passing Oil Major Inspections is the unwritten motto of this company 
[ref: 87].
By way of explaining the seriousness of the Oil Majors’ influence on the operation of the
two companies, the managers from both companies offered to describe how the Oil Majors
conducted their inspections64. They in their interviews revealed that the Oil Majors’
inspections were extremely rigorous and much harder than any other form of inspection.
They also acknowledged that most of the deficiencies spotted by the inspectors were of
great significance to OHS and prevention of pollution. Although most of the examples of
deficiencies were related to mechanical defects or operational errors on the ships, some
also demanded more fundamental changes to the ways the ships were managed. One
superintendent from one of the companies, for example, said:
These inspectors make a number of observations -  they are very thorough and I 
must say that they are very professional... Any defects they point out and we have 
to attend to them swiftly, sometimes it involves sending technicians or spare parts, 
at other times it even means placing extra officers or whatever it takes to please 
them [ref: 19].
From the interviews it also showed that the Oil Majors looked beyond issues that emerged 
from the physical inspections of ships. They routinely intervened in various managerial 
aspects in the two companies. Interviews with managers in both companies revealed that 
the recent introduction of Tanker Management and Self Assessment (TMSA)65 -  initiated 
by the Oil Majors -  required ship managers to self-evaluate their performance against the 
industry’s best practice. As a result of which, in the views of the managers, the Oil Majors
64 Oil Major Inspections were conducted on every ship o f  both fleets. Managers estimated that on an average 
each ship was inspected around eight times in a year.
65 TMSA has been designed by the OCIMF to provide ship operators with a tool to measure and improve 
their management systems through their own internal self-assessment against best practice key performance 
indicators provided in the guide.
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were getting more and more involved with the management of ship’s operation than ever 
before.
A number of managers also revealed how Oil Majors were involved even in the
management of those areas which are usually considered ‘the managers’ prerogative’. In
way of providing examples, a manager from the personnel department of one company
highlighted how in the last two years the Oil Majors influenced their crew recruitment
policy. In his interview, the manager said:
Oil Majors go to the extent of telling us which crew selection software (criteria 
considered in the selection process) we should use and even what score we should 
accept as minimum acceptable... In many ways they (Oil Majors) run the company 
for us [ref: 14].
Equally, another manager from the other company in his interview revealed:
The behavioural safety programme that we run in the company or some of the 
safety videos that we show on ships were all prescribed by X (Oil Major Company). 
They require us to do this and various other training programmes on our ships [ref: 
87].
The most convincing example of how Oil Majors intervened in the management of the two
companies came to light from the interview of a senior manager of one of the companies.
In his interview, the manager described how an Oil Major found the ‘navigation’ section of
the company’s SMS inadequate and directed the managers to review it thoroughly. He said:
Normally we don’t have to review so frequently... one month ago one of the Oil 
Majors pointed out that as managers we should explicitly instruct the captains the 
minimum distance to maintain when passing certain landmarks... May be it is good 
I can’t say but that’s not the point... the point is that the Oil Majors made us put 
together an emergency review... we inserted a whole new section in the navigation 
manual (of the SMS) because they wanted the new ‘minimum distance off salient 
points table’ in our SMS [ref: 30].
Thus, from the interviews with the managers of the two companies it was apparent that the 
Oil Majors did not limit themselves in detecting only the mechanical, structures or 
operational matters in the two fleets. They evaluated different aspects of management of 
the two companies. It showed that through a robust inspection procedure and by exerting 
their economic leverage on the managers of two companies, the Oil Majors were a major 
source of influence in the companies’ operation and in particular in the practice of the 
review of SMSs.
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The interviews, however, also showed that the users of the system, i.e. the seafarers, had a 
limited role to play in the review of the SMSs in the two companies. Their contribution was 
symbolic which merely satisfied the bureaucratic requirements. Nonetheless, the seafarers 
also acknowledged that the Oil Majors’ initiatives had far reaching consequences. They 
pointed out that the rigour of the Oil Majors’ inspections and their pivotal position in the 
industry contributed immensely to the safety of the ships. One captain, for example, in his 
interview said:
Because of the Oil Major these ships are safer -  it’s more work on these ships, more 
inspections yet I would say that Oil Majors are good for us. The inspectors find out 
everything from ships while their bosses get things done influencing the office 
(management unit) [ref: 51].
The benefits of the Oil Majors’ inspections were also acknowledged by the managers.
Although they viewed it as intrusions to their managerial prerogatives, they also
unanimously acknowledged that such pressures from Oil Majors contributed to the safety
of the ships. One manager, for example, mentioned:
But it is also true that Oil Majors actually make ships safer -  their inspection keeps 
us on our toes. To be honest compared to the bulk carriers, the tankers are far safer 
which is only because of the Oil Majors [ref: 45].
The discussion in the review of the literature (section 2.1.3) also highlighted that the 
underlying economic interest was one of the main reasons why the Oil Majors were keen 
on tanker safety. A number of articles in the maritime press (such as Lloyds List, 2004c) 
and by other industry practitioner (see for example Oldham, 1997) showed how Oil 
Majors’ role in the tanker sector of the maritime industry influenced in making it one of the 
safest sectors in the industry.
The influence of the head of supply chain in augmenting the safety of an industry is also 
well documented in various land-based studies. Gunningham (1998a), for example, in his 
discussion on ways of improving self-regulation drew attention to the roles that the entities 
controlling the supply chain can play. He argued that alongside the more traditional ways 
of managing workplace safety, pressure from the head of the supply-chain is an effective 
complimentary way of improving workplace health and safety.
In another study, James et al. (2007), discussing the impacts of organisational restructuring 
in the context of UK health and safety, pointed out how organisational restructuring and the 
change in the employment structure over the last two decades have negatively affected
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workers’ OHS. In their discussion the authors explored the consequences of entrusting 
regulatory roles to the head of supply chains. They pointed out the way in which such 
innovative measures add a new dimension to traditional State-based regulation system and 
argued how it was an important way OHS could be managed better in organisations which 
were economically dependent on the heads of supply chains.
There are empirical works too in support of this notion. Walters et a l (2005), for example, 
in their studies on chemical and construction industries in the UK found that organisations 
at the head of supply chains played an important role in the management of OHS in the 
smaller organisations connected to the business. Discussing the example of one particular 
case study in the construction industry, the authors showed that the top managers of smaller 
organisations were aware that they were required to demonstrate commitment towards a 
good standard of OHS in their organisations in order to win and retain contracts with the 
heads of the supply chains.
Summary
This chapter discussed the practice of audit and review of the SMS in the two case studies. 
It revealed that both companies espoused a narrow meaning of the purpose of audit. They 
used it merely to monitor seafarers’ compliance with the company’s existing procedures 
and instructions. In effect managers made use of audit as a tool to reinforce managerial 
controls over seafarers. Looking at it in light of what has already been presented in the two 
previous chapters, the managers’ interpretation of the purpose of audit is not surprising. 
The use of audit as a feedback loop to check seafarers’ compliance with the company’s 
existing control blended well with the earlier findings that revealed how the managers 
followed a top-down style of management in the two organisations.
Such practice gave no opportunity to the managers to be self-critical on the current 
procedures and instructions followed in the two companies which prevented them from 
using it as a tool to reflect on the effectiveness of different elements of the SMSs or the 
adequacy of the existing risk control measures. In other words, the practice of audit in the 
two companies failed to look at the bigger picture: whether the seafarers were being 
effectively safeguarded from workplace hazards. It showed that, instead, the managers in 
the two companies were preoccupied to make sure that the seafarers were complying with 
the companies’ procedural requirements. The audit was used as a means simply to establish
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it. The procedures that were followed in the two companies, however, directed the 
emphasis of audit towards locating verifiable objective evidence which further 
strengthened the bureaucratic dependencies in the two companies.
The practices of audit and review of the SMSs in the two companies also revealed the 
limited role played by the seafarers in the operations of these two elements. While in the 
first case, the seafarers were simply subjected to auditors’ scrutiny and were not required to 
assume any active role, in the second, although there were provisions for them to 
contribute, in practice in most cases they merely complied with the companies’ 
bureaucratic requirements.
Finally, the Oil Majors’ influence in the practice of SMS review brought in a new 
dimension to the discussion. It showed that the two companies, in spite of having 
considerably different operating focus, were both heavily influenced by the Oil Majors. It 
revealed how these economic players, despite having no mandate to regulate organisations, 
played a persuasive role in the ways the two companies managed their OHS. The 
discussion showed that the Oil Majors’ authoritative influence on the management of OHS 
was largely regarded by managers as well as seafarer as a step in the positive direction.
All these themes identified in this and in the previous two chapters will be further 
developed in the following discussion chapter.
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Chapter 8: Discussion
Introduction
The thesis explored the impact of the ISM Code on the management of Occupational 
Health and Safety (OHS) in the maritime industry. In so doing it identified three 
components common to Safety Management Systems (SMSs) and examined their 
operations in two shipping companies. The results of this analysis were presented in the 
three preceding chapters. It was apparent that there is a considerable gap between the 
documented expectations of the ISM Code and the features of its operations observed in the 
two case studies. It also showed how the views of managers and seafarers differed 
significantly on the management of OHS in their companies. In order to understand why 
these differences existed, this chapter explores the sociological underpinnings and the 
wider socio-economic factors that shaped the practices in the two companies.
The discussion in the three previous chapters showed that the two companies developed 
detailed procedural requirements for managing OHS. The procedures and instructions, 
which were developed to meet the regulatory requirements of the ISM Code, were largely 
focused on enumerating ways to safeguard ships and seafarers from risks that have already 
been identified. It showed that in developing the procedures and instructions in the SMSs 
the companies closely followed a number of popular marine publications and guidelines. 
This approach was largely a reflection of the requirements stated in the ISM Code where 
the duty holders, i.e. the managers, were not explicitly asked to develop procedures to 
identify hazards or assess risk. Instead, they were required to ensure that risk assessments 
and risk mitigating steps identified (in the standard industry guidelines) were taken into 
account when developing their own SMSs.
The analysis in chapter-5 revealed that in the view of the managers the company’s 
procedures and instructions were most suitable for the purpose of managing OHS in their 
organisations. They therefore felt that a strict implementation with these was essential to 
operate their fleets safely. However, the managers in both organisations were also of the 
opinion that their seafaring colleagues generally did not share the same view. They 
indicated that most seafarers in their organisation were indifferent or even averse to abiding 
by the company’s policies and procedures. This posed a major concern for the managers.
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As a consequence of this perception, the managers felt that they had to find suitable ways 
to address this concern.
Another reason why managers relied so heavily on the company’s written procedures and 
instructions was because of the lack of continuity of knowledge onboard. The analysis in 
section 5.2 showed that due to the nature of the profession, the seafarers spent between six 
weeks at the least to nine months at the most onboard before their replacements took over 
from them. Such change of onboard workforce was a recurring and ongoing process. As a 
result, the managers felt that onboard workforce was merely transitory and argued that they 
should take even greater responsibility to ensure that seafarers complied with the pre­
existing operating structure laid out in the company’s instructions and procedures.
The managers as a result directed their main focus on carrying out surveillance of 
seafarers’ onboard practices. However, due to the physical distance between the shore- 
based management and ships, regular physical surveillance was difficult. Therefore 
conducting surveillance by checking paperwork was seen as a crucial alternative. In both 
companies therefore the managers required the seafarers to fill in various logbooks, forms 
and checklists as an integral part o f the company’s formal safety management system. They 
believed that these documents would act as evidence to show whether or not the seafarers 
followed the SMS. In both organisations it was generally recognised that properly filled in 
logbooks and checklists were reflections of such compliance. The extent to which the 
managers relied on checking such paperwork was also evident from the stance they took in 
conducting shipboard audits. The analysis in Chapter-7 showed that the audit programme 
was centred on scrutinising archived logbooks, forms and checklists on ships. The auditors’ 
main task was to determine the level of seafarers’ compliance with the company’s policies 
and procedures by looking at the accuracy of shipboard documentation. However, such an 
approach disclosed little about how effectively the policies and procedures written in the 
SMSs safeguarded seafarers’ OHS, instead it merely revealed whether or not the seafarers 
filled in a set of paperwork. In effect, it reinforced the importance of accurate 
documentation among the seafarers and gave the managers an added tool to operate the 
ISM Code in an authoritarian manner.
The three preceding chapters also revealed that one of the underlying reasons for the 
managers’ interest in correct documentation was the pressure from Oil Majors and Port
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State Control Inspectors. Successful inspection by these commercial and regulatory 
inspectors was considered essential to maintain the trading ability of the ships. As part of 
their inspection practice, they routinely scrutinised ships’ logbooks and checklists to 
establish whether or not the ships were following safe operational practices. Negative 
remarks made by them had far-reaching consequences which as revealed by the managers 
could not only affect the earning from the individual ship but also spoil the reputation of 
the whole company. In fact, the managers’ need to impress Oil Majors in particular was felt 
strongly in the practices of all three elements of the SMSs. It was most striking in the ways 
the Oil Majors were routinely involved in contributing to the development and review of 
the operating procedures o f both companies. These practices demonstrated the power of Oil 
Majors to use their economic leverage as the heads of supply chain in the oil sector.
The seafarers however interpreted the situation differently. Analysis from the three 
previous chapters indicated that they were aware of workplace risks and the ways to 
mitigate them through their professional skills and experiences. The analysis in chapter-5 
showed the seafarers strongly believed that their skills and knowledge were a product of 
what they learnt on ships from their colleagues and seniors as well as what they acquired 
on ships through their day-to-day practical exposures. They did not consider that in this 
regard the policies and procedures written in the SMSs had anything new to offer. They 
also believed that by practising what they learnt and by sharing their knowledge with their 
colleagues were an important part of their professional identity. This helped the seafarers 
form and maintain an identity o f shipboard community. They also considered it as a part of 
the job to share their knowledge and expertise and pass them on from one generation to the 
next. Within this community the seafarers worked as teams and used their professional 
skills also to identify hazards and determine the levels of risk. It was, in other words, a 
representation of a strong community of practice which took into account practising and 
learning shipboard work and in the process safeguarding their own OHS. The analyses also 
pointed out that the shipboard community in this context was particularly strong because of 
its isolation from other influences. The seafarers felt that because of the special nature of 
their workplace, they could acquire the skills only through practical training that they got 
onboard. It was also shown that the managers failed to integrate the virtues of the seafarers’ 
community of practice into the operation of the formal system of the management of OHS 
in their organisation.
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Thus the managers and seafarers had fundamental differences in their views on the purpose 
of the policies and procedures written in the SMSs. The analysis also showed how the 
conflict in their understanding emerged primarily because the company’s formal system 
allowed no room for seafarers to bring in their professional skills and experiences. It 
merely required the seafarers to comply with a set of rigid procedures. Yet the seafarers did 
not openly disagree with the company’s procedural requirements written in the SMS. In 
fact, whether or not they followed the company’s procedures and instructions, they filled in 
the forms and checklists to register their compliance on paper.
The analysis, particularly in section 6.3.1, further revealed that the main reason behind this 
attitude from the seafarers was rooted in their fear of losing their job. For this reason they 
believed that it was vital that they should fulfil the company’s written requirements in order 
to present themselves as compliant individuals. The seafarers felt that the failure to do so 
could identify themselves as deviants, and they could be seen by the managers as the ones 
causing shipboard accidents. They feared that as a consequence the managers could take 
various measures including terminating their current employment or not employing them in 
the future. The seafarers in both organisations, therefore, appeared guarded and notably 
manipulative in practising incident reporting which resulted in significant underreporting. 
The way the managers operated the incident reporting system showed that the seafarers’ 
fear was not unfounded. The analysis in section 6.2.3 showed that although the stated aim 
of the incident reporting system in the two organisations was to identify the underlying 
concerns and rectify them for future improvement of the company’s OHS, in practice, 
however, the managers generally used the system to identify the weaknesses among the 
seafarers’ working practice. This was established from the managers’ interviews as well as 
from the company’s accident analysis archived reports.
The analysis further revealed how the managers took additional initiative to promote 
seafarers’ compliance with company’s procedures and instructions. These included 
showing regular training videos, conducting safety meetings and running behaviour-based 
safety programmes. While some of these additional programmes were considered by 
seafarers as valuable, they nonetheless reflected the managers’ firmly held belief that the 
management of safety can be more effective if seafarers could be turned into safer workers 
and obliged to follow company’s procedures and instructions. The managers’ efforts were 
thus largely focused on identifying the unsafe individuals and training them and turning
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them into individuals who would comply better with company’s procedures and 
instructions. However, the findings showed that all these efforts had minimal impacts in 
altering this situation.
The seafarers in the two companies also experienced the impacts of power relations in the 
onboard hierarchy which prevented those at the bottom of the hierarchical structure from 
expressing their concerns on safe working practices. These seafarers, who were mostly 
ratings, were fearful of being regarded as outspoken and demanding individuals -  the 
qualities that they felt could be viewed negatively by the senior officers onboard or by the 
managers ashore. The seafarers were particularly vulnerable because they felt that by 
voicing their concerns they could even lose their jobs to others waiting in the wings. The 
ratings’ perception, however, varied from one ship to another and largely depended on the 
social relationships with their senior officers.
The impact of all these practices was reflected in the way the seafarers from the two case 
studies participated in the implementation of the ISM Code. The discussions in the three 
preceding chapters consistently pointed out seafarers’ limited opportunity to contribute to 
the management of OHS. Their roles in identifying hazards at work or utilising their 
experiences in safeguarding themselves from such hazards were systematically ignored. 
Equally, their interest in reporting incidents to managers or contributing in the SMS review 
process was conspicuously low due to their vulnerable employment conditions.
These are the main overriding issues that influenced the practice of the management of 
OHS in the two companies studied. They are manifestations of much deeper concerns lying 
underneath these managerial weaknesses. The purpose of this chapter is to present an 
understanding of these issues by looking into the nature of social and economic relations 
affecting the practice of management of OHS in the two companies. The explanation draws 
on literature on management, regulation, nature and structure of the maritime industry, 
occupational health and safety in the maritime industry and occupational health and safety 
management more generally.
8.1 Key social relations emerged from the study
There are several underlying issues of social relationships which appear to affect the way 
the ISM Code is perceived and operationalised in shipboard activities. They include the
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prevalent fear of job loss among seafarers, relations of trust between seafarers of various 
ranks and their managers, power relations onboard ships and between seafarers and 
managers and barriers to seafarers’ participation and communication in the management of 
OHS. All these issues are discussed in the following subsections.
8.1.1 Seafarers’ fear of job security
Seafarers’ fear about their job security was one of the most apparent themes that emerged 
from the analysis. It showed that this fear had a major influence on the way they operated 
the ISM Code. The extent of job insecurity emerged from the discussions throughout the 
three preceding chapters, which, however, was most evident in the discussion in chapter-6 
(see section 6.3.1). The way the incident and near-miss occurrence reporting was operated 
from the ships clearly indicated that because of their fear they manipulated reporting and 
generally underreported the unpleasant shipboard events. They feared that by reporting 
incidents and near-miss occurrences they could harm their careers or even lose their jobs. 
Irrespective of their ranks, the seafarers essentially did not want to be associated with any 
such reports because they felt that by reading the reports their managers would identify 
them and subsequently blame them for ‘causing’ the incidents. Looking at the practice 
from the managers’ perspective, it showed that it was indeed the norm to use the incident 
reports to identify and reprimand the individual seafarers ‘responsible’ for the incidents. 
The following interview with one of the senior officers during the fieldwork summarises 
the point:
Yesterday when I reported the pollution (hydraulic oil leak on deck) and pointed 
out that it occurred because of a defective valve to Mr. X (the superintendent) the 
first thing the guy said was ‘who was in charge of the operation and who had done 
the maintenance? How can you have so many problems despite having qualified 
engineers?’... The first and last question is ‘who is at fault?’ [ref: 18].
While the seafarers’ fear of losing their jobs in the practice of incident reporting was most 
apparent, an undertone of the fear was also noticeable in the way they practised risk 
assessment. In the discussion on the practice of risk assessment from the perspective of the 
seafarers (see section 5.3.2) it showed that they registered their compliance on paper 
despite having limited faith in the formal system. It showed how on several occasions the 
seafarers filled in logbooks, forms and checklists as required by the company’s procedures 
only to present themselves as compliant employees to their managers.
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The analysis in the three preceding chapters also revealed how the seafarers’ fear of losing 
their jobs was largely associated with the type of their employment contract. It showed that 
the temporariness in their employment made them feel significantly vulnerable. Although 
every rank onboard appeared fearful of losing their jobs, the ratings from both companies 
appeared as the most susceptible group. The following interview of one of the ratings is an 
example depicting how the nature of seafarers’ employment contracts generally made them 
feel vulnerable:
I have wife plus two children who go to university, which is very expensive (I still 
need to support them)... for sure I need job... I’d do anything to keep job... Talking 
too much is not good because it may show on appraisal report and any bad remark 
will mean big problem for next contract... (no matter for how many contracts I have 
already worked) each time I have to go through character check where crewing 
manager checks my past record -  any extra remark is not good for job... like others 
(ratings on this ship) I am always worried about next job [ref: 64].
The description of the two case studies in chapter-4 presented the structure of employment 
of the seafarers. There it showed that apart from the senior officers of Company-B, the rest 
were employed under short-term temporary contracts. While the officers’ contracts were 
for between four and six months, the ratings’ contracts were usually for nine months. As 
with temporary contracts, they were paid only during their periods of employment and 
prior to each employment they were required to sign a fresh contract even if it was with the 
same employer as the previous one. In the two organisations the officers indicated that it 
was relatively easier to find such temporary contracts, while the ratings felt that it was a lot 
harder. They complained that it was common for them to wait for several months before 
the crewing agent offered them fresh assignments. These findings corroborate the 
BIMCO/ISF Manpower Study (2005) which showed that globally there is a steady shortage 
of marine officers but a persistent surplus of ratings. The study showed that in 2005 there 
were around 135,000 ratings in surplus, i.e. 18.8% more than the number required. These 
provide some explanation why the ratings in the two organisations were most anxious 
about their jobs among all seafarers.
The seafarers’ engagement on fixed short-term contracts was not an exclusive feature of the 
two case studies. A survey of 4,525 seafarers conducted by the International Labour 
Organisation revealed that the ‘majority of seafarers worked on contracts covering a single 
voyage or tour of duty’. The length of which was typically between five and 12 months but 
some were for even longer (ILO, 2001a: 64). In another study conducted by Kahveci and 
Nichols (2006) into car carriers also reported that a very high percentage of seafarers were
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engaged in fixed short-term contracts which lasted between six and 12 months. From a 
survey data of 627 seafarers working on car carriers, the authors found that a staggering 
96% were employed on temporary short-term contracts. By citing the 1998 Work 
Employment Relations Survey, the authors showed that in contrast only 1% of the shore- 
based car industry workers in the UK were employed under temporary short-term 
contracts. This indicates that the practice of short-term contractual employment in the 
maritime industry is extremely severe which deprives the seafarers from assured future 
employability and steady income.
A number of authors have demonstrated how this form of employment contract affects 
working conditions including workers’ health and safety. Quinlan (1999), for example, in 
his argument based on a review of a wide body of literature pointed to a global growth in 
contractual and other forms of precarious employment. The author showed that in the last 
30 years there has been a general shift from permanent form of employment to various 
forms of precarious employment, such as part-time employment, short-term contracts and 
jobs on shift-work. He pointed out that such change in the employment structure has 
generally made the workforce feel concerned about the lack of continuous income and 
develop uncertainty in their future employment. The author further argued that under these 
conditions -  as workers prioritise ways to keep their jobs and secure future employments -  
their overall working conditions deteriorate. Among other consequences, the workers’ 
focus on ‘keeping job’ generally discourages them to take any initiative on OHS. They are 
thus coerced to accept inferior working conditions and adopt unsafe work practices. In 
other words, the author brought to light how precarious employment potentially deprives 
workers from having a safe standard of working conditions.
The findings from this study also revealed how the senior officers of Company-B, who 
were paid round the year and worked on a permanent basis, were also suffering from the 
fear of losing their jobs. The discussion showed that despite being offered permanent 
employment they did not feel that their jobs were secure. As a result their involvement in 
the implementation of the company’s formal health and safety management system was not 
any different from their counterparts in Company-A. In fact, the discussion in section 6.3.1 
specifically highlighted how senior officers from Company-B showed signs of fear of 
losing job in the same way as the rest of the seafarers did. All eight senior officers from 
Company-B in their interviews indicated this fear. One captain, for instance, said:
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We can’t be too adventurous when dealing with the managers. We can’t ask for any 
more hands (on this ship). If I make hullabaloo may be tomorrow I will be replaced 
by a Master from X nation... Permanent or not they (the managers) can make us 
redundant any time... so I should rather keep quiet [ref: 85].
This small group of officers who came from Western European countries saw how their 
compatriots in the same organisation were being replaced by seafarers from comparatively 
newer labour supply nations and felt concerned that they too might be made redundant. 
This impacted upon these senior officers’ willingness to make suggestions relating to 
shipboard operations or to put forward any creative or confident proposal to the managers 
with regard to the management of OHS. In other words, the Company-B’s senior officers’ 
fear of losing job although had a different origin but resulted in a similar impact. The 
BIMCO/ISF Manpower Study (2005) which presented the global seafaring labour 
distribution provided an explanation to this. It showed how ship-owners globally have been 
shifting away from employing seafarers from Western Europe, North America and Japan to 
seafarers from countries in the Far East, Indian sub-continent and Eastern Europe.
The senior officers’ fear of redundancy can be seen as a part of a wider development. As 
Blanchflower and Shadforth (2009) found in the case of the UK (like most Western 
industrialised nations), there is a growing fear among the employees of losing jobs to 
foreign workers. They fear that their jobs may be taken over by workers from other labour 
supply nations or lost due to work outsourcing. In this respect, studies such as by Turnbull 
and Waas (2000) have particularly identified that it is the workers from the non-unionised 
sectors who suffer from this fear the most. They determined the lack of trade union support 
is one of the major reasons why workers feel vulnerable and fear that they have no 
protection against management’s decision on redundancy.
In the case of the maritime industry the underlying reason for both the forms of fear of 
losing job can be better understood by looking into the wider context of the labour market 
and the labour market restructuring in the industry. As pointed out in the review of the 
literature (section 1.2.2), in the 1970s and 80s the maritime industry went through 
significant changes. With the increasing number of ships transferred to the FOC, it caused 
void in the regulatory structure in the industry which particularly affected the seafarers’ 
employment practice and their working conditions. The sourcing of seafarers from newer 
labour supply nations also made the conditions harder for trade unions to provide support 
to the seafarers particularly for bargaining with their managers (discussed in more detail in
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section 8.2.2). Thus a weak maritime regulatory infrastructure and a declining influence of 
trade unions in the industry offered very little to counter the seafarers’ vulnerability 
towards loss of their jobs. This offers some explanation to the reasons why the seafarers’ 
employment conditions especially their short-term temporary employment contracts was a 
major impediment in the shipboard operation of the ISM Code.
8.1.2 Trust between Managers and Seafarers
The other and equally pervasive theme that emerged from this study was the level of trust 
between the managers and seafarers. Slovic (1999: 697), in his work on factors affecting 
social construction of risk, pointed out that trust-building is one of the most fragile 
elements of human relationship ‘which is typically created rather slowly but can be 
destroyed in an instant’. However, as discussed in section 5.2, the seafarers’ work and 
leave system did not facilitate seafarers to maintain an unbroken employment over a long 
period of time. It showed that seafarers served for six weeks to nine months at a stretch 
(depending on the rank) before they were replaced by others. Moreover, seafarers’ short­
term contracts (discussed in the previous section) were an impediment for developing a 
sense of permanency with any one ship-manager. Before each assignment seafarers were 
required to sign a fresh contract even if it was with the managers they worked for on the 
previous occasion. The pattern o f seafarers’ intermittent engagement and the employment 
practices thus prevented the managers and seafarers from developing an unbroken 
relationship. Furthermore, the physical distance between management offices and ships 
(discussed in section 5.2.1) limited the scope of face to face interaction between the two 
groups. On an average managers or superintendents visited ships once between three to six 
months which for most of the seafarers was the only occasion when they interacted with 
the managers. This prevented the managers from getting to know the seafarers and vice- 
versa, which was yet another hindrance to developing trust between them.
Authors discussing issues o f trust in work organisations pointed out how trust can be 
viewed in terms of social and economic relationships. The discussion in the review of the 
literature (chapter-2) showed that the level of trust between the employers and workers was 
an important element in the social relationships that affected the implementation of the 
ISM Code. In particular, Fox’s (1974) important contribution in relation to the outcome of 
trust in workplaces showed that workers’ involvement and contribution were largely 
reflections of the amount o f trust employers place on the workers. A high-level of trust
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from employers encouraged workers to use their discretion at work and commit to the goals 
of the organisation, whereas a low-level of trust from the employers in an organisation led 
to a low-trust relationship centred on the idea of economic exchange.
The attributes of low-level of institutionalised trust, such as low-discretionary roles given 
to workers, were closely associated with what was found in the two case studies. In various 
places in the three preceding chapters, the managers showed that they were not prepared to 
give seafarers much leeway on how to manage shipboard work. Throughout the analysis it 
showed that the managers considered that their main task was to ensure that seafarers 
followed a narrowly defined path in order to conform to the companies’ procedural 
requirements. The managers’ practice of risk assessment, incident reporting and audit 
showed that in both companies all the three elements were interpreted, designed and 
followed to facilitate the working procedures rooted in a low level of institutionalised trust.
Blau’s (1964) theory of social exchange as discussed in the review of the literature 
(section: 2.2.2) assists in understanding why the seafarers in the two companies exhibited 
limited trust in their managers in most aspects of the management of OHS. It pointed out 
that in situations where employees are required to work in an environment of low-level of 
institutionalised trust they too tend to reciprocate with a degree of suspicion and distrust. In 
fact, what emerged strongly from the seafarers’ perspective was a strong sense of 
scepticism. The most obvious example came from the practice of incident and near miss 
occurrence reporting (described in Chapter-6). The discussion showed that the seafarers 
were anxious about managers’ hidden agendas. They appeared convinced that the managers 
used the reporting system in a deceitful manner to find their faults. As a consequence of the 
erosion of trust and ingress of scepticism in their relationships, the seafarers resorted to 
underreporting.
Throughout the study seafarers’ distrust and scepticism towards their managers was
tangible. The following interview from one of the captains in the case studies portrays one
such example, in which he said:
They (managers) use the system (SMS) to their advantage. A few days ago I filled 
in and sent a deviation report form (used to report technical defects) for 
malfunctioning of an instrument -  the superintendent called me on the phone and 
asked me to cancel the entry. They don’t want this type of entries, it puts them in 
trouble. They want us to follow the SMS, but only as long as they can have things 
their way... for example, they would like to receive near-miss reports, monthly
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maintenance reports, SMS checklists... I don’t like to talk to them on the phone to 
take instructions, I like to use e-mails -  I need records... Suddenly one day they 
may turn around and ask ‘who asked you to do that, is it as per the SMS, or why 
didn’t you report?’ [ref: 86].
Such sceptical feelings have been analysed in a number of studies. Poortinga and Pidgeon 
(2003), for example, using quantitative survey of over 1500 people conducted in parts of 
the UK, determined the public perception of the British government’s policy on sensitive 
issues such as climate change, mobile phone radiation and radio-active waste. The authors 
found a high degree of public scepticism on the government’s policies on such issues 
affecting the general public. It showed that although the public showed signs of relying on 
government’s competence they were sceptical about the government’s hidden agenda and 
felt unsafe about some of these decisions taken by the government. The public perceived 
that the government’s decisions were being driven by wider economic pressures which 
were not particularly in the interest of the public. While this and several other studies (such 
as Taylor-Gooby, 2006; Frewer et a l , 1996) were rooted in locating public’s trust in 
government and industry, they nonetheless bring out issues related to individual’s trust on 
entities in the position of power and authority.
The senior officers in the two companies also had limited trust in their managers because of 
the low-level of welfare offered by the managers. An earlier discussion on complying with 
risk assessment and incident reporting showed that seafarers did not consider the managers 
trustworthy for protecting them from criminal proceedings. Although criminalisation cases 
were few and were carried out by the state authorities, from the seafarers’ perspective it 
was a case of managers’ failure in looking after their welfare needs. A number of authors 
have demonstrated that taking care of an individual’s welfare is an important way of 
developing trust. Renn and Levine (1991) and Kasperson et al. (1992), for example, 
reviewing the literature on factors associated with trust highlighted that a major element of 
trust depended on the individual’s or group’s perception of the level of welfare that the 
other (trusted) person or organisation was willing to support and take care of.
The discussion thus shows that a high-level of trust between the managers and workers 
generally is crucial for an effective management of OHS. However, the social relationship 
between the managers and seafarers in the two organisations was based on low-trust. 
Arguably, a high-trust work environment is of particular relevance in this industry because 
of the lack of other forms of support, such as from the trade union, available to the
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seafarers. As a result, the seafarers largely driven by their fear of job loss failed to 
communicate and participate in the management of OHS in their organisation.
8.1.3 Communication and participatory management
The combination of seafarers’ fear of job security and a low-trust work environment made
it challenging for the seafarers in the two organisations to engage in effective upward risk
communication. The analysis in the three preceding chapters showed that the senior
officers generally felt intimidated by communications from managers. Nearly every one of
them felt that the company’s managers communicated to them using phone calls or e-mails
merely to pass on orders, or to investigate operational issues or worse cast doubt on their
professional judgements. They also did not feel that there was much opportunity for them
to share their expertise and experiences with the managers as the overall social
relationships was generally not conducive to a good working condition. The following
interview of one captain is as an example of the nature of communication generally
exchanged between him and his managers. He said:
It is best we didn’t get any e-mail from them (managers). An e-mail from marine 
manager or superintendent means trouble... it is either inquiring why we need that 
store, or why we cannot sort out the (mechanical) problem ourselves, or why such 
and such inspector pointed out deficiencies... what for should I call them? There is 
absolutely no informal exchange, only question by them and answers by me [ref: 
51].
Although the managers assigned a low-discretionary role to their seafaring colleagues in 
the operation of the ISM Code, they nonetheless demanded a great deal of information 
from the ships. Such information was required by the managers to facilitate a top-down 
style of management in their organisations. The detailed information in the incident 
reporting form (discussed in section 6.1.4), for example, required a high degree of 
institutionalised trust which was clearly absent in both organisations. It thus resulted in a 
tension which prompted the seafarers to communicate only the favourable information to 
the managers and suppressing those they believed made them more vulnerable. This, as 
Read (1962) and O’Reilly (1978) discussed in their works, was a typical response from 
workers in low-trust environment. These authors on their studies on industrial 
communication pointed out that workers in a low-trust environment filter the favourable 
and possibly irrelevant cases and withhold the unfavourable yet potentially important 
information in the upward communication.
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In the review of the literature (chapter-2) it was discussed how effective communication 
between workers and managers was a prerequisite for a participatory style of organisational 
management. It showed that among other things, free and effective upward risk 
communication was vital. Gallagher et a V s (2003: 71) study, for example, which 
attempted to identify barriers to successful OHS management pointed out that one of the 
recurring themes that stood out as central to OHS management was the need for effective 
organisational communication. It pointed out that effective upward communication is 
essential for promoting worker participation in the management of OHS. Similarly, Walters 
et al (2005) in their study in the UK construction and chemical industries found how safety 
representatives encourage workers’ communication and promote a participatory style of 
management in organisations. The authors showed that the performance of health and 
safety management was comparatively better in those establishments which practised a 
participatory style of OHS management.
The practice in the two case studies, however, did not indicate signs of participatory 
management of health and safety. Overall, the analysis from the three preceding chapters 
showed that the communications initiated by the managers were examples of managerial 
control which mostly included orders and instructions, while the communications in the 
upward direction were largely filtered and manipulated which the seafarers felt was 
important to conform to the bureaucratic requirements of the SMSs. This form of 
organisational communication did not allow seafarers to participate in the OHS decision 
making process. It limited them to comply with their predetermined roles and to follow 
decisions that were already taken by the managers.
Arguably, the managers’ authoritarian form of communication is a reflection of the kind of 
participation that they demanded from their seafaring colleagues. Their style of 
communication merely coerced the seafarers to attune to the managerial views and 
facilitate a top-down style o f management and did not contribute to participatory style of 
management of OHS. This, as discussed by Walters and Frick (2000: 54-57), is an example 
of direct form of participation that does not promote participatory style of OHS 
management in organisations (see section 2.1.2).
Looking at participation from the perspective of organisational communication, authors 
such as Stohl (1995) have also highlighted how the nature of communication within an
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organisation serves as an indicator of the type of participation that takes place in 
organisations. The type of communication, both formal and informal, between managers 
and workers and the support provided in facilitating such communication in practice 
demonstrate both the intended style of worker participation and the extent to which it has 
been achieved. For workers’ participation to be effective it requires a management system 
that particularly recognises the importance of upward communication.
Bums and Stalker’s (1961) description of ‘mechanistic’ versus ‘organic’ organisational 
models also described the critical difference between two types of organisational 
communication. It helped explain how the nature of communication in the two case studies 
resembled an extreme version of the former model in which it merely flowed from superior 
to subordinate. These communications largely contained instructions and directives of the 
decisions taken at the top with limited or no consultation with the seafarers. In view of the 
discussion on the level of trust (in the previous section) between the managers and 
seafarers in the two case studies, it is not surprising to find the practice of such rudimentary 
level of communication in the two organisations.
While effective organisational communication is seen as fundamental to effective 
management of OHS generally, arguably the matter in the maritime industry is even more 
crucial. One of the unique features of the industry is the distance between the shore-based 
management office and its ships. This prevents managers from conducting regular physical 
surveillance of their fleets (see section 5.2.1) which is why for the managers the most 
important way and at times the only channel of learning what goes on the ships is from the 
seafarers’ communications. The effectiveness of the operationalisation of the ISM Code, in 
other words, is critically reliant on the upward risk communication and effective 
participation from the seafarers. However, as discussed earlier, the approach of OHS 
management taken by the managers in the two organisations clearly did not consider this as 
important. The low-trust environment in the two organisations and the employment 
conditions in the industry which made the seafarers fearful of losing their jobs were major 
impediments in promoting effective communication essential for a participatory style of 
OHS management.
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8.2 Influences from the Industry
Having identified the main social relations and the socio-economic elements that affect the 
implementation of the ISM Code, the discussion in this section looks into some of the main 
features of the maritime industry that further exacerbate the conditions that limit its 
operation. It identifies and discusses three main industry-specific factors that have 
considerable impact on the way the ISM Code was practised in the two organisations and 
builds upon the effects o f the issues that have been discussed in the previous section. First, 
the discussion highlights how onboard hierarchical structure and social arrangement on 
ships influence the opportunity of participatory styles of management on board ships. 
Second, it looks into how the lack of trade union support in the maritime industry plays a 
significant role in the way the ISM Code is implemented. Finally, it looks into the 
shipboard subculture and discusses how lack of integration between the dominant 
managerial culture and the shipboard subculture within organisations introduces a major 
obstacle to the implementation of the ISM Code. These features of the industry add new 
perspectives to the understanding of the way in which the Code is implemented.
8.2.1 Shipboard hierarchy and communication
The previous section among other factors identified how risk communication between 
seafarers and managers was affected by the insecure nature of seafarers’ employment and 
the lack of trust between the managers and seafarers. In this section the nature of the 
hierarchical structure of the shipboard management and how it affects upward risk 
communication within ships, as analysed in section 5.3.5, is further explored.
In chapter-4 (section 4.2.3) the description of the two case studies showed that a shipboard 
community is extremely hierarchical in structure with a distinct superior-subordinate 
relationship between any two seafarers onboard. They also belonged to one of the three 
departments on the ship: the deck, engine or catering, with clear job responsibilities. Within 
each department there were precise lines of communication and reporting procedures. 
Thus, there existed parallel strings of hierarchy, and the rank of each seafarer signified his 
precise location in them.
The impact of strong hierarchical structure onboard ships was evident from the analysis of 
the ethnographical fieldwork. It not only affected the seafarers’ work-related practices but 
also the way in which they interacted socially. It showed, for instance, that on most
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occasions the ratings kept to their peers during their spare time. They watched videos and 
played cards and interacted among themselves in the recreation room which was for the 
exclusive use of ratings. The officers too largely socialised only among themselves -  they 
had their meals in officers’ mess-rooms and engaged in recreations involving only the 
officers in the officers’ saloon. Social interaction between the senior and junior officers 
was also not very common. The size and location of the seafarers’ cabins were 
commensurate to the seafarers’ ranks. The senior officers generally had larger cabins with 
separate living and bed rooms which were located on the upper decks of the ship’s 
accommodation block. The ratings’ and junior officers’ cabins were comparatively smaller, 
while the ratings’ cabins were the smallest and located on the lowermost levels of the 
accommodation block.
The ethnographic observations on the four research voyages indicated that both officers
and ratings were largely contented with this arrangement. Their interviews indicated that
‘socialising’ as per one’s rank was clearly the accepted norm and as such did not pose any
difficulty in the day-to-day running of the ships. The following diary entry on the fourth
and final research voyage on Ship-B2, in which I reflected on the impact of shipboard
hierarchy from the four research voyages, depicted this picture:
Strong hierarchical presence was evident on all four research voyages. Regardless 
of the number or nationality of the seafarers, the type of trade the ships were 
engaged in or the size of the ships, I found shipboard hierarchy was a constant 
feature and the accepted norm. It was not only apparent in the way work was 
organised on the ships but also how meetings were held, meals were taken and 
seafarers organised their recreations.
The presence of strong hierarchical features onboard cargo ships has been depicted in 
earlier studies. Roger (1983), for example, in his description of how Norwegian sailors on 
board the Hoegh Mallard worked and lived revealed significant hierarchical tension on the 
ship. This ethnographic study showed that seafarers on that ship lived and worked in a 
noticeable hierarchical atmosphere despite the managers’ attempt to increase socialising 
between the officers and ratings through the introduction of common mess room (for 
officers and ratings) and several other features. The detailed account revealed that in work 
related issues the senior officers consulted very little with the ratings, and generally passed 
down instructions to them. There was limited evidence of participative style of 
management on the ship. Roger’s (1983: 70-71) description of the way the safety meetings 
were conducted onboard the Hoegh Mallard matched closely with my finding. In particular
244
the author’s use of the simile of ‘a stem schoolmaster’ in describing the role assumed by 
the captain during safety meetings was very similar to what I observed in my own work 
(described in section 5.3.5). The description also showed that even outside the working 
hours the seafarers largely continued to maintain the original hierarchical positions. The 
ratings appeared more comfortable in spending time with their peers while the officers did 
not appear particularly keen on cutting down the hierarchical divide. Although the officers 
and ratings showed signs of considerable cooperation and cohesion at work, the impacts of 
hierarchy continued to remain evident on the ship.
However, such hierarchical shipboard environment also had major consequences in the 
way the shipboard communication was practised. The analysis in the three preceding 
chapters especially in section 5.3.5 showed that the ratings largely found such hierarchical 
divide as a barrier to communicate with their senior officers. As a result they often 
refrained from informing their superiors on issues such as workplace hazards even when it 
endangered their own lives. They also carried out certain tasks merely because they did not 
want to be seen as a disobedient group of seafarers. It was evident, for example, from the 
way the ratings presented themselves as mere listeners during the shipboard safety 
meetings. Equally it could be seen the way the ratings of Company-A expressed their 
anxiousness with regard to the confidential appraisal system used in the organisation. In 
this case they were particularly careful to ensure that their ways of behaving or 
communicating were not construed by the senior officers as instances of challenging their 
authority. The following quote in one of the ratings’ interview sums up the seafarers’ 
feelings:
It is better to listen and not talk too much because if you talk, make suggestion or 
ask question or may be find out fault then chief engineer or captain may not like 
it.... because of talking I may be known as the trouble maker... because also they 
(crewing managers in home country) want to employ seamen with clean record -  a 
remark like trouble maker is no good for new employment [ref: 39].
Bailey (2006: 67), too, identified in his study on risk perception in the global maritime 
industry such rigid shipboard hierarchical structure as a major hindering factor for upward 
communication. His work among other findings revealed that ratings and apprentices 
onboard felt intimidated by their senior officers and as a result appeared reluctant to 
communicate their views and concerns to the senior officers. The author also stressed that 
in the maritime industry a strong hierarchical environment is considerably more damaging 
because the captain of the ship remains the only gateway of communication between the
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ship and the management office. As a result, intimidating hierarchical setups on ships gives 
little opportunity for the ratings to communicate their concerns or grievances to their 
managers.
Although this affected the ratings’ upward communications generally, the analysis showed
that its intensity varied from one case to another which largely depended on their social
relationship with the senior officers. It pointed out that in the perception of the ratings the
central element which affected their ability to communicate with the senior officers was the
latter’s behaviour towards them. One such example of the ratings’ perception from an
interview is presented below:
It (how much we communicate) depends on the chief mate or the captain really. 
Some captains are free and you can talk in meetings, they don’t mind and they don’t 
feel bad (offended). Sometimes some chief mates are very friendly -  it’s easier to 
talk then. But like with the last captain we didn’t talk at all because he was not open 
-  he was always shouting and ordering. He did not want to believe us. If we told 
him something he said it’s your fault, you should check it first [ref: 33].
This perception was also apparent from what I observed on the four ships. The following 
diary entry illustrates the point, where it indicates how the levels of communication from 
the ratings in two departments on the same ship were significantly different. The diary 
entry read:
On this ship there is a sharp contrast in the way the second engineer and chief 
officer operate. The second engineer is one of the most disliked persons on board. 
All the engineers and the engine rating consider him as a rude person and don’t 
communicate with him anymore than what is required. One the other hand, the 
chief officer is the most popular person on this ship. He organises games and parties 
for the whole ship and is especially liked by the deck ratings. The difference was 
reflected especially from the ratings’ interviews which showed that the deck ratings 
were generally contented and much more communicative than their engine room 
colleagues.
Discussions on leadership behaviour have pointed out that supervisors and line managers as 
leaders in factory settings play major roles in promoting communication from the workers. 
They show that among other features different facets of leadership style has an important 
influence. Zohar (2000), for example, identified that one of the elements that the workers in 
an organisation look for in their leaders is their relative emphasis on safety and production. 
Besides the importance of safety-specific behaviour of the leader, authors such as Mattila et 
al (1994) have identified how general leadership quality of the supervisor has an equally 
important impact on how supervisors and subordinates communicate in an organisation.
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The authors pointed out that when supervisors engage in a participatory style of 
communication with their subordinates and spend more time on the site and among other 
things talk on non-work-related issues, it promotes an environment for better 
communication in the organisation and thus leads to its better safety performance. 
Hofmann and Morgeson (2004: 169) reviewing a number of studies on the role of 
leadership in organisational safety have pointed out that the two modes of leadership are 
complementary; while workers look for safety-specific qualities in their leaders, they also 
depend on general leadership qualities which emphasise on factors such as employee 
wellbeing.
This provides an explanation as to why the ratings’ upward risk communication was 
heavily reliant on the senior officers’ general leadership qualities. The analysis showed that 
to the ratings the senior officers’ general leadership qualities was essentially the starting 
point. Only when the ratings were convinced that the senior officers were approachable and 
receptive to their concerns, did they develop some confidence to communicate freely. In 
other words, the ratings needed trustworthy leaders, for instance, to report incidents or 
near-miss occurrences or to generally raise their concerns on workplace hazards. A high- 
level of trust, thus, was important to redress the balance in an environment that was 
evidently highly hierarchical and generally non-supportive of upward communication.
The description in this section thus provided a new perspective to the understanding of the 
lack of ratings’ participation in the management of OHS. It showed that the hierarchical 
setup on ships was a further cause for ratings’ vulnerability. As a consequence they felt 
intimidated and found it considerably harder to engage in effective communication with the 
senior officers. It added to their fear of loss of job which was largely due to the precarious 
nature of their employment (discussed in the previous section). However, from the 
discussion above it showed that senior officers’ leadership quality had a major impact on 
the ratings’ willingness to communicate. Such quality helped them in developing ‘trust’ on 
their senior officers and was thus a mitigating factor for upward shipboard communication. 
In section 8.1.2 the discussion already pointed out how trust between the manager and 
senior officer is an important factor that influenced the communication between them. 
Here, the discussion reiterated the significance of trust at another level. It thus shows that 
social relationship of ‘trust’ is a vital ingredient for upward communication at all 
organisational levels.
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Having identified shipboard hierarchy as a major factor, the following section looks at 
other important issues on maritime industry which also affect seafarers’ communication. It 
looks into the features o f labour organisation and the role of trade union in the maritime 
industry and points out how this particular feature of the maritime industry also played a 
major role in the outcome of the organisation of labour critically influencing the 
implementation of the Code in the two organisations.
8.2.2 Organised Labour and Trade Unions
The discussion in the three preceding chapters consistently indicated a void in the support 
for the seafarers (at all levels) to engage in upward risk communication. It showed that one 
of the main underlying reasons was their fear of losing their job. This, however, was the 
case despite seafarers’ knowledge of the hazards associated with their jobs and their 
capability of safeguarding themselves from such hazards. For an explanation of this 
contradiction the discussion now turns to the organisation of labour and the wider context 
of industrial relations.
Although the main focus of the thesis was not to examine the industrial relations issues or 
to evaluate the critical roles of the trade unions in the two case studies, the discussion in 
section 2.1.2 firmly established the significant role that trade unions and trade union 
organisations play in supporting participative management. There, drawing on several 
studies (such as Walters, 2006), the discussion showed that trade unions play a vital role in 
supporting worker participation at three different levels: workplace, management and 
regulatory.
However, the findings in this study do not show any evidence of trade unions’ support 
either at the workplace level or for conducting collective bargaining with the employers at 
the management level. From the analysis it showed that at both organisations the concept 
of ‘an external entity’ intervening in the company’s ‘internal matters’ at either of these two 
levels was inconceivable. The crewing manager of one of the organisations, for example, 
expressed the following which demonstrated how seafarers and managers usually viewed 
the purpose of the trade unions. He said:
There is a bit of presence of X Union (of a particular country) where they only
discuss the wage scale... I can't imagine that they have any other role to be honest...
on ships, we sometimes get the ITF Inspectors -  but that's about it [ref: 34].
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Similar views on the trade unions were also evident from the seafarers’ perspective. In one
typical response, a junior officer from one of the case studies mentioned:
We don’t know who they (the trade unions) are. Our union dues are deducted from 
our salaries and we receive a magazine in return... I personally have never met 
anyone, they never come on board [ref: 49].
A number of authors have pointed out how certain features of the maritime industry make 
it difficult for trade unions to play an effective role. Kahveci and Nichols (2006), for 
example, in their study on car carriers, pointed out that the nature of the industry and the 
isolation of ship in particular act as barriers for union organisations to support seafarers at 
the workplace level. In their discussion the authors also pointed out that for this reason 
even during the period when traditional maritime nations employed domestic seafarers and 
ships regularly touched ports of the home countries, trade unions’ support for improving 
onboard working conditions was rudimentary. They added that the advent of globalisation 
further weakened the scope for union participation. With little connection between the 
country of registration of ships, their trading pattern and the nationality of the seafarers, it 
became even harder for trade unions to provide any support at the workplace level. In other 
words, as discussed by Lillie (2006) in his work on the effectiveness of global union in the 
maritime industry, the changes to the structure of the labour market and the fragmentation 
of relationship between the ship-owners and seafarers contributed to the lack of organised 
labour in the maritime industry. It considerably weakened seafarers’ ability to present their 
views to the managers in a representative manner and also made it harder for the trade 
union organisations to operate in the maritime industry generally.
The economic globalisation in the maritime industry not only limits the scope for trade 
unions to address issues at the workplace level, the fragmentation of the relationship 
between the ship-owners and seafarers in particular that resulted as a consequence also 
weakened the potential for the trade unions to engage in any form of collective bargaining 
with the employers. With widespread flagging out along with the increase in the 
employment of seafarers from the new labour supply countries (see section 1.2), the 
maritime labour, capital and regulatory source were all geographically dispersed. As a 
consequence, the nationally based seafarers’ unions became ineffective. Thus it became 
increasingly beyond the reach of trade unions to participate in improving general labour
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conditions or address issues specific to the seafarers’ OHS through bargaining with the 
ship-owners.
However, while the role of trade unions at the workplace level and at the level of 
negotiating with employers has been weak, its impact at the global industry level was 
significantly different. Authors such as Lille (2005) in his research on global maritime 
unions’ activity showed how maritime unions working at the trans-national level 
successfully bargained for seafarers’ wages by negotiating with seafaring unions in 
traditional maritime nations and in new labour supply nations. It showed how the global 
association of national unions under the banner of International Transport Workers 
Federation (ITF) developed a high degree of inter-union consensus and successfully 
bargained for better pay and working conditions for seafarers sailing on ships under the 
Flags of Convenience (FOC). The political and industrial strength of the ITF can be seen in 
its increasing prominence. Since the start of the ITF campaign in early 1970s the number of 
ships operating under the ITF contract has gone up to approximately quarter of the world 
FOC fleet amounting to over 123,000 seafarers66 (ITF, 2008). The ITF through 
commitment to its affiliates, growth of its inspectors and by the threat of industrial actions 
particularly by involving dock labour unions globally, made noticeable contribution to 
redress the balance of the impacts of globalisation on the seafarers’ labour conditions.
Lille’s (2005) study also pointed out how the ITF has also taken their campaign at the 
global regulatory level. At the International Labour Organisation (ILO) the ITF has 
represented the seafarers on several labour issues since the middle of the last century. The 
role of the ITF in the recent introduction of the Maritime Labour Convention (ILO, 2006) 
by the ILO shows the continuing influence of the ITF on the regulatory front at the global 
level. This convention consolidated and updated more than 65 international labour 
standards related to seafarers adopted over the last 80 years. It sets out seafarers' rights to 
decent conditions of work on a wide range of subjects, such as seafarers’ length of contract 
or tours of duty, maximum hours of work, and qualities of food and accommodation 
welfare, health protection, medical care and social security protection.
Nevertheless, although the ITF plays a significant role at the global level -  engaging in the 
regulatory process and also through inspection and threat of industrial action -  the lack of
66 Globally it is estimated that there are approximately 1.2 million seafarers
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trade unions’ support at the workplace level and at the level of negotiation with the ship­
owners has left considerable void in supporting seafarers in safeguarding OHS. This 
reiterates the point made by Walters (2006) that trade unions have roles to play at more 
than one level. However in the maritime industry the trade unions’ role at the workplace 
representation is seriously underdeveloped.
In the review of the literature (section 2.1.2) it was pointed out that strong legislative 
provisions for facilitating workers’ representative participation and employers’ 
commitment for a better risk communication and overall contribution to the management of 
OHS were essential to support employee participation. However, the discussion there also 
showed that the ISM Code failed to make any regulatory provision for promoting seafarers’ 
representative participation. It, unlike the European Union Directive (EEC, 1989), made no 
reference to stimulate or support the selection of worker representation, allow 
representatives time off with pay to carry out their functions and receive training, or enable 
them to take part in consultations with employers over OHS matters. The ISM Code had no 
provision laid out that even suggested that seafarers should be provided with basic floor of 
rights on which with the support of the employers and the trade unions they could stand 
and make their cases.
Although the ISM Code did not specify the need for developing work procedures for 
representative participation, the two organisations incorporated them in their SMSs. They 
required every ship to have onboard safety representatives and a safety officer, and conduct 
safety meetings. The discussion in section 5.1.4, for example, pointed out how the 
managers from both organisations expected the safety representatives to bring out 
seafarers’ OHS related concerns, the safety officers to take extra initiative and discuss them 
during the safety meetings in a forum type of discussion67. The managers felt (see section 
5.2) that safety meetings were especially designed to address the concerns of the ratings, as 
it gave them an opportunity to present their grievances directly to the managers. However, 
as the analyses in sections 5.2 and 5.3.5 showed, in practice the outcome was markedly 
different. They revealed how the safety representatives and the safety meetings generally 
failed to stimulate upward communication and in particular made little impact to elicit 
communication for the ratings.
67 The requirements o f  safety representation and safety meeting in the two SMSs closely resembled the 
requirements laid out in the Code o f  Safe Working Practices — which as pointed out in section 5.1.1 o f the 
thesis played a considerable influential role in the operationalising o f  the ISM Code.
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In view of the findings in the shore-based studies the observations from the two case 
studies are hardly surprising. Walters and Gourley’s (1990) and Walters and Nichols’ 
(2007) research on the implementation and the effectiveness of safety representation of the 
1977 Safety Representatives and Safety Committees (SRSC) Regulation in the UK, for 
example, pointed out that the effectiveness of safety committee and safety representative 
administered by the employers without the presence of strong union membership or 
without being supported by trained trade union representatives met with limited success. It 
illustrates why despite the commendable effort of the managers in the two organisations in 
promoting seafarers’ participation through implementation of the safety committee and 
safety representative, the outcome was noticeably unproductive.
The discussion in this section thus presented a deeper understanding of the way OHS was 
practised in the industry. It provided an explanation from a particular angle on why 
seafarers failed to make upward communication or participate effectively in the 
management of OHS in their organisations. Along with the seafarers’ fear of job insecurity 
and their lack of trust in their managers, the discussion in this section demonstrated how 
the lack of trade union support made it even harder for them to participate. It showed that 
despite the noticeable involvement of maritime trade unions working at the global level 
striving for better labour conditions and pay, and also despite the employers’ effort in 
setting up procedures for safety meeting and seafarers’ representative participation, in 
practice it was evident that these provisions provided little assistance in promoting 
seafarers’ participation in the management of OHS.
8.2.3 Communities of Practice
The final sub-section of this chapter discusses the role of shipboard subcultures in the 
implementation of the ISM Code. It points out why this particular industry-specific feature 
is an important determinant in the way in which OHS was managed at the shipboard level 
and influenced the operationalisation of the ISM Code in the two case studies. It points out 
how such practice had a major influence in the way in which social relations were 
developed at the shipboard level.
The analysis in chapter-5 revealed the way the seafarers worked onboard was largely an 
example of members of community of practice. They relied considerably on learning from
252
peers how to carry out their tasks and develop their working skills through work practice. It
showed that on ships there was a great deal of emphasis on developing and utilising
practical knowledge and in knowledge sharing when conducting shipboard tasks. The
importance of using hands-on professional knowledge was evident from across the
hierarchy. Moreover, with regard to workplace safety, the analysis in section 5.3.1 also
pointed out how seafarers firmly believed that learning about safety and learning to carry
out their work efficiently was one and the same thing. Thus the seafarers’ reliance on their
and their fellow-workers’ professional skills and experiences for safeguarding from
workplace hazards emerged as one of the most important aspects of shipboard working life.
The following interview of one of the senior officers serves as an example of this prevalent
perception among the seafarers on all four research voyages. He said:
Just as the way there is a limit to what can be taught in the classroom there is also a 
limit to what can be written in these (pointing to the SMS volumes). Not everything 
can be written down. In our profession we need a lot of creativity -  these books 
(volumes of SMS) don’t teach you that, they in a way restrict you. Your experience 
is what counts -  what you learn at work -  how you experience real-life situations... 
that’s what makes ships safe [ref: 86].
From the discussions in chapter-5 it also emerged that both the experienced seafarers and
their junior colleagues recognised that shipboard work was best learnt through practical
experience. The two groups also appreciated the importance of the time taken for one to
acquire the practical knowledge for operating ships. During the interviews the senior
officers openly expressed how essential it was to pass on ‘the tricks of the trade’ to the new
generation for working efficiently and safely. Equally, the junior officers and ratings
(especially in the rank of OS) too showed equal keenness to acquire seafaring skills
through practical experiences by understudying their seniors and acquiring the valuable
tacit knowledge of shipboard work. This feature of gaining hands-on-knowledge was
clearly articulated by one junior engineer in his interview, in which he said:
I have 2nd engineer’s license (certificate) but I have many things to learn, this chief 
is good, he teaches me. Just because I have the license I can’t be sailing as a 2nd. It’s 
not an easy job... there is a lot of responsibility. May be after two or three more 
ships after I get experience to work on more types of engines (main propulsion 
system) and other machineries and have more experience I shall ask for promotion 
[ref: 80].
In other words, the process of learning and developing skills, practising it in the shipboard 
community and passing on the skills to the future generations worked in a self-reinforcing 
cyclic manner. In this way the seafarers not only passed on how to work efficiently but also 
shared their knowledge on how to ensure workplace safety. From the analysis the
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importance of utilising practical knowledge thus emerged as a significantly important 
element in the day-to-day OHS management at the shipboard level.
A number of researchers have also highlighted the significance of workplace learning and 
how that plays an important role in a person’s identity with a profession. In discussing the 
process of learning and apprenticeship within organisations Lave and Wenger (1991) 
brought to light how learning at workplace has a distinct social undertone. The authors 
argued that learning is a complex process which does not follow a linear transmission of 
factual knowledge or pass information from one person to another. It also takes into 
account the context in which a person acquires the working knowledge. Learning, thus, 
involves a process of participation which allows newcomers in particular to gradually 
increase their involvement from periphery to the core of the organisational activities. It is 
especially applicable in well-bounded communities of practice where learning to work is 
seen as a collaborative exercise.
In this context Hutchins’ (1996) description on the apprenticeship of quartermaster68 in the 
American Navy, which has close parallel with the subject of this thesis, further assists in 
understanding how shipboard learning through experience was of critical importance to 
building professional knowledge. It described how trainee quartermasters gradually learnt 
increasingly important elements of their jobs and moved in from the periphery of the 
organisation to the centre but only after successfully passing their apprenticeships. The 
author’s work in particular highlighted how the new entrants learned the ropes by gaining 
practical knowledge from the senior members of the community.
The seafarers’ view on how learning to be safe at work was dependent on learning to work 
itself — corroborated a number of studies on land-based organisations. Research on 
organisational safety cultures showed that communities of practice and organisational 
learning played a major part in the outcome of safety in organisations. Martin (1992) and 
Gherardi and Nicolini (2000: 7-8), for example, reviewing a large body of literature on 
organisational influences on safety cultures found that safety was a product of collective 
working practice in an organisation. The authors pointed out that learning to work safely is 
a virtue that is inculcated in the members of organisations by doing and by being part of an
68 Quartermasters are junior members o f  the ships’ navigation team who are in charge o f  steering and watch- 
keeping duties. Their task may also include maintenance, correction, and preparation o f  nautical charts and 
navigation publications.
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organisation. The two are not unconnected developments. The safety culture in any 
organisation thus becomes a reflection of organisational practices and is deeply rooted in 
the ways workers carry out their tasks in a shared manner and learn from each other and 
through practical experiences.
Wenger’s (1998) work on community of practice further shows that such communities 
which are essentially developed through the creation and refinement of knowledge and 
expertise assume a high level of participation and communication among the members. It 
points out that the membership to such community is largely based on the participation 
from the individual members and not by merely registering physical presence in the 
communities. Building on this discussion, Wenger also pointed out that for such 
communities to develop and function effectively they require internal leadership. He 
highlighted that the effective leaders in the community need to show a range of leadership 
qualities largely depending on the context of the community. It, for instance, needs leaders 
to execute the day-to-day operation of the community, or focus on the interpersonal issues 
among the member of the community.
By drawing on the above discussion, it can be seen why shipboard communication and 
participation from the ratings are so vital. They are the two building blocks for the 
shipboard community of practice to be effective. Although, the analyses in sections 5.3.1 
and 5.3.4 show that generally there was a strong presence of shipboard community of 
practice on the four research ships, Wenger’s (1998) argument goes some way in 
explaining why a strong hierarchical divide onboard ships in which senior officers lack of 
leadership qualities impede effective upward communication (discussed in section 8.2.1) 
was detrimental to its functioning.
The analysis (mostly in sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.4), however, also pointed out that this 
particularly strong feature of workgroup safety culture was not incorporated in the formal 
systems operated by the shore managers. The analysis showed that the managers failed to 
pay importance to the expertise and skills the seafarers brought with them in organising 
their day-to-day work onboard ships and safeguarding their and their colleagues from 
workplace hazards. The instructions and procedures operated by them were robustly 
structured aimed at operating a comprehensive top-driven management system. The 
managers aimed at engendering a common organisational safety culture, but in that they
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left very little room for seafarers to incorporate their expertise and skills. As a consequence 
of this conflict there existed a wide gap between the procedures that the managers wanted 
their seafaring colleagues to follow and the actual practice conducted by the seafarers. In 
effect the gap was so wide that the managers very often viewed the seafarers’ ways of 
working as apathy or even insubordination, while the seafarers construed the managers’ 
requirements and instructions on safeguarding OHS as undue impositions.
This tension and its consequence in the management of safety were also highlighted in 
other studies. Vaughan (1990) and Gherardi et a l (1998), for example, in their empirical 
studies in the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and in an Italian 
construction industry respectively pointed out how there were more than one communities 
of practice within a single organisation and how it affected the day-to-day activities of the 
organisations. Gherardi and his colleagues’ study, for instance, revealed how engineers and 
site foremen in the building site of the same organisation adopted different and at times 
conflicting methods to safeguard from workplace hazards. Although they worked for the 
same organisation, the variance in their practices reflected the existence of different safety 
cultures at work. Each of the units within a single organisation brought with it the 
reflections of its own community of practice. The final outcome of safety of the 
organisation, however, became a complex matter of interrelation between these 
communities depending, for example, on the power relations between the different 
communities in the same organisation.
The discussion thus assists in understanding why seafarers relied so heavily on their skills 
in protecting themselves from workplace hazards and why they kept emphasising that safe 
working practice could only be learnt through work experiences. It lends itself to explain 
why the one-track top-down implementation of the safety management system in the two 
organisations had limited impact in the way the ISM Code was implemented at the 
shipboard level. This as the discussion showed was due to the presence of a strong 
subculture developed as a consequence of a strong community of practice at the shipboard 
level.
Finally, the discussion in chapter-5 pointed to some of the features of the industry which 
showed how ships are special places of work. Their physical remoteness from land-based 
influence as well as the type of knowledge and skill required for the seafarers to work and
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survive in such workplaces makes practical shipboard experience particularly vital for this 
profession. However, the seafarers did not consider that shore-based training or instructions 
and procedures written in the company’s SMS were capable of delivering this. Thus, the 
special nature of the industry demanded the presence of a strong community of practice 
onboard ships. While communities of practice can be found in most work settings, from 
reasons discussed above it can be argued that in the shipboard context it is particularly 
pronounced.
Summary
The analysis of the findings of this study showed that the managers of the two shipping 
companies and the seafarers serving on their ships had major differences in their 
perceptions on the purpose of the ISM Code and its implementation process. The 
discussion in this chapter began by locating the underlying reasons for the difference in 
their perceptions. It found that both the social relations on ships and those between the 
seafarers and managers of the organisation as well as socioeconomic conditions and 
employment relations of the seafarers in the two organisations were the underlying factors 
that influenced these perceptions.
The discussion revealed that the main underpinning social factors were the dependency on 
job security, trust-relationships and communication and participation in the organisations. 
It showed how the seafarers’ fear of job loss and their concern for future employability was 
a major underlying factor that affected the way they operated the ISM Code on ships. The 
temporary nature of the seafarers’ employment contracts was found as one of the main 
causal factors for their fear.
The discussion also revealed how the social relationship between the managers and 
seafarers was based on a low level of trust. This was evident from the way the managers 
required the seafarers to conform to the company’s narrow set of procedures in the 
implementation of the different elements of the ISM Code. It was also reflected in the 
sceptical attitude of seafarers towards their managers. Such social relationship did not 
make the atmosphere conducive to effective management of OHS. It also pointed out that 
as a consequence of the seafarers’ fear of job security and the environment of low-trust 
there was a lack of effective upward communication.
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Such organisational atmosphere resulted in the OHS in the two organisations being 
managed without effective participation from the seafarers. In this way my research 
demonstrated that the social conditions which are widely acknowledged in the land-based 
research literature as prerequisites for effective management of OHS were largely absent in 
the maritime industry.
Moreover, it also argued how some of the special features of the maritime industry 
exacerbated this situation. It highlighted how the presence of a strong onboard hierarchical 
structure affected the participatory style of management of OHS and pointed out how it 
acted as a major impediment to onboard communication especially from the ratings to 
senior officers. The discussion also showed how lack of trade union at the workplace level 
failed to alleviate the seafarers’ fear of job security or provide support to their participation 
in the management of OHS. Finally, the discussion revealed how on ships there was a 
strong shipboard community of practice which was regarded by the seafarers as the most 
effective way to acquire both working knowledge as well as safety skills. Onboard 
practices such as work experience sharing and getting on-the-job training were considered 
its central elements. However, my research showed that the managers’ way of operating the 
SMS did not take into account of the powerful subculture that the shipboard community of 
practice produced. This resulted in a wide gap in the way the managers conceived the 
implementation of the ISM Code in the organisations studied and in the way the seafarers 
operated them at the shipboard level.
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Conclusion
This concluding chapter summarises the key findings from the study and highlights how 
this research contributes to the understanding of the practice of the management of OHS in 
the maritime industry. It discusses the way in which the thesis answered the research 
question and acknowledges some of the limitations of the research process. It also 
identifies a number of supplementary findings that emerged from the study which have 
indirect yet important influence on the effective management of shipboard OHS. The final 
section draws out the policy implications of the research and suggests how further research 
is essential for a better understanding of the subject.
The ISM Code was introduced to the maritime industry in 1998 because it was felt that the 
earlier prescriptive regulatory framework for safeguarding OHS in this global industry was 
no longer tenable. In response the industry adopted a process based system which increased 
the focus on organisations to manage OHS. In many ways this shift reflected a recognisable 
trend in the industrialised nations. However, despite this change of approach to the 
management of OHS, there has continued to be a wide range of criticisms of the standards 
of safety management in the industry calling into question the effectiveness of the ISM 
Code. Within the industry it has been suggested that the introduction of the Code has 
resulted in a needless bureaucratisation at best and an opportunity to conceal the failings of 
the management of OHS at worst. While a small number of studies have attempted to 
systematically investigate the effectiveness of the ISM Code, they have had limited success 
due to the methodological approaches adopted. In particular there have been no sustained 
studies that have attempted to examine in-depth the underlying factors influencing the 
implementation of the ISM Code.
Against this backdrop this research was set out to examine the underlying issues with the 
practice of OHS management in the maritime industry. Thus this thesis has sought to 
address the following question: What is the impact o f  the ISM Code on the management o f 
OHS in the maritime industry? The literature review, drawing mainly on studies conducted 
on the management of OHS in various shore-based industries, revealed how commitment 
from managers and participation from employees were important prerequisites for effective 
management of workplace health and safety. It further highlighted that these prerequisites 
were in fact dependant on the social relations between the managers and employees in an 
organisation and the prevalent socio-economic conditions in the wider industry affecting
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the general employment relations. Thus, the arguments in the extant literature steered this 
study to investigate the existence and role of these prerequisites in the maritime context. 
The study further investigated the deeper social and economic factors affecting the 
seafarers, such as their employment relations and their social relationships with their 
managers.
To answer the research question I took a case study approach using research techniques 
such as semi-structured interview, observation and documentary analysis. As described in 
section 3.1.3, my research studied the implementation of the ISM Code in practice in two 
companies involving fieldwork onboard two ships and the shore-based management office 
of the organisation in each case. In all I conducted interviews with 20 managers and 67 
seafarers spread over 59 days o f fieldwork. This research method yielded a rich source of 
data that enabled me to understand the practice of implementation of the ISM Code in the 
two organisations. By analysing the data it then engaged in a more theoretical discussion 
on the underlying social factors underpinning such practice.
Key findings
In this section I present the main findings from my study. First, it points out the way in 
which the managers and seafarers in the two companies studied perceived the purpose of 
the ISM Code differently. Then, it shows how their perceptions were the major influence to 
the way in which the Code was implemented in practice. Third, it identifies the presence of 
the two prerequisites of the management of OHS by locating the findings in relation to the 
managers’ commitment and the employees’ participation. Finally, it shows how this study 
went further and elucidated the way in which a range of underlying social factors had a 
major influence in the operation of the ISM Code.
Perceptions of the managers and seafarers
A number of key findings have emerged from this research, but perhaps most significantly 
it has clearly shown that the managers and seafarers have very different understandings of 
the way in which the ISM Code contributes to shipboard occupational health and safety, 
which in turn impacts upon how they implement it. While the managers believed that the 
Code was a managerial tool which for the benefit of workplace health and safety in their 
organisations requires to be imposed on the seafarers, the seafarers considered it as a mere
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regulatory exercise and a bureaucratic overlay which is of little benefit to safeguarding 
OHS onboard ships.
The conflicting perspectives of management and shipboard workers were reflected in the 
way in which the managers found it difficult to get the seafarers to abide by the company’s 
procedures and instructions in implementing the Code. During the discussion on the 
practice of risk assessment (section 5.2), for instance, it was shown that the managers were 
of the opinion that seafarers possessed an inherent tendency to ‘take short-cuts’ from the 
company’s stated procedure and believed that it was mainly for this reason that there were 
injuries and accidents in their organisations. The implementation of the audit process in 
which the auditors’ emphasis on scrutinising shipboard documentation with the intention to 
identify whether or not the seafarers were complying with the work procedures (section 
7.1) reflected the same perception of the managers. The same viewpoint was also evident in 
relation to managers understanding of the practice of incident reporting (section 6.2). It 
showed how the managers felt that the seafarers chose not to effectively contribute in the 
incident reporting element of the company’s SMS.
On the other hand the seafarers in the two organisations felt that they were generally 
capable of protecting themselves and their colleagues from workplace hazards. In their 
views, their knowledge about safe ways of working was entirely acquired from their work- 
based skills which they learnt through experiences and also from hands-on training given to 
them by their senior colleagues. They categorically pointed out that the company’s written 
procedures and instructions did not contribute to their understanding of workplace hazards. 
As a result they felt that the implementation of the ISM Code made little impact on the 
management of safety in their day-to-day lives onboard and complained that the formal 
system made no room to accommodate these virtues.
The significance of this key finding is further elucidated and developed through the further 
findings of the study.
Operation of the ISM Code in practice
Importantly, it was found that the differences in understanding described above translate 
into differences in practices in the implementation of the Code. It showed that despite 
having a particular understanding of the function of the ISM Code, the seafarers did not
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convey this to their managers. Workers filled in the paperwork as per the company’s 
requirements and presented themselves as compliant and rule abiding employees.
My findings showed, importantly, that the reason for this disjunction between the seafarers’ 
views and actions was largely due to their fear of losing their jobs. The analysis in section
5.3 on the practice of risk assessment, for instance, showed that the seafarers generally took 
special care in ensuring that the risk assessments were ‘correctly’ documented -  as it 
helped them demonstrate to the managers and regulators that they were following the 
company’s regulations. They felt that a lack of accuracy or an omission in record-keeping 
could make them vulnerable to losing their jobs and in extreme cases even lead to their 
criminalisation. As a result, accurate documentation by the seafarers in the two companies 
was considered as an unnecessary task for managing their health and safety yet important 
for their own protection.
With regard to incident reporting, however, the seafarers used their discretion on which 
incidents or near-miss occurrences to report. The analysis in section 6.3 showed that the 
seafarers, driven largely by the same fear, reported those which were clearly apparent or 
which were not likely to harm their or their colleagues’ reputation. They felt that an honest 
implementation of this element of the Code could make them exceedingly susceptible to 
recriminations from the managers as well as regulators. They were thus particularly keen to 
hide the incident and near-miss occurrences which could indicate their professional 
shortcomings.
What was even more striking in my study (see section 5.2.2) was that in both companies 
the managers were largely conscious of the futility of this bureaucratic exercise as they 
were aware that the paper entries which reached them from ships did not reflect the 
onboard practice. Yet, these managers persisted with using this method of operating the 
ISM Code. The findings also brought to light that one of the reasons why accurate 
shipboard documentation was deemed essential was to meet the demands of certain key 
industry stakeholders. The analysis showed that among managers and seafarers it was 
generally believed that regulators, such as the PSC Inspectors and commercial players, 
such as Oil Major Inspectors, also place importance on checking documentation on ships to 
determine whether or not a ship has been compliant with the maritime rules and regulations 
and with the implementation of the ISM Code particularly.
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From the analysis it is apparent that the operation of the ISM Code in the two organisations 
studied was mainly driven by auditing requirements which emphasised the need for a paper 
trail. The success or failure of the effectiveness of the implementation of the Code was 
judged by the level of documented evidence that could be produced. From the two case 
studies it emerged that the maintenance of the SMS was in a large part seen as a way of 
satisfying the various inspectors, including those from regulatory and commercial 
organisations as evidence of safe procedure followed on ships. These findings mirror those 
from other industries (see for example Frick et al., 2000) that found managers to be over 
concerned with ensuring that the OHS management systems were in place, but paid 
insufficient attention to whether these systems were being implemented in a systematic 
manner.
While a central element of implementing a management system approach was continual 
improvement of the safety standard in the company, the evidence from my study suggests 
that the way in which this was operationalised failed to achieve the intended aim. The 
discussion in section 5.3.2 showed that it resulted in excessive bureaucratisation which, in 
particular, increased the workload on seafarers in terms of their having to prove their 
compliance with the system. More importantly, the intimate detail that the managers 
required from the seafarers especially in the implementation of the incident reporting 
system it produced an increased notion of vulnerability among them due to their fear of job 
insecurity and criminalisation.
My findings thus largely indicate that there are significant differences between the way the 
ISM Code was meant to operate and the way it was understood and operated in practice. 
The following section presents my main findings relating to the nature and role of the key 
prerequisites to effective OHS as practised in the maritime sector, namely management 
commitment and worker participation.
Managers’ commitment and workers’ participation
The three empirical chapters demonstrate that the managers in the organisations studied 
implemented detailed work procedures and also introduced various additional measures to 
supplement them. However, it was also shown that they operated a highly structured top- 
down management system in their organisations in which it was only they who took the
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safety decisions and required the seafarers merely to abide by them. It was found that 
managers clearly operated from the assumption that they needed to lay down the 
procedures and instructions as the seafarers were neither keen nor capable of ensuring 
shipboard safety. As a consequence, a major element in the managers’ approach to the 
management of OHS involved identifying ways to get seafarers to comply with the 
procedural requirements.
The managers, driven by this line of thinking, placed a significant focus on improving 
workers’ personal qualities so that they could be turned into safe persons. Similar findings 
have been recorded in the research literature from studies conducted in shore based 
industries (see for example Nichols’ (1997: 61-68) critical argument). The managers 
largely subscribed to the human error theory which assumes irrational worker behaviour, 
workers’ lack of motivation and law breaking attitude and misapplication of a good rule as 
the main reasons for workplace injuries and accidents. As a result -  being committed 
managers -  they also took a number of measures to address these perceived failings. The 
behavioural based programme used in one of the companies is a reflection of this line of 
thinking. However, this also shifted the managers’ priorities with regard to the management 
of OHS. It was evident from the study that they placed great emphasis on tackling the 
seafarers’ behavioural attributes, at the expense of engaging in a participative form of OHS 
management in their organisations -  identified in the research literature as a prerequisite for 
the management of workplace health and safety.
Arguably, it is not that the managers in the organisations studied did not show signs of 
commitment, but this particular version of their commitment did not engender the 
precondition for effective management of OHS. The only meaning that was attached to 
worker participation in the formal system was mere execution of the managers’ instructions 
and orders on the shipboard work procedures. Perhaps not surprisingly, it was found that 
this led the seafarers to experience the implementation of the ISM Code as an imposition 
on them and thus they did not develop a sense of ownership of the management of 
shipboard OHS. This also had a major repercussion on how the seafarers could contribute 
in the management o f OHS in the formal safety management system. As a result employee 
participation in the two companies was largely absent in its strict interpretation.
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However, the discussion in section 8.2.3 revealed that the seafarers in the two organisations 
studied engaged in participative practices onboard. It showed how they engaged in 
communicating with each other at work and vicariously learning about their work from 
others’ experience and generally sharing experiences on how to work efficiently and safely. 
Such onboard participatory practice however largely stayed within the confines of the ships 
-  as though the seafarers as members of a community of practice operated their own safety 
management system. This was mainly because the formal system was structured in a way 
that made no room to utilise the significant potential of the seafarers’ experience. Thus, the 
outcome of the discussion on whether the seafarers effectively participated in the 
management of OHS is paradoxical. While on the one hand there is evidence to show a 
significant participation from the seafarers in the day-to-day operation onboard ships, on 
the other, such participation in the two organisations did not form a part of the formal 
system that operated for managing workplace health and safety.
Underlying social determinants influencing the operation of the ISM 
Code
My study went further and revealed how the difference in the perceptions between the 
managers and seafarers and the operation of the ISM Code in the two organisations was 
dependant on a number of social determinants. It demonstrated that a sense of job security 
among seafarers, a high trust-relationships and free upward communication with their 
managers were the main underpinnings for effective management of OHS. It also revealed 
how social relations determined by organisational factors as well as relations of 
employment were important underpinnings for a participative style of management that 
was essential for the effective implementation of the ISM Code.
However, my findings showed that these social factors were largely absent in the two 
organisations. The discussion brought to light how the seafarers’ fear of losing job impeded 
effective communication both from the ratings to senior officers (section 5.3.5) and from 
the senior officers to managers (section 6.3.1). They felt that their communication could 
expose their weaknesses and jeopardise their chances of keeping their employments. Based 
on this analysis the discussion in sections 8.1.1 and 8.2.2 revealed that the underlying 
factor contributing to this fear was the fact that workers were embedded in weak 
employment relationships. It showed that the seafarers’ short-term temporary employment
265
was a major causal factor as it provoked fear in them with regard to their future 
employability.
It was argued that the seafarers’ sense of vulnerability could be understood in the context 
of an unorganised workforce, i.e. they lacked any form of collective support, such as that 
provided by trade unions. My study drew on widely acknowledged academic sources (see 
for example Reilly et al., 1995) highlighting the roles played by trade union organisations 
and argued why the lack of trade union support in the maritime context failed to provide 
employment security to the seafarers. It identified that the absence of any regulatory steer 
to provide trade union support to the seafarers was the fundamental weakness in the 
industry. Drawing on the discussion on flagging out, it showed that effective functioning of 
trade unions in the maritime industry was challenging under the current regulatory and 
employment structure of the maritime industry.
The limited discretionary roles offered to the seafarers in the operation of the ISM Code 
and the nature of the communication between the managers and seafarers in the two 
organisations also reflected a low level of trust between them. The discussions in section
8.1.3 showed that the seafarers felt that the managers communicated mainly to pass orders 
and to find faults with the seafarers with the purpose of exposing their operational errors. 
The consequence of the low trust environment created by the managers was also reflected 
in the way the seafarers responded. The discussion in section 8.1.2 showed that the 
seafarers in the two organisations generally did not consider their managers as trustworthy 
and were deeply sceptical o f some of the managers’ ways of working. On the whole the 
environment in the two organisations resembled what Blau (1964) identified as a mere 
economic exchange process and in general not supportive of a participative management of 
OHS.
By placing this study in the wider context it shows that implementation of OHS 
management systems in industries which lack the sociological underpinnings poses danger 
of running into a self-defeating frivolous exercise. As cautioned by several scholars such as 
Frick et al. (2000) and Nichols and Tucker (2000), my study also shows that it needs to be 
borne in mind that a management systems approach -  such as the one practised in the two 
companies in the implementation of the ISM Code — is merely the tool to execute the 
management of OHS, the success of which only partially lies in the effective
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implementation of the system but mainly rely on the underlying social factors discussed 
above. While the intention to introduce the ISM Code and to implement it effectively are 
not wrong, there is a clear danger that the maritime community or indeed workers, 
managers and others in similar situation in other industries too may fail to achieve its 
purpose by placing too much emphasis on the detail of the implementation process and too 
little on the wider social issues such as industrial and employment relations factors.
While these are the key findings from this study, the following section points out how two 
further issues proved to have considerable influences in the way in which the Code was 
implemented in the two organisations. As these were not central to the focus of this thesis 
they are presented separately.
Supplementary Findings
The influences of management system
The findings from the study showed that the practice of the ISM Code in the two 
organisations followed a top-down approach in which the managers used various elements 
of the Code to increase managerial control over the seafarers. The increased focus on 
managerialism is not surprising as the Code heavily focused on the management of safety 
requiring the duty holders to better manage their workplaces and applying a considerably 
light touch to regulatory involvement and largely ignoring employee participation. The 
functional requirements o f the Code, for instance, showed that its focus clearly pointed to 
increasing the power o f the managers and making them more efficient in the act of 
managing safety in their organisations. These developments in the maritime industry has 
close analogy with the increasing importance placed on the use of management systems 
approach in various industries generally, in which it is seen as a panacea of solving an 
otherwise impenetrable problem of deregulation. The parallel influences of increased 
emphasis on managerialism and of the use of ‘systems’ approach in the safeguarding of 
workers’ OHS made a considerable impact in the way the ISM Code was developed and 
operationalised in the maritime industry. It is thus apparent that the development of the 
Code is a reflection of this wider global influence.
However the weaknesses of implementing such narrow perspective of quality management 
systems are well established in the research literature. Drawing on a large body of 
international evidence Gunningham and Johnstone (1999: 46-53), for example, pointed out
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how quality management systems could be potentially ineffective or even counter­
productive in organisations in which it lacked management commitment and employee 
participation. In such cases operating quality management systems may result in 
bureaucratic dependencies and potentially shift the balance of power to the managers as 
these systems do very little to support employee participation in a way that the employees’ 
voices can be heard by their managers. The net result thus gives managers added control, 
but, does not necessarily create conditions for providing with a safe working environment. 
These observations have close parallels with the findings from this study and go some way 
in explaining the limitation of developing a safety management system based on the 
principles of quality management system without taking into consideration the 
prerequisites of effective management of OHS.
While the implementation of the ISM Code mainly emphasised the management of safety 
by bringing the role of the managers to the forefront, it did not dismiss the role of the 
regulators altogether. Although the thesis has already discussed the drawbacks of the weak 
regulatory control in the industry, the following section revisits the discussion and 
identifies how withdrawal of the State control has affected the implementation of the Code 
in more than one way.
Oil Majors as surrogate regulators
Although the thesis did not investigate the effectiveness of the regulatory bodies in the 
maritime industry, the analysis in the three findings chapters provided several evidences on 
how the different regulatory involvement shaped the practice of management of health and 
safety in the two organisations.
As pointed out in sections 1.3.1, 1.3.3 and 2.1.3, the maritime States retained an element of 
regulatory control in the implementation of the ISM Code. The certification and 
verification process involving the Flag States and the Port State Control (PSC) were 
integral to the operationalisation of the ISM Code. With regard to the certification process 
the Flag States had to determine whether the policies and procedures developed by the 
managers were suitable for the purpose and also conduct subsequent routine verification of 
the standard of implementation. The PSC on the other hand had the authority to conduct 
unannounced inspection of ships on the level of compliance of the ISM Code.
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However, the evidence from this study (sections 5.3.2, 7.1.2 and 7.2.2) showed that the 
Flag State and Port States safety inspections were far more rudimentary compared to how 
the Oil Majors practised their inspection and control over the two organisations. In spite of 
being commercial players and having no mandate on regulation their inspection standard 
was deemed by the seafarers as well as the managers as significantly more stringent than 
the standard of the State regulatory inspection. Moreover, their influence went beyond the 
ship inspection and surveillance. They influenced the implementation of various elements 
of the companies’ SMSs including sensitive organisational matters such as the crew 
selection policy and the review of the company’s SMS (see section 7.2.2).
While the Oil Majors had to increase their interest in the regulation to protect their public 
image (see discussion in section 2.1.3), arguably, they needed to do so because they could 
not rely on the inadequate and ineffective State regulatory control. It created a void and left 
the field open for other players to emerge as regulators. The Oil Majors thus stepped in to 
exercise a higher level of control than what the regulators in the oil tanker sector of the 
maritime industry were capable of offering. Such development in the tanker sector of the 
maritime industry is not entirely uncommon. As James et al (2007) argued, with the shift 
in the balance of power as a consequence of economic globalisation it is feasible for the 
heads of supply chain to assume some of the statutory provisions on OHS regulation.
In summary, this study has generated a number of important findings, and in so doing has 
answered the research question. It has shown that managers and workers have very 
different understandings o f the role of the ISM code, which in turn influences the ways in 
which they relate to it. Through detailed, in-depth analysis it has further been shown that 
these differences in understanding and practice in the implementation of the Code need in 
turn to be understood in the context of broader socio-economic and organisational factors. 
Importantly the findings, while emerging from the study of two specific companies, do not 
relate per se to the organisational arrangements of the companies themselves, but the wider 
context in which OHS in the maritime sector is practised. By bringing to light and 
discussing the broad underlying socio-economic factors affecting the operation of the ISM 
Code, this thesis has expanded the boundaries of research previously conducted on the 
subject in the maritime industry in a way that both contributes to academic knowledge and 
has significance for those in the industry.
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Limitations of this study
As discussed in the methodology chapter (section 3.1.3), like most other doctoral theses 
this research was not free from limitations. It had the drawbacks of limited time and 
financial resources that was available for this project as well as of the limitations of 
conducting the study single-handedly. Some of the most apparent weak points of this study 
are highlighted below.
In all I spent 49 days on fieldwork on the four research voyages, averaging around 12 days 
on each ship. Although it produced a large amount of rich qualitative data, a longer period 
of time on each ship could have generated more in-depth data. In particular it could have 
given me the opportunity to conduct more onboard observations and allow some of the 
reluctant and shy seafarers to get familiar with me and possibly open up better during 
interviews.
In answering the research question it would have been useful to include some of the other 
players from the industry, such as representatives from trade union organisations and 
managers from crewing agencies. The former could have contributed in the understanding 
of the challenges faced by trade union organisations in influencing the management of 
OHS in this globalised environment. Similarly, the interviews with the crewing managers 
especially in the major labour supply nations could have been very useful in understanding 
the issues affecting the employment relations of seafarers.
Also, during my association with the maritime industry for 15 years I have worked in 
various capacities including being a tanker captain and a manager in the shore-based 
management office particularly involved in the operation of the ISM Code. From the 
beginning of this research I have been acutely aware of my special position and have made 
conscious effort to keep an open mind about the analysis and not bring in my prior 
knowledge into the research. Nonetheless, it is possible that on a few occasions my 
familiarity with the topic may have influenced the interpretation of the data. However, I am 
confident that the rigorous analysis method used in the study has not allowed that to 
compromise the authenticity of this study.
Finally, it is important to acknowledge the impacts of the limitations of the case study 
methodology used in this research. Based on the principles of case study selection, this 
research was conducted on two organisations. While it was never the intention to locate 
representative cases, evidences from my study suggest that the two organisations 
nonetheless were examples of the better end of the maritime industry. Besides being tanker 
operating companies, which are widely acknowledged as one of the safest sectors in the 
maritime industry, the analysis of the companies’ PSC inspection records against the 
industry-wide average indicated their above-average safety standard. Moreover, these two 
organisations were well established, financially robust and engaged in business with Oil 
Majors which required high operating standards. Also, the fact that the managers of the two 
companies offered me unrestricted access to their archived documents and files, permitted 
me to interview their shore-based staff as well as seafarers and allowed me to sail onboard 
their ships for several days, indicated that they did not have anything to hide from an 
outsider closely observing their day-to-day activities.
Therefore, it is likely that the findings from this study have demonstrated the general 
factors affecting the management of OHS but it is possible that other companies may be 
facing additional challenges which were not captured in this study. Although this research 
is not a representative study of the wider industry, the deep theoretical understanding of the 
issues on OHS management that emerged from it outweighs the acknowledged limitations 
of the representativeness o f the case study approach.
Recommendations
This study clearly points to the need of further work in this area. While it has contributed to 
the understanding of what influences the operation of the ISM Code, it is by no means 
exhaustive. As the weaknesses discussed in the previous section pointed out it is necessary 
to investigate the operation of the ISM Code on other sectors of the industry. It would be 
important to investigate such practices on ships trading other types of cargoes, such as bulk 
cargoes and containers, as there could be trade commodity specific issues influencing the 
way health and safety is managed on those ships. It is also important to expand the scope of 
any such study by looking into the views of other stakeholders, such as the trade union 
organisations, Flag State officials and crewing agents to appreciate their perspectives on 
the underlying issues that affect the implementation of the Code.
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The finding from this study shows that the conceptual difference between the managers and 
seafarers on the operation of the ISM Code was largely caused by the weaknesses in 
employment relations o f the seafarers. The conditions of temporary employment contract 
and the way in which the demographic features affected the stability in their employment is 
an important finding. However, more research needs to be conducted in this area to 
appreciate how employment relations in an organisation and demographic background of 
the seafarers influence their participation by looking at how other shipping companies may 
have able to circumvent this problem.
Authors such as Walters and Nichols (2007) pointed out that the presence of workplace 
trade union organisation is an important prerequisite for effective participatory style of 
management of OHS. Its absence in the maritime industry thus limits the opportunity for 
seafarers to engage in such participation. Moreover, the study also shows that the lack of 
trade union organisations’ influence at the workplace level is not effectively replaced by 
any other form of support. This kind of situation requires further investigation. It would be 
useful to be able to determine whether alternative forms of worker engagement are or could 
be practised in the industry.
During the course of this study the long-awaited Maritime Labour Convention (ILO, 2006) 
was introduced at the ILO. While it is a significant step in addressing the core issues of 
seafarers’ working conditions, its effectiveness needs to be assessed once it is 
implemented.
In light of what emerged from the study with respect to the weaknesses in the employment 
relations of seafarers and industrial relations generally, it indicates that due consideration 
be given to the appreciation of the underlying concerns of employment relations of 
seafarers and industrial relations generally. The study revealed that the managers in the two 
shipping companies were not formally trained in the management of OHS instead they 
were generally qualified either as a ship’s chief engineer or captain. Studies from the OHS 
literature, however, draw attention to the importance of OHS training for managers and 
safety practitioners involved in the management of organisation’s health and safety (see for 
example Booth et a l, 1991). Especially in view of the absence of trade union organisations 
in the maritime industry it is recommended that a training programme is included in the 
STCW convention for managers in shipping companies with direct responsibility for the
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implementation of the ISM Code. It should include, among other elements, an overall 
appreciation of the prerequisites for OHS management which should provide an insight 
into how personal leadership qualities and a participatory style of management are 
important for an effective implementation of the ISM Code.
Last, it is recommended that the IMO gives due consideration to the wording of the ISM 
Code. Given the absence in the current text of the Code of a clear direction in relation to a 
participatory approach, greater emphasis should be placed on the contribution of seafarers 
to the management of health and safety. Such a textual adjustment would be in line with 
well-established regulations and voluntary models of systematic occupational health and 
safety management, such as those found in the EU Directive 89/391 (EEC, 1989) and the 
ILO guideline on occupational safety and health management systems (ILO, 2001b). This 
would also provide the maritime community with the clear focus that is needed to promote 
both a systematic and participatory approach to the management of OHS.
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Appendix -  A: [The ISM Code]
International Safety Management (ISM) Code 2002
Preamble
1 The purpose of this Code is to provide an international standard for the 
safe management and operation of ships and for pollution prevention.
2 The Assembly adopted resolution A.443 (XI), by which it invited all 
Governments to take the necessary steps to safeguard the shipmaster in the 
proper discharge of his responsibilities with regard to maritime safety 
and the protection of the marine environment.
3 The Assembly also adopted resolution A.680(17), by which it further 
recognized the need for appropriate organization of management to enable 
it to respond to the need of those on board ships to achieve and maintain 
high standards of safety and environmental protection.
4 Recognizing that no two shipping companies or shipowners are the same, 
and that ships operate under a wide range of different conditions, the 
Code is based on general principles and objectives.
5 The Code is expressed in broad terms so that it can have a widespread 
application. Clearly, different levels of management, whether shore-based 
or at sea, will require varying levels of knowledge and awareness of the 
items outlined.
6 The cornerstone of good safety management is commitment from the top. In 
matters of safety and pollution prevention it is the commitment, 
competence, attitudes and motivation of individuals at all levels that 
determines the end result.
PART A - IMPLEMENTATION
1 GENERAL
1.1 Definitions
The following definitions apply to parts A and B of this Code.
1.1.1 "International Safety Management (ISM) Code" means the International 
Management Code for the Safe Operation of Ships and for Pollution 
Prevention as adopted by the Assembly, as may be amended by the 
Organization.
1.1.2 "Company" means the owner of the ship or any other organization or 
person such as the manager, or the bareboat charterer, who has assumed the
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responsibility for operation of the ship from the shipowner and who, on 
assuming such responsibility, has agreed to take over all duties and 
responsibility imposed by the Code.
1.1.3 "Administration" means the Government of the State whose flag the 
ship is entitled to fly.
1.1.4 "Safety management system" means a structured and documented system 
enabling Company personnel to implement effectively the Company safety and 
environmental protection policy.
1.1.5 "Document of Compliance" means a document issued to a Company which 
complies with the requirements of this Code.
1.1.6 "Safety Management Certificate" means a document issued to a ship 
which signifies that the Company and its shipboard management operate in 
accordance with the approved safety management system.
1.1.7 "Objective evidence" means quantitative or qualitative information, 
records or statements of fact pertaining to safety or to the existence and 
implementation of a safety management system element, which is based on 
observation, measurement or test and which can be verified.
1.1.8 "Observation" means a statement of fact made during a safety 
management audit and substantiated by objective evidence.
1.1.9 "Non-conformity" means an observed situation where objective 
evidence indicates the non-fulfilment of a specified requirement.
1.1.10 "Major non-conformity" means an identifiable deviation that poses a 
serious threat to the safety of personnel or the ship or a serious risk to 
the environment that requires immediate corrective action and includes the 
lack of effective and systematic implementation of a requirement of this 
Code.
1.1.11 "Anniversary date" means the day and month of each year that 
corresponds to the date of expiry of the relevant document or certificate.
1.1.12 "Convention" means the International Convention for the Safety of 
Life at Sea, 1974, as amended.
1.2 Objectives
1.2.1 The objectives of the Code are to ensure safety at sea, prevention
of human injury or loss of life, and avoidance of damage to the
environment, in particular to the marine environment and to property.
1.2.2 Safety management objectives of the Company should, inter alia:
.1 provide for safe practices in ship operation and a safe working 
environment;
.2 establish safeguards against all identified risks; and
.3 continuously improve safety management skills of personnel ashore and
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aboard ships, including preparing for emergencies related both to safety 
and environmental protection.
1.2.3 The safety management system should ensure:
.1 compliance with mandatory rules and regulations; and 
.2 that applicable codes, guidelines and standards recommended by the 
Organization, Administrations, classification societies and maritime 
industry organizations are taken into account.
1.3 Application
The requirements of this Code may be applied to all ships.
1.4 Functional requirements for a safety management system
Every Company should develop, implement and maintain a safety management 
system which includes the following functional requirements:
.1 a safety and environmental-protection policy;
.2 instructions and procedures to ensure safe operation of ships and 
protection of the environment in compliance with relevant international 
and flag State legislation;
.3 defined levels of authority and lines of communication between, and 
amongst, shore and shipboard personnel;
.4 procedures for reporting accidents and non-conformities with the 
provisions of this Code;
.5 procedures to prepare for and respond to emergency situations; and
.6 procedures for internal audits and management reviews.
2 SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL-PROTECTION POLICY
2.1 The Company should establish a safety and environmental-protection 
policy which describes how the objectives given in paragraph 1.2 will be 
achieved.
2.2 The Company should ensure that the policy is implemented and
maintained at all levels of the organization, both ship-based and shore-
based.
3 COMPANY RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITY
3.1 If the entity who is responsible for the operation of the ship is 
other than the owner, the owner must report the full name and details of 
such entity to the Administration.
3.2 The Company should define and document the responsibility, authority
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and interrelation of all personnel who manage, perform and verify work 
relating to and affecting safety and pollution prevention.
3.3 The Company is responsible for ensuring that adequate resources and 
shore-based support are provided to enable the designated person or 
persons to carry out their functions.
4 DESIGNATED PERSON(S)
To ensure the safe operation of each ship and to provide a link between 
the Company and those on board, every Company, as appropriate, should 
designate a person or persons ashore having direct access to the highest 
level of management. The responsibility and authority of the designated 
person or persons should include monitoring the safety and pollution- 
prevention aspects of the operation of each ship and ensuring that 
adequate resources and shore-based support are applied, as required.
5 MASTER'S RESPONSIBILITY AND AUTHORITY
5.1 The Company should clearly define and document the master's 
responsibility with regard to:
.1 implementing the safety and environmental-protection policy of the 
Company;
.2 motivating the crew in the observation of that policy;
.3 issuing appropriate orders and instructions in a clear and simple 
manner;
.4 verifying that specified requirements are observed; and
.5 reviewing the safety management system and reporting its deficiencies
to the shore-based management.
5.2 The Company should ensure that the safety management system operating 
on board the ship contains a clear statement emphasizing the master's 
authority. The Company should establish in the safety management system 
that the master has the overriding authority and the responsibility to 
make decisions with respect to safety and pollution prevention and to 
request the Company's assistance as may be necessary.
6 RESOURCES AND PERSONNEL
6.1 The Company should ensure that the master is:
.1 properly qualified for command;
.2 fully conversant with the Company's safety management system; and
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.3 given the necessary support so that the master's duties can be safely 
performed.
6.2 The Company should ensure that each ship is manned with qualified, 
certificated and medically fit seafarers in accordance with national and 
international requirements.
6.3 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that new personnel 
and personnel transferred to new assignments related to safety and 
protection of the environment are given proper familiarization with their 
duties. Instructions which are essential to be provided prior to sailing 
should be identified, documented and given.
6.4 The Company should ensure that all personnel involved in the Company's 
safety management system have an adequate understanding of relevant rules, 
regulations, codes and guidelines.
6.5 The Company should establish and maintain procedures for identifying 
any training which may be required in support of the safety management 
system and ensure that such training is provided for all personnel 
concerned.
6.6 The Company should establish procedures by which the ship's personnel 
receive relevant information on the safety management system in a working 
language or languages understood by them.
6.7 The Company should ensure that the ship' s personnel are able to 
communicate effectively in the execution of their duties related to the 
safety management system.
7 DEVELOPMENT OF PLANS FOR SHIPBOARD OPERATIONS
The Company should establish procedures for the preparation of plans and 
instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key shipboard 
operations concerning the safety of the ship and the prevention of 
pollution. The various tasks involved should be defined and assigned to 
qualified personnel.
8 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
8.1 The Company should establish procedures to identify, describe and 
respond to potential emergency shipboard situations.
8.2 The Company should establish programmes for drills and exercises to 
prepare for emergency actions.
8.3 The safety management system should provide for measures ensuring that 
the Company's organization can respond at any time to hazards, accidents 
and emergency situations involving its ships.
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9 REPORTS AND ANALYSIS OF NON-CONFORMITIES, ACCIDENTS AND HAZARDOUS 
OCCURRENCES
9.1 The safety management system should include procedures ensuring that 
non-conformities, accidents and hazardous situations are reported to the 
Company, investigated and analysed with the objective of improving safety 
and pollution prevention.
9.2 The Company should establish procedures for the implementation of 
corrective action.
10 MAINTENANCE OF THE SHIP AND EQUIPMENT
10.1 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is 
maintained in conformity with the provisions of the relevant rules and 
regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established 
by the Company.
10.2 In meeting these requirements the Company should ensure that:
.1 inspections are held at appropriate intervals;
.2 any non-conformity is reported, with its possible cause, if known;
.3 appropriate corrective action is taken; and 
.4 records of these activities are maintained.
10.3 The Company should establish procedures in its safety management 
system to identify equipment and technical systems the sudden operational 
failure of which may result in hazardous situations. The safety management 
system should provide for specific measures aimed at promoting the 
reliability of such equipment or systems. These measures should include 
the regular testing of stand-by arrangements and equipment or technical 
systems that are not in continuous use.
10.4 The inspections mentioned in 10.2 as well as the measures referred to 
in 10.3 should be integrated into the ship's operational maintenance 
routine.
11 DOCUMENTATION
11.1 The Company should establish and maintain procedures to control all 
documents and data which are relevant to the safety management system.
11.2 The Company should ensure that:
.1 valid documents are available at all relevant locations;
.2 changes to documents are reviewed and approved by authorized personnel;
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and
.3 obsolete documents are promptly removed.
11.3 The documents used to describe and implement the safety management 
system may be referred to as the Safety Management Manual. Documentation 
should be kept in a form that the Company considers most effective. Each 
ship should carry on board all documentation relevant to that ship.
12 COMPANY VERIFICATION, REVIEW AND EVALUATION
12.1 The Company should carry out internal safety audits to verify whether 
safety and pollution-prevention activities comply with the safety 
management system.
12.2 The Company should periodically evaluate the efficiency of and, when 
needed, review the safety management system in accordance with procedures 
established by the Company.
12.3 The audits and possible corrective actions should be carried out in 
accordance with documented procedures.
12.4 Personnel carrying out audits should be independent of the areas 
being audited unless this is impracticable due to the size and the nature 
of the Company.
12.5 The results of the audits and reviews should be brought to the 
attention of all personnel having responsibility in the area involved.
12.6 The management personnel responsible for the area involved should
take timely corrective action on deficiencies found.
PART B - CERTIFICATION AND VERIFICATION
13 CERTIFICATION AND PERIODICAL VERIFICATION
13.1 The ship should be operated by a Company which has been issued with a 
Document of Compliance or with an Interim Document of Compliance in 
accordance with paragraph 14.1, relevant to that ship.
13.2 The Document of Compliance should be issued by the Administration, by 
an organization recognized by the Administration or, at the request of the 
Administration, by another Contracting Government to the Convention to any 
Company complying with the requirements of this Code for a period 
specified by the Administration which should not exceed five years. Such a 
document should be accepted as evidence that the Company is capable of 
complying with the requirements of this Code.
13.3 The Document of Compliance is only valid for the ship types
explicitly indicated in the document. Such indication should be based on 
the types of ships on which the initial verification was based. Other ship
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types should only be added after verification of the Company's capability 
to comply with the requirements of this Code applicable to such ship 
types. In this context, ship types are those referred to in regulation 
IX/l of the Convention.
13.4 The validity of a Document of Compliance should be subject to annual 
verification by the Administration or by an organization recognized by the 
Administration or, at the request of the Administration, by another 
Contracting Government within three months before or after the anniversary 
date.
13.5 The Document of Compliance should be withdrawn by the Administration 
or, at its request, by the Contracting Government which issued the 
Document when the annual verification required in paragraph 13.4 is not 
requested or if there is evidence of major non-conformities with this 
Code.
13.5.1 All associated Safety Management Certificates and/or Interim Safety 
Management Certificates should also be withdrawn if the Document of 
Compliance is withdrawn.
13.6 A copy of the Document of Compliance should be placed on board in 
order that the master of the ship, if so requested, may produce it for 
verification by the Administration or by an organization recognized by the 
Administration or for the purposes of the control referred to in 
regulation IX/6.2 of the Convention. The copy of the Document is not 
required to be authenticated or certified.
13.7 The Safety Management Certificate should be issued to a ship for a 
period which should not exceed five years by the Administration or an 
organization recognized by the Administration or, at the request of the 
Administration, by another Contracting Government. The Safety Management 
Certificate should be issued after verifying that the Company and its 
shipboard management operate in accordance with the approved safety 
management system. Such a Certificate should be accepted as evidence that 
the ship is complying with the requirements of this Code.
13.8 The validity of the Safety Management Certificate should be subject 
to at least one intermediate verification by the Administration or an 
organization recognized by the Administration or, at the request of the 
Administration, by another Contracting Government. If only one 
intermediate verification is to be carried out and the period of validity 
of the Safety Management Certificate is five years, it should take place 
between the second and third anniversary dates of the Safety Management 
Certificate.
13.9 In addition to the requirements of paragraph 13.5.1, the Safety 
Management Certificate should be withdrawn by the Administration or, at 
the request of the Administration, by the Contracting Government which has
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issued it when the intermediate verification required in paragraph 13.8 is 
not requested or if there is evidence of major non-conformity with this 
Code.
13.10 /Notwithstanding the requirements of paragraphs 13.2 and 13.7, when 
the renewal verification is completed within three months before the 
expiry date of the existing Document of Compliance or Safety Management 
Certificate, the new Document of Compliance or the new Safety Management 
Certificate should be valid from the date of completion of the renewal 
verification for a period not exceeding five years from the date of expiry 
of the existing Document of Compliance or Safety Management Certificate.
13.11 ,When the renewal verification is completed more than three months 
before the expiry date of the existing Document of Compliance or Safety 
Management Certificate, the new Document of Compliance or the new Safety 
Management Certificate should be valid from the date of completion of the 
renewal verification for a period not exceeding five years from the date 
of completion of the renewal verification."
14 INTERIM CERTIFICATION
14.1 An Interim Document of Compliance may be issued to facilitate initial 
implementation of this Code when:
.1 a Company is newly established; or
.2 new ship types are to be added to an existing Document of Compliance,
following verification that the Company has a safety management system 
that meets the objectives of paragraph 1.2.3 of this Code, provided the 
Company demonstrates plans to implement a safety management system meeting 
the full requirements of this Code within the period of validity of the 
Interim Document of Compliance. Such an Interim Document of Compliance 
should be issued for a period not exceeding 12 months by the 
Administration or by an organization recognized by the Administration or, 
at the request of the Administration, by another Contracting Government. A 
copy of the Interim Document of Compliance should be placed on board in 
order that the master of the ship, if so requested, may produce it for 
verification by the Administration or by an organization recognized by the 
Administration or for the purposes of the control referred to in 
regulation IX/6.2 of the Convention. The copy of the Document is not 
required to be authenticated or certified.
14.2 An Interim Safety Management Certificate may be issued:
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.1 to new ships on delivery;
.2 when a Company takes on responsibility for the operation of a ship 
which is new to the Company; or 
.3 when a ship changes flag.
Such an Interim Safety Management Certificate should be issued for a 
period not exceeding 6 months by the Administration or an organization 
recognized by the Administration or, at the request of the Administration, 
by another Contracting Government.
14.3 An Administration or, at the request of the Administration, another 
Contracting Government may, in special cases, extend the validity of an 
Interim Safety Management Certificate for a further period which should 
not exceed 6 months from the date of expiry.
14.4 An Interim Safety Management Certificate may be issued following 
verification that:
.1 the Document of Compliance, or the Interim Document of Compliance, is 
relevant to the ship concerned;
.2 the safety management system provided by the Company for the ship 
concerned includes key elements of this Code and has been assessed during 
the audit for issuance of the Document of Compliance or demonstrated for 
issuance of the Interim Document of Compliance;
.3 the Company has planned the audit of the ship within three months;
.4 the master and officers are familiar with the safety management system 
and the planned arrangements for its implementation;
.5 instructions, which have been identified as being essential, are 
provided prior to sailing; and
. 6 relevant information on the safety management system has been given in 
a working language or languages understood by the ship's personnel.
15 VERIFICATION
15.1 All verifications required by the provisions of this Code should be 
carried out in accordance with procedures acceptable to the 
Administration, taking into account the guidelines developed by the 
Organization.
16 FORMS OF CERTIFICATES
16.1 The Document of Compliance, the Safety Management Certificate, the 
Interim Document of Compliance and the Interim Safety Management 
Certificate should be drawn up in a form corresponding to the models given
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in the appendix to this Code. If the language used is neither English nor 
French, the text should include a translation into one of these languages.
16.2 In addition to the requirements of paragraph 13.3, the ship types 
indicated on the Document of Compliance and the Interim Document of 
Compliance may be endorsed to reflect any limitations in the operations of 
the ships described in the safety management system.
Source: IMO Website
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Appendix -  B: [Fieldwork Access Letter]
Syamantak Bhattacharya 
C/o The Seafarers’ International Research Centre
52 Park Place, 
Cardiff, 
CF10 3AT 
UK
Tel: +44 (0)29 2087 4620 
Fax:+44 (0)29 2087 4619 
E-mail: bhattacharyas 1 @cf.ac.uk 
Website: www.sirc.cf.ac.uk
To,
Mr..........................................
Director.................................
...............Shipping Company
Request for a meeting
Dear Sir,
I am a PhD student at the Seafarers International Research Centre (SIRC), Cardiff 
University, undertaking research into the operation of the International Safety Management 
(ISM) Code with special reference to risk management, accident reporting and safety 
management review. My study requires the participation of two leading shipping companies. 
In each of the companies the research will involve a series of confidential and anonymous 
interviews across the hierarchy within the company focussed on the operation of the ISM 
Code.
I have studied details of a number of shipping companies and their ships in the Lloyds 
Fairplay Directory (2005-2006) and the publicly available ‘equasis’ website. In choosing the 
companies for this research, I have paid particular attention to the type and size of the 
companies and the types and sizes of their ships. After a careful assessment, I found your 
company profile ideally suited to my research.
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As you will note from my enclosed curriculum vitae I have extensive experience within the 
industry. Starting from a deck cadet I progressed to become ship master and subsequently a 
manager. During the 15 years I have been in the industry I have experienced a wide diversity 
of safety practices both in management and onboard operation. This has motivated me to 
study occupational health and safety in the industry from an academic viewpoint in the hope 
of gaining a deeper understanding of the subject. My aim is to produce research that will add 
to the understanding of the practice and operation of the ISM Code in a way that will be of 
value to companies, maritime administrators and policy makers.
I appreciate that you and your colleagues are extremely busy and I would be very grateful if 
you could spare some time to meet with me in order to discuss the possibility of your 
Company taking part in this research. I eagerly await your kind response and take this 
opportunity to wish you a Happy Easter.
Yours sincerely
Capt S Bhattacharya 
Dated: XX April 2006
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The operation of the ISM Code in the 
__________maritime industry
A PhD project by:
Capt. Syam antak Bhattacharya
c/o Seafarers International Research Centre 
(SIRC), Cardiff University
Full contact details: 
Syamantak Bhattacharya 
c/o  Seafarers International 
Research Centre (SIRC) 
52, Park Place 
Cardiff, CF10 3AT 
UK
Tel: (029) 2087 4620  
Fax: (029) 2087 4619  
E-mail:
bhattacharvasl@cf.ac.uk  
Website: www.sirc.cf.ac.uk
3 2 5
The operation of the ISM Code 
in the maritime industry
Aim
This research aims to understand the effectiveness of self-regulated 
occupational health and safety (OHS) management systems by focussing 
on the example of the shipping industry.
It  will study the operation of the ISM Code and analyse its ability to 
improve OHS matters in the industry keeping in mind the changing trends 
in shipping and working lives of seafarers.
Confidentiality
The research is an independent academic venture towards my PhD at the 
Cardiff University.
The data and the findings will be completely confidential; names of 
personnel, companies and the ships will not be identified in my thesis or 
in any future publication.
Method
The research would be split between company office and two company 
vessels at sea.
Office-based research: will include confidential and anonymous interviews 
with the Safety Managers and Technical Managers who are in charge of 
day-to-day ship operation and the study of some Company Safety 
Management System files. The participation of the office staff will only be 
undertaken on a voluntary basis.
Onboard research: will involve confidential and anonymous interviews 
with seafarers of different ranks and the observation of some of their 
regular activities. All such observation will be conducted overtly and with 
relevant onboard permission. In the course of the study every effort will 
be made not to interfere with the daily running of the ship. On average 
voyages will be of five days duration. The participation of seafarers will 
only be undertaken on a voluntary basis.
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Appendix -  C: [Research Informed Consent Form]
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RESEARCH INFORMED CONSENT FORM
I , ................................................................................................................................. (Name)
of ....................................................................................................................... (Company), have
agreed to participate in this research project on the operation of International Safety 
Management (ISM) Code voluntarily which is being conducted by Capt. Syamantak 
Bhattacharya.
I have / have not* agreed to a voice recording of this interview between me and the 
researcher.
The objectives and purpose of the exercise have been clearly explained to me and I have been 
assured of the confidentiality and anonymity of the interviews. I therefore give permission 
for any appropriate use of the information I give in any subsequent writings and publications.
Signed 
Dated .
* please delete as appropriate
Appendix -  D: [Ethical Committee Approval Letter]
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Ysgol Gwyddorau Cymdeithasol Caerdydd 
Cyfarwyddwr Yr Athro Huw Beynon
Cardiff School of Social Sciences 
Director Professor Huw Beynon CARDIFF
UNIVERSITY
PRIFYSGOL
CaeRDY[§> 
Our ref: SRECY77
26th April 2006
Cardiff University 
Glamorgan Building 
King Edward VII Avenue 
Cardiff CF10 3WT 
Wales UK
Tel Ffon + 4 4 (0 )2 9  20 8 7  5 1 7 9  
Fax Ffacs + 4 4 (0 )2 9  20 8 7  4 1 7 5  
www.cardiff.ac.uK/
Syamantak Bhattacharya 
MPhil / PhD Programme
Prifysgol Caerdydd 
Adeilad Morgannwg 
Rhodfa Brenin Edward VII 
Caerdydd CF10 3WT 
Cymru Y Deymas Gyfunol
SOCSI
Dear Syamantak
Your project entitled “The operation o f  International Safety Management (ISM) Code 
in the Shipping Industry ” has been approved by the Cardiff School of Social Sciences 
Research Ethics Committee (SREC) following its meeting on 3rd April 2006, and you 
can now commence the project.
If you make any substantial changes with ethical implications to the project as it 
progresses you need to inform the SREC about the nature of these changes. Such 
changes could be: 1) changes in the type of participants recruited (e.g. inclusion of a 
group of potentially vulnerable participants), 2) changes to questionnaires, interview 
guides etc. (e.g. including new questions on sensitive issues), 3) changes to the way 
data are handled (e.g. sharing of non-anonymised data with other researchers).
All ongoing projects will be monitored every 12 months and it is a condition of 
continued approval that you complete the monitoring form.
Please inform the SREC when the project has ended.
Please use the SREC’s project reference number above in any future correspondence. 
Yours sincerely
Pro:______________
Chair of the School of Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee
cc: Supervisors - D Walters
N Bailey
Appendix -  E: [The Interview Schedules]
INTERVIEW SCHEDULES
Part: 1 [Interview Schedule for Managers]
Basic Facts’.
1. Can you briefly talk about yourself, where are you from?
2. How long have you been in the industry?
3. How long have you been working in the company and in this position?
4. What was you previous position?
5. Were you sailing prior to that?
6. What is the official title of your job?
7. What all tasks are you responsible for?
8. How many employees are you responsible for?
9. How many ships do you manage/ supervise?
10. What are your specific responsibilities?
a. Are you the Designated Person Ashore?
b. In that case, do you have any special responsibility?
c. Do you look after the implementation of the ISM Code?
11. Who do you report to?
12. Which part of your job do you consider most demanding and why?
Risk Assessment:
13. How often do you communicate with the ships in the fleet?
a. How?
b. What do you discuss?
c. Do they speak to you about shipboard risk?
14. How often do you visit them?
a. What do you when you are there?
b. Do you manage to visit ships as often as the procedures require?
c. Do you consider that ship visits are useful?
15. Would you consider that maritime industry generally as risky?
a. Why?
16. How would you rate the safety standard of your company?
a. Why?
b. Are there any special features of your company that makes it (un)safe?
17. In the last one year have you had any incident?
a. What sort were they?
b. How did they happen?
18. Who were at fault?
a. Why do you think so?
19. How could you prevent those?
20. How would you rate the company’s SMS?
a. Would you consider that the SMS is sufficient for managing shipboard risks?
b. Do you know who all contributed in developing it?
21. In practice, who all contribute to risk assessment?
a. How is the office staff involved?
b. How is the ship staff involved in this?
c. Anyone else?
22. What training do you provide to office staff for assessing risk?
a. How?
b. Are they relevant?
c. If no, would you have found certain trainings useful?
23. What training do you provide to sea staff
a. What are they specifically aimed at it?
b. Onboard or ashore?
c. Are they beneficial?
24. How do you assist the ships in assessing risk?
25. How do you encourage sea staff to assess risk prior to their tasks?
a. Example?
b. Do they comply?
26. What do you do if you find that risk assessment is not done properly?
a. How do you check whether your colleagues at sea are in fact assessing risk?
b. Is there any complain from the seafarers?
27. Can you think of any reason why seafarers may not comply with the risk assessment if it 
meant for their benefits?
a. Are all seafarers same?
b. Is there any specific issue because of which seafarers find it hard to comply?
28. Can you manage to comply with the SMS yourself?
a. Always?
b. Completely?
c. Is there any specific issue that impedes safety compliance in the office?
29. How often do you hold office meetings and discuss safety/ risk assessment issues?
30. How do you contribute in such meetings?
a. Can you please remember what happened in the last meeting?
b. How do you follow it up?
31. Do you look at the shipboard meeting reports?
a. Who all does?
b. For what?
32. How do you find the reports of the shipboard meetings?
a. How frank are the sea staffs in the safety meetings?
b. Please could you show me some examples?
Incident Reporting:
33. Why do you have incident reporting system?
34. How do you practice it?
35. Does it help reduce the number of incidents?
a. How?
36. How often do you get incident reports?
a. What kind?
37. Do you find that your colleagues at sea are reporting all incidents/ near-miss occurrences?
38. What problems do you face in receiving incident reports?
39. If not, what do you think is the problem?
a. Please could you provide some examples?
b. How do you address it?
40. How does the office encourage the ships to report?
a. No-blame?
b. Affect promotion?
c. Please could you show an instance of such encouragements?
41. Do you consider that the reporting form is easy to fill in?
42. Do you give any training to the sea staff particularly for this reporting procedure?
a. What kind?
b. How?
43. What happens in the office when such reports reach here?
a. Do you involve any external party?
b. Who studies such reports in this office?
44. Do you hold any meeting?
45. Who attends such meeting?
46. Generally, who all contribute to it?
a. MD?
b. All departments?
c. Only Safety Manager?
47. What training is provided for the office staff to analyse such reports?
a. Do you feel you need any more training?
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48. How do you follow up on these reports?
a. Circulars/ e-mails?
49. Who all are involved in this follow up process?
a. MD/ Managers?
50. What happens after that?
a. Can you please share examples of responses to such reports?
b. Actions taken?
Audit:
51. How often do you conduct audits on ships?
52. Who selects the auditors and on what basis?
a. MD?
b. Others?
53. Who conducts these audits?
54. Do you audit yourself?
a. Please provide examples.
55. What would you say is the purpose of conducting audits?
56. What do auditors actually do?
a. What is the main focus?
b. Why?
c. Please could you share your experience with conducting audit?
57. How is the audit report dealt with?
a. Do the auditors meet the relevant office staff after the audit?
b. Who investigates the report in the office?
58. Please could you explain how an audit report was dealt with?
Review.
59. How often do you review your management system?
60. Who all contribute to it?
a. Do you?
61. How do you urge the seafarers to contribute?
62. Do captains contribute?
a. Why (not)?
b. How do people find time out from their regular jobs to carry out reviews?
c. Are they useful?
63. Where do you get the maximum input from?
a. Why do you think?
64. What do you do with the reviews?
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65. Would you call this an easy or a complex procedure?
a. Why?
b. Please could you show example of a review from start to end?
66. Finally, would like to add something?
Part: 2 [Interview Schedule for Senior Officers!
Basic Facts:
1. Where do you come from?
2. How long have you been at sea?
3. For how many years have you sailing in this rank?
4. For how long have you been sailing on this ship?
5. How is your contract of employment?
6. How long have you been employed by this company?
7. (For contracted employees only) Do you plan to return to this company
a. Why/ or why not?
8. Do you feel anxious of keeping your job/ getting next job?
9. What is the exact nature of your task?
10. Which part of your job do you consider most demanding, why?
Risk Assessment:
11. Do you consider that maritime industry is generally dangerous?
a. Why?
12. Is this a safe ship?
a. Why?
13. What do you consider as the most important elements of ship safety?
a. Officers?
b. Ratings?
14. How safely do you conduct your day-to day task?
15. What do you do in practice?
a. Consult procedures written in SMS?
16. Do you feel that the ratings and junior officers work safely?
17. Do you know about any unsafe practice on this ship?
a. How?
b. Why does it occur?
18. Have you had any injury/ incident on this ship?
a. Please could you tell me about it?
19. How could it be prevented?
20. Generally speaking, how could you make this ship safer?
21. Does the management provide you with any assistance?
a. How?
b. Do you consider that the assistance is adequate?
c. What more could they offer?
22. How do you communicate with the managers?
a. Is the Designated Person Ashore aware of all ship’s requirements?
b. Who do you communicate with most?
23. How do you practice risk assessment on this ship?
a. Does it contribute to safety effectively?
b. How?
c. Who all are involved in the assessment?
24. Do you or others have any special training for the purpose?
25. Who is expected to contribute?
a. Can a rating have a say, how?
26. Is the checklist type assessment effective?
a. Why do you say that?
27. What is the main purpose of company’s risk assessment system?
a. Is it helpful?
b. Why or why not?
c. Please could you give me an example?
28. Do the managers provide any support?
a. How?
b. Does it help?
c. Can you discuss with the managers freely?
29. When do you conduct risk assessment?
a. Every time?
b. Are you expected to carry out such assessment every time for every job?
30. How do you think can one improve the company’s risk assessment system?
Incident Reporting:
31. How does the incident reporting system work in your department?
32. If you discover a minor incident/ injury -  what do you do?
33. What training did you receive in conducting this task?
34. Who all can make such reports?
a. How?
b. What problems he may encounter in making such a report?
c. How do you motivate/ encourage your crew to report to you?
35. Do you report all types of incidents?
a. Every time?
b. Do you face any concern?
36. What do you feel about reporting incidents?
a. Please could you explain?
b. Any concerns in particular?
37. What types of incidents and accidents do you generally report?
a. Please could you give some recent examples?
38. What about reporting near-miss occurrences?
a. Is it any different?
b. Do you have recent examples?
c. Is this of any concern?
39. What kind of response do you get from the office after reporting?
a. How do they reply to your reporting?
b. How do they encourage reporting?
c. Do they take any action on reporting?
40. Have you reported from this ship?
a. Please could you share you experience with me?
41. How do you feel that the reporting practice could improve?
Audit:
42. In the last audit which all areas did the auditor focus on?
a. How much time did he take to audit the ship?
43. What are the typical questions that he/she asked?
44. What do you feel was the main objective of the audit?
45. How were you involved in preparing for it?
46. How do you generally prepare for such audits?
a. How long does it take to prepare?
b. Do the ratings contribute?
47. Does the audit improve safety on this ship?
a. How?
b. Why not?
48. What do you do after an audit is completed?
Review:
49. What practice do you follow to conduct review of the SMS?
50. Who contributes to this review?
a. Junior Officers?
b. Ratings?
51. Have you carried one out on this ship?
a. Can you please show/ explain it?
52. How much time does it take to review?
53. What is the response from the managers?
54. Do you consider that your views are important to the managers?
Part: 3 [Interview Schedule for Junior Officers and Ratings!
Basic Facts'.
1. Where are you from?
2. How long have you been at sea?
3. For how many years have you sailing in this rank?
4. For how long have you been sailing on this ship?
5. How is your contract of employment?
6. How long have you been employed by this company?
7. (For contracted employees only) Do you plan to return to this company
a. Why/ or why not?
8. Do you feel anxious of keeping your job/ getting next job?
9. What is the exact nature of your task?
a. What are your main activities?
Risk Assessment:
10. Do you consider ships are generally dangerous workplaces?
a. What are the sources of hazards?
11. Do you think that this is a safe ship?
a. Why/ why not?
12. Have you had any injury/ incident on this ship?
a. Please could you tell me about it?
b. How about your fellow ship-mates?
13. Would you say that you give priority to health and safety?
a. Always?
b. Every time?
c. If not, what has come before safety?
14. What would you say is the most dangerous part of your job?
a. Why?
15. How could you make it safer?
16. Do you know how you could face hazards at work generally?
a. When working aloft?
b. When in the tank?
c. When using the welding machine?
17. Whose duty is it to ensure that work is being conducted safely?
18. What is the most helpful source of information for you to work safely?
a. Could you speak to your colleagues?
b. Who?
19. Could you speak to the senior officer to express your concerns?
a. Who?
b. Do you have any concern?
20. What role do you play to ensure that you and your colleagues are safe?
21. How do you contribute in Safety Meetings?
a. Raise Points?
b. If not, why?
c. Do you know who represents you in such meetings?
d. Does he bring up all the points that you convey to him?
22. What do you think about the company’s risk assessment system?
a. Is it effective?
b. Why?
23. Do you consider that the checklists are useful?
a. How?
24. Do you use formal checklists before your work started?
a. Every time?
25. If you saw some hazard, could you tell a senior officer?
a. Who is it in your case?
b. Without any concern?
c. Please could you give an example?
Incident Reporting:
26. Do you know anything about the incident/ near-miss reporting procedure?
27. What do you consider as an injury/ incident/ near-miss occurrence?
28. What are you expected to report?
29. Have you ever made any reporting or contributed to it?
a. How?
b. Please could you share your experience?
30. Who did you report to?
31. What response do you get?
a. Angry?
b. Upset?
c. Encouragement?
32. Did you ever fill in any reporting form?
a. Please could you share your experiences?
Safety Audits:
33. In the last audit what were the items checked by the auditor?
34. Did he/she inquire from you about the procedures you follow at work?
35. Do you see that operation of the ship becomes any safer after an audit?
36. Generally how do you prepare for an audit?
37. What happens after an audit?
Review:
38. How are you involved in reviewing the SMS?
39. Have you ever read the SMS?
a. Where are these kept?
b. Which part of the SMS have you studied?
40. Have you suggested any change to the SMS?
a. Please could you share some examples?
